Respondent can not force the petitioner to implead joint tortfeasors as one of the parties to the M.V.O.P. = Now the law is well settled that the liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. In case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation among tort feasors vis--vis claimant is not permissible. Admittedly, the petitioner is an insurer of the vehicle. The liability of the petitioner is coextensive with that of the owner/insured. It is the primary duty of the claimants to establish negligence and justify their claim. It is for the claimants to file the claim petition against the parties whom they consider as proper or necessary. Now the petitioner, in its written statement, pointed out that there are other parties who are to be impleaded in the claim petition filed by the claimants. In spite of the point raised by the petitioner herein in its written statement, if the claimants do not take necessary steps, they will be doing so at their own risk. It is not for the petitioner herein to force the claimants or the Court to implead some other parties in order to invite a finding on the role of the proposed party in the negligence which resulted in the accident. There is no material to show that the proposed parties are joint tort feasors. Even if it is assumed that some of the proposed parties are joint tort feasors, in their absence also a finding can be recorded with regard to the entitlement of the claimants and the petitioner herein can recover the amount which it was forced to part with due to the role of other joint tort feasors by initiating separate proceedings. But, the summary proceedings in a claim petition arising out of a motor vehicle accident cannot be enlarged and the Tribunal cannot be asked to give a finding with respect to the role of other parties in the accident. The reliance on United India Insurance Company Limited's case (supra) is of no avail as that case arose out of an accident caused by Jayanthi Janatha Express hitting a passenger bus at the unmanned level crossing. The decision was rendered on the facts of that case only and it cannot be extended to the authorities like National Highways Authority of India Limited who undertake laying of the roads.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.427 of 2016 and Batch  

Dated 29-04-2016

HDFC ERGO General Insurance Company Ltd......Petitioner  

vs.

Smt.Khawjabi and others.... Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner: Learned Senior Counsel Sri Atul Nanda for A.Ramakrishna Reddy

Counsel for the Respondents: Sri A.Sanjay Kishore

<Gist :

>Head Note :

?Cases referred
1.(2007) 5 SCC 428
2.(2008) 13 SCC 198
3.(2008) 3 SCC 748
4.(2014) 3 SCC 590
5.(2015) 9 SCC 273
6.(2010) 7 SCC 417
7.AIR 1998 SC 640

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.427 and 772 of 2016  

COMMON ORDER:                                          

        These two Civil Revision Petitions are being disposed of by
this common order, at the admission stage, as they arise out of
the applications in O.P.No.599 of 2013 on the file of the learned
Principal District Judge, Mahabubnagar, seeking identical
reliefs.

        C.R.P.No.427 of 2016 arises out of an order in I.A.No.1309
of 2014, whereas C.R.P.No.772 of 2016 arises out of an order in
I.A.No.1355 of 2014.  Both the petitions were filed by the second
respondent in O.P.No.599 of 2013.  They were dismissed by a
common order on 18.09.2015, challenging which the present
Civil Revision Petitions are filed.

        A ghastly road accident took place on 30.10.2013 at about
5:10 a.m. on the outskirts of Palem Village on NH-44 road (RHS)
at culvert No.129/1 near KM stone No.128 Hyderabad in front
of 33/11 KV electricity sub-station, where the entire bus was
burnt along with the passengers.  The Volvo bus bearing No.AP
02 TA 0963 started from Bangalore city on 29.10.2013 at about
11 p.m. with total occupancy. When it crossed the Pullor toll
plaza, the driver of the bus appears to have driven it in a rash
and negligent manner and dashed it to the culvert No.129/1 on
the median (which is open to the sky in the middle), as a result
of which the diesel tank was broken, sparks and flames erupted
and total bus engulfed in fire, resulting in death of 45
passengers (including a little child).  The above Original Petition
was filed by three claimants claiming an amount of
Rs.1,00,00,000/- for the death of one Mohammed Asif in the
said accident.  The claim petition was filed against the owner of
the bus, the insurance company and two others.  A written
statement was filed by the second respondent, insurance
company in the said O.P and the relevant portions of the written
statement are extracted hereunder:
      8.  It is humbly submitting that during the course of
investigation by the police authority, it has came into light
that the incident has occurred due to negligent in building the
culvert protruding on the outer side of the highway road
exposing to the risks of accidents by the National Highway
Authority of India (hereinafter referred to as 'NHAI').

        9.  It is submitted that at the very same point of time,
the investigation has revealed the manufacturing defect in the
placement design of the battery and fuel tank in the Volvo
Bus by the manufacturer i.e. M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt. Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as 'M/s.Volvo').

        10.  It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble
Tribunal that the petitioners may kindly be directed to join
M/s.Jabbar Travels, the NHAI and M/s.Volvo as they are
found to be necessary parties to the proceedings.

        12.  It is humbly submitted that M/s.Volvo is
negligent in not providing the emergency exit door in the
Volvo Buses and the very same point of time, ARAI was
negligent in approving the design of the bus sparing the safety
of the passengers.  Hence the petitioners may kindly be
directed to join the ARAI as they are found to be necessary
parties to the proceedings.

               
        18.  It is submitted that the luggage compartment of
the bus is meant to carry the baggage of the passengers
traveling in the insured vehicle.  At the material time of the
accident, the respondent/insured and the alleged Lessees had
permitted carriage of the good and parcels viz. baby-corn bags
weighing in tones, cut hairs, cell phones, memory cards,
boxes of flowers, iron, leather photo frames, pumps and
machinery parts, etc. belonging to the entities other then the
passengers.  Hence this Insurance Company is not liable to
pay any compensation.

        21.  This carriage of goods and plying the vehicle as
stage carriage is grossly in violation of the permit and
therefore, this respondent is not liable to indemnify the
insured and/or any other respondents against their Third
party liability.

        27.  It is submitted that further, the placement of the
battery and the fuel tank in the design of the Volvo was found
very close to each other.  There are 3 interconnected fuel
tanks with 600 liters capacity adjacent to the battery
compartment.  It was observed that the impact of the bus
with the culvert led to bursting of the fuel tank and sparks
from the battery which was the resultant effect of the ill-fated
incident of fire in the bus.  With the high fuel capacity, the
fire engulfed the bus rapidly leaving the driver and the
attendant-cleaner incapable to save the lives of the
passengers who were in deep sleep in the early hours of the
morning.

        28.  In view of the above facts, the incident has
occurred solely on of the negligence and neglect of the NHAI  
in building the defective culvert.  Further, M/s.Volvo is
equally negligent in building the wrong design of the bus in
placing the fuel tank and the battery in the proximity to cause
such an ill-fated event and providing the emergency exit to
ensure the safety of the passengers.  It is further submitted
that the ARAI is also negligent in approving the design of the
Volvo Buses which endangers human life.  It is submitted
that the fitness to the said vehicle was issued by the Motor
Vehicle Inspector - RTO Bangalore Central on dt.07.10.2013
who has shown negligence by ignoring the safety precautions
and measures viz. fire extinguishers, emergency exit doors,
hammer to break the window in case of emergency by
allowing the said bus to ply on the road in such unsafe
conditions and hence, the liability may kindly be saddled on
the above mentioned tort feasors and hence this respondent is
not liable to pay any amount of compensation to the
petitioners.


       34.  This respondent submits that the Provisions of
Section 147 makes it clear that the policy of insurance will
have to insure the person (the owner) against any liability,
which may be incurred by him (owner).  Therefore, unless
there is a liability fixed on the owner, the question of the
insurance company indemnifying the owner will not arise.  In
other words, the Act presupposes that before calling upon the
insurance company to satisfy the judgment and awards, it is
precondition that there must be actual liability being cast on
the insured and unless such a liability exists, the question of
the insurance company being saddled with the responsibility
to satisfy the judgment and award, does not arise.


       36.  This respondent craves leave of this Hon'ble Court
to take all defenses available to the Respondent No.1 under
section 170 of M.V.Act and contest the case on all the
grounds apart from those specified U/s.149(2) of M.V.Act."

      I.A.No.1309 of 2014 was filed seeking impleadment of
proposed respondent Nos.5 to 7 therein, who were stated to be
the lessees of the bus, and I.A.No.1355 of 2014 was filed
seeking impleadment of proposed respondent Nos.8 to 11
therein i.e., the National Highway Authority of India, M/s.Volvo
Buses India Pvt. Ltd., Automotive Research Association of India
and the Motor Vehicle Inspector - RTO Bangalore Central,
Bangalore.  The application in I.A.No.1309 of 2014 was
supported by an affidavit stating that on the date of the
accident, the bus was leased to the proposed respondent Nos.5
to 7 therein, who were in possession of the bus and the driver
was under their sole control and hence they are necessary to be
impleaded as parties.  An affidavit was filed in support of
I.A.No.1355 of 2014 with the following averments:
       "I submit that during the course of investigation by the
police authority, it has came to light that the incident has
occurred due to neglect in building the culvert protruding on
the outerside of the highway road exposing to the risks of
accidents by the National Highway authority of India.  To put
it to the records of the Hon'ble Tribunal, it is humbly
submitted that the driver of the above-alleged vehicle was
driving the Volvo carefully, cautiously and with moderate
speed on the correct side of the road.  It was the carelessness,
neglect and the sheer negligence on the part of the NHAI in
building a culvert protruding on the highway road.  It was
observed in the police investigation that the steel railing rod
painted in red is found on the left hand side of the road to
highlight the culvert and the same was found missing on the
right hand side of the road which is the exact spot of the
accident.  In view of the above facts and to adjudicate the
matter on the merits, the National Highway Authority of India
rep. by its Regional Officer is very much necessary party to
implead in the above case as Respondent No.8.

       I submit that the investigation has revealed the
manufacturing defect in the placement design of the battery
and fuel tank in the Volvo Bus by the manufacturer i.e.
M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt. Ltd.  Further, the placement of
the battery and the fuel tank in the design of the Volvo was
found very close to each other.  There are 3 interconnected
fuel tanks with 600 liter capacity adjacent to the battery
compartment.  It was observed that the impact of the bus
with the culvert led to bursting of the fuel tank and sparks
from the battery which was the resultant effect of the ill-fated
incident of fire in the bus.  With the high fuel capacity the fire
engulfed the bus rapidly leaving the driver and the attendant-
cleaner incapable to save the lives of the passengers who were
in deep sleep in the early hours of the morning.  Further I
submit that the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed
thereunder provides for the requirement for the emergency
exit in all passenger carrying buses as is provided in the Volvo
buses of the KSRTC and the same emergency door is absent  
in the present case.  It is the duty of the Automotive Research
Association of India to provide technical expertise in R and D,
testing, certification, homologation and framing of vehicle
regulations.  In view of the above facts and to adjudicate the
matter on the merits, the M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt Ltd. Rep.
by its General Manager and Automotive Research Association
of India rep. by its Director are very much necessary parties
to implead in the above case as Respondent No.9 and
Respondent No.10.

       I submit that the fitness to the said vehicle was issued
by the Motor Vehicle Inspector, RTO Bangalore Central on
dtd.07-10-2013 who has shown negligence by ignoring the
safety precautions and measures viz. fire extinguishers,
emergency exit doors, hammer to break the window in case of
emergency by allowing the said bus to ply on the road in such
unsafe conditions.  In view of the above facts and to
adjudicate the matter on the merits, the Motor Vehicle
Inspector, RTO Bangalore Central is very much necessary
party to implead in the above case as Respondent No.11."

      The aforesaid applications were opposed by the claimants
as well as by M/s.Volvo Buses India Pvt. Ltd., and the
Automotive Research Association of India.  The claimants
opposed the applications in general and the counter of proposed
respondent No.9 stated that the vehicle involved was more than
four years old and had covered more than 9,00,000 kilometers
without any issues.  There are nearly 5000 Volvo buses running
in India which had covered over a couple of billion kilometers on
Indian roads with an excellent track record of safety.  Finally
they stated that the issue, whether or not the vehicle suffered
from any manufacturing/designing defect is highly technical in
nature and outside the scope of the summary proceedings in a
matter like the present one.  The counter affidavit of the
proposed respondent No.10 stated that it was a registered
Society under the Registration of Societies Act, 1860, and
affiliated to the Department of Heavy Industries, Ministry of
Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises, Government of India.
It is one of the seven testing and certifying agencies authorised
by the Central Government under Rule 126 of the Central Motor
Vehicle Rules, 1989.  Thus, there are six other agencies which
are also so authorised by the Central Government under the
said Rule.  The vehicle involved in the accident was not certified
by the said respondent.  Since the proposed respondent is not a
manufacturer, seller or distributor of the vehicle, it is not a
necessary party.  The applications were ultimately dismissed on
18.09.2015 by the Tribunal, holding as follows:
       "In view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision
reported in [2015] Acci.C.R.632 (SC) cited supra; when
there is composite negligence on the part of two or more
persons each of them is jointly and severally liable to the
injured or dependents of the deceased for payment of the
entire damages and the said injured and dependents of the
deceased have the choice of proceedings against all or any of
them and the claimants need not add all the joint tort feasors
in their claim petition.  So, the petitioner/respondent No.2
insurance company cannot dictate terms to the claimants to
ad the other joint tort feasors who had some part in
composite negligence which resulted the accident.  Whereas
in the decissional cited by the learned counsel for the
petitioner/respondent No.2 insurance company, the
claimants therein have added the railways or the Municipal
Corporation of their choice.  So, the decisions cited are in no
way helpful to the petitioner/respondent No.2 insurance
company.  In view of the above said reasons these petitions
are liable to be dismissed."

      Challenging the said order, as stated above, the present
Civil Revision Petitions were filed.

      Learned Senior Counsel, Sri Atul Nanda appearing for the
petitioner submitted that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the
applications and the reasons mentioned by the Tribunal are not
correct.  He further submitted that the presence of all tort
feasors is necessary for recording a finding on the negligence of
the parties before the Tribunal and apportionment of the
liability, in which event, the petitioner would be in a position to
recover the amount from the other joint tort feasors.  The
applications were filed in the interest of the claimants only in
order to adjudicate the dispute effectively.  He relied on
Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Meena Variyal ,
Machindranath Kernath Kasar v. D.S.Mylarappa ,
T.O.Anthony v. Karvarnan , Pawan Kumar v. Harkishan
Dass Mohan Lal , Khenyei v. New India Assurance Company  
Limited , Mumbai International Airport Private Limited v.
Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private Limited  and
Union of India v. United India Insurance Company Limited .

      Learned Counsel for the proposed respondent No.9 in the
O.P opposed the applications stating that the contentions raised
by the learned Senior Counsel are not tenable and the scope of
enquiry by the Tribunal cannot be expanded by including other
parties.

      Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also filed a copy
of the Black's Law Dictionary, (Ninth Edition) showing the
meaning given to "tortfeasor" and "joint tortfeasors".  Though
the learned Senior Counsel drew the attention of this Court to
the above cases, this Court, after going through the ratio
decided in Khenyei's case (supra), thought that the issues
raised by the learned Senior Counsel are substantially covered
in the said decision.  The lower Court dismissed the
applications of the petitioner herein relying on the said decision
only and its reliance on the said decision for dismissal of the
applications appears to be correct in view of the reasons given
below.

      Learned Senior Counsel relied on Meena Variyal's case
(supra) to buttress his argument that the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act are still based on tortious liability.  He took
support from that decision to submit that the Tribunal cannot
forget the basic principles of establishing liability and
establishing the quantum of compensation payable.  He also
relied on D.S.Mylarappa's case (supra) in support of his
argument, as in the said case it was held that the employer and
employee are joint tortfeasors and hence they are jointly and
severally liable.  In the said case the Supreme Court held that
the finding of negligence requires the presence of driver and he
should be made a party to the proceedings.  Taking support
from the said observations and extending the said argument,
the learned Senior Counsel wanted this Court to allow the
applications.  The cases of Karvarnan (supra) and Harkishan
Dass Mohan Lal (supra) were relied for the interpretation of
"composite negligence".  Ultimately, he pressed into service the
decision in Regency Convention Centre and Hotels Private
Limited's case (supra) to remind this Court that this Court can
add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a
necessary party or proper party.

      But, as stated above, the issues raised by him, to a large
extent, were answered in Khenyei's case (supra).  The said case
arose out of collision of a bus and trailor-truck.  In the said case
the Supreme Court extensively considered the meaning of the
words "composite negligence" and also the liability of 'joint tort
feasors'.  The Supreme Court ultimately held as follows:
   "15. There is a difference between contributory and
composite negligence. In the case of contributory negligence, a
person who has himself contributed to the accident cannot
claim compensation for the injuries sustained by him in the
accident to the extent of his own negligence; whereas in the
case of composite negligence, a person who has suffered has
not contributed to the accident but due to the outcome of
combination of negligence of two or more other persons. This
Court in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan ((2008) 3 SCC 748 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738) has held that
in case of contributory negligence, the injured need not
establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer
separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the
extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. It is only in
the case of contributory negligence that the injured himself
has contributed by his negligence in the accident. Extent of
his negligence is required to be determined as damages
recoverable by him in respect of the injuries have to be
reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence. The
relevant portion is extracted hereunder: (SCC pp. 750-51,
paras 6-7)

     "6. 'Composite negligence' refers to the negligence
on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is
injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or
more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured
on account of the composite negligence of those
wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer, is jointly
and severally liable to the injured for payment of the
entire damages and the injured person has the choice of
proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case,
the injured need not establish the extent of
responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it
necessary for the court to determine the extent of
liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other
hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the
negligence on the part of another person or persons,
and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the
negligence on the part of the injured which contributed
to the accident is referred to as his contributory
negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some
negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely
by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages
recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand
reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence.

    7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an
accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation
from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other
driver denies negligence or claims that the injured
claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes
necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was
negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly
responsible for the accident and the extent of his
responsibility, that is his contributory negligence.
Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the
principle of 'composite negligence' will not apply nor can
there be an automatic inference that the negligence was
50:50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal
ought to have examined the extent of contributory
negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided
confusion between composite negligence and
contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to
correct the said error."

The decision in T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan ((2008) 3 SCC
748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738) has
been relied upon in A.P. SRTC v. K. Hemlatha ((2008) 6 SCC
767 : (2008) 3 SCC  (Cri) 34).

   16. In Pawan Kumar v. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal
((2014) 3 SCC 590 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 303 : (2014) 4 SCC
(Cri) 639), the decisions in T.O. Anthony ((2008) 3 SCC 748 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738) and
Hemlatha ((2008) 6 SCC 767 : (2008) 3 SCC  (Cri) 34) have
been affirmed, and this Court has laid down that where the
plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be negligent jointly and
severally, liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the
extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have
to be severed. He is entitled to damages not attributable to his
own negligence. The law/distinction with respect to
contributory as well as composite negligence has been
considered by this Court in Machindranath Kernath Kasar
v. D.S. Mylarappa ((2008) 13 SCC 198 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
519) and also as to joint tortfeasors. This Court has referred
to Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence as to cause of action
in regard to joint tortfeasors thus: (Machindranath Kernath
Kasar case ((2008) 13 SCC 198 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 519),
SCC p. 212, para 42)

    "42. Joint tortfeasors, as per 10th Edn. of
Charlesworth and Percy on Negligence, have been
described as under:

     'Wrongdoers are deemed to be joint tortfeasors,
within the meaning of the rule, where the cause of
action against each of them is the same, namely, that
the same evidence would support an action against
them, individually.... Accordingly, they will be jointly
liable for a tort which they both commit or for which
they are responsible because the law imputes the
commission of the same wrongful act to two or more
persons at the same time. This occurs in cases of (a)
agency; (b) vicarious liability; and (c) where a tort is
committed in the course of a joint act, whilst pursuing a
common purpose agreed between them.'"  

   17. The question also arises as to the remedies available
to one of the joint tortfeasors from whom compensation has
been recovered. When the other joint tortfeasor has not been
impleaded, obviously question of negligence of non-impleaded
driver could not be decided. Apportionment of composite
negligence cannot be made in the absence of impleadment of
joint tortfeasor. Thus, it would be open to the impleaded joint
tortfeasors after making payment of compensation, so as to
sue the other joint tortfeasor and to recover from him the
contribution to the extent of his negligence. However, in case
when both the tortfeasors are before the court/Tribunal, if
evidence is sufficient, it may determine the extent of their
negligence so that one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount
so determined from the other joint tortfeasor in the execution
proceedings, whereas the claimant has right to recover the
compensation from both or any one of them.

       
   22. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as
follows:

   22.1. In the case of composite negligence, the
plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the
joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as
liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several.

   22.2. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment
of compensation between two tortfeasors vis--vis the
plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his
option whole damages from any of them.

   22.3. In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded
and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to
determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the
drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence
between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their
inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the
other after making whole of the payment to the
plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of
the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the
apportionment/extent of their negligence has been
determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint
tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the
execution proceedings.

   22.4. It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to
determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of
two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint
tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should
be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor
in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or
award."

      The basis for filing the present applications by the
petitioner in the pending O.P is that the proposed parties were
also negligent and in their absence, in the event of holding the
petitioner liable to pay the amount, the petitioner would not be
in a position to recover the amount, if the applications were not
allowed.  Now the law is well settled that the liability of joint tort
feasors is joint and several.  In case of composite negligence,
apportionment of compensation among tort feasors vis--vis
claimant is not permissible.  Admittedly, the petitioner is an
insurer of the vehicle.  The liability of the petitioner is
coextensive with that of the owner/insured.  It is the primary
duty of the claimants to establish negligence and justify their
claim.  It is for the claimants to file the claim petition against
the parties whom they consider as proper or necessary.  Now
the petitioner, in its written statement, pointed out that there
are other parties who are to be impleaded in the claim petition
filed by the claimants.  In spite of the point raised by the
petitioner herein in its written statement, if the claimants do not
take necessary steps, they will be doing so at their own risk.  It
is not for the petitioner herein to force the claimants or the
Court to implead some other parties in order to invite a finding
on the role of the proposed party in the negligence which
resulted in the accident.  There is no material to show that the
proposed parties are joint tort feasors.  Even if it is assumed
that some of the proposed parties are joint tort feasors, in their
absence also a finding can be recorded with regard to the
entitlement of the claimants and the petitioner herein can
recover the amount which it was forced to part with due to the
role of other joint tort feasors by initiating separate proceedings.
But, the summary proceedings in a claim petition arising out of
a motor vehicle accident cannot be enlarged and the Tribunal
cannot be asked to give a finding with respect to the role of
other parties in the accident.  The reliance on United India
Insurance Company Limited's case (supra) is of no avail as
that case arose out of an accident caused by Jayanthi Janatha
Express hitting a passenger bus at the unmanned level
crossing.  The decision was rendered on the facts of that case
only and it cannot be extended to the authorities like National
Highways Authority of India Limited who undertake laying of
the roads.

      The decision of the Supreme Court in Khenyei's case
(supra) is a complete answer to the points raised on behalf of
the petitioner.  The Tribunal also relied on the said decision.  In
view of the same, these Civil Revision Petitions are liable to be
dismissed and are accordingly dismissed.

      It is needless to observe that the dismissal of the
applications filed by the petitioner cannot be construed as an
expression of opinion on the contentions/defences raised by the
petitioner in its written statement and the Original Petition shall
be disposed of on merits uninfluenced by the observations made
herein above.

       The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand
closed.  There shall be no order as to costs.


________________________________    
(A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO, J)      
Dated:29-04-2016

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