Order XVI Rule 1 of C.P.C. for summoning the Bank Manager for the purpose of speaking about the transactions mentioned in the statement of account for the period from 2005 to 2014, which was marked as Ex.A.10 in the execution application. This application was dismissed by the executing Court on the ground that there is no necessity to summon the Bank Manager.= The executing Court is right in holding that there is no necessity for the Bank Manager to speak about the transactions mentioned in Ex.A.10. Ex.A.10 is a statement of account which is already marked through the witness of the 2 nd judgment debtor. It is a statement furnished in the course of banking transactions. Therefore, unless the decree holder challenges the very admissibility of Ex.A.10, it is not necessary to summon the Bank Manager to prove its contents. Moreover, the only purpose for which Ex.A.10 is marked is to show the availability of funds on the date on which the third cheque was dishonoured. For this purpose, Ex.A.10 itself is sufficient and there is no necessity to examine the Bank Manager.


CRP 342 / 2016
CRPSR 31705 / 2015CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
K SUBASHINI, KRISHNA DIST  VSMARGADARSI CHIT FUND LTD., KRISHNA DIST & 7 OTHERS

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 342 of 2016
ORDER:
This revision arises out of an order passed by the executing Court dismissing an application filed by the petitioner/2 nd judgment debtor for summoning and examining the Manager of a Bank, which happens to be the Bank on which a cheque was drawn by the 2 nd judgment debtor in favour of the 1 st respondent/decree holder.
2. Heard Mr. Nimmagadda Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the petitioner/2 nd judgment debtor, and Mr. P. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/decree holder.
3. Towards full and final settlement of the claim of the decree holder upon all the debtors, the 2 nd judgment debtor appears to have issued three cheques, two of which were honoured and the third cheque got dishonoured.
 4. Therefore, the decree holder proceeded with the execution. The 2 nd judgment debtor filed an application in E.A.No.178 of 2012 contending that the entire claim has been settled. Both sides adduced evidence in the said execution application and it appears that it is at the final stage of disposal.
5. At that stage, the 2 nd judgment debtor took out an application in I.A.No.168 of 2015 under Order XVI Rule 1 of C.P.C. for summoning the Bank Manager for the purpose of speaking about the transactions mentioned in the statement of account for the period from 2005 to 2014, which was marked as Ex.A.10 in the execution application. This application was dismissed by the executing Court on the ground that there is no necessity to summon the Bank Manager. Aggrieved by the same, the 2 nd judgment debtor is before me.
6. The executing Court is right in holding that there is no necessity for the Bank Manager to speak about the transactions mentioned in Ex.A.10. Ex.A.10 is a statement of account which is already marked through the witness of the 2 nd judgment debtor. It is a statement furnished in the course of banking transactions. Therefore, unless the decree holder challenges the very admissibility of Ex.A.10, it is not necessary to summon the Bank Manager to prove its contents. 
7. Moreover, the only purpose for which Ex.A.10 is marked is to show the availability of funds on the date on which the third cheque was dishonoured. For this purpose, Ex.A.10 itself is sufficient and there is no necessity to examine the Bank Manager. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions if any pending in the revision shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. __________________________ V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J 3 rd June, 2016 cbs HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 342 of 2016 3 rd June, 2016 cbs

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