When quantum of punishment can be reduced - Reduced to 15 days already undergone from 3 months = Medam Rami Reddy The State of Andhra Pradesh,Rep. By its P.P., High Court of A.P.= Reported in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydispfree.aspx?filename=7701


When quantum of punishment  can be reduced - Reduced to 15 days already undergone from 3 months =
In view of the nature
of the offence alleged namely causing two simple injuries upon the left little
finger and the left elbow of P.W.1, in view of the incident occurring more than
'12' years ago and 
in view of the fact that the petitioner has been on suspended
sentence as on today, I consider that it would be unjust to send him back to
jail to serve the remaining sentence. 
Where the accused was not involved in any
other incident after the incident in this case, it is a fit case where the
sentence of imprisonment suffered by the revision petitioner should be
considered to be sufficient sentence. 
Consequently, the award of sentence
imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court at three months
deserves to be reduced to the imprisonment already undergone. 
The sentence 
regarding the fine imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate
Court needs to be maintained. The conviction recorded by the appellate Court
against the revision petitioner however deserves to be confirmed.

8. The Criminal Revision Case, therefore, is allowed to the extent of
reducing the sentence of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court to the
imprisonment already undergone by him, but confirming the conviction for the
offence under Section 324 I.P.C.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR      
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE.No.860 of 2004    

27-01-2011

Medam Rami Reddy  

The State of Andhra Pradesh,Rep. By its P.P., High Court of A.P.

Counsel for the Petitioner :  Sri Ch.Srinivasa Reddy

Counsel for Respondent  :  Public Prosecutor

:ORDER:

        The prosecution laid a case against two accused for the offences under
Sections 447, 324 and 506 (2) I.P.C. Both the accused faced trial before the
Judicial First Class Magistrate, Podili. Through Judgment, dated 01.07.2000, the
learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Podili, acquitted A.2 of the
offences leveled against her. He found A.1 guilty for the offence under section
324 I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of
three months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- with appropriate default sentence.
A.1 was also convicted for the offence under section 447 I.P.C. and was
sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.200/- together with appropriate default sentence.

        2.  Aggrieved by the same, A.1 preferred Criminal appeal No.117 of 2000
before the V Additional Sessions Judge Ongole. Through the impugned judgment
dated 30.04.2004, the learned V Additional Sessions Judge, Ongole, confirmed the
conviction for the offence under Section 324 I.P.C. The learned Sessions Judge,
however, acquitted A.1 for the offence under section 447 I.P.C. and thus,
allowed the criminal appeal No.117 of 2000 partly.
        3. So far as the sentence recorded by the trial Court against A.1 for the
offence under section 324 I.P.C. is concerned, the punishment recorded by the
trial Court was confirmed by the appellate Court. Aggrieved by the same, A.1
preferred the present revision.

        4. Sri Ch.Srinivasa Reddy, learned counsel representing A.1 contended that
the dispute is a civil dispute and that this case was foisted against the
accused to wreck vengeance against the accused.  P.W.1 is the injured in this
case. P.W.3 is his wife. P.W.5 is the brother of P.W.3.
Indeed P.W.5 was not an eyewitness. However, the evidence of P.W.1 is supported
by another eyewitness. The evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 primarily and the evidence
of P.Ws. 1 to 3 and 5 is consistent on all material aspects.

        5. Medical evidence supports the case of the prosecution story. A.1
allegedly attacked P.W.1 with an Axe. However, he caused only two simple
bleeding injuries i.e. one injury to the little finger of the left palm and an
injury to the left elbow of P.W.1. In view of the simple injuries caused with an
axe, which is established by the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2, as corroborated by
P.W.4 medical officer, the guilt of A.1 for the offence under Section 324 I.P.C.
is proved beyond reasonable doubt. To the extent of the conviction recorded by
the trial Court against the accused, the contention of the learned counsel for
the accused is not correct. The conviction against the accused deserves to be
upheld. The finding of the trial Court and the finding of the appellate Court
that A.1 is guilty of the offence under Section 324 I.P.C. is proved beyond
reasonable doubt in view of the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 corroborated by other
witnesses. The conviction, therefore, deserves to be confirmed.

        6. Regarding quantum of punishment to be imposed against A.1, who is the 
revision petitioner herein, 
the learned counsel for the revision petitioner
contended that the fine amount of Rs.2,000/- was already paid by the revision
petitioner and that he was in jail for a period of '15' days in all. 
The
revision petitioner - A.1 presently is on suspended sentence. The offence
occurred way back on 08.11.1998 i.e. more than '12' years ago. 
Learned counsel
for the revision petitioner further contended that no incidents occurred in the
village between A.1 and P.W.1 after the incident in the instant case. 
I hope and
trust that the revision petitioner has learnt to behave himself as a law-abiding
citizen.

        7. The revision petitioner was described to be '25' years old by about
2000 when the judgment was delivered by the trial Court.
 In view of the nature
of the offence alleged namely causing two simple injuries upon the left little
finger and the left elbow of P.W.1, in view of the incident occurring more than
'12' years ago and
in view of the fact that the petitioner has been on suspended
sentence as on today, I consider that it would be unjust to send him back to
jail to serve the remaining sentence.
Where the accused was not involved in any
other incident after the incident in this case, it is a fit case where the
sentence of imprisonment suffered by the revision petitioner should be
considered to be sufficient sentence.
Consequently, the award of sentence
imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate Court at three months
deserves to be reduced to the imprisonment already undergone. 
The sentence 
regarding the fine imposed by the trial Court and confirmed by the appellate
Court needs to be maintained. The conviction recorded by the appellate Court
against the revision petitioner however deserves to be confirmed.

        8. The Criminal Revision Case, therefore, is allowed to the extent of
reducing the sentence of imprisonment recorded by the trial Court to the
imprisonment already undergone by him, but confirming the conviction for the
offence under Section 324 I.P.C.

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