criminal Court has jurisdiction under Section 31 of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995, to pass orders for release of vehicles for interim custody. = BONDUGULA SRINU VS THE STATE OF A.P., THROUGH SHO., HYD. = Published in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.jsp?mtype=CRLRC&mno=1878&year=2013

criminal Court has jurisdiction under Section 31 of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995, to pass orders for release of vehicles for interim custody. =

CRLRC 1878 / 2013

CRLRCSR 31955 / 2013
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
BONDUGULA SRINU  VSTHE STATE OF A.P., THROUGH SHO., HYD.
PET.ADV. : BABUJI TENNETIRESP.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
SUBJECT: Other offences not covered aboveDISTRICT:  WARANGAL
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. CHANDRA KUMAR

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1878 of 2013


ORDER:       
This Criminal Revision Case is filed by the petitioner seeking to set aside the order dated 04.09.2013 passed in C.F.R.No.2839 of 2013 in Crime No.228 of 2013 by the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Jangaon, Warangal District, and consequently to direct the Station House Officer, Cherial Police Station, Warangal District, to release the Passion Pro Motorcycle bearing registration No.AP 36 AQ 9179 to him.    
This Court, in the cases between P. Swarupa Vs. State of A.P.[1]Jitendra Palnitker Vs. State of A.P.[2], and Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai Vs. State of Gujarat[3] and in case between Itham Yesu S/o. Bullaiah v. State of A.P., through SHO, Chintakani Police Station, Khammam District, in Crl.R.C.No.426 of 2013, by order dated 15.03.2013 and in Crl.R.C.No.50 of 2010 by order dated 25.01.2010, held that criminal Court has jurisdiction under Section 31 of Andhra Pradesh Prohibition Act, 1995, to pass orders for release of vehicles for interim custody.
In view of the same, the impugned order dated 04.09.2013 passed in C.F.R.No.2839 of 2013 in Crime No.228 of 2013 by the Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class at Jangaon, Warangal District is set aside and the Passion Pro Motorcycle bearing registration No.AP 36 AQ 9179 shall be released to the petitioner on condition of his executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) with one surety for a like sum to the satisfaction of the said Magistrate.  The petitioner shall not change the colour or shape of the vehicle and not alienate the vehicle pending disposal of the case.  He shall produce the vehicle as and when required by the trial Court.
Accordingly, this Criminal Revision Case is allowed.

_________________________
 Justice B.Chandra Kumar

06th September, 2013
Bvv


[1]  1996(1) ALT (Crl.) 130
[2]  1995(3) ALD 80
[3]  (2002) 10 SCC 283

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