C.M.A. was dismissed - No appeal nor revision - these petitions again on the same grounds not maintainable = Even after filing of the suit belatedly, the petitioner failed to evince proper interest in pursuing the same, resulting in dismissal of the suit for default. He has also filed I.A. No.556 of 2008 for restoration of the said suit. Even the said I.A. was also dismissed for default. The petitioner has failed to show diligence in pursuing the subsequent I.A., i.e. I.A. No.777 of 2010 filed for restoration of I.A. No.556 of 2008, by not paying batta. Another interesting aspect is that the petitioner has filed a civil miscellaneous appeal, i.e., C.M.A. No.33 of 2013 before the III Additional District Judge, Guntur, purportedly questioning the order in I.A. No.1156 of 2011, instead of the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011. The said appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge, holding that appeal does not lie against an order dismissing the application filed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, as on today, no appeal against the order in I.A.No.1155 of 2011, is filed by the petitioner. Even if the present revision petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner, the same will not enure to his benefit, as the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011 remained unchallenged


CRP 168 / 2016
CRPSR 29025 / 2014CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
TATINENI VIJAYA BHASKAR RAO  VSK ARUNA & ANOTHER
PET.ADV. : NAGENDRA REDDYRESP.ADV. : PEDDA BABU


THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.168 OF 2016 DATED:22-01-2016
Between: Tatineni Vijaya Bhaskar Rao … Petitioner
And
K. Aruna and another … Respondents
COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: Mr. P. Nagendra Reddy
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.1: - COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.2: Mr. G. Ramachandra Rao, for Mr. G. Pedda Babu
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER:
This civil revision petition arises out of common order dt.07.06.2013 in I.A. Nos.1155 and 1156 of 2011 in I.A. No.777 of 2010 in I.A. No.556 of 2008 in O.S. No.136 of 2003, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri. 
I have heard Mr. P. Nagendra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. G. Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel, representing Mr. G. Pedda Babu, learned counsel for respondent No.2. The petitioner has filed the above mentioned suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of the year 1991. On 23.08.2007 the suit was dismissed for default.
The petitioner has filed I.A. No.1095 of 2007 for restoration of the said suit and the said I.A. was renumbered as I.A. No.556 of 2008. The said application was also dismissed for default on 03.03.2010. For restoration of the said application, the petitioner has filed I.A. No.777 of 2010 and the said application was dismissed for non-payment of batta, on 31.12.2010.
The petitioner has thereafter filed I.A. No.1155 of 2011 for restoration of I.A. No.777 of 2010. As there was a delay of 73 days in filing the said application, he has also filed I.A. No.1156 of 2011 for condonation of the said delay.
Both these applications were dismissed by the lower Court by order dt.07.06.2013.
The facts narrated above would show that in respect of an agreement of sale of the year 1991, the petitioner has filed the suit in the year 2003, i.e., twelve years after the execution of the agreement of sale. Interestingly, it is the pleaded case of respondent No.2 that the petitioner himself has executed an agreement of sale in his favour, and later respondent No.1, who is the original owner, executed a registered sale deed in respect of respondent No.2. This plea does not appear to be in serious dispute. Even after filing of the suit belatedly, the petitioner failed to evince proper interest in pursuing the same, resulting in dismissal of the suit for default. He has also filed I.A. No.556 of 2008 for restoration of the said suit. Even the said I.A. was also dismissed for default. The petitioner has failed to show diligence in pursuing the subsequent I.A., i.e. I.A. No.777 of 2010 filed for restoration of I.A. No.556 of 2008, by not paying batta. Another interesting aspect is that the petitioner has filed a civil miscellaneous appeal, i.e., C.M.A. No.33 of 2013 before the III Additional District Judge, Guntur, purportedly questioning the order in I.A. No.1156 of 2011, instead of the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011. The said appeal was dismissed by the learned District Judge, holding that appeal does not lie against an order dismissing the application filed for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus, as on today, no appeal against the order in I.A.No.1155 of 2011, is filed by the petitioner. Even if the present revision petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner, the same will not enure to his benefit, as the order in I.A. No.1155 of 2011 remained unchallenged. In the above facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any merit in this civil revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the civil revision petition, C.R.P.M.P. No.6584 of 2014 shall stand disposed of as infructuous. _______________________ C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY, J 22-01-2016 bnr

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

cancellation of the sale deeds = Under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide that registration/cancellation of document is only with reference to the executant and the claimant under a document, which is already registered. Petitioner, being a third party, is, therefore, not entitled to approach the registering authority and seek cancellation of the documents executed by third party in favour of any other party. Petitioner’s reliance upon Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Registration Act is also misconceived inasmuch as Rule 26(k)(i) of the Rules specifically refer to the duty of the registering authority to ensure that the deed of cancellation is executed by all the executants and the claimants, who are parties to previously registered document and only on mutual consent a deed of cancellation can be registered. Since petitioner is not a party to the impugned sale transactions between two different individuals, he is not entitled to seek cancellation thereof and in any case, the petitioner does not satisfy even the requirement of Rule 26, referred to above.

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.