Divorce on the ground of chastity after the marriage of 14 years and after born of children - Husband mother not supported the version of her own son - alleged paramour was added later - created letter - further the husband himself leading unchaste life - not entitled for any divorce - Lower court rightly dismissed the divorce petition = KANAPARTHI MANOHAR RAO VS KANAPARTHI RAJAMMA = = published in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.jsp?mtype=CMA&mno=828&year=2013

Divorce on the ground of chastity after the marriage of 14 years and after born of children - Husband mother not supported the version of her own son - alleged paramour was added later - created letter  - further the husband himself leading unchaste life - not entitled for any divorce - Lower court rightly dismissed the divorce petition = 
a letter marked as Ex.A-1, which was written by the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent, wherein it was mentioned that the 1st respondent intended to continue her relationship with the 2nd respondent.  It is a postal letter, and admittedly is not signed by the 1st respondent.  The manner in which the appellant is said to have gained the custody of that letter is indeed strange.  According to him, one Abraham, a boy of 11 years, one day got a bunch of papers to him and asked him to find out whether any intimation was received by his elder brother Babu Rao from Employment Exchange.  In the bunch of letters, he is said to have got Ex.A-1 letter.  It is not as if this event has occurred after the O.P. was filed.  If, in fact, what is pleaded by the appellant in relation to Ex.A-1 is true, it ought to have been mentioned in the original petition itself.  No mention to that was made. 
The inference is that it was concocted later.
In the structure of Indian families, even where there is harmony between a wife and husband, the disharmonies exist between the daughters-in-law and mother-in-law.  In the event of any dispute between the spouses, the mother of the male spouse tends to support her son, even by going to the extent of stating falsehood.  This is a typical case, in which, the mother of the appellant, who deposed as RW.4, stated that her daughter-in-law, the 1st respondent, is a chaste woman.  Apart from that she proceeded to depose that her son, the appellant, is a man of without character and that it is he, who is leading adulterous life with another woman.  When this is the evidence, there is absolutely no alternative for the trial Court except to dismiss the O.P.  We are in total agreement with the findings of the trial Court. 

15.  The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed by imposing a costs of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) payable by the appellant to the 1strespondent.      

CMA 828 / 2013
CMASR 100726 / 2002
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
KANAPARTHI MANOHAR RAO  VSKANAPARTHI RAJAMMA
PET.ADV. : RAVINDRA BABURESP.ADV. : 
SUBJECT: MATRIMONIAL CASESDISTRICT:  NELLORE

*  HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY

AND

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K. JAISWAL

+  CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.828 OF 2013


%  Date:  13-11-2013


#  Kanaparthi Manohar Rao                                               ..  Appellant

v.

$  Kanaparthi Rajamma and another                               ..  Respondents




!  Counsel for the appellant                 :        Sri Ch. Ravindra Babu


^  Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 :                  -




<  GIST:




>  HEAD NOTE:



?  CASES REFERRED:



C/15

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY

AND

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K. JAISWAL
            
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.828 OF 2013

JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice L. Narasimha Reddy)


The appellant was married to the 1st respondent in the year 1971 and they also blessed with children.  He was employed as Non-Medical Assistant at Kovur, Nellore District.  He filed O.P. No.184 of 1986 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (for short, “the Act”) for divorce against the 1st respondent.  He pleaded that in the year 1983, when both of them were living at Kovur on account of employment, his wife – the
1st respondent developed intimacy with some persons and she has been living in adultery.  He also pleaded that in spite of his best efforts, he could not find out the names of the persons, who are having illicit relationship with his wife.  Subsequently, he got impleaded the
2nd respondent, by filing I.A. No.469 of 1986, by terming him as a paramour of the 1st respondent.

2.  The 1st respondent filed counter opposing the O.P. 
She admitted her marriage with the appellant and stated that both of them had a son and daughter through the wedlock.  However, she denied the allegations made against her.  She, on the other hand, pleaded that the appellant deserted her and their children and she had to file M.C. No.34 of 1979 for maintenance for her and their children. 
It was alleged that the appellant did not implement the order passed in M.C.  She further pleaded that when he started neglecting her and the children, they have moved away from Kovur and started living at their native place.  She has also stated that the appellant had illicit relationship with one Smt. Mahalakshmi and had begotten a child.

3.  The trial Court dismissed the O.P. through the order dated
04-09-2002.  Hence, this appeal under Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act.

4.  Heard the learned counsel for the appellant. 

5.  Though the 1st respondent was served with notice, she has not entered her appearance.

6.  There is no dispute that the appellant married the
1st respondent and both of them had children also.  He is a native of Guntur District and on account of employment, he lived for sometime at Kovur.  It is during his stay at Kovur in Nellore District, that he filed the O.P. for dissolution of the marriage, alleging grounds of adultery. 
The 1st respondent flatly denied the allegation and the 2nd respondent remained ex parte.

7.  The trial Court framed only one issue for consideration i.e., whether the 1st respondent is leading adulterous life in general and in particular with the 2nd respondent?  On behalf of the appellant, PWs.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-17 were filed.  On behalf of respondent No.1, RWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-12 were filed.  Initially, the trial Court allowed the O.P. through the order dated 06-08-1994.  The matter came before this Court for confirmation as required under Section 17 of the Act.  This Court allowed the appeal and remanded the matter to the trial Court for fresh consideration and disposal.
8.  After remand, the appellant examined PWs.6 and 7, whereas the 1st respondent examined RWs.3 to 5.  This time, the trial Court dismissed the O.P.

9.  The allegation of adultery that too made by a husband against his wife is a very serious matter.  It is only when substantial evidence exists in this behalf, an allegation of that nature can be made.  The mere suspicion about the honesty of the woman spouse would not only be not helpful to the husband but also would further aggravate the situation.

10.  The only ground alleged by the appellant against his wife, the 1st respondent, was that the latter is leading adulterous life. 
However, when the O.P. was filed initially in the year 1986, he did not make any mention about the persons with whom she had such relationship.  The allegation was general and vague.  It was only at a later stage that he filed I.A. No.469 of 1986 and got the 2nd respondent impleaded.

11.  The evidence adduced by the appellant comprised of the depositions of PWs.1 to 5 at the initial stage and PWs.6 and 7 at a later stage.  No credence can be given to the deposition of PW.1. 
The basis pleaded by him in his deposition is some what curious. 
He stated that he came across a letter marked as Ex.A-1, which was written by the 1st respondent to the 2nd respondent, wherein it was mentioned that the 1st respondent intended to continue her relationship with the 2nd respondent.  It is a postal letter, and admittedly is not signed by the 1st respondent.  The manner in which the appellant is said to have gained the custody of that letter is indeed strange.  According to him, one Abraham, a boy of 11 years, one day got a bunch of papers to him and asked him to find out whether any intimation was received by his elder brother Babu Rao from Employment Exchange.  In the bunch of letters, he is said to have got Ex.A-1 letter.  It is not as if this event has occurred after the O.P. was filed.  If, in fact, what is pleaded by the appellant in relation to Ex.A-1 is true, it ought to have been mentioned in the original petition itself.  No mention to that was made. 
The inference is that it was concocted later.

12.  PW.2 is a resident of Kovur.  He stated that he is doing coolie work.  He stated that once the appellant went to another village and stayed there for six months, and during that time, he found someone or the other entering the house of the appellant and that such persons used to stay with the 1st respondent during the night.  Even this was not mentioned in the O.P. 

13.  PW.3 is the father of Abraham, a boy of ten years, from whom the appellant is said to have got Ex.A-1.  This witness deposed almost in same terms, as PW.2.  He too was vague enough and was not particular.  The version given by him about his son Abraham is rather shocking.  In his cross-examination, it was elicited that he did not inform anything to the appellant about the visit of any strangers to his house.  The other evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant was almost on the same lines.

14.  In the structure of Indian families, even where there is harmony between a wife and husband, the disharmonies exist between the daughters-in-law and mother-in-law.  In the event of any dispute between the spouses, the mother of the male spouse tends to support her son, even by going to the extent of stating falsehood.  This is a typical case, in which, the mother of the appellant, who deposed as RW.4, stated that her daughter-in-law, the 1st respondent, is a chaste woman.  Apart from that she proceeded to depose that her son, the appellant, is a man of without character and that it is he, who is leading adulterous life with another woman.  When this is the evidence, there is absolutely no alternative for the trial Court except to dismiss the O.P.  We are in total agreement with the findings of the trial Court. 

15.  The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed by imposing a costs of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) payable by the appellant to the 1strespondent.      

_______________________
                                                              L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J

                                                                                  
                                                                                       _______________________
                                                              M.S.K. JAISWAL, J
November 13, 2013.

NOTE:

L.R. Copy to be marked.

            (B/O)
               PV

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