Or. 21, rule 54,66 and T.P. Act Gift - No mutation - whether the estate of deceased debtor ? = Estate of Deceased debtor - Gift in year 1965 infavour of wife but no mutation of entries - No proof of acceptance of Gift - it forms part of estate - liable to be sold in execution as the property of deceased debtor = ALE NAGA PULLAMMA & 8 OTHERS VS KOPPARAPU VENU GOPAL = Published in http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.jsp?mtype=CRP&mno=1470&year=2013

Or. 21, rule 54,66 and T.P. Act Gift - No mutation - whether the estate of deceased debtor ? = Estate of Deceased debtor - Gift in year 1965 infavour of wife but no mutation of entries - No proof of acceptance of Gift - it forms part of estate - liable to be sold in execution as the property of deceased debtor =
During the pendency of the suits, the sole defendant Poli Reddy died.  The petitioners being his successors, were impleaded as defendants in the suits.  The suits were decreed with the specific directions to recover the decretal amounts from the estate of late Poli Reddy.  
The respondents/plaintiffs filed E.Ps. for recovery of money through the sale of the E.P. schedule property, which was claimed to have been gifted in the year 1965 in favour of petitioner No.1  who is one of the two wives of late Poli Reddy.  It is the pleaded case of petitioner No.1 that as the gift deed was executed and registered as far back as the year 1965, it ceases to be a part of the estate of late Poli Reddy and therefore the same cannot be sold in execution.  
The Court below however took the view that as no mutation has taken place in favour of petitioner No.1 in respect of the property covered by the gift deed, the same cannot be said to have been acted upon. 
The settled legal position is that to constitute a valid gift, the donee must accept the same.  If petitioner No.1 has accepted the gift in question, the property covered thereby would have been mutated in her name.  
In the absence of any evidence proving acceptance of the gift by petitioner No.1, it cannot be said that the registered gift deed stated to have been executed by Poli Reddy was acted upon.  
Consequently, the property covered by the gift deed continued to be the part of the estate of Poli Reddy.  The Court below has therefore rightly rejected the plea of the petitioners.
CRP 1470 / 2013
CRPSR 8037 / 2013

PETITIONERRESPONDENT
ALE NAGA PULLAMMA & 8 OTHERS  VSKOPPARAPU VENU GOPAL
PET.ADV. : SUBBA REDDYRESP.ADV. : 
SUBJECT: C.P.C.DISTRICT:  KRISHNA
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY
C.R.P.Nos.1468, 1470, 1472 and 1476 of 2013
Date : 5-6-2013
C.R.P.No.1468/2013

Between:

Alle Naga Pullamma and others                                              .. Petitioners

And

Kopparapu Sri Sivakama Sundaramma                      .. Respondent







Counsel for petitioner : Smt. A. Harija for Sri M. Subba Reddy
Counsel for respondents : --









                





The Court made the following:






COMMON ORDER:
           These Civil Revision Petitions arise out of separate but identical orders passed in separate suits in which the petitioners are the defendants. 
          The petitioners are the legal heirs of one Alle Poli Reddy against whom suits for recovery of money were filed by different plaintiffs, who are respondents in these revision petitions.  During the pendency of the suits, the sole defendant Poli Reddy died.  The petitioners being his successors, were impleaded as defendants in the suits.  The suits were decreed with the specific directions to recover the decretal amounts from the estate of late Poli Reddy.  
The respondents/plaintiffs filed E.Ps. for recovery of money through the sale of the E.P. schedule property, which was claimed to have been gifted in the year 1965 in favour of petitioner No.1  who is one of the two wives of late Poli Reddy.  It is the pleaded case of petitioner No.1 that as the gift deed was executed and registered as far back as the year 1965, it ceases to be a part of the estate of late Poli Reddy and therefore the same cannot be sold in execution.  
The Court below however took the view that as no mutation has taken place in favour of petitioner No.1 in respect of the property covered by the gift deed, the same cannot be said to have been acted upon. 
          After hearing Smt. A. Harija, learned counsel representing Sri M. Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners, I am of the opinion that the reasoning of the Court below does not suffer from any illegality or jurisdictional error.  The settled legal position is that to constitute a valid gift, the donee must accept the same.  If petitioner No.1 has accepted the gift in question, the property covered thereby would have been mutated in her name.  
In the absence of any evidence proving acceptance of the gift by petitioner No.1, it cannot be said that the registered gift deed stated to have been executed by Poli Reddy was acted upon.  
Consequently, the property covered by the gift deed continued to be the part of the estate of Poli Reddy.  The Court below has therefore rightly rejected the plea of the petitioners.
          For the above mentioned reasons, I do not find any merit in the revision petitions and they are accordingly dismissed.
          As a sequel, CRPMP Nos.2011, 2013, 2015 and 2019 of 2013 filed in the respective revision petitions for interim reliefs, are disposed of as infructuous.   
 ________________________
Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy
Date : 5-6-2013

AM

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