Change of name in C.B.S.E. - Educational records - not permitted - only spelling mistakes can be rectified - Total change of name for other name not allowed = Change of name in Educational records - not permitted - only spelling mistakes can be rectified - Total change of name for other name not allowed = KUM. DEEKSHAA DHARMAPURI, VSP. VS REGIONAL OFFICER, CBSC REGIONAL OFFICE & ANO.= published in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.jsp?mtype=WA&mno=138&year=2013

Change of name in C.B.S.E. - Educational records - not permitted - only spelling mistakes can be rectified - Total change of name for other name not allowed =
 her name in the records of the school was Kum. Dharmapuri Sai Sri Meghana and as she intends to change her name to Kum. Deekshaa Dharmapuri she made a request to the respondents and the same was rejected. 
as per byelaw No.69.1 of the C.B.S.E. Examination Bye-Laws, no change in name/surname, once recorded in the Board’s record, shall be made.  However, correction in name/surname/father’s name/mother’s name to the extent of spelling errors, factual typographical errors etc., can be done. 
The Hon’ble Single Judge having considered the matter observed that the request made by the petitioner is nothing but complete change of her name, which is impermissible as per law.  His Lordship found that there is no merit in the writ petition and dismissed the same.

WA 138 / 2013
WASR 172643 / 2011
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
KUM. DEEKSHAA DHARMAPURI, VSP.  VSREGIONAL OFFICER, CBSC REGIONAL OFFICE & ANO.
PET.ADV. : ANJANA DEVI, SATYANARAYANARESP.ADV. : CHAYA DEVI
SUBJECT: WADISTRICT:  VISAKHAPATNAM

THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA

                                                                                    

WRIT APPEAL NO.138 OF 2013



DATED:7.2.2013

Between:                                                                            

Kum. Deeksha Dharmapuri                              …  Petitioner

And


Regional Officer
CBSC Regional Office
Neo 3J Block
Annanagar West
Chennai
and another                                                  … Respondents



 THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA

WRIT APPEAL NO.138 OF 2013


JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Sri Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

          This writ appeal is directed against the order dt.27.4.2011 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in W.P. No.3071 of 2011.
          The appellant – writ petitioner filed the writ petition to declare the action of respondent No.1 in rejecting the application of the appellant to change her name in her academic records, as illegal, arbitrary and null and void, and for consequential directions.
          The case of the petitioner was that her name in the records of the school was Kum. Dharmapuri Sai Sri Meghana and as she intends to change her name to Kum. Deekshaa Dharmapuri she made a request to the respondents and the same was rejected. 
          Respondent No.1 has filed counter in the writ petition wherefrom it appears that as per byelaw No.69.1 of the C.B.S.E. Examination Bye-Laws, no change in name/surname, once recorded in the Board’s record, shall be made.  However, correction in name/surname/father’s name/mother’s name to the extent of spelling errors, factual typographical errors etc., can be done. 
The Hon’ble Single Judge having considered the matter observed that the request made by the petitioner is nothing but complete change of her name, which is impermissible as per law.  His Lordship found that there is no merit in the writ petition and dismissed the same.
          Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order dt.27.4.2011 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, this writ appeal is filed.
          Learned counsel appearing in support of this writ appeal only submitted that change of name of the petitioner as requested can be made by the respondents.
          We do not find any law in support of his submission, which he tried to made before us.  It appears to us that there is no merit in the writ appeal.
          The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.  No costs.
         


________________________
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, CJ




_____________________
                                                                          B.N. RAO NALLA, J      
7.2.2013

bnr

         









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