The said suit was filed by the respondents herein seeking injunction and the same was ultimately dismissed. Challenging the same, A.S.No.10 of 2014 was filed. In the said appeal, the appellants filed I.A.No.482 of 2014 seeking temporary injunction and the same was allowed by order dated 1.5.2014. = In view of non-filing of the certified copy and other technical defects, the civil revision petition could not be numbered and it is now numbered as C.R.P.No.495 of 2016. In view of the operation of the order in I.A.No.482 of 2014 since 01.05.2014, this Court is not inclined to go into the merits, but directs the learned I Additional District Judge, Ongole to dispose of A.S.No.10 of 2014, in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.


CRP 495 / 2016
CRPSR 24845 / 2014CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
BATHULA SUBBA RAO & 12 OTHERS  VSSINGAMSETTY VENKATESWARA RAO & 8 OTHERS


HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO
C.R.P.No.495 of 2016
ORDER
This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated 1.5.2014 passed in I.A.No.482 of 2014 in A.S.No.10 of 2014 by the I Additional District Judge, Ongole.
The petitioners are the defendants in O.S.No.464 of 2009 on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ongole.
The said suit was filed by the respondents herein seeking injunction and the same was ultimately dismissed. Challenging the same, A.S.No.10 of 2014 was filed. 
In the said appeal, the appellants filed I.A.No.482 of 2014 seeking temporary injunction and the same was allowed by order dated 1.5.2014. 
Aggrieved thereby, the present revision was filed.
In view of non-filing of the certified copy and other technical defects, the civil revision petition could not be numbered and it is now numbered as C.R.P.No.495 of 2016. 
In view of the operation of the order in I.A.No.482 of 2014 since 01.05.2014, this Court is not inclined to go into the merits, but directs the learned I Additional District Judge, Ongole to dispose of A.S.No.10 of 2014, in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this revision shall stand closed. __________________________________ JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO 3 rd June, 2016 rkk

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