Depense with personal attendance for each adjournment = the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are facing much difficulty in attending the Court on each and every adjournment. First petitioner is husband, second petitioner is father-in-law and third petitioner is mother-in-law of the second respondent. There is no dispute with regard to the identity of the petitioners. Even if the presence of the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 / respondent Nos.2 and 3 is dispensed with, no prejudice will be caused to the second respondent. Therefore, the presence of the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 / respondent Nos.2 and 3 in DVC No.34 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Judge for Prohibition and Excise), Srikakulam on each and every adjournment is hereby dispensed with. However, the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 / respondent Nos.2 and 3 shall appear before the trial Court as and when their presence is required.


CRLP 556 / 2016
CRLPSR 1253 / 2016CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
NAMMALAM LAKSHMI NARESH RAO AND 2 OTHERS  VSTHE STATE OF A.P.,REP.,PP AND ANOTHER



SUBJECT: DVC-2005 Conviction - Domestic Violence ActDISTRICT:  SRIKAKULAM

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY CRIMINAL PETITION No.556 OF 2016 ORDER: 1 This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/respondent Nos.1 to 3 in DVC No.34 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Judge for Prohibition and Excise), Srikakulam. 2 Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State. 3 A perusal of the record reveals that the second respondent filed a petition under section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (for short ‘DVC Act’) on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Judge for Prohibition and Excise), Srikakulam against the petitioners seeking various reliefs. After satisfying himself with the material placed before him, the learned Magistrate has taken the case on file and numbered it as DVC No.34 of 2015. Petitioners herein are respondent Nos.1 to 3 and the second respondent is the petitioner in DVC No.34 of 2015. There is no dispute between the parties with regard to their inter se relationship. 4 As per the principle enunciated in Valisetti Chandra Rekha v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1] , Mohit Yadam v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2] , Mohd. Akber Yaseen v. Rizwana Sultana [3] and Mangesh Sawant V. Minal Vijay Bhosale [4] the various reliefs sought under the provisions of D.V.C.Act are civil in nature. There is no element of criminality in the reliefs sought by the second respondent. The allegations made in the complaint, prima facie, reveal the role played by the petitioners. The maintainability of the petition itself is very much doubtful in view of the nature of the reliefs sought for by the second respondent. 5 Whether the second respondent is entitled to claim the reliefs against the petitioners or not is purely a question of fact, which requires a full fledged trial and the same cannot be gone into while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. If this Court expresses any opinion, touching the merits of the case, the same may cause prejudice to either of the parties. 6 Viewed from factual or legal aspects, I am of the considered view that this is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this stage. 7 The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are facing much difficulty in attending the Court on each and every adjournment. First petitioner is husband, second petitioner is father-in-law and third petitioner is mother-in-law of the second respondent. There is no dispute with regard to the identity of the petitioners. Even if the presence of the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 / respondent Nos.2 and 3 is dispensed with, no prejudice will be caused to the second respondent. Therefore, the presence of the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 / respondent Nos.2 and 3 in DVC No.34 of 2015 on the file of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Special Judge for Prohibition and Excise), Srikakulam on each and every adjournment is hereby dispensed with. However, the petitioner Nos.2 and 3 / respondent Nos.2 and 3 shall appear before the trial Court as and when their presence is required. 8 With the above observations, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this criminal petition, shall stand closed. ____________________ T. SUNIL CHOWDARY, J Date: 21 st January, 2016 Kvsn [1] 2010 (2) ALD (Crl.) 689 (AP) [2] 2010 (1) ALD (Crl.) 1 (AP) [3] 2010 (2) ALD (Crl.) 680 (AP) [4] 2012 Cri.L.J. 1413 (Bombay)

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