Declaration of title and injunction - Wakf board - simply there is a mosque and Samadhis in 30 cents - it can not be said as wakf property - -admittedly property was that of Abdulla - the plaintiffs proved title - Reg. Gift Deed through Abdulla legal heir and possession by relevant revenue records - - Wakf Board not filed any notifications and documents - Writ proceedings against govt. in the absence of plaintiffs - does not confer title and possession on Wakf = AP STATE WAKF BOARD, NAMPALLLY, HYDERABAD. VS AMED BIN ALI @ JANI MIAN [DIED] AND 8 OTHERS = published in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.jsp?mtype=SA&mno=159&year=2013

Declaration of title and injunction - Wakf board - simply there is a mosque and Samadhis in 30 cents - it can not be said as wakf property -admittedly property was that of Abdulla - the plaintiffs proved title -  Reg. Gift Deed through Abdulla legal heir and possession by relevant revenue records - Wakf Board not filed any notifications and documents - Writ proceedings against govt. in the absence of plaintiffs - does not confer title and possession on Wakf =
Mere denial relationships is not valid unless proved contra =
The 4thplaintiff as PW1 spoke to the entire allegations in the plaint including to the effect that Aliya Begum is daughter of Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
There is no contra evidence on behalf of the defendant.  =
The defendant did not lead any oral or documentary evidence to show Aliya Begum was not daughter of Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
in the absence of notification  and other revenue and oral evidences - no property can be treated as wakf property = 
The defendant did not claim the suit property as wakf property by way of any notification by the competent authority after making due survey and enquiry under the old Wakf Act, 1954, or the new Wakf Act, 1995.  
No oral evidence was also let in by the defendant to show that the suit schedule property was used as wakf by user.  
Writ proceedings of defendant does not confirm title nor possession when plaintiffs are not parties = 
Therefore, neither the plaintiffs’ rights in the suit property were decided nor the defendant’s right for the suit property was decided by this Court in the above writ proceedings in the presence of other party.  
Muslim Reg. Gift Deed proof = 
Apart from proof of execution of Ex.A12 registered gift deed in accordance with Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiffs also proved the requirements of a valid Mohammedan gift as reiterated in HAFEEZ BIBI (1-supra).  
Acceptance of gift and delivery of property is proved by production of abundant documents to show possession of the plaintiffs and also by oral evidence of the 4th plaintiff as PW1. 
Further, declaration of gift by the donor is evident from the contents of Ex.A12 registered gift deed.  
The plaintiffs have thus proved validity of Ex.A12 gift not only under the Indian Law, but also under the Muslim Personal Law. The plaintiffs having proved all legal requirements and factual aspects relating to their title and their entitlement for permanent injunction, the Courts below rightly decreed the suit in their favour.  

SA 159 / 2013
SASR 12240 / 2007

PETITIONERRESPONDENT
AP STATE WAKF BOARD, NAMPALLLY, HYDERABAD.  VSAMED BIN ALI @ JANI MIAN [DIED] AND 8 OTHERS
PET.ADV. : MIR MASOOD KHANRESP.ADV. : MOHD GHULAM HUSSAIN
SUBJECT: CONCURRENTDISTRICT:  MAHABUBNAGAR
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

SECOND APPEAL No. 159 of 2013

JUDGMENT:
        Unsuccessful defendant/Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board is the appellant herein.  
The respondents 1 to 9/plaintiffs 1 to 9 filed the suit in the trial Court for declaration of their title for the plaint schedule property and for permanent injunction against the defendant.  
The plaint schedule property is 
Ac.4-33 guntas of land in S.No.529 (old No.230) known as Bagh Abdullah or Oori Anchu chelka with houses bearing Nos.2-105 and 2-106 and excluding the mosque and grave yard comprised in Ac.0-30 guntas.  
The property is located at Farooqnagar of the then Shadnagar mandal, Mahaboobnagar district.  Presently, Farooqnagar itself is a mandal.  
The plaintiffs’ case is that the suit land originally belonged to Abdullah Ba Hasan who constructed a mosque on northern side and there is also family grave yard in Ac.0-30 guntas out of the suit land and that Abdullah Ba Hasan died leaving his only daughter Aliya Begum as his legal heir and that she succeeded to the property and was in possession and enjoyment of the same and her name was mutated in revenue records.  
Aliya Begum had no children.  
The plaintiffs 3 to 9 are children of Aliya Begum’s brother.  It is the plaintiffs’ case that the plaintiffs 3 to 9 were staying with Aliya Begum and her husband and that Aliya Begum’s husband Kareemuddin died in the year 1958 and that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 brought Aliya Begum to their house at Hyderabad and looked after her and that therefore out of natural love and affection, 
Aliya Begum executed Ex.A12 registered gift deed dated 21.02.1967 and put the plaintiffs in possession of the schedule land. 
 On the other hand, it is contention of the defendant/wakf board that the suit land is a wakf by user and that late Abdullah Saheb was revered as saint and he used the suit property as God’s property and that the suit property is not family property or private property of Abdullah Saheb.  
After trial, the trial Court decreed the suit; and on appeal by the defendant, the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal.  Therefore, the defendant seeks to file this second appeal in this Court.
It is contended by the appellant’s counsel in this second appeal that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that Aliya Begum was daughter of Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
It is next contended by the appellant’s counsel that the plaintiffs have failed to prove three ingredients required for a muslim gift as laid down by the Supreme Court in HAFEEZA BIBI V. SHAIKH FARID[1].  
It is thirdly contended for the appellant that there is no valid proof of Ex.A12 registered gift deed.
There is no dispute that the suit property originally belonged to late Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
Excluding Ac.0-30 guntas of land wherein family grave yard is located and a mosque is located on the northern side, 
relief is claimed by the plaintiffs in respect of rest of the suit property as they have title.  
They based their claim on Ex.A12 registered gift deed dated 10.02.1967 executed by Aliya Begum who is daughter of Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
The 4thplaintiff as PW1 spoke to the entire allegations in the plaint including to the effect that Aliya Begum is daughter of Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
There is no contra evidence on behalf of the defendant.  
The defendant did not lead any oral or documentary evidence to show Aliya Begum was not daughter of Abdullah Ba Hasan.  
Kareemuddin who is husband of Aliya Begum predeceased her.  During last days of Aliya Begum, she was looked after by the plaintiffs 1 to 9 and therefore she is stated to have executed Ex.A12 registered gift deed in their favour for the suit property.  
The plaintiffs filed copies of pahanis from the year 1969-70 to the year 1981-82 to show possession of the plaintiffs of the suit land.  
They also filed Exs.A13 and A14 property tax demand notices, A15 to A19 house tax receipts and Exs.A20 to A27 land revenue receipts to show possession of the property with them.  
The plaintiffs have also filed Ex.A36 certified copy of Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 to show that the suit land was shown to be entitled to and was in possession of Aliya Begum.  
Right and title of Aliya Begum were also recognized by the revenue authorities and also that of the plaintiffs after Ex.A12.
There is no iota of evidence on behalf of the defendant/wakf board to show that the suit property is a wakf property by user.  The defendant did not claim the suit property as wakf property by way of any notification by the competent authority after making due survey and enquiry under the old Wakf Act, 1954, or the new Wakf Act, 1995.  
No oral evidence was also let in by the defendant to show that the suit schedule property was used as wakf by user.  
The only document marked on behalf of the defendant is Ex.B1 copy of order of this Court dated 01.12.1995 in WP No.2201 of 1984. When the district collector issued notification under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1991 for acquisition of the suit property, the defendant/wakf board filed the above WP No.2201 of 1984 and this Court allowed the said WP on the premise that admittedly the suit property is a wakf property.  
In the writ petition, none of the plaintiffs herein is a party.  
It is only the land acquisition authorities who were party-respondents therein.  Any admission from any quarter in WP No.2201 of 1984 is not binding on the plaintiffs herein who are not parties to it.  
On the other hand, when the plaintiffs filed WP No.7875 of 1982 in this Court questioning the same land acquisition proceedings, this Court dismissed the said writ petition directing the plaintiffs/petitioners to establish their right and title in a civil Court.  
Therefore, neither the plaintiffs’ rights in the suit property were decided nor the defendant’s right for the suit property was decided by this Court in the above writ proceedings in the presence of other party.  
Apart from proof of execution of Ex.A12 registered gift deed in accordance with Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, the plaintiffs also proved the requirements of a valid Mohammedan gift as reiterated in HAFEEZ BIBI (1-supra).  
Acceptance of gift and delivery of property is proved by production of abundant documents to show possession of the plaintiffs and also by oral evidence of the 4th plaintiff as PW1. 
Further, declaration of gift by the donor is evident from the contents of Ex.A12 registered gift deed.  
The plaintiffs have thus proved validity of Ex.A12 gift not only under the Indian Law, but also under the Muslim Personal Law. The plaintiffs having proved all legal requirements and factual aspects relating to their title and their entitlement for permanent injunction, the Courts below rightly decreed the suit in their favour.  
The defendant/wakf board miserably failed to prove its case and miserably failed to lead any evidence in their favour to prove their rights in the suit land.  I find no error either in law or on facts committed by the Courts below and I further find that no substantial question of law arises for determination in this second appeal.  All the questions raised by the appellant’s counsel are pure questions of fact only and they were rightly decided by the Courts below.
In the result, the second appeal is dismissed.



__________________________

SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU, J

 

15th July, 2013

KSM




[1] AIR 2011 SC 1695

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