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DVC retrospective - None of the reliefs claimed in D.V.C. No.8 of 2011 by the 2nd respondent can be called crimes. Though, the Act empowers a Magistrate to entertain the complaint of an aggrieved person under Section 12 of the Act and makes it incumbent on the Magistrate to make enquiry of the same under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are in the nature of civil reliefs only. It is only violation of order of the Magistrate which becomes an offence under Section 31 of the Act and which attracts penalty for breach of protection order by any of the respondents. Similarly Section 33 of the Act provides for penalty for discharging duty by Protection Officer. Except under Sections 31 and 33 of the Act which occur in Chapter V, all the reliefs claimed under Chapter IV of the Act are not offences and enquiry of rights of the aggrieved person under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act cannot be termed as trial of a criminal case.Further, this Court in Sikakollu Chandra Mohan v Sikakollu Saraswati Devi by order dated 06.07.2010 in Crl.R.C.No.1093 of 2010 held that it cannot be said that provisions of the Act cannot be invoked in case separation between the parties was prior to the Act coming into force. Therefore, contention of the petitioners fails. 3. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.

the insurance police is a comprehensive policy and covers the risk of damage to the vehicle insured as also risk coverage to 10 persons in all. Though it is not stated that the claimant who travelled in the jeep in question on the fateful day is a family member of the owner of the jeep nor the driver of the jeep, but was a third person. But it is not the case of either the insurance company or anybody else that the claimant was travelling as a gratuitous passenger or was a fare paid passenger or for reward. Inasmuch as the policy being a comprehensive policy and covers the risk of 10 persons in all, it cannot be said that the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the claimant who was travelling in the jeep in question. When once the policy being a comprehensive policy and covers the risk of ten persons, not being gratuitous passengers or fare paid passengers or for reward, the claimant being none of them, can be one of the ten persons covered under the comprehensive policy. In the absence of any evidence adduced that the jeep in question was used for hire or reward contrary to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, it cannot be said the insurance policy does not cover the risk of the claimant. 4. Therefore, I am of view that the Tribunal below erroneously exonerated the liability of the 3rd respondent-insurance company from paying the compensation awarded jointly and severally.

whether the presence of the petitioner is necessary for grant of divorce under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short ‘the Act’). The petitioner is represented by Special Power of Attorney Holder, as he is presently residing in UK. He along with the respondent, who is his wife, presented an application for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13B of the Act, on 21.04.2011. After expiry of the statutory minimum period of six months, the case was posted on 31.12.2011. On the said date, the respondent and the Special Power of Attorney Holder of the petitioner were present. The affidavit of the petitioner herein was also filed. However, the lower Court has adjourned the case to 21.01.2012 with the direction to the petitioner to attend the Court on the said date. Feeling aggrieved by the said direction for personal presence of the petitioner, he filed the present civil revision petition. = In the instant case, the petitioner expressed his inability to be personally present as he is living in UK. There does not appear to be any objection from the respondent’s side for grant of divorce. As held by the Division Bench, unless there are suspicious circumstances or any reason to think that the averments contained in the affidavit filed by the petitioner may not be true, there is no reason for the lower Court to order personal presence of the petitioner. As noted above, the Special Power of Attorney Holder of the petitioner is pursuing the case and therefore, there is no requirement for the petitioner being personally present for disposal of the joint application filed for divorce.

regularise the services of the applicant/first respondent notionally w.e.f. 25.11.1993 as per G.O.Ms.No. 212 dated 22.4.1994.- the regularization of the daily wage employees cannot be made with retrospective effect, but they are entitled to be considered as per the scheme of the Act in G.O.Ms.No.212 dated 22.4.1994 and G.O.P No. 112 dated 23.7.1997 for regularization from the date of issuance of the regularization order but not with retrospective effect i.e., from 25.11.1993. Therefore, the order of the Tribunal is unsustainable and liable to be set aside and accordingly the same is hereby set aside and the writ petition is allowed holding that the first respondent is entitled for regularization of his services from the date of issuance of the regularization order i.e., proceedings in R.O.C. No. 4598/2002/C1 dated 19.11.2010 but not with retrospective effect i.e., from 25.11.1993. No costs.

the Andhra Pradesh Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 However, once it has emerged that there existed attachment and proceedings have also taken place, he has to take recourse to law to establish his rights and the filing of the suit by the petitioner was a step in that direction. When there are so many complications surrounding the land, be it as regards attachment or the consequential sale, the issuance of pattadar pass book and title deed in favour of the petitioner cannot be sustained. The question as to whether respondent No.6 held any land exclusively by herself, can certainly be examined in the pending suit. So is the case with the question as to the legality or otherwise of the sale in favour of respondent No.6. In case the petitioner is successful in the suit, the entries can certainly be made in his favour. Hence, the writ petition is disposed of, upholding the order under challenge, but directing that issuance of pattadar pass book and title deed in respect of the land in question shall await the outcome of O.S.No16 of 2011 on the file of the District and Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam. There shall be no order as to costs. The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition also stands disposed of.

under Section 22(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 the plaintiff can be permitted to amend the relief for refund of earnest money at any stage. Section.22(2) of the said Act reads as under:- "Section.22. Power to grant relief for possession, partition, refund of earnest money, etc., (1).......................... (2) No relief under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be granted by the Court unless it has been specifically claimed: Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such relief in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief."However, it is to be noted that the provision under Section 22(2) of the Act is a special provision and it gives the power of amendment at any stage of the proceedings"The proviso to sub-clause (5) of section 21 is clear and unambiguous and enables the plaintiff to seek the amendment of the plaint at any stage of the proceeding. The object obviously is to avoid multiplicity of suits. The expression "at any stage" in it means without limitation either in the frequency or duration or length of time. The question of applying the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act in a case where the amendment of the plaint is sought either under sub-clause (5) of section 21 or sub-clause (2) of section 22 of the Act does not arise. A specific relief is an equitable remedy and the Courts are competent to grant the relief sought for or other specific remedies which are incidental. It is a matter of common knowledge that in some cases the contract becomes unenforceable and the party suffers some loss. In such a case, it is open for the party to ask for damages in the alternative in the same suit and Section21 of the Act provides for the same".

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Act, for shortquashment of First Information Report in Crime No.353 of 2009 on the file of Narayanaguda Police Station, Hyderabad, whereunder case was registered under Section 354 IPC as well as under Sections 3 and 5 of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (the Act, for short). Be that as it is, for the reasons already set out, the 2nd respondent failed to make out a prima facie case either for the offence under Section 354 IPC or for the offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act. Consequently, the private complaint is liable to be quashed as against the petitioners. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. The complaint in Crime No.353 of 2009 on the file of Narayanaguda Police Station, Hyderabad, so far as the accused 1, 3 and 4, who are the petitioners herein, stands quashed. Be that as it is, for the reasons already set out, the 2nd respondent failed to make out a prima facie case either for the offence under Section 354 IPC or for the offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act. Consequently, the private complaint is liable to be quashed as against the petitioners. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. The complaint in Crime No.353 of 2009 on the file of Narayanaguda Police Station, Hyderabad, so far as the accused 1, 3 and 4, who are the petitioners herein, stands quashed.

the pendency of a civil suit is no bar for criminal proceedings.It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the dispute is purely a civil dispute and that the FIR consequently is liable to be quashed. As rightly submitted by Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing the Public Prosecutor, the pendency of a civil suit is no bar for criminal proceedings. The 2nd respondent initiated criminal proceedings under Sections 420, 427, 454 and 506 IPC. The dispute, as already pointed out by me, can be resolved through evidence only. Consequently, this petition deserves to be dismissed.

A.P. Estates Abolition (Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act'),The interests of the petitioners can be protected by restricting the scope of examination of the matter by the 2nd respondent to the one of identification of the land and whether ryotwari pattas were granted in respect of the lands in the immediate neighbourhood of the land, which is the subject- matter of these proceedings.

On the facts of the present case, when the assessee filed a defective return, and did not rectify the defects which were pointed out by the I.T.O., the assessing officer was bound to treat the return of income as invalid and take further proceedings on the footing that the assessee had failed to furnish the return. The assessing authority could not have proceeded to make ex parte assessment under Section 144 without serving notice under Section 139 (2) or as the case may be under Section 148.

"The assignment of a promissory note by the payee is a part of the "cause of action" within the meaning of S.20 (c), C.P.C. and the assignee can sue on it in the Court having jurisdiction where the assignment took place: