Sec.320(2) of Cr.P.C = Even after disposal of SLP BY SUPREME COURT - High court has no power to review the judgment to give permission to compund the offence - Compounding of an offence after disposal of case does not arise under sec.320(2) of Cr.P.C.= Asi Balayya (A1)and others State of A.P.,rep. by P.P. and another= Reported in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydispfree.aspx?filename=8168

Sec.320(2)  of Cr.P.C = Even after disposal of SLP BY SUPREME COURT - High court has no power to review the judgment to give permission to compund the offence - Compounding of an offence after disposal of case does not arise under sec.320(2)  of Cr.P.C.=
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whether the judgment delivered
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be reviewed at this stage and then the parties can be permitted to compound the offences.
There is no provision which provides that such a
composition can be done even after the final disposal of a criminal case which
is covered by either clause (1) or clause (2).
The overall reading of the provisions enumerated makes it very clear or implies
that in order to compound an offence in a criminal case the basic rule is that
it should be pending before the trial Court or the appellate Court or the
revisional Court as the case may be.  Clause (1) is to be read together with the
other clauses with regards to the stage of compounding an offence, subject to
the satisfaction of required formalities.
When that is the position the question of compounding the offences in respect of
which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced before this Court does not
arise at all because the corresponding criminal case was already disposed of
finally.  Therefore, the plea of the petitioner to do so is to be rejected even
supposing that Section 326 IPC is compoundable. 
        Further, significantly Section 326 IPC does not come under the purview of
either Section 320(1) Cr.P.C or under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. which really rules
out the question of compounding of the same offence.
        In the result, the petition is dismissed.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY          
Crl.R.C.M.P.No.1835 of 2011 and bt

1-7-2011

Asi Balayya (A1)and others

State of A.P.,rep. by P.P. and another

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri T.PRASANNA KUMAR  

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: The Public Prosecutor

:JUDGMENT:  

        The revision petition is filed under Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. against
common judgment made in Crl.A.Nos.91 and 94 of 1999 dated 7.12.2004 on the file
of the Court of II Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court),
Srikakulam confirming conviction and sentence imposed in Sessions Case No.116 of
1994 dated 7.7.1999 on the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Sompeta, Srikakulam
district.
        The second respondent in the case gave report to Itchapuram Police
Station, Srikakulam district basing upon which, the case was registered in
Cr.No.47 of 1992 for the offences punishable under Sections 148, 326, 324 and
307 IPC against the revision petitioners (A1 to A6) and they were tried
accordingly before the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sompeta and were found guilty
of committing the offences punishable under Sections 148, 324 and 326 IPC and
accordingly they were convicted under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C. and sentenced to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under
Section 148 IPC and  further A1 to A4 were sentenced to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for a period of three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- and in
default of payment of the fine amount, to suffer simple imprisonment for a
period of three months for the offence punishable under Section 326 IPC and
further A2, A5 and A6 were sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a
period of one year for the offence punishable under Section 324 IPC each while
acquitting them of the charge punishable under Section 307 IPC, whereas
consequently,
  they preferred the Crl.A.Nos.91 and 94 of 1999 on the file of the
II Additional District Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Srikakulam which were
dismissed confirming the convictions and sentences imposed by the trial Court
and being aggrieved by that, Crl.R.C.No.2030 of 2004 was filed, which was also
dismissed by order dated 28.1.2010 and being aggrieved by the same, the revision
petitioners filed Special Leave Petition, which was also dismissed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court on 25.10.2010.  
Now the revision petitioners have filed
the present Crl.R.C.M.P.No.1835 of 2011 under Section 482 read with Sec.320 
Cr.P.C. to review the matter and to free the revision petitioners by way of
compounding the offences. 
        It is the claim of the revision petitioners that all of them and the
second respondent are the residents of same village and in order to have cordial
relations between them, elders of the village came forward and advised them to
settle the matter for the purpose of maintaining peace between them and to end
their disputes and accordingly they entered into a compromise to compound the
offences and further this Court has got authority to review the matter even
subsequent to the dismissal of Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court by virtue of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and it is also contended that Section 326
IPC is compoundable subject to obtaining necessary permission from the Court.
        Therefore, the point for consideration is
whether the judgment delivered
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be reviewed at this stage and then the parties can be permitted to compound the offences.
        No provision has been shown to the effect that the judgments delivered in
criminal cases can be reviewed.
Further, Order 47 Rule 1 CPC has no application so far as the criminal cases are concerned.
 Further, under Section 320(1)
Cr.P.C. certain offences can be compounded without the permission of the court,
while under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. certain offences can be compounded with the
permission of the Court which does not include Section 326 IPC.  In fact,
Section 320(1) and (2) Cr.P.C. read as under:

Section 320 Cr.P.C - Compounding of offences 

(1) The offences punishable under the sections of Indian Penal Code, 1860,
specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may be compounded
by the persons mentioned in the third column of that Table.

TABLE  
                .............................
                ..............................
                ..............................

(2) The offences punishable under the sections of Indian Penal Code, 1860,
specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may, with the
permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is
pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that
Table.

TABLE  
                .............................
                ..............................
                ..............................

(3) When any offence is compoundable under this section, the abetment of such
offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an
offence) may be compounded in like manner. (3) When an offence is compoundable  
under this section, the abetment of such offence or ah attempt to commit such
offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) or where the accused is liable
under Secs. 34 or 149 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be compounded in 
like manner.

(4) (a) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence  
under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a
lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf may, with the permission
of the Court, compound such offence.

(b) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence   
under this section is dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), of such person may, with the consent of the
Court, compound such offence. 

(5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has  been convicted
and an appeal is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed
without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or as the case may be,
before which the appeal is to be heard.

(6) A High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of
revision under Section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which 
such person is competent to compound under this section. 

(7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is, by reason of a previous
conviction, liable either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a
different kind for such offence.

(8) The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an
acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. 

(9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.
Corresponding old law.-S.345 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1898.   

Consequently, section 320(1) Cr.P.C. does not specify at what stage an offence
which can be compounded thereunder can in fact be compounded, whereas Section    
320(2) Cr.P.C. clearly provides as to at what stage any of the offences
prescribed thereunder can be compounded as it clearly reads that it can be done
with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offences
is pending and clause (5) clearly provides that when an appeal is pending
against conviction in respect of an offence composition of it can be allowed
either before the appellate  Court or before the trial Court which must be
subject to the leave of the appellate Court and clause (6) provides that the
High Court or Court of Session while exercising its power of revision under
Section 401 Cr.P.C. can allow any person to compound any offence subject to his
competency to do so.
There is no provision which provides that such a
composition can be done even after the final disposal of a criminal case which
is covered by either clause (1) or clause (2).
The overall reading of the provisions enumerated makes it very clear or implies
that in order to compound an offence in a criminal case the basic rule is that
it should be pending before the trial Court or the appellate Court or the
revisional Court as the case may be.  Clause (1) is to be read together with the
other clauses with regards to the stage of compounding an offence, subject to
the satisfaction of required formalities.
When that is the position the question of compounding the offences in respect of
which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced before this Court does not
arise at all because the corresponding criminal case was already disposed of
finally.  Therefore, the plea of the petitioner to do so is to be rejected even
supposing that Section 326 IPC is compoundable. 
        Further, significantly Section 326 IPC does not come under the purview of
either Section 320(1) Cr.P.C or under Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. which really rules
out the question of compounding of the same offence.
        In the result, the petition is dismissed.

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