Or. 6, rule 17 C.P.C - amendment of plaint = For each and every thing amendment of plaint not necessary when it is pleaded that she is lawful owner whether it is by way of sale deed, or gift deed or by inheritance can be covered by way of adducing evidence = SMT. AYESHA RIZWANA, HYD VS MUSHTAQ AHMED, HYD= PUblished in http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2013/crp/crp_155_2013.html

Or. 6, rule 17 C.P.C - amendment of plaint = For each and every thing amendment of plaint not necessary when it is pleaded that she is lawful owner whether it is by way of sale deed, or gift deed or by inheritance can be covered by way of adducing evidence  =

once the petitioner has asserted that she is the lawful owner of the said property, it is for the petitioner to establish her ownership over the said property whether by way of registered settlement deed or sale or gift or by succession, and by all means, she can establish her ownership.  Merely because she has not stated in the plaint  that she became owner by virtue of the release deed, it can not be said that the petitioner would be precluded from leading evidence.

CRP 155 / 2013
CRPSR 841 / 2013

PETITIONERRESPONDENT
SMT. AYESHA RIZWANA, HYD  VSMUSHTAQ AHMED, HYD
PET.ADV. : MOHAMMAD ADNANRESP.ADV. : 
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 227DISTRICT:  HYDERABAD

C.R.P.No.155 of 2013





24.1.2013






IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT HYDERABAD


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH

C.R.P.No.155 of 2013


Date: 24.1.2013

Between:

Smt.Ayesha Rizwana                                                .. Petitioner
And


Mushtaq Ahmed
.. Respondent











THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. ESWARAIAH

C.R.P.No.155 of 2013

ORAL ORDER:
          This Revision is filed  by the petitioner aggrieved by the  order made in I.A.No.843 of 2012 in O.S.No.4163 of 2010 dated 21.11.2012 on the file of  III Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, whereunder the application filed under Order VI Rule 7 of CPC to amend the plaint was dismissed.
           The petitioner is the plaintiff, who filed suit O.S.No.4163 of 2010 against the respondent-defendant for recovery of mesne profits based on the title over the suit schedule property.  After filing the suit, the petitioner filed the present I.A. seeking to amend the plaint by incorporating the following:
      “That the plaintiff became the owner of the suit schedule property by virtue of registered release deed vide document No.2246 of 1992 and she has been regularly paying property tax and electricity charges”.

After considering the matter, the trial Court dismissed the said I.A. by impugned order.  Questioning the same, the present C.R.P. is filed.

Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the impugned order and other material available on record, I am of the view that once the petitioner has asserted that she is the lawful owner of the said property, it is for the petitioner to establish her ownership over the said property whether by way of registered settlement deed or sale or gift or by succession, and by all means, she can establish her ownership.  Merely because she has not stated in the plaint  that she became owner by virtue of the release deed, it can not be said that the petitioner would be precluded from leading evidence.

Therefore, I am of the opinion that the application filed by the petitioner seeking to amend the plaint stating that she became the owner by virtue of the registered release deed is immaterial as she is always free to lead evidence to establish her ownership over the suit schedule property.
Subject to the above observation, the revision is dismissed at the stage of admission.  As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, stands dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.     
      

                                                           ________________
                                                            V. ESWARAIAH, J

Date: 24.1.2013
DA/VVR
                      


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.ESWARAIAH







(  my note = except Will Deed  )


or7rule14cpcnoamountofevidenceisallowedtobeadducedwithoutpleadingsdocumentpetitionforreceivingawilldeedwithoutpleadingswasrightlyrejectedbylowercourtmakamsubbarayuduvsmakambalasubbaiah4otherpublishedinhttphcapnicincsismaininfojspmtypecrpmno1811year2013
http://advocatemmmohanlaw.blogspot.in/2013/11/or-7-rule-14-cpc-no-amount-of-evidence.html












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cancellation of the sale deeds = Under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide that registration/cancellation of document is only with reference to the executant and the claimant under a document, which is already registered. Petitioner, being a third party, is, therefore, not entitled to approach the registering authority and seek cancellation of the documents executed by third party in favour of any other party. Petitioner’s reliance upon Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Registration Act is also misconceived inasmuch as Rule 26(k)(i) of the Rules specifically refer to the duty of the registering authority to ensure that the deed of cancellation is executed by all the executants and the claimants, who are parties to previously registered document and only on mutual consent a deed of cancellation can be registered. Since petitioner is not a party to the impugned sale transactions between two different individuals, he is not entitled to seek cancellation thereof and in any case, the petitioner does not satisfy even the requirement of Rule 26, referred to above.