Remove the encroachment - The impugned notices issued directing the petitioners to remove the bunks erected by them virtually amounts to ‘an order’. However, as the Gram Panchayat is vested with power conferred under Section 88 of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, the impugned communication shall be treated as show cause notice and the petitioners are at liberty to submit their explanations within two weeks from today. If such explanations are filed, the fourth respondent-Gram Panchayat shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders in terms of Section 98 of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Till the orders are passed by the fourth respondent, there shall not be any interference with the subject bunks erected by the petitioners.

WP 5166 / 2016
WPSR 27069 / 2016CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
K.JAYARAMUDU, KURNOO DIST & 9 OTHERS  VSSECY, PANCHAYAT RAJ & RURA DEVP DEPT., HYD & 3 OT

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM
WRIT PETITION No. 5166 of 2016
DATED 17 TH FEBRUARY, 2016
BETWEEN K.Jayaramudu and ors …Petitioners And The State of Telangana, Rep. by its Principal Secretary, Panchayatraj Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad and ors. ..Respondents
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM
WRIT PETITION No. 5166 of 2016
ORDER:
Heard learned Counsel for the petitioners, learned Government Pleader for Panchatraj appearing for respondents 1 to 3 and Sri G.Narender Reddy, learned Standing Counsel appearing for respondent No.4.
The impugned notices dated 27.01.2016 issued by the fourth respondent-Gram Panchayat directing the petitioners to remove the bunks erected by them is challenged before this Court.
A perusal of the impugned notices issued by the fourth respondent-Gram Panchayat, reveals that the District Collector and Chairman, Sports Authority, Kurnool ordered to conduct auction of the six shops constructed by Sri K.Jayaramudu, Aluru Village, the District Sports Authority, Kurnool in the premises of Aluru Junior College and as the bunks erected by the petitioners are situated in the encroached road and in front of the aforesaid six shops causing obstruction to the shopping complex rooms, the impugned notices have been issued to the petitioners to remove the same.
The impugned notices issued directing the petitioners to remove the bunks erected by them virtually amounts to ‘an order’. 
However, as the Gram Panchayat is vested with power conferred under Section 88 of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, the impugned communication shall be treated as show cause notice and the petitioners are at liberty to submit their explanations within two weeks from today. If such explanations are filed, the fourth respondent-Gram Panchayat shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders in terms of Section 98 of the Panchayat Raj Act, 1994. Till the orders are passed by the fourth respondent, there shall not be any interference with the subject bunks erected by the petitioners. Subject to the above, the Writ Petition is disposed of. Miscellaneous petitions pending consideration if any in the Writ Petition shall stand closed in consequence. No order as to costs. --------------------------------------------------- JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM DATED 17 TH February, 2016. Msnrx 

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