Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (For short “the Act”) to send Ex.P3-cheque to an handwriting expert for comparison of hand writing thereon. According to the petitioner, the body of Ex.P3-cheque contains three different hand writings and therefore, they are required to be examined by the hand writing expert. = R.RAMESH CHAND VS THE STATE OF A.P. & ANOTHER PET.ADV. : RAMA GOPAL RESP.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SUBJECT: Other offences not covered above DISTRICT: VISAKHAPATNAM = published in http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2013/crlrc/crlrc_42_2013.html

 Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (For short “the Act”)  to send Ex.P3-cheque to an handwriting expert for comparison of hand writing thereon.  According to the petitioner, the body of Ex.P3-cheque contains three different hand writings and therefore, they are required to be examined by the hand writing expert =Lower court dismissed - High court confirmed =
he issued the cheque infavour of one of his customer and the said cheque came into the hands of the complainant who misused the same for initiating the cheque bouncing proceedings against him.  
Even if it is assumed that the body of the cheque contains different hand writings, it does not advance the plea taken by the petitioner-accused. 
Therefore, the trial Court is justified in dismissing the application filed under Section 45 of the Act. 
I do not see any illegality or irregularity in the order impugned in the revision warranting interference of this court in exercise of powers under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
CRLRC 42 / 2013
CRLRCSR 398 / 2013
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
R.RAMESH CHAND  VSTHE STATE OF A.P. & ANOTHER
PET.ADV. : RAMA GOPALRESP.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
SUBJECT: Other offences not covered aboveDISTRICT:  VISAKHAPATNAM
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. SESHASAYANA REDDY


CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.42 of 2013


ORDER:


        This revision is directed against the order dated 20.11.2012 passed in Crl.M.P.No.2445 of 2012 in C.C.No.483 of 2010 on the file of the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise) at Visakhapatnam, whereby and whereunder, the learned Special Judicial First Class Magistrate dismissed the application filed by the petitioner under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (For short “the Act”).
2. The petitioner is the accused and the second respondent is the complainant.  Petitioner is being prosecuted in C.C.No.483 of 2010 for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.  Ex.P3 is the cheque issued by the petitioner. The plea of the petitioner is that he issued the cheque infavour of one of his customer and ultimately the cheque came into the hands of the complainant, who misused the same and initiated the cheque bounce proceedings against him. 
3.     After the closure of the evidence of the complainant, the petitioner-accused filed Crl.M.P.No.2445 of 2012 under Section 45 of the Act to send Ex.P3-cheque to an handwriting expert for comparison of hand writing thereon.  According to the petitioner, the body of Ex.P3-cheque contains three different hand writings and therefore, they are required to be examined by the hand writing expert.  The said petition has been resisted by the second respondent-complainant.  The learned Magistrate, having taken note of the defence pleaded by the petitioner-accused, came to the conclusion that the petition filed under Section 45 of the Act is devoid of merits and thereby proceeded to dismiss the petition by order dated 20.11.2012.  The said order is assailed in this revision.
4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused and learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-complainant and perused the order impugned in the revision. 
5. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused that Ex.P3-cheque contains different hand writings and therefore, they are required to be examined by the hand writing expert. 
6. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-Complainant supported the order impugned in the revision.
7. The plea of the petitioner is that 
he issued the cheque infavour of one of his customer and the said cheque came into the hands of the complainant who misused the same for initiating the cheque bouncing proceedings against him.  
Even if it is assumed that the body of the cheque contains different hand writings, it does not advance the plea taken by the petitioner-accused. 
Therefore, the trial Court is justified in dismissing the application filed under Section 45 of the Act. 
I do not see any illegality or irregularity in the order impugned in the revision warranting interference of this court in exercise of powers under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
8. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed.


______________________________

JUSTICE B. SESHASAYANA REDDY

04.03.2013
Gkv

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