Notwithstanding the intransigence of DCHL, in failing to vacate the premises and remove the machinery therefrom, this Court cannot ignore the possibility of the expensive printing machinery of DCHL, lying in the subject premises, suffering extensive damage if sufficient safeguards are not taken while removing it therefrom. We consider it appropriate, therefore, to permit DCHL to remove its machinery and moveables from, and vacate, the subject premises by 31.08.2015. If they fail to do so by then, the respondent police officers shall, on a written request from the petitioner, provide them necessary assistance in having the machinery and other movables of DCHL removed from the subject premises without interference from either DCHL or any one else on their behalf. This order shall also not preclude the petitioner from initiating appropriate legal proceedings for damages on account of the loss and injury suffered by them as a result of the repeated, albeit unsuccessful, forays by DCHL into the portals of this Court. Both the Writ Petitions are allowed with exemplary costs of Rs.25,000/-, which DCHL shall pay the petitioner-bank within four weeks from today. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE S. RAVI KUMAR              

WRIT PETITION NOS.10602 OF 2015    

28-07-2015

Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited .  Petitioner            

The Station House Officer, Madhapur P.S. Hyderabad and others..Respondents  

Counsel for the Petitioner:   Sri S. Niranjan Reddy

Counsel for respondents:  Learned Government Pleader for Home
appearing on behalf of the official respondents; and Sri D.V.
                                                 Sitaram Murthy and Sri Vedula
Venkata Ramana, Learned Senior  
Counsel appearing on behalf of DCHL.
       
<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Citations:
1)      (2004) 13 SCC 610
2)      (2003) 8 SCC 648
3)      (2012) 3 SCC 522
4)      AIR 1997 AP 179
5)      (2014) 2 SCC 62
6)      (1871) 3 PC 465
7)      (1971) 1 MLJ 220
8)      AIR 1985 SC 39
9)      AIR 1953 SC 136
10)     AIR 1966 SC 948
11)     (1922) 49 IA 359 = AIR 1922 PC 269
12)     (2007) 14 SCC 165
13)     (2006) 1 SCC 613
14)     (2004) 7 SCC 261
15)     (2000) 10 SCC 285
16)     (2006) 5 SCC 399
17)     AIR 1982 AP 394
18)     AIR 1971 AP 53
19)     (2006) 4 SCC 501
20)     (1968) 1 ALL ER 763
21)     (1969) 2 Mad LJ 1
22)     (2007) 12 SCC 201
23)     2010 (2) ALD 41 (DB
24)     AIR 1997 SC 1125
25)     AIR 1954 SC 207
26)     AIR 1952 SC 12
27)     AIR 1962 SC 1044
28)     (1999) 4 SCC 526
29)     (2005) 3 ALD 233 (LB)
30)     AIR 1954 SC 440
31)     2002 (1) ALD 200 (FB)
32) AIR 1988 A.P. 144


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN            
AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE S. RAVI KUMAR      

WRIT PETITION NOS.10602 AND 17935 OF 2015      

COMMON ORDER: (per Honble Sri Justice Ramesh Ranganathan)                    

      The petitioner, a banking company under Section 5[c] of the
Banking Regulations Act, 1949 and a company incorporated under
the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office at Mumbai,
invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, by way of W.P.No.10602 of
2015, seeking a writ of mandamus directing respondents 1 to 3
(The Station House Officer, Madhapur Police Station, the Principal
Secretary, Home Department, State of Telangana, and the Director
General of Police, State of Telangana, Hyderabad) to take necessary
steps for putting them in absolute control of land admeasuring
9892.6 sq. yards in Survey No.186 situated at Kondapur in
furtherance of the acts initiated by them under the Securitization
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Act, 2002 (for short, the SARFAESI Act), and followed by
violation of the undertaking by the 4th respondent (the Deccan
Chronicle Holdings Limited-hereinafter called DCHL) in W.A.
No.679 of 2013 before this Court.
      In its interim order, in WPMP No.14020 of 2015 in
W.P.No.10602 of 2015 dated 09.06.2015, this Court observed that
there was no order either of this Court, or of the Debt Recovery
Tribunal, in force which prevented the police officers from
rendering assistance to the petitioner.  While making it clear that
they had not issued any direction, as at present, to respondents 1
to 3 to give the petitioner police assistance, this Court clarified that
there was no court order preventing respondents 1 to 3 from
providing police aid, to the petitioner, if they so choose.
      Thereafter, the petitioner filed W.P.No.17935 of 2015 seeking
a writ of mandamus declaring the action of respondents 2 to 6 in
not providing police aid for implementation of the rule of law in
discharge of their public duties, in terms of the representation
dated 15.06.2015 made by the petitioner seeking necessary police
protection for taking absolute control of the property i.e., land
admeasuring 9892.6 sq. yards in Survey No.186 situated at
Kondapur, as arbitrary, illegal and in violation of Articles 14 and
300-A of the Constitution of India.  They sought a consequential
direction to respondents 1 to 6 to take necessary steps to put them
in absolute control over the property at Kondapur in furtherance of
the acts initiated by them under the SARFAESI Act followed by the
violation of the undertaking by the 7th respondent (DCHL) in W.A.
No.679 of 2013 before this Court.
      It is stated, in the affidavit filed in support of W.P.No.17935
of 2015, that the petitioner had approached respondents 1, 3 to 5
informing them that they intended to take absolute control over
the property at Kondapur on 17.06.2015 at 11.00 A.M; they had,
by their letter dated 15.06.2015, requested the respondent
authorities to provide necessary police assistance/protection; the
respondent-authorities had refused to provide protection on the
pretext that there was no specific direction from the Court to the
police officers to provide any such assistance while the petitioner
took absolute control of the subject property; this Court, by its
order in W.P.M.P. No.14020 of 2015 in W.P. No.10602 of 2015
dated 09.06.2015, did not direct the police to provide
protection/assistance to the petitioner; when no favourable action
was forthcoming from the respondent-authorities, they had
proceeded to take absolute control over the property at Kondapur;
however, the same was resisted by the representatives, agents,
henchmen of DCHL and their employees union; due to the inaction
of respondents 1 to 6, in providing necessary assistance and police
protection to them, the petitioner was unable to take absolute
control of the property at Kondapur; DCHL still continues to stay
in the subject property by running a printing press, contrary to the
directions of this Court dated 11.11.2013, and in gross violation of
the undertaking given by them to vacate the premises on or before
28.02.2014 after removing all the machinery available in the
premises; and respondents 1 to 6 were bound to provide assistance
to the petitioner to enforce orders of the Court, and to ensure that
such orders are not violated.
      This case has a long and chequered history.  The petitioner,
a notified financial institution under Section 2(i)(m)(iv) of the
SARFAESI Act, sanctioned a short term loan facility of Rs.50 crores
in favour of DCHL by sanction letter dated 22.06.2010.
Thereafter, they accorded sanction for a working capital demand
loan facility of Rs.50 crores which was availed by DCHL, and an
equitable mortgage was created by them, in favour of the
petitioner, by deposit of title deeds over an extent of 9892.6 sq.
yards of land in Survey No.186 situated at Kondapur village along
with the buildings located thereupon.  DCHL defaulted in
repayment of the loan, which resulted in the petitioner classifying
their account as a non-performing asset (NPA).  A notice dated
17.08.2012 was issued by the petitioner to DCHL recalling the
credit facility, and calling upon them to clear the outstanding
amounts due and payable under the credit facilities.  The
petitioner issued notice dated 25.10.2012, under Section 13(2) of
the SARFAESI Act, to DCHL asking them to pay the petitioner the
amounts due as on 15.08.2012 along with additional/penal
interest.  By way of the said notice, DCHL was informed that they
were legally bound, under Section 13 (2) of the SARFAESI Act, not
to transfer the mortgaged properties by way of sale or otherwise
without the prior written consent of the petitioner.  As DCHL,
despite receipt of the Section 13(2) notice, failed to repay the
amounts due, the petitioner initiated proceedings under Section
13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, and informed DCHL that they would
take possession of the property on 07.01.2013 at 10.00 A.M.  The
petitioner claims that some persons, on behalf of DCHL, prevented
the authorised officer from entering the property, and they took
symbolic possession by affixing the possession notice dated
07.01.2013 as contemplated in Appendix-IV of the SARFAESI Act.
A copy of the possession notice was also published in the Times of
India and Sakshi daily newspapers on 09.01.2013.
      Anticipating resistance from DCHL and its personnel, while
taking actual physical possession, the petitioner filed Crl.M.P.
No.123 of 2013, before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Cyberabad, under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, requesting the
court to appoint an advocate-commissioner to take actual physical
possession of the property, and deliver it to the petitioner, if
necessary, by providing police protection for taking possession of
the property.  By his order dated 26.03.2013, the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad appointed an advocate-
commissioner.  The advocate commissioner was directed to take
possession of the property and hand it over to the petitioner, if
required, by taking necessary assistance from the concerned police
after putting them on notice and, if further required, to break open
the lock of the premises.  The Learned Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate made it clear that if, in such a process, any articles
were found at the spot, an inventory of the articles should be
prepared and delivered to the bank.
      DCHL filed S.A.I.R. No.167 of 2013 (later numbered as SA
No.340 of 2013) before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Hyderabad
(DRT for short) under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act,
challenging the action initiated by the petitioner under Section
13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.  By its order dated 14.03.2013, the
DRT directed DCHL to deposit with the petitioner a sum of Rs.10
Crores (Rs.5 Crores within four weeks from the date of the order
i.e., 14.03.2013, and the balance Rs.5 Crores within four weeks
thereafter).  The petitioner was directed to defer all further
proceedings, in respect of the subject property and other
properties, until further orders.  The DRT observed that, in the
event DCHL failed to deposit the said amount within the stipulated
period, the petitioner was at liberty to proceed against DCHL in
accordance with law.
      According to the petitioner, DCHL neither sought extension
of time to comply with the order dated 14.03.2013 nor did they file
any application to that effect before the DRT.  On the ground that
there was no stay operating against the petitioner, with respect to
the property at Kondapur as on 15.05.2013, the advocate-
commissioner sought to execute the warrant in Crl.M.P. No.123 of
2013 and, at 3.20 P.M. on 15.05.2013, he visited the subject
premises along with the authorised officer of the petitioner-bank.
At the request of the advocate-commissioner, the Station House
Officer, Madhapur PS deputed an assistant sub-inspector of police
and four constables to ensure that there was no resistance in
taking over possession of the property.  The advocate-
commissioner conducted a panchanama, and is said to have
delivered possession of the property to the authorised officer.
      W.P. No.14938 of 2013 was filed, by Deccan Chronicle
Employees Union (hereinafter called the Union) to declare the
action of the petitioner in initiating proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act, and in interfering and preventing the printing and
publishing activity of Deccan Chronicle and Andhra Bhoomi
newspapers as illegal, arbitrary and in violation of their
fundamental rights.  The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked by
way of an urgent house motion during summer vacation.  A
Learned Single Judge of this Court by his order in WP No.14938 of
2013 dated 15.05.2013, while posting the Writ Petition for
admission in the next vacation Court, directed the petitioner
herein, or any one claiming through them, not to prevent the
Union from undertaking the activity of printing and publishing the
newspapers.  The Station House Officer, Madhapur PS was
directed to extend co-operation in this regard.  The Learned Single
Judge also directed that attachment of the property, if any, would
continue.
      Aggrieved thereby the petitioner filed W.A.No.679 of 2013
and a Division Bench of this Court, by its order in W.A. No.679 of
2013 dated 17.05.2013, held that, for the purpose of protecting the
property as it is, the representatives of the petitioner-bank were
permitted to stay in the property without any interruption by the
Union or anybody else, including the police.  The Division Bench
made it clear that neither the petitioner-bank nor their
representatives should cause any interruption to the activity of
printing and publishing the newspaper.

      Thereafter, both W.A.No.679 of 2013 and W.P.No.14938 of
2013 were finally disposed of by order dated 11.11.2013.  The relief
sought for in this Writ Petition is largely based on the said order
dated 11.11.2013 which reads thus:-
       .With the consent of counsel appearing for the parties, we order
the following:
       In view of the contentions raised by counsel appearing for the parties,
we
direct respondent No.4-Deccan Chronicle Holdings Limited to vacate the
premises on or before 28.02.2014 and remove all machinery available in the
premises in question.  In view of the fact that possession was already handed
over to appellant herein, the appellant can take further steps to sell the
property
in order to recover the amount due to the Bank.
       4. With the above terms, the Writ Appeal as well as the Writ Petition are
disposed of directing respondent No.4 to file unconditional affidavit within one
week from today to the effect that it will remove the machinery by the end of
28.02.2014 and in case, respondent No.4 fails to file any such undertaking
affidavit, the Writ Petition shall stand dismissed and consequently, the appeal
would be allowed.  Counsel for the Writ Petition agreed for the same.
Similarly,
respondent No.1 herein shall also file an undertaking affidavit to the effect
that
it will cooperate with respondent No.4.  There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in the Writ Appeal as well as in the
Writ
Petition shall stand closed.


      The first respondent in W.A. No.679 of 2013 was the Union,
and respondent No.4 was DCHL. Aggrieved by the order of the
Division Bench in W.A. No.679 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013, DCHL
carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court and, in its order
in SLP (Civil) No.37891 of 2013 dated 17.12.2013, the Supreme
Court recorded the request of the Learned Counsel for DCHL for
permission to withdraw the SLP with liberty to approach the High
Court by filing a review petition.  The Supreme Court, while
granting permission, dismissed the SLP as withdrawn with liberty
as prayed for.
      DCHL filed W.P.No.5286 of 2014 challenging the vires of
Section 2(1)(o) of the SARFAESI Act.  They sought a declaration
from this Court that the action of the petitioner-bank, in declaring
their account as N.P.A, was contrary to the letter and spirit of
Section 2(1)(o) of the SARFAESI Act; and the action of the
petitioner-bank, in taking action against DCHL under the
SARFAESI Act, was arbitrary and illegal.  A Division Bench of this
Court, by its order in WPMP No.6563 of 2014 in W.P.No.5286 of
2014 dated 03.03.2014, held that DCHL had failed to establish a
prima-facie case, and the balance of convenience was also not in
their favour.  The Division Bench was not inclined to grant any
interim order as it appeared to them that the Writ Petition was filed
with a view to evade repayment of the loan taken by DCHL.  The
Division Bench further observed that their order should not nullify
another judicial order passed by the DRT. While admitting
W.P.No.5286 of 2014 the Division Bench, by its order dated
03.03.2014, dismissed WPMP No.6563 of 2014.  
      Aggrieved thereby, DCHL carried the matter in appeal to the
Supreme Court by way of SLP (Civil)./2014 in CC No.4636 of
2014.  By its order dated 14.03.2014, the Supreme Court
dismissed the Special Leave Petition.  However, having regard to
the controversy involved in the matter, the Supreme Court
requested the High Court to hear and decide WP No.5286 of 2014
as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within eight weeks
from the date of the order.  The Supreme Court made it clear that
dismissal of the SLP should not be construed as its opinion on the
merits of the case.
      DCHL filed Review WPMP No.1156 of 2014 in W.A. No.679 of
2013 seeking review of the order passed in W.A. No.679 of 2013
dated 11.11.2013.  In its order, in Review WPMP No.1156 of 2014
dated 14.03.2014, the Division bench held that the counsel for the
review petitioner had sought time to shift the machinery available
at the site, which was handed over to the petitioner-bank for the
purpose of proceeding further in terms of the SARFAESI Act; the
consent given by the Counsel for the review petitioner was to
enable DCHL to vacate the premises; as DCHL had consented to  
vacate the premises on that day, they could not, thereafter, turn
around and state that the consent given was with regard to the
undertaking; the same could not be accepted; Order XXIII Rule 3
CPC made it clear that the agreement or compromise shall be in
writing and signed by the parties; in the present case no such
agreement or compromise was entered into; the consent given was
to remove the machinery from the premises in question; Order
XXIII Rule 3 had no application; and there was no error apparent
on the face of the record so as to review the order passed earlier.
The review petition was, accordingly, dismissed.
      The General Secretary of Union informed the authorised
officer of the petitioner bank, by letter dated 15.03.2014, that they
undertook to comply with the order in W.A. No.679 of 2013 dated
11.11.2013, and in WPMP No.6563 of 2014 dated 03.03.2014.  
They requested him to consider postponing his proceedings, for
vacating the premises, till Tuesday. They undertook to
unconditionally, and without any coercion, leave the premises
irrespective of whether there was any order from the management
or not, and to peacefully vacate the premises by 10.00 A.M. on
19.03.2014.  The said letter dated 15.03.2014 was attested by the
General Manager, DCHL, despite which neither the Union nor
DCHL have vacated the subject premises till date.
      The earlier order of the DRT, in SAIR No.167 of 2013 (later
numbered as S.A.No.340 of 2013) dated 14.03.2013 was subjected  
to challenge by DCHL in WP No.8304 of 2014.  A Division bench of
this Court, by its order dated 19.03.2014, disposed of W.P.
No.8304 of 2014 at the admission stage directing DCHL to deposit
a demand draft for Rs.1 crore with the petitioner-bank by the next
day i.e., 20.03.2014.  DCHL was also directed to deposit Rs.4.5
crores on or before 31.05.2014, and another sum of Rs.4.5 crores
on or before 31.07.2014.  The Division bench restrained the
petitioner-bank from taking coercive steps to recover the amount,
and from taking any action against DCHL in running the printing
press.  The Division bench made it clear that, in case DCHL was
already in possession of the secured asset, it could not be
dispossessed in the meantime; and, in case, DCHL failed to pay the
amount in compliance with the directions, the petitioner-bank was
at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
      Aggrieved by the order, in W.P. No.8304 of 2014 dated
19.03.2014, the petitioner-bank filed Civil Appeal No.4402 of 2014
and the Supreme Court, by its order dated 04.04.2014, set aside
the order passed by the Division bench in W.P. No.8304 of 2014
dated 19.03.2014, restored W.P. No.8304 of 2014 to the file of this
Court, and granted liberty to DCHL to apply to this Court for
consideration of the matter on 07.04.2014.  The Supreme Court
observed that, if the petitioner-bank desired to remain present
before the High Court, it could do so.
      Consequent on W.P. No.8304 of 2014 being restored to file,
the Division bench, by its order in WPMP No.10367 of 2014 in W.P.
No.8304 of 2014 dated 29.04.2014, directed DCHL to deposit the
demand draft for Rs.1 crore with the petitioner bank on or before
05.05.2014, deposit Rs.4.5 crores on or before 05.06.2014, and
Rs.4.5 crores on or before 07.07.2014.  The petitioner bank was
restrained from taking any coercive steps to recover the amount
due and from taking any action against DCHL for running the
printing press.  The Division bench observed that, if DCHL was
already in possession of the secured asset, it should not be
dispossessed in the meantime and, in case DCHL failed to pay the
amount in compliance with the said directions, the petitioner bank
would be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law.
      Aggrieved by the order passed, in WPMP No.10367 of 2014 in
WP No.8304 of 2014 dated 29.04.2014, the petitioner-bank filed
SLP (Civil) No.12617 of 2014 and the Supreme Court, by its order
dated 09.05.2014, dismissed the SLP and requested this Court to
hear and decide the Writ Petition on the next date or, in any case,
within three months.  Thereafter WP No.8304 of 2014 was taken
up for final hearing.  The Division bench, in its order in W.P.
No.8304 of 2014 dated 05.08.2014, held that there was an effective
alternate remedy available to DCHL under Section 18 of the
SARFAESI Act.  The Writ Petition was dismissed, leaving it open to
DCHL to avail its remedies under law.  The Division bench made it
clear that any observation, or finding made in the Writ Petition
could not be construed as a finding of the Court, and it was only
for the purpose of disposal of the Writ Petition.  The DRT was also
directed to dispose of the SA in accordance with law, uninfluenced
by any observations made in the order.  It is not in dispute that
DCHL did not, thereafter, avail the statutory remedy of appeal.
The petitioner-bank filed a contempt case alleging violation of the
order passed by the Division bench in WA No.679 of 2013 and WP
No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013, and to punish DCHL and the
official respondents under the Contempt of Courts Act, which is
said to be still pending.  It is relevant to note that DCHL have not
complied with the order of the DRT in S.A.No.340 of 2013 dated
14.03.2013 till date.  While they are said to have deposited Rs.1.00
crore long thereafter, the remaining Rs.9 crores was not deposited
at all.
      The petitioner bank issued sale notice dated 08.10.2014
under Rule 8(6) of the SARFAESI Rules (hereinafter called the
Rules) informing DCHL that, in case they failed to repay the loan
amount of Rs.50.25 crores with interest from 16.08.2012 within
thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice, the scheduled
property would be brought to sale.  DCHL filed I.A. No.14460 of
2014 in S.A. No.384 of 2013 questioning the action of the
petitioner bank in bringing the subject properties to sale.  On a
status quo order being passed by the DRT on 14.11.2014, the
petitioner-bank carried the matter in appeal to the Debt Recovery
Appellate Tribunal (DRAT for short) at Calcutta.  The DRAT, by
its order dated 04.03.2015, set aside the order of status quo passed
by the DRT, and allowed the appeal.  The petitioner bank issued a
sale notice afresh, under Rule 8(6) of the SARFAESI Rules, on
13.04.2015 informing DCHL that, if they failed to repay the loan
amount of around Rs.62.61 crores with interest from 06.03.2015
within thirty days, the scheduled property would be brought to
sale by public bid-cum-auction on 27.05.2015.  DCHL was
informed that they should remove all the moveable properties lying
in the Scheduled premises within fifteen days from the date of
receipt of the notice, failing which the authorised officer would be
constrained to remove and deal with the moveable properties.
      Questioning the sale notice dated 13.04.2015, DCHL filed
I.A. No.1916 of 2015 in SA No.384 of 2013.  The DRT, by its order
dated 01.05.2015, directed the petitioner bank to maintain status
quo.  Aggrieved thereby the petitioner-bank filed Appeal No.44 of
2015 before the DRAT, Calcutta.  By its order dated 26.05.2015,
the DRAT, while setting aside the order of status quo passed by the
DRT, held that the sale if any conducted, and even if it was
confirmed, would be subject to the outcome of S.A. No.384 of
2013.  The DRAT directed the authorised officer to obtain an
undertaking from the successful bidder that he would be bound by
the decision in S.A. No.384 of 2013, and to only defer registration
of the sale pending disposal of S.A. No.384 of 2013.  The DRT was
directed to dispose of S.A. No.384 of 2013 within three months
from the date of receipt of a copy of the order, along with the
connected S.A. No.340 of 2013.  The subject property was
auctioned on 27.05.2015, and the bid of Dr. D. Satyanaryana
Raju, for Rs.22.10 crores, was accepted.  Sri S. Niranjan Reddy,
Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, while the
highest bidder has since deposited the entire sale consideration,
the petitioner-bank is unable to deliver possession of the subject
property to him as the respondent police officers have expressed
their inability to provide assistance to them in taking absolute
control of the subject property.
      Elaborate submissions were put forth by Sri S.Niranjan
Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, the Learned
Government Pleader for Home appearing on behalf of the official
respondents, and Sri D.V. Sitaram Murthy and Sri Vedula Venkata
Ramana, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of DCHL in
W.P.No.10602 of 2015 and W.P.No.17935 of 2015 respectively.  It
is convenient to examine the contentions, urged by Learned
Counsel on either side, under different heads.
I. DOCTRINE OF RESTITUTION: ITS SCOPE:    
      Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
would submit that the legal right conferred on the petitioner, by
the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Crl.M.P.No.123 of
2013 dated 26.03.2013, stood negated by the interim order of this
Court in W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013; as the petitioner
is now rendered remediless, they have perforce invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to seek restitution; and the principle of  actus curiae
neminem gravabit (an act of the Court should prejudice no one)
should be applied in granting them relief.  Learned Counsel would
rely on V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. Ratnam Raju ; South Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P. ; State of Gujarat v. Essar Oil
Ltd. ; Honble Secretary and Correspondent, Badruka College
of Commerce and Arts (Day), Hyderabad v. State of A.P. ; and
Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases  in this
regard.
      Though the petitioners were put in possession of the subject
property by the advocate-commissioner, appointed by the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad by his order in Crl.M.P.
No.123 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013, the interim order passed by this
Court in W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013 barred the
petitioner and the police officers either from removing the
machinery of DCHL from the subject premises or from stopping
either DCHL or its Union from carrying on the activity of printing
and publishing the newspapers.  But for the interim order in
W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013, the petitioner would have
been put in absolute and exclusive control of the subject premises
by the advocate commissioner with the assistance of police
personnel, and the machinery and other moveables of DCHL would
have been removed therefrom.  The interim order, passed in
W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013, merged in the final order
passed in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated  
11.11.2013 whereby DCHL was directed to vacate the premises on
or before 28.02.2014, and remove all machinery available in the
subject premises.
      An interim order, passed in favour of a party, stands
reversed in the event of a final decision going against the party
successful at the interim stage. Unless, otherwise ordered by the
Court, the successful party at the end would be justified, with all
expediency, in demanding compensation and to be placed in the
same situation in which it would have been if the interim order
had not been passed against it. The successful party could demand
(a) delivery of the benefit earned by the opposite party under the
interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it had
lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, the restitution, far from
meeting the ends of justice, would defeat the same. Undoing the
effect of an interim order, by resorting to the principles of
restitution, is an obligation of the party who has gained by the
interim order of the Court, so as to wipe out the effect of the
interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by
the Court at the stage of final decision, the Court earlier would not,
or ought not to, have passed.  An effort should be made to restore
the parties to the same position in which they would have been if
the interim order did not exist.  (South Eastern Coalfields Ltd.2).
While the petitioner can seek damages as compensation for the
loss they suffered, and the benefits which the Union and DCHL
gained by continuing to print and publish the newspapers under
the protection of the interim order in W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated
15.05.2013, they can also seek restitution from this Court.
      An act of the Court cannot prejudice anyone.  This principle
is based on the Latin maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. The
actus curiae principle is founded upon justice and good sense, and
is a guide for the administration of law. (Essar Oil Ltd.,3).  In
Sarah Mathew5 the Supreme Court applied the legal maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit (which means the act of court shall
prejudice no man) to hold that the courts inaction in taking
cognizance (i.e. courts inaction in applying its mind to the
suspected offence) should not be allowed to cause prejudice to a
diligent complainant.
      One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to ensure
that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors, and
when the expression, the act of the court is used, it does not
merely mean the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate
Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the
lowest Court which exercises jurisdiction over the matter upto the
highest Court which finally disposes of the case.  This is also on
the principle that a wrong order should not be perpetuated by
keeping it alive and respecting it.  In the exercise of such inherent
power, Courts have applied the principles of restitution to myriad
situations. (South Eastern Coalfields Ltd.2; Rodger v. Comptoir
DEscompte de Paris ; A. Arunagiri Nadar v. S.P. Rathinasami ).
      The word restitution, in its etymological sense, means
restoring to a party, on the modification, variation or reversal of a
decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of the
decree or order of the court, or in direct consequence of a decree or
order. In law, the term restitution is used in three senses: (i) return
or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status;
(ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to
another; and (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to
another. (South Eastern Coalfields Ltd.2; Zafar Khan v. Board of
Revenue, U.P. ; Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315;
The Law of Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M.
Perillo).  Restitution sometimes refers to the disgorging of
something which has been taken, and at times to compensation for
injury done.  Often, the result under either meaning of the term
would be the same. Unjust impoverishment, as well as unjust
enrichment, is a ground for restitution.  (South Eastern Coalfields
Ltd.2; Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edn., p. 1315; The Law of
Contracts by John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo).
      The doctrine of restitution is based on the principle that, on
the reversal of a judgment, the law imposes an obligation on the
party, who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment, to make
restitution to the other party for what he had lost; and it is the
duty of the court to enforce that obligation. (Lal Bhagwant Singh
v. Sri Kishen Das ; Essar Oil Ltd.,3; Binayak Swain v. Ramesh
Chandra Panigrahi ).   The concept of restitution is a common
law principle, and it is a remedy against unjust enrichment or
unjust benefit. The core of the concept lies in the conscience of the
Court which prevents a party from retaining the benefit derived
from another which it has received by way of an erroneous decree
of the Court. (Essar Oil Ltd.,3). The obligation to restitute lies on
the person or the authority that has received unjust enrichment or
unjust benefit. (Essar Oil Ltd.,3; Halsburys Laws of England, 4th
Edn., Vol. 9, p. 434).
      That no one shall suffer by an act of the Court is not a rule
confined to an erroneous act of the Court.  The act of the court
embraces, within its sweep, all such acts which the court may form
an opinion in any legal proceedings that it would not have so acted
had it been correctly apprised of the facts and the law. The factor,
attracting applicability of restitution, is not the act of the Court
being wrongful or a mistake or an error.  The test is whether, on
account of an act of the party persuading the Court to pass an
order held at the end as not sustainable, the earlier order had
resulted in one party gaining an advantage which it would not have
otherwise earned, or the other party has suffered an
impoverishment which it would not have suffered but for the order
of the Court and the act of such party. (South Eastern Coalfields
Ltd.2).
      When a decree is reversed, the law imposes an obligation on
the party, who received the unjust benefit of an erroneous decree,
to restitute the other party for what the other party had lost during
the period the erroneous decree was in operation. The Court, while
granting restitution, is required to restore the parties, as far as
possible, to the same position as they were in at the time when the
Court, by its erroneous action, displaced them.  (Essar Oil Ltd.,3).
The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to
do complete justice between the parties. It is the duty of the Court
to place the parties in the position which they would have
occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been
varied or reversed. This duty or jurisdiction is inherent in the
general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly, according
to the circumstances, towards all the parties involved. (South
Eastern Coalfields Ltd.2; Jai Berham v Kedar Nath Marwari ).
       The injury, if any, caused by the act of the Court shall be
undone and the gain which the party would have earned, if it was
not interdicted by the order of the Court, would be restored to, or
conferred on, the party by suitably commanding the party liable to
do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust, if not
disastrous, consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful
industry.  Unscrupulous litigants may feel encouraged to approach
the Courts, persuading it to pass interlocutory orders favourable to
them by making out a prima facie case when the issues are yet to
be heard and determined on merits and, if the concept of
restitution is excluded from application to interim orders, then the
litigant would stand to gain by swallowing the benefits which the
interim order yielded, even though the battle is lost at the end.
This cannot be countenanced. (South Eastern Coalfields Ltd.2).
      The litigation thereafter had no effect on the order of the
Division Bench, in W.A.No.679 of 2013 and W.P.No.14938 of 2013
dated 11.11.2013, and, on the said order attaining finality, DCHL
should have vacated the premises, and removed the machinery
therefrom, which they have failed to do. It is only because the
order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, in Crl.M.P.No.123 of
2013 dated 26.03.2013, was interdicted by the interlocutory order,
passed in WP No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013, was the
petitioner prevented from enforcing its rights under the SARFAESI
Act to have the machinery of DCHL, lying in the subject premises,
removed therefrom.
      The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not
only what the party excluded would have made, but also what the
party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. There
is nothing wrong in the parties demanding that they be placed in
the same position in which they would have been had the Court
not intervened by its interim order when, at the end of the
proceedings, the Court pronounces its judicial verdict which does
not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. (South
Eastern Coalfields Ltd.2).
      As the petitioner has suffered injury, as a result of the
interim order of this Court in W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated
15.05.2013, they are entitled for restitution and to be extended the
benefits which they would have secured but for the said
interlocutory order.  The only manner in which the petitioner can
be placed in a similar position, in which they would have been but
for the aforesaid interim order, is if the respondent police officers
are directed to render assistance to them in having the machinery
of DCHL removed from the subject premises, and in taking
absolute and exclusive control thereof.
II. RESTITUTION CANNOT BE ORDERED IN CONTEMPT          
       PROCEEDINGS:

      Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
would submit that, while the petitioner can invoke the contempt
jurisdiction of this Court, for violation by DCHL of the order of the
Division bench dated 11.11.2013, DCHL can only be punished for
contempt; the petitioner would not be entitled to seek any other
relief in contempt proceedings; as the petitioner has been made to
suffer as a result of the interim order passed in W.P. No.14938 of
2013 dated 15.05.2013, this Court should now command DCHL to  
vacate the premises, and put the petitioner in absolute control
thereof; the police officers should be directed to render assistance
to enforce the order of this Court in W.A.No.679 of 2013 and
W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013; and such a power,
though not available under the Contempt of Courts Act, is
available to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India.
      While contempt proceedings can be initiated for violation of
orders of Court, the jurisdiction which this Court exercises, under
the Contempt of Courts Act, is limited only to an enquiry whether
its orders have been wilfully violated and, in such cases, to impose
punishment.  The injury which the person, in whose favour an
order is passed by the Court, suffers at the hands of the other
party who has violated the order, cannot be compensated in
contempt proceedings.  While dealing with an application for
contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether
the earlier decision has been complied with or not. The Court,
exercising contempt jurisdiction, is primarily concerned with the
question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to
have committed default in complying with the directions in the
judgment or order.  (Special Deputy Collector (LA) v. N.
Vasudeva Rao ; Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV ;
Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhand ; and Lalith Mathur
v. L. Maheswara Rao ).
      In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide
whether contempt of court has been committed and, if so, what
should be the punishment to be imposed, and matters incidental
thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or
decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the
parties.  Any direction issued, or decision made, by the High Court
on the merits of a dispute between the parties will not be in the
exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. (Midnapore
Peoples Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda ).  The only remedy
which the person who suffered an injury has, in this regard, is to
invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking restitution, and for necessary
directions to enforce its earlier order.

III. POLICE OFFICERS HAVE A LEGAL DUTY TO ENFORCE          
      ORDERS OF COURT:  

      Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
would submit that the rule of law requires lawful orders of Court to
be implemented; the lawful orders which DCHL has violated are (1)
the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad, in
Crl.M.P. No123 dated 26.03.2013, giving the petitioner control and
possession over the subject property, and (2) the order of the
Division Bench, in W.A.No.679 of 2013 and W.P.No.14938 of 2013
dated 11.11.2013, directing DCHL to vacate the premises and
deliver possession to the petitioner by 28.02.2014; a public duty is
cast on police officers to ensure compliance of the orders of Court;
as the duty to enforce orders of the Court is a public duty, a Writ
Petition would lie to enforce it; and a writ of mandamus should be
issued directing the police officers to render assistance to the
petitioner in taking exclusive and absolute control over the subject
property. Learned Counsel would rely on Satyanarayana Tiwari v.
SHO, PS Santhoshnagar, Hyderabad ; Rayapati Audemma v.    
Pothineni Narasimham ; P.R. Murlidharan v. Swami
Dharmananda Theertha Padar ; and R. v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis Ex P. Blackburn (No.1)  in this regard.
        On the other hand, Learned Government Pleader for Home
would submit that this Court has the power, under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, to issue necessary directions for
implementation of its earlier orders; in the absence of any specific
direction from this Court, it would be impermissible for police
officers to act on their own; while the order of the Division Bench,
in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated
11.11.2013, required DCHL to remove the machinery and vacate
the premises by 28.02.2014, no direction was issued therein to the
police officers to act against DCHL in case they failed to comply
with the said order; and, as the disputes between the petitioner
and DCHL are in the nature of civil disputes, police officers cannot
render assistance, in putting the petitioner in absolute control over
the subject property, in the absence of any specific order or
direction from this Court.  Learned Government Pleader would also
rely on Satyanarayana Tiwari17; and Rayapati Audemma18).
      The order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in Crl.M.P.
No.123 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013, and the order of the Division
Bench in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and WP No.14938 of 2013 dated  
17.05.2013, necessitated compliance by DCHL.  Police officers are
duty bound to enforce the law, including orders of Courts.  The
petitioners representation notwithstanding, the respondent police
officers have expressed their inability to render them assistance in
the absence of any specific direction or order from this Court.
      In the absence of an express provision for enforcement of its
orders, it is not only proper but also necessary that Courts should
render all aid to the aggrieved party to enable him to derive the full
benefits of the order.  While the aggrieved party can himself
approach the police authorities seeking their assistance for
enforcement of the order, there is no reason why, when the same
person brings to the notice of the Court that enforcement of the
order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the Court should not
exercise its inherent power and direct the police authorities to
render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the
court order.  The court has ample jurisdiction to exercise such
powers, and pass such orders as are necessary to meet the ends of
justice and to prevent abuse of its process, and the police officers
are bound to obey such directions (Rayapati Audemma18;
Satyanarayana Tiwari17) as it is their duty to ensure that the
orders of the High Court, and the Civil Court, are not only
faithfully enforced but also that all persons, seeking enforcement of
such orders, are given the required assistance and protection.
(Satyanarayana Tiwari17). The law enforcement officers owe a
legal duty to the public to perform those functions which are the
raison d'etre of their existence.  These legal duties include the duty
to enforce the law. In these matters, they are not the servant of
anyone, save of the law itself. The responsibility for law
enforcement lies on them, and they are answerable to the law and
to the law alone. (Rayapati Audemma18; R. v. Commissioner of
Police of the Metropolis Ex P. Blackburn (No.1)20;
Varadachariar v. Commr. of Police ).
IV. POWER OF THE CIVIL COURT TO DIRECT POLICE        
       OFFICERS TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE EXECUTION        
       OF ORDERS OR DECREES:    

      The power of the Civil Court to direct police officers to render
assistance is well recognized.  When parties violate orders of
injunction or stay, the Court can, by exercising its inherent power,
put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to
issuance of the injunction order or give appropriate direction to the
police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due
and proper implementation of the orders passed in the suit, and
also order police protection for implementation of such an order.
(Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi ).
      In Rayapati Audemma18, a Division Bench of this Court
held that, though an order of injunction under Order 39 CPC is
only interim in nature, it still clothes the person, who obtained the
order, with certain rights which he is entitled to enforce against the
party who is bound by the order; in such a case the aggrieved
party can, himself, approach the police authorities and seek their
assistance to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order,
or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order of
the Court; there is no reason why, when the same person brings to
the notice of the court that enforcement of the order is sought to be
prevented or obstructed, the Civil Court should not exercise its
inherent power under Section 151 CPC, and direct the police
authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the
implementation of the court order; the exercise of such power is
necessary to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of court; the Civil Court has ample jurisdiction to pass
such an order under Section 151 CPC; and the police are bound to
obey such directions.
      However a slightly different view was taken by a Division
Bench of this Court, in Polavarapu Nagamani v. Parchuri
Koteshwara Rao , wherein it was held that in a situation, where
threat of violation or disobedience is alleged by the party obtaining
a prohibitory order, the Court has the power to direct the police to
prevent such violation and disobedience by providing necessary
protection to enforce the order of injunction; such police protection
order, when there is a threat of disobedience, is justifiable under
Section 94(e) read with Section 151 CPC; in a situation, where a
complaint is made that the order of injunction granted by the
Court, restraining or prohibiting the opposite party from interfering
with possession etc, has been violated, the Civil Court cannot pass
a police protection order in the exercise of its powers under Section
94(e) or Section 151 CPC; and the power of the Court to pass a
police protection order to prevent the disobedience of the
injunction order is different from the power of the Court to deal
with actual disobedience.

V. POWER OF THE HIGH COURT TO COMMAND POLICE            
     OFFICERS TO AID IN ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ORDERS:        

      Whatever be the view, regarding the power of the Civil Court
to direct police officers to render assistance to enforce its orders,
the High Court, undoubtedly, has the power to issue such
directions.  Article 226 is a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution of India (L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India ), and
the power conferred on the High Court thereunder cannot be
negated or circumscribed even by an amendment to the
Constitution, much less by legislation  plenary or subordinate.
Article 226 of the Constitution confers on the High Court wide
powers in issuing writs for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III of the Constitution, and for any other purpose.
Under the first part of Article 226 of the Constitution, a writ would
be issued only after holding that the aggrieved party has a
fundamental right, and that it has been infringed. Under the
second part, a writ may be issued only after finding that the
aggrieved party has a legal right, and that such a right has been
infringed. (Rashid, K.S. v. Income-tax Investigation
Commissioner ;  State of Orissa v. Rungta ;  Calcutta Gas Co.
v. State of West Bengal ; K. Venkatachalam v. A.
Swamickan ; B.A. Bhavani v. LAO, Yeluru Reservoir Project,
Peddapuram ).
      The words any other purpose in Article 226 brings within
its ambit the enforcement of any legally enforceable right.
(Satyanarayana Tiwari17).  Article 226 of the Constitution is a
storehouse or a reservoir of justice, equity and good conscience
which are meant, within the discretionary power of the Court
vested by that Article, to do full and complete justice.  (Honble
Secretary and Correspondent, Badruka College of Commerce  
and Arts (Day), Hyderabad4).    The High Court, in issuing
directions, orders and writs under Article 226, can travel beyond
the contents of the writs which are normally issued, provided the
broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of
jurisdiction, in the grant of such writs, are not transgressed.
Article 226 empowers the High Court to grant appropriate relief,
and also to modify the form of relief according to the exigencies of
each case, without being obsessed by the limitations of prerogative
writs. There can be no higher purpose than the enforcement of
orders of the High Court whereby the rights of a party are either
confirmed or recognized.  The power of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to enforce its own orders or
the orders of the Civil Court, cannot be curtailed. (Satyanarayana
Tiwari17; Calcutta Gas Company (Prop) Ltd.27; T.C. Basappa v.
T. Nagappa ).
      As the police authorities owe a legal duty to enforce the law,
citizens are entitled to seek directions, under Article 226 of the
Constitution, for discharge of such duties by them.
(Satyanarayana Tiwari17; Rayapati Audemma18; R. v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex P. Blackburn
(No.1)20).  The High Court can be approached for issuance of a writ
on the plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an
order of injunction passed in his favour, or that he was deliberately
flouting that decree or order and, inspite of the petitioner applying
for it, the police authorities were not giving him the needed
protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court of
competent jurisdiction. (P.R. Murlidharan19).  In the event of the
police failing or refusing to carry out their duty, the court would
not be powerless to intervene, and an order of mandamus would
issue. (R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex P.
Blackburn (No.1)20). Mandamus is a very wide remedy which is
available against public officers to ensure that they discharge their
public duty.  Once the party, who applies for mandamus, shows
that he has sufficient interest to be protected, and there is no other
equally convenient remedy, the remedy of mandamus is available.
(R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis Ex P.
Blackburn (No.1)20).
      The petitioner is entitled for restitution and to be placed in
the position which they would have been in, but for the interim
order in W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013.  Likewise,
DCHL cannot be permitted to unjustly enrich itself, and continue
to remain in the subject premises flouting the order of the Division
bench in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated
11.11.2013 and the undertaking given by them therein.  As Review
WPMP No.1156 of 2014 in W.A. No.679 of 2013 was dismissed by    
order dated 14.03.2014, the order of the Division bench, in W.A.
No.679 of 2013 and W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013, has
attained finality.  A mandamus shall, therefore, be issued to the
respondent police officers to provide assistance in having the
machinery of DCHL, lying in the premises, removed therefrom, and
in putting the petitioner in absolute and exclusive control of the
subject property.

VI. IS THE HIGH COURT REQUIRED TO HAVE ITS ORDERS          
      ENFORCED ONLY BY THE CIVIL COURT?      

      Sri Vedula Venkataramana, Learned Senior Counsel, would
submit that all orders of the High Court, where directions are
issued, are in the nature of mandatory directions or injunctions;
execution of such orders is necessary for obtaining the relief; the
order of the Division Bench, in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and
W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013, is in the nature of a
decree against DCHL; the said order dated 11.11.2013 is an
executable decree which, in terms of Rule 23 of the Writ
Proceeding Rules, can only be executed by the Civil Court; the
order of the Division Bench dated 11.11.2013 requires execution
through the process of Court, and not through police officers; the
police officers can, at best, assist in execution of the order of the
High Court through the process of the Civil Court i.e., the Court of
the Principal District Judge which is a Court of unlimited
jurisdiction; and, even in the absence of any specific provision, the
High Court has the inherent power to direct the Civil Court to
execute the order of the Division Bench dated 11.11.2013 which is
an executable decree.
      The Civil Procedure Code prescribes the procedure for
execution of decrees passed by a Civil Court of competent
jurisdiction.  There is no provision therein for enforcement of
orders of the High Court.  The jurisdiction of this Court, under
Article 226 of the Constitution, is extremely wide, and the power to
issue prerogative writs, orders or directions is not circumscribed
by any limitation of its orders being required to be enforced only in
execution proceedings by the Civil Court.  Accepting this startling
submission of the Learned Senior Counsel would mean that, while
the High Court can issue writs, orders or directions and punish,
those who disobey its orders, under the Contempt of Courts Act, it
cannot enforce its own orders, and must depend upon the Civil
Court to have its orders enforced.  It would also require us to hold
that the power of the High Court under Article 226, (which in view
of its being a part of the basic structure of the Constitution cannot
be negated even by a constitutional amendment much less by
legislation (plenary and subordinate)), is implicitly limited by the
requirement of having its orders executed by the Civil Court (again
implicitly) under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Neither
has the Learned Senior Counsel referred to any statutory
provision, nor to any judicial pronouncement, which requires the
High Court to have its orders enforced only by the Civil Court.
Such a far fetched submission does not merit acceptance.
      Reliance placed on Rule 23(1) of the Writ Proceeding Rules,
to contend that the orders of the High Court must only be enforced
by invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, is misplaced.  Rule
23(1) provides that a party, to whom costs have been awarded in a
Writ Petition or a Writ Appeal, on an application therein, may
obtain an order of the Court for transmission for the purpose of
execution of the order of costs to the court of the District Munsif or
to the Court of the Subordinate Judge in the State in whose
jurisdiction the party, against whom the order is to be executed,
ordinarily resides or carries on business or has property which can
be attached.  The said Rule, which enables the Civil Court to
execute the order of the High Court, is restricted only to recovery of
the costs awarded by the High Court.  Rule 23(1) does not, in any
manner, circumscribe the power of the High Court to pass orders
or issue directions, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
for the enforcement of its orders.

VII. OTHER CONTENTIONS:    

(A). ALTERNATIVE REMEDY:    
        Sri D.V. Sitarama Murthy, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of DCHL in W.P.No.10602 of 2015, would
submit that, for failure to comply with the order passed by the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI
Act, the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy of
approaching the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate himself under
Section 14(2) thereof; and, as the petitioner has an effective
alternative statutory remedy, the jurisdiction of this Court, under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be invoked.
Learned Senior Counsel would rely on Polavarapu Nagamani23;
Vemula Prabhakar v. LAO and RDO, Peddapalli, Karimnagar  
Dt. ; and the order of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal in
Appeal No.44 of 2015 dated 26.05.2015.
      Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act requires the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate to assist the
secured creditor in taking possession of the secured asset and,
under sub-section (1) thereof, where the possession of any secured
asset is required to be taken by the secured creditor, or if any of
the secured asset is required to be sold or transferred by the
secured creditor under the provisions of this Act, the secured
creditor may, for the purpose of taking possession or control of any
such secured asset, request, in writing, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate or the District Magistrate within whose jurisdiction any
such secured asset or other documents relating thereto may be
situated or found, to take possession thereof, and the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or, as the case may be, the District
Magistrate shall, on such a request being made to him (a) take
possession of such asset and documents relating thereto; and (b)
forward such assets and documents to the secured creditor.
Under sub-section (2) thereof, for the purpose of securing
compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1), the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate may take or
cause to be taken such steps and use, or cause to be used, such
force as may, in his opinion, be necessary.
      It is only if the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had passed an
order merely under Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act and, if the
said order had not been complied with, could his jurisdiction,
under Section 14(2) of the SARFAESI Act, have been invoked.  By
his order, in Crl.M.P. No.123 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013, the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad directed the advocate
Commissioner to take possession of the property and hand it over
to the petitioner; permitted the advocate commissioner, if required,
to take necessary assistance from the concerned police officers
after putting them on notice; and, if further required, also to break
open the locks of the premises.  The order of the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, in Crl.M.P.No.123 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013, is an
order passed both under Section 14(1) and (2) of the SARFAESI
Act.  As they have already exhausted their remedy under clauses
(1) and (2) of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the petitioner cannot
again be relegated to invoke the jurisdiction of the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14(2) of the SARFAESI Act.
As the said order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate dated
26.03.2013 was interdicted by the interlocutory order of this
Court, in W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013, the petitioner-
bank no longer has the remedy of approaching the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14(2) of the SARFAESI Act,
and the only remedy available to them is to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
      Reliance placed by Sri D.V. Sitaram Murthy, Learned Senior
Counsel, on Vemula Prabhakar31 is misplaced.  In Vemula
Prabhakar31, a Full Bench of this Court held that, in view of the
provisions contained in Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, an
execution petition under Order 21 CPC was maintainable even for
executing a decree passed by a Civil Court in a reference under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act; mere absence of the
ingredients of coercion against the State, and/or Collector, in
executing the decree, was no ground for by-passing such a civil
remedy; the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code,
dealing with the execution of a decree, were wide; it could not be
said to be an ineffective remedy; the submission that an award
made by a Civil Court, being a right of property under Article 300-
A of the Constitution, can be enforced through a writ of mandamus
could not be accepted; a decree passed, in terms of Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, was a money decree; and, if the
aforementioned proposition was accepted, all money decrees,
passed against the Government, could be directed to be executed
through a writ of mandamus.  In B. A. Bhavani29, a Larger Bench
(5 Judges) of this Court held that the view taken by the Full Bench,
in Vemula Prabhakar31, was  bad, contrary to law, and was,
accordingly, overruled.  The plea of existence of an alternative
remedy, requiring this Court to refrain from interference, does not
therefore merit acceptance.

(B). IS THE PETITIONER, UNDER THE GUISE OF POLICE      
       ASSISTANCE, SEEKING ADJUDICATION OF CIVIL      
       DISPUTES?

      Sri Vedula Venkataramana, Learned Senior Counsel, would
submit that no Writ can be sought to take possession of the
property with police force; there is no specific plea in the Writ
Petition that the petitioner had lost possession; the very fact that
the petitioner has sought the relief, of being put in possession by
police force, implies that they are not in possession; a direction to
render police assistance can be given either to enforce an order of
the Court or to perform a statutory duty or to protect a statutory
right; and no direction can be given to the police to render
assistance in putting the petitioner in possession of the subject
property.  On the other hand Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned
Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the relief sought for
in the Writ Petition is not for a direction to put the petitioner in
possession, but to direct police officers to enforce the earlier order
of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and
W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013.
      The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised
prudently and in appropriate situations. (P.R. Murlidharan19).
Though the power, which the High Court exercises under Article
226 of the Constitution, is discretionary and no limits can be
placed upon the exercise of such discretion, the power must be
exercised judiciously, along recognised lines, and not arbitrarily.
While exercising this power, Courts have imposed upon themselves
certain self- imposed limitations. (B.A. Bhavani29).
      A writ of mandamus cannot be sought for protection of
property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated, that too
when such an exercise of adjudication can only be undertaken in
properly instituted proceedings.  Under the guise of seeking a writ
of mandamus, directing the police authorities to give him
protection, no person can make the Court a forum for adjudicating
his civil rights. It would be an abuse of process of the Court for any
person to approach the High Court, under Article 226 of the
Constitution, seeking a writ of mandamus directing police officers
to protect his claimed possession of property without first
establishing his possession in appropriate legal proceedings.  The
temptation to grant relief, in cases of this nature, should be
resisted by the High Court. (P.R. Murlidharan19). A writ for police
protection, so-called, has limited application to cases where the
Court is approached for protection of the rights declared by a
decree, or by an order passed by the Court. It cannot be extended
to cases where rights have not yet been determined either finally
by the Court or at least at an interlocutory stage in an
unambiguous manner, and even then only in furtherance of the
decree or order. (P.R. Murlidharan19).  While exercising
jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court would not,
collaterally, determine disputed questions of fact. (P.R.
Murlidharan19). This Court would not exercise jurisdiction, under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, save on a clear case, of a
legal injury having been caused to the person who has invoked its
jurisdiction, being made out requiring its interference.
      While the need for police officers to ensure compliance of,
and to enforce, orders of Court cannot be over emphasised, the
need for them to tread warily in such matters must also be
recognised.  While interlocutory orders of Court can be varied in
appeal or in revision, final orders of Court can also be set aside in
appeal or in review.  The possibility of the orders of Court, enforced
by police officers, being varied or set aside later cannot be ruled
out.  If police officers are given a free hand, and are permitted to
interpret court orders in the guise of implementing them,
irreparable loss may ensue to the party which has suffered the
order.  While police officers are no doubt obligated to assist in
implementation of orders of court any bonafide dispute, regarding
the scope and purport of the order, would require them to exercise
restraint and leave it to the party, which seeks police assistance, to
approach the Court and obtain necessary directions/orders in this
regard.  This safeguard is essential to ensure that police officers do
not run amok.
      The facts, in the present case, justify interference by this
Court in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. There is neither any dispute with
regards title or possession, nor is it purely a civil dispute between
two private parties which necessitates adjudication by a competent
Civil Court. It is not in dispute that the subject property was
mortgaged by DCHL in favour of the petitioner, or that the
petitioner invoked Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act to take
possession of the subject property and to put it to sale.  It is only
because their attempt to take possession met with resistance from
DCHL that the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act,
seeking assistance in taking possession of the subject property.
The entire litigation thereafter, till the present Writ Petitions were
filed before this Court, was only because the petitioner was
prevented from taking absolute and exclusive control of the subject
premises despite the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, dated 26.03.2013 and the
order of the Division bench of this Court dated 11.11.2013.
      It is not as if the petitioners right to take absolute control of
the subject property, to the exclusion of DCHL or the Union, is yet
to be determined.  It is not even the case of DCHL that disputed
questions of fact are involved in the present case which necessitate
adjudication in appropriate legal proceedings.  By its order in W.A.
No.679 of 2013 and W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013, the
Division Bench had directed DCHL to vacate the premises by
28.02.2014 and remove all machinery available therein.  As
possession of the subject premises was already handed over to
them, the Division Bench also permitted the petitioner to take
further steps to sell the property in order to recover the amount
due to them.  Consequent upon the review petition, in review
WPMP No.1156 of 2014 in W.A.No.679 of 2013, being dismissed on  
14.03.2014, the earlier order of the Division bench, in W.A.No.679
of 2013 and W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013, attained
finality.  In such circumstances there is no reason why this Court,
in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, should refrain from granting the
petitioner the benefit of restitution.  A mandamus shall issue to the
respondent police officers to provide all necessary assistance to
enable the petitioner-bank to remove the machinery of DCHL from,
and to take absolute and exclusive control of, the subject premises.
      The petitioners request for police assistance to enable them
to be put in absolute control of the subject premises, must be seen
in the context of the interim order passed in W.P. No.14938of 2013
dated 15.05.2013 whereby DCHL was permitted to continue to
carry on its printing activity in the subject premises.  As there
appeared to be a dispute whether the interim order passed in W.P.
No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013 enabled the petitioner to
remain in possession, albeit along with DCHL and the Union, the
petitioner filed WA No.679 of 2013.  The Division Bench, by its
order in W.A.No.679 of 2013 dated 17.05.2013, directed that, for
the purpose of protecting the property as it was, the representative
of the petitioner-bank was permitted to stay in the property
without any interruption by the Union or anyone else including the
police.  The petitioner-bank and their representatives were also
directed not to cause any obstruction to the activity of printing and
publishing of the newspapers.  As a result of the said order dated
17.05.2013, while the petitioner-bank continued to remain in
possession of the subject property, DCHL has also been carrying
on its printing activity thereat, and has not removed the machinery
from the subject premises till date, though the final order of the
Division Bench, in W.A.No.679 of 2013 and W.P.No.14938 of 2013
dated 11.11.2013, required them to vacate the premises and
remove all machinery therefrom on or before 28.02.2014.  It is only
on DCHL being required to remove the machinery, and to vacate
the subject premises, can the petitioner-bank remain in absolute
control of the property to the exclusion of DCHL and its Union.
Police officers are duty bound to render assistance in
implementation of the orders of Court, and can be directed to
discharge their legal duty of ensuring compliance with court
orders.  A writ of mandamus being issued, in the present case,
does not necessitate adjudication of any civil disputes.
(C). ARE THE TWIN PRAYERS IN W.P. NO.17935 OF 2015      
       SELF-CONTRADICTORY?  

      Sri Vedula Venkataramana, Learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of DCHL in W.P.No.17935 of 2015, would
submit that the prayer in the said Writ Petition is in two parts;
while the first limb relates to inaction of the police in not
considering the representation dated 15.06.2015, the second limb
is for a direction to the police to put the petitioner in absolute
control; even if the first limb of the prayer is allowed, the only
direction which can be issued to the police officials is to act upon
the petitioners representation dated 15.06.2015; the first limb of
the prayer contradicts the second limb; the twin prayers in the
Writ Petition are self-contradictory; and, if the first limb of the
prayer is granted, there would be no necessity to grant the second
limb of the prayer, as grant of relief of the first limb would result in
the petitioner achieving what it wanted.
        On the other hand Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, Learned Counsel
for the petitioner, would submit that the complaint in the Writ
Petition is that police officers are not performing their public
duties; no relief has been sought to direct police officers to dispose
of the petitioners representation; the petitioner has not only
sought police aid in removing the machinery of DCHL, they have
also sought assistance to take absolute and exclusive control  over
the subject property; they were unable to do so in view of the
resistance offered by DCHL and their men; the Writ Petition does
not emanate merely from the representation submitted by the
petitioner to the police officers, but also from the subsequent event
of the resistance offered by DCHL when the petitioner attempted to
take absolute control in terms of the order of the Division bench
dated 11.11.2013; and, while grant of the relief sought for in the
first limb of the prayer may render the second limb superfluous,
the second limb does not contradict the first.
        The prayer in W.P.No.10602 of 2015 is for this Court to issue
a Writ of Mandamus directing respondent Nos.1 to 3 to take
necessary steps to put the petitioner in absolute control of the
subject property in furtherance of the acts initiated by them under
the SARFAESI Act, followed by the violation of the undertaking of
DCHL in W.A. No.679 of 2013.  The first limb of the prayer in
W.P.No.17935 of 2015 is for this Court to issue a Writ of
Mandamus declaring the action of Respondent Nos.2 to 6 in not
providing police aid, in terms of their representation dated
15.06.2015, to take absolute control of the subject property as
illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 300A of the
Constitution of India.  The second limb of the prayer is for a
consequential direction to respondent Nos.1 to 6 to take necessary
steps to put the petitioner in absolute control over the subject
property in furtherance of the action initiated by them under the
SARFAESI Act followed by the violation of the undertaking made by
DCHL in W.A. No.679 of 2013.
      Both W.P.Nos.10602 and 17935 of 2015 have been filed
questioning the action of police officers in not providing police aid
for implementation of the rule of law which, in the present case,
relates to implementation of the orders of the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate in Crl.M.P.No.123 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013, and the
order of the Division Bench in W.A.No.679 of 2013 and
W.P.No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013 which order attained
finality on the review petition, filed in Review WPMP No.1156 of
2014, being dismissed by the Division Bench by its order dated
14.03.3014.  On their failure to consider the petitioners
representation, to render police assistance, being declared illegal, a
mandamus would ordinarily have been issued directing the
respondent police officers to consider the representation of the
petitioner-bank afresh, and in accordance with law.   However, the
stand of the respondent-police officers, in their counter-affidavit
filed before this Court, is that they would not be able to render
police assistance in the absence of any specific direction from this
Court.  No useful purpose would, therefore, be served in directing
them to re-consider the representation of the petitioner-bank
seeking police aid.  We see no inconsistency between the first limb
and the second limb of the prayer as the second limb is merely a
consequence of the first.  In any event the High Court, while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, has
the power to mould the relief taking into account the totality of the
circumstances and the exigencies of the situation. (D.
Satyanarayana v. N.T.Rama Rao ).
VIII. CONCLUSION:
      DCHL has failed to comply with the conditional order passed
by the DRT, in SA No.340 of 2013 dated 14.03.2013, to deposit
Rs.10 crores, and has merely deposited Rs.1 crore that too long
after the time stipulated therefor had expired.  They have
repeatedly used the judicial process to deny the petitioner their
right to enforce the mortgage in terms of the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act, to take possession of the subject mortgaged
property, and to put it to sale.  They have also violated the solemn
undertaking given to this Court more than a year and a half ago, in
WA No.679 of 2013 and WP No.14938 of 2013, to remove the  
machinery from the premises by 28.02.2014, and have continued
to retain possession of the subject property in brazen defiance, and
utter disregard, of the order of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in
Crl.M.P. No.123 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013, and the order of the
Division bench of this Court in W.A. No.679 of 2013 and W.P.
No.14938 of 2013 dated 11.11.2013.
      The judicial adventures of DCHL, to somehow or the other
retain possession of the subject property culminating in the order
of the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No.44 of 2015
dated 26.05.2015, have all come to naught.  Yet they have not
removed their machinery from the subject premises, possession of
which was handed over to the petitioner by the advocate
commissioner on 15.05.2013 more than two years.  The petitioner
has been unable either to recover its debt in excess of Rupees 62
crores, or to take exclusive and absolute control over the subject
property.  Even though sale of the subject property was confirmed
in favour of the highest bidder in the auction held on 27.05.2015,
the petitioner has not been able to deliver possession to him till
date. The only way in which the petitioner can be restituted for the
loss and injury suffered by them, on account of the interim order
passed by this Court in W.P. No.14938 of 2013 dated 15.05.2013,
is if a direction is issued to the respondent police officers to provide
them necessary assistance in taking absolute and exclusive control
of the subject property, and to have the machinery and movables
of DCHL removed therefrom. A writ of mandamus shall be issued
accordingly.
      Notwithstanding the intransigence of DCHL, in failing to
vacate the premises and remove the machinery therefrom, this
Court cannot ignore the possibility of the expensive printing
machinery of DCHL, lying in the subject premises, suffering
extensive damage if sufficient safeguards are not taken while
removing it therefrom.  We consider it appropriate, therefore, to
permit DCHL to remove its machinery and moveables from, and
vacate, the subject premises by 31.08.2015.  If they fail to do so by
then, the respondent police officers shall, on a written request from
the petitioner, provide them necessary assistance in having the
machinery and other movables of DCHL removed from the subject
premises without interference from either DCHL or any one else on
their behalf.  This order shall also not preclude the petitioner from
initiating appropriate legal proceedings for damages on account of
the loss and injury suffered by them as a result of the repeated,
albeit unsuccessful, forays by DCHL into the portals of this Court.
      Both the Writ Petitions are allowed with exemplary costs of
Rs.25,000/-, which DCHL shall pay the petitioner-bank within
four weeks from today.  The miscellaneous petitions pending, if
any, shall also stand disposed of.
______________________________    
RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J      
___________________  
S. RAVI KUMAR, J  
Date: 28.07.2015.

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