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Order 15-A of CPC provides for striking off defence in a suit filed by the lessor. Rule 2 thereof requires the Civil Court to serve a notice on the defendant to show-cause as to why the defence should not be struck off, and then the Court shall consider any such cause, if shown in order to decide as to whether the defendant should be relieved of an order striking off the defence put up by him. The order passed on 02.07.2015 by the Court in I.A.No.116 of 2014 is very clear. For the period from December 2011 up to end of June 2015 for nearly 43 months period, the defendant was directed to deposit the admitted rent @ Rs.3,500/- per month and 30 days time was granted by the Court for that purpose. Therefore, the petitioner herein ought to have deposited the entire arrears of rent within the time so stipulated by the Court. That he has not done and on the other hand, he has drawn a cheque of Rs.75,000/- on 01.09.2015 and offered to the plaintiff. Rs.75,000/- does not answer or satisfy the quantum of arrears payable for the entire 43 months period, which works out to Rs.1,50,500/-. This apart, there is a finding of fact recorded now that the petitioner herein has also failed to comply with the other obligation to deposit the admitted rent of Rs.3,500/- before 10th of every month. Hence, for the default committed by the petitioner herein to live up and comply with the stipulations contained in I.A., the Court below rightly struck off the defence set up by him as provided for under Order 15-A (2) of CPC. I, therefore, do not find any good reason for interference in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court below.

Order XXVI Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code, for short) requesting to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to visit the suit schedule properties and note down the physical features of the suit C schedule property and the existence of a road-C schedule property and file a report.=the entire property is divided as A to G parts and that out of that A to G, C schedule property is a road carved out and that the plaintiff also relies upon a plan to that effect and that in turn the defendants are contending that there is no road in existence as claimed by the plaintiff, had eventually appointed a commissioner while observing that there are no tenable objections in the counter and that no prejudice would be caused if a commissioner is appointed.In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. the trial court shall consider the probative value of the Commissioners report at the appropriate time having regard to the facts and the circumstances of the case, however, after giving an opportunity to both the parties to file objections, if any, to the said report.

Order VII Rule 10 and 10A of C.P.C.- In the present case, the application has not been made under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. The same is made under Order VII Rule 10 and 10A of C.P.C. which provides only in one contingency the return of plaint i.e., only on the Court coming to the conclusion that the suit is not initiated in the proper Court or the Court does not have either pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction. The same is clear on a conjoint reading of Order VII Rule 10 and Rule 10A (iii) of C.P.C. The learned I Additional District Judge, Nalgonda (FAC Judge, VIII Additional District Judge, Miryalaguda) had taken all these aspects into consideration and rightly refused to return the plaint. In the facts of the present case, the impugned order does not warrant any interference of this Court and as such this Civil Revision Petition is liable to be dismissed.

Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C., seeking amendment of the description of the plaint schedule property by way of insertion of Survey Number and Patta Number. The learned Judge allowed the said amendment by way of the order impugned in the instant revision.=Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, we do not find any difficulty to hold that in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, it is permissible to amend a part of the description of the suit property not only in the plaint but also in the agreement Section 26 clearly says as to when a contract or other instrument can be rectified and provides that when through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, the agreement in writing does not express their real intention, it is open to the parties to apply for amendment of the instrument. It provides that when such a situation arises, then- (a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have the instrument rectified, or (b) the plaintiff may, in any suit in which any right arising under the instrument is in issue, claim in his pleading that the instrument be rectified.- the amendment was sought only with regard to the description of the schedule of the property in the plaint, but not the description of the property in the suit agreement of sale in the light of the provisions of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act. It is also to be noted that even for maintaining such application for amendment of description of property in the schedule of agreement, the contingencies as stipulated under Section 26 of the Act shall exist. In the instant case, the above circumstances and the contingencies are conspicuously absent. Therefore, the Court below grossly erred in applying the principles laid down by the Honble Apex Court in the judgment referred to above. Therefore, this Court has absolutely no scintilla of hesitation to hold that the order under challenge cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

business manager - termination of service of private employee - whether hit by sec.23 of Contract and entitled for damages ?= I) Whether the civil suit lies and the relief granted by the trial Court in awarding damages including on the quantum for the termination while holding the termination is hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act, is unsustainable ? = the declaratory relief in service matters are maintainable.= the age of the plaintiff as on the date of termination notice under Ex.A.4 was about 45 years in claiming there could be at least 12 years of service remained and in saying as on the date of termination he was drawing undisputedly Rs.45,430/- per month and therefrom even estimated for 4 years of the salary payable at that rate it can be arrived of Rs.20lakhs. In fact, as pointed out by the appellant neither in the plaint nor in the plaintiffs evidence much less in the arguments before the trial Court, it was not raised much less pleaded of plaintiff could not get any alternative employment and remained idle totally with no any earnings or avocation and became burden to somebody with any basis for it but for saying the plaintiff could not secure an equivalent employment. Thus, it is not even a case of specific plea of he could not be in some other avocation to get any means. Once that also requires consideration in arriving the quantum of damages, even from possessing earning capacity not in dispute, even 50% therein as capacity of getting alternative source of earning taken consideration, what the trial Court granted of Rs.20lakhs requires to reduce to Rs.10lakhs and but for that there is nothing to interfere with the trial Courts decree and judgment by sitting against.

In the instant case, the respondents proved their title by filing Ex.A-1, dated 21-03-1966. Both on account of the fact that the document is more than 30 years old and that there is no controversy as to its execution, the document was held proved. It is true that there is some discrepancy as to the extent that is mentioned in the document on the one hand, and the one found on the ground as measured by the Commissioner. However, the principle that the "boundaries mentioned in a document would prevail upon the extent and other particulars", needs to be kept in mind. It is not in dispute that the eastern boundary for the property under Ex.A-1 is a road leading to Mosque. It means that the property of the respondents abuts the road. The suit schedule property is a vacant land between the road on the one hand, and the house of the respondents on the other. The title of the respondents over the suit schedule property came to be proved. The appellant could have convinced the Courts below to dismiss the suit if only he established a superior title to the property. Though a plea was taken that a deed of settlement was executed in favour of the Mosque in respect of the suit schedule property, the document was not made part of record. Thereby, the presumption provided for under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act gets attracted.

The appellate court has held that for claiming a right of easement, it has to be established that the petitioners have been using the same continuously and uninterruptedly. However, there is no such evidence on record. The Amin commissioner had exceeded its power in mentioning in his report that the alleged Rasta seems to be in existence from the year 1975. It has been further noted in the order of the lower appellate court that during consolidation operations, only a four feet wide Rasta was left. For coming to such conclusion, reliance has been placed on the order dated 2.7.2012 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation, in revision filed by the petitioners. The claim of the petitioners, in relation to existence of a 15 feet wide Rasta, was held to be unsustainable. The lower appellate court has also held that there is neither any prima facie case in favour of the petitioners nor the balance of convenience lies with them. In such view of the matter, the contention of the petitioners that report of the Amin commissioner has not been considered by the courts below, cannot be accepted.

Order XVIII Rule 17A C.P.C- It is an admitted fact that the suit is at the stage of arguments of the defendants. At this belated stage the relief of the nature cannot be granted. Another aspect which needs to be considered is maintainability of such application invoking section 151 C.P.C. though relief of the nature is akin to the relief that could be considered under Order XVIII Rule 17A C.P.C. The enormous delay that is likely to be caused in entertaining the applications of this nature at every stage succinctly elaborate in the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. At this stage, this court is conscious of the limitations. Further allowing of the application of this nature at this stage would only be paving way for one or the other of the parties to fill lacuna in evidences which is also not permissible. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the junior civil judge refusing to entertain the application for reopening of the case and further refusal to appoint advocate commissioner cannot be found fault and accordingly there are no merits in the Civil Revision Petition.