Showing posts from May, 2013

"Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction". These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari."


Writ Petition No.7837 of 2013 and another


M/s. Aasra Archiventures Pvt., Ltd., Hyderabad rep., by its Partner A.
Raghunath and another.

The State of A.P., rep., by its Law Secretary,Law Department, Hyderabad and

Writ Petition No.7837 of 2013 & Writ Appeal No.411 of 2013

COMMON ORDER: (Per The Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice N.V. Ramana)    

        The writ appeal is filed by the 2nd respondent in W.P.No.7837 of 2013
against the interim orders, dated 18.03.2013, passed by the learned Single Judge
in W.P.No.7837 of 2013 suspending all further proceedings in I.A.Nos.269 and 270
of 2012 in O.S.No.33 of 2012 on the file of the III Additional Chief Judge, City
Civil Court, Hyderabad.

2.      When the appeal was initially heard by us both the learned counsel
represented that W.P.No.7837 of 2013 itself may be heard and disposed of.

OR. 6, RULE 17 EVEN AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL, PLAINT AMENDMENT FOR CANCELLATION OF SALE DEED IN BARE INJUNCTION SUIT IS PERMISSIBLE =No doubt, in a suit for permanent injunction simplicitor, possession of the plaintiff is the primary concern, the second or secondary concern being as to whether the plaintiff has got better title to the property than that of the defendants. In the secondary aspect to be decided in the suit for permanent injunction, the plaintiff has to necessarily attack the sale deed dated 08.06.2011. Since the sale deed dated 08.06.2011 is in respect of the suit property only and in between the defendants 1 and 2 on the one hand and the 3rd defendant on the other hand, scope of the suit may not be totally changed. The proposed amendment if allowed will only enlarge the procedure of the suit by way of giving permission to defendants to file additional written statement and framing additional issues before proceeding with further trial. 5) In the circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the lower Court did not exercise its discretion properly and it resulted in dismissal of the petition refusing to give permission for amendment of the plaint. 6) In the result, the revision petition is allowed setting aside impugned order passed by the lower Court and directing the lower Court to permit the plaintiff/petitioner to amend the plaint as prayed for in I.A. No.1166 of 2012 in the suit, subject to the plaintiff paying Rs.500/- to the District Legal Services Authority, Khammam within 4 weeks from today; and in default, this order shall stand set aside automatically. No further extension of time will be granted.




Vallala Yasodha

Vallala Naga Venkata Laxmi & 2 others

Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri N.V.Anantha Krishna
Counsel for the Respondents :  Sri M.Rajamalla Reddy

<Gist :

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:

        This revision petition is filed questioning order of the lower Court
refusing to permit amendment of the plaint.  Originally the suit is filed for
permanent injunction by the petitioner and it was being contested by the
respondents/defendants.  Trial of the suit has commenced and evidence of the
plaintiff as P.W-1 was over.  At that stage, the plaintiff filed the present
petition in the lower Court for amendment of the plaint in order to include the
relief of cancellation of the document No.4615/2011, dated 08.06.2011.  The said
sale deed dated 08.06.2011 was executed by the defendants 1 and 2 in favour of
the 3rd defendant in respect of the suit …

CORRECTION OF DATE OF BIRTH IN SERVICE REGISTER =The petitioner filed declaratory suit in 1990 for correction of his date of birth as 08.07.1954 in all records including service records i.e. after completion of almost 15 years of his joining the service. Even if it is assumed that the date of birth of the petitioner is wrongly entered in the service records, the petitioner has not properly explained what prevented him from getting his date of birth altered by taking necessary steps within a reasonable period of time, and as such, it cannot be said that the petitioner is diligent in taking steps to correct his date of birth. The Apex Court time and again cautioned the civil Courts including High Courts against entertaining and accepting the claim made by the government servant long after entering into service for correction of the recorded date of birth. Further, a perusal of the record shows that on 30.11.1994, the petitioner submitted his declaration declaring that his date of birth is 08.07.1952, which is subsequent to passing of decree and judgment by the civil Court. In the circumstances, we do not find any error or irregularity in the impugned order warranting interference by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. The writ petition is devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

W.P. No.38766 OF 2012  


S.Ram Manohar  s/o. late S.Sundera  Murthy

The Union of India,rep. by the Deputy Commissioner,Kendriya Vidyalaya
Sanghatan, Regional Office, Picket, Secunderabad, and another

Counsel for the petitioner: Mr.V.R. Balachary

Counsel for Respondents:Mr.B.Narasimha Sarma  



Referred Cases:

ORDER: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice B.N. Rao Nalla)

This writ petition is filed for a writ of Certiorari calling for the records
relating to the order dated 05.10.2012 passed by the Central administrative
Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench (for short 'the Tribunal') in O.A. No.866 of 2012, and
to quash the same by declaring the action of the respondents  in prematurely
retiring the petitioner from service as contrary to law, and consequently direct
the respondents to correct the entry relating to the date of birth of the

M.V.ACT - RICKSHAW PULLER= It is the evidence of PW.2 that the deceased was the rickshaw puller and was earning Rs.100/- to Rs.150/- per day. PW.2 is also the rickshaw puller and that he is the eye witness to the accident. As observed by the Tribunal there was no material on record to prove that the deceased was earning Rs.3,000/- per month except oral testimony of PWs 1 and 2. As per Second Schedule under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, non- earning person's income has to be fixed at Rs.15,000/- per annum. In this case, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 is that the deceased was a rickshaw puller and was earning Rs.3,000/- per month. In the circumstances and the deceased was non-earning member person, in fact, he was living by plying rickshaw and also to meet the ends of justice, this Court is of the view that the Tribunal ought to have fixed the income of the deceased at Rs.2,000/- per month, which is just and reasonable, and as such this Court has fixed the income of the deceased at Rs.2,000/- per month and Rs.24,000/- per annum. Since there are six dependents, 1/4th of the income has to be deducted towards personal expenses of the deceased and thus, the loss of dependency is Rs.18,000/- per annum. Further, Ex.A.2 - post-mortem certificate indicates that the deceased was 48 years at the time of his death in the accident. As per the decision of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (supra), the appropriate multiplier for a person aged 48 years is "13" and thus the total loss of dependency would come to Rs.2,34,000/- (Rs.18,000/- x 13), apart from that the petitioner No.1 is entitled to Rs.16,000/- towards loss of consortium. Therefore, the petitioners are held to be entitled to a total compensation of Rs.2,50,000/-. Since the petitioners were awarded Rs.50,000/- under 'no fault liability' in M.O.P. No.1187 of 1997, the said amount has to be deducted from the total compensation and the same is hereby deducted and thus the petitioners are held to be entitled to Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) only (Rs.2,50,000/- minus Rs.50,000/-). In the result, the C.M.A. is allowed enhancing the compensation from Rs.70,360/- to Rs.2,00,000/-, with interest at 6% per annum so far as the enhanced compensation is concerned. There shall be no order as to costs.


C.M.A. No.2069 OF 2004  


Smt. Dosali Appalanarasamma w/o. late D.Suri and five others Appellants

Smt. A.V. Swarnalatha w/o. A. Narayana Murthy and another Respondents  

Counsel for the Appellants: Sri G. Ram Gopal

Counsel for Respondent No.2:Sri B.Devanand



?Cases referred :
2009 ACJ 1298

           The petitioners in M.O.P. No.204 of 2000 on the file of the Motor
Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal- cum- District Judge, Visakhapatnam assailing
the impugned order dated 13th August,2003 filed this appeal seeking enhancement
of compensation since they were awarded only Rs.1,20,360/- with proportionate
costs and interest at 9% per annum from the date of the petition till
realisation, though they claimed a total compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- for the
death of deceased - Dosali Suri, who is husband of petitioner No.1 and father of
petitioner Nos. 2 to 6.

2.      For the sake of convenience…

SARFAESI Act, verses Official liquidator under companies Act = any sale conducted defraud other secured creditor within one year after the commencement of company petition is void = There cannot be any doubt of the fact from the dates given earlier that the transfer was within a period of six months from the date of presentation of the liquidation proceedings and consequently it is statutorily invalid and the law does not recognize it. In fact, an attempt was sought to be made that there is no reference to sale in either of the Sections and it only refers to transfer and consequently these provisions can have no application. It has to be held that the transfer of interest in immovable property is in consequence of a sale and therefore the word transfer takes in its fold the very act of sale. Therefore, by applying Section 531 it is quite clear that the transfer shall be deemed to be invalid. 12. Even under Section 531-A it is quite clear if the sale was within a period of one year from the date of presentation of the liquidation proceedings as against the Official Receiver who represents the body of the creditors on his appointment after the winding up proceedings, the sale is void. Therefore, by applying Section 531 or 531-A it is quite clear from any angle the sale in this case is hit by the above provisions and when the sale is statutorily invalid or void there is no need for a relief to be asked by the Official Receiver to set aside the sale or approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal, since these two provisions are to be exclusively dealt by the Company Court alone, which is rightly contended by the Official Liquidator. I hold that this Court alone can decide the binding nature of the transactions under Section 531 or 531(A) of the Companies Act. It is to be noted that the powers conferred under the SARFAESI Act for the Bank or the Authorized Officer is only in order to avoid the delay of legal proceedings and it does not give any right or advantage to misuse the power of quasi judicial nature in order to convert a Non Performing Asset and realize the money by adopting improper mode. Therefore, for all the above reasons, I hold that the sale as held by the Authorized Officer on behalf of the Creditor Bank is void and the right of the Official Receiver in the liquidation proceedings cannot be defeated and as the sale is void, it goes to the root of the obligations between the auction purchaser and the Authorized Officer and when once the sale is set aside as void, it is needless to say that the Creditor Bank cannot take advantage of the void sale and the auction purchaser shall be restored to the same position prior to the sale and any amount realized by the Creditor Bank cannot be retained by it. Accordingly, W.P.No.19297 of 2012 is allowed granting the reliefs claimed thereunder. W.P.No.33655 of 2011 and Company Application No.1972 of 2011 are dismissed. Consequent on the orders holding that the sale as void as it comes within the purview of this Court, Company Application No.421 of 2013 is also allowed as a consequence of the sale being held as void under Section 531 and 531 (A) of the Companies Act. No costs.


WRIT PETITION Nos.19297 of 2012 & 33655 of 2011 & COMP.A.Nos.1972 of 2011 & 421      
of 2013 in C.P.No.215 of 2010


M/s. United Steel Allied Industries Private Limited             ....Petitioner

M/s. Indian Bank, Corporate Office, and others            ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:

Counsel for the Respondents:

<Gist :

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:
1. (2004) 4 SCC 311
2. 2013 LawSuit(SC) 205
3. 2012 (2) D.R.T.C. 47 (M.P.)
4. (2006) 134 Comp Cases 267 (Madras)
5. (2005) 127 Comp Cases 85 (Madras)
6. 2004 Comp Cases 27
7. (2007) 139 Comp Cases 191 (Madras)
8. 2012 (6) ALD 345 (DB)
9. (2010) 1 SCC 655
10. 2011 (1) L.S. 196


1.      All these matters arise out of a common issue.
M/s. Laran Sponge & Minerals Private Limited (hereinafter called as borrower)
has availed a loan with Indian Bank by hypothecation of the agricultural land
and also machinery belonging to the …