The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who „is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty‟, whereas the offences contemplated in the PC Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former PC Act was materially imported in the new PC Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code.

1

GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

APHC010634402018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI

WP 30961/2018

Mr.K.Srinivasa Rao Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh

2024:APHC:6896

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY ,THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF JANUARY

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

[

3462

]

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDAR

WRIT PETITION NO: 30961 OF 2018

Between:

Mr.K.Srinivasa Rao ...PETITIONER(S)

AND

THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner(s):SRI. V R MACHAVARAM

Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR REVENUE (AP)

The Court made the following:

ORDER:

Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned

Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for ACB

Cases, appearing for the 2nd respondent.

2) The petitioner is before this Court impugning the order of

sanction, dated 16.02.2018, issued vide G.O.Ms.No.77,

whereby the competent authority was pleased to grant sanction

to the 2nd respondent to prosecute the petitioner before the

designated Court for the offences punishable under the

provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short,

“the P.C.Act”). The impugned order is assailed on the short

ground of it being vitiated by non-application of mind.

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

3) The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are that,

while the petitioner was working as an In-charge Deputy

Commercial Tax Officer at Kadapa, the 2nd respondent initiated

investigations and pursuant to that it determined that the

petitioner possessed income, highly disproportionate to his

known sources of income. On the said basis, search warrants

were got issued by the Special Judge for Special Police

Establishment and Anti Corruption Bureau Cases, Vijayawada,

on 06.10.2010 and in pursuance of the warrants, the

residential and office premises of the petitioner and his relatives

were searched. The Bank Locker No.16 at Andhra Bank,

Emani Village of Duggirala Mandal, Guntur District, was also

subjected to search. Pursuant to the searches, inventories were

prepared and various articles found in the various premises

and the information gleaned from the petitioner and his family

members were drawn-up and after giving reasonable

allowances, the 2nd respondent computed the income of the

petitioner from known sources and concluded that the income

from known sources for the relevant check-period amounted to

Rs.78,53,578/- and after giving deductions towards expenses

at the rate of 33%, concluded that the assets available in the

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

hands of the petitioner would amount to Rs.44,83,840/-. But,

the computation of the assets revealed that the total value of

the assets seized amounted to Rs.3,72,90,161/-, in other

words, nearly eight times more than the known sources of

income. The said materials along with the copy of the F.I.R.,

statements of witnesses, inventory proceedings and final report

were placed before the competent authority and the competent

authority, after applying its mind, has proceeded to consider it

a case which requires to be taken to its logical end, thereby

permitting the prosecution of the petitioner before the

designated Court. Paras.4, 5, 7 and 8 of the impugned order

read thus:

“4. AND WHEREAS, initially at the time of

registration of the Cases, the then Inquiring Officer has taken

the Check Period from 07-11-1981 to 08-10-2010 i.e, from the

date of joining into service to the date of searches. But,

subsequently the check period for calculation of the Assets,

Income and Expenditure of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao is

taken from 31.12.1995 (ie., subsequent to the previous check

period in Cr.No.6/RCA-TPT/1995) till date of house searches

on 08.10.2010.

5. AND WHEREAS, it is alleged that Sri Kondaveeti

Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c Deputy Commissioner of

Commercial Taxes, Kadapa acquired assets on his name and

in the names of his family members to the extent of

Rs.4,17,74,001-00 (RUPEES FOUR CRORES SEVENTEEN

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4

GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

LAKHS SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE ONLY) during

the said check period. The total income of Sri Kondaveeti

Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c Deputy Commissioner of

Commercial Taxes, Kadapa from all the above sources during

the above check period is estimated as Rs.78,53,678-00

(RUPEES SEVENTY EIGHT LAKHS FIFTY THREE THOUSAND

FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY EIGHT ONLY). The total

expenditure of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly

I/c.Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa

during the check period is worked out to Rs.33,69,738-00

(RUPEES THIRTY THREE LAKHS SIXTY NINE THOUSAND

SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY EIGHT ONLY). The likely

savings of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c.Deputy

Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa during the check

period was Rs.44,83,840-00 (RUPEES FORTY FOUR LAKHS

EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY

ONLY). As such, Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly

I/c.Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa was

in possession of disproportionate assets of Rs.3,72,90,161-00

(RUPEES THREE CRORES SEVENTY TWO LAKHS NINETY

THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY ONE ONLY). (Total

Assets of Rs.4,17,74,001-00 – Rs.44,83,840-00 likely

savings) which he acquired by corrupt and dubious methods

and failed to account satisfactorily.

6. …..

7. AND WHEREAS, after completion of the

investigation, the Investigating Officer served notice to the

accused officer on 09.04.2011 and also issued two reminder

notices on 23.04.2011 and 08.05.2011 to offer his

explanation and issued another notice on 22.09.2017, on

receipt of the order of the Hon‟ble High Court in Criminal

Petition No.5171 of 2011 dated 11.09.2017, but he did not

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

offer his explanation till date, even though opportunity was

given to him.

8. AND WHEREAS, the Government of Andhra

Pradesh being the competent authority to remove Sri

Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, worked as I/c. Deputy

Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa, from service

after fully and carefully examining the material i.e. copy of

FIR, Inventory Proceedings, Statements of Witnesses and

relevant record and Final Report placed before them in

respect of the above said allegation and having regard to the

facts and circumstances of the case, consider that Sri

Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c. Deputy Commissioner

of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa should be prosecuted in a court

of law.”

4) Learned counsel for the petitioner would strenuously

contend that the sanctioning authority has failed to see that the

amount listed as having been available in the Bank Accounts

has been doubled without any justification and that though the

amounts totaled only about Rs.20,00,000/-, the same has

been recorded as Rs.1,20,00,000/-; similarly, a property

document, where the value of the property has been recorded

as Rs.4,00,000/-, has been valued at Rs.19,00,000/-; and

pointing out these instances, he would submit that it has to be

concluded that the competent authority has failed to address

itself to the material on record and thereby failed in applying its

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6

GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

mind and hence, the same vitiates the impugned order of

sanction.

5) In the considered opinion of this Court, the case

canvassed is one that ought to be canvassed and adjudicated

by the Courts of Law. It is no more res integra that the

sanction proceeding is an administrative act. That being so

and further in the light of the settled position, that the

delinquent has no right of audience before the sanctioning

authority, it can be safely and is accordingly concluded, that

the act of granting of permission is not an adversarial

proceeding, as the order does not also automatically result in a

conviction. It merely permits the prosecuting agency to set in

motion the proceedings before the Courts of Law.

6) The learned counsel for the petitioner would further place

reliance on the ruling of the Hon‟ble Apex Court rendered in the

case of State of Karnataka v. Ameer Jan1 and in particular

placed reliance on the observations in para.7, which read thus:

“7. We agree that an order of sanction should not be

construed in a pedantic manner. But, it is also well settled

that the purpose for which an order of sanction is required to

be passed should always be borne in mind. Ordinarily, the

1

(2007) 11 SCC 273

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

sanctioning authority is the best person to judge as to

whether the public servant concerned should receive the

protection under the Act by refusing to accord sanction for his

prosecution or not.”

7) This Court has no quarrel with the proposition of law laid

down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. It is but a well settled

proposition, that the competent authority issuing the sanction

order is not required to be judgmental nor is the order of

sanction, be adjudicatory in nature. The proceeding of the

competent authority is merely required to reflect a subjective

satisfaction of the competent authority, arrived at on an

objective appraisal of the material placed before it. As noted

supra, a reading of Paras.4 to 6 and 8, clearly establishes the

fact that the competent authority has applied its mind to the

material placed before it and has concluded that the assets

available in the hands of the delinquent are disproportionate to

the known sources of income and in that view of the matter,

this Court does not find any good ground, which would enable

the Court to draw a conclusion that the order impugned is

vitiated by non-application of mind.

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

8. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Subramanian

Swamy v. Manmohan Singh2, observed as under:

“20. The learned Attorney General argued that the

question of grant of sanction for prosecution of a public

servant charged with any of the offences enumerated in

Section 19(1) arises only at the stage when the court decides

to take cognizance and any request made prior to that is

premature. He submitted that the embargo contained in

Section 19(1) of the Act is applicable to the court which is

competent to take cognizance of an offence punishable under

Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed

by a public servant and there is no provision for grant of

sanction at a stage before the competent court applies its

mind to the issue of taking cognizance.

34. The argument of the learned Attorney General that

the question of granting sanction for prosecution of a public

servant charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises

only at the stage of taking cognizance and not before that is

neither supported by the plain language of the section nor the

judicial precedents relied upon by him. Though, the term

“cognizance” has not been defined either in the 1988 Act or

CrPC, the same has acquired a definite meaning and

connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal

parlance cognizance is “taking judicial notice by the court of

law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented

before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for

initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or

matter judicially”.

2

(2012) 3 SCC 64

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

44. We may also observe that grant or refusal of

sanction is not a quasi-judicial function and the person for

whose prosecution the sanction is sought is not required to be

heard by the competent authority before it takes a decision in

the matter. What is required to be seen by the competent

authority is whether the facts placed before it which, in a

given case, may include the material collected by the

complainant or the investigating agency prima facie disclose

commission of an offence by a public servant. If the

competent authority is satisfied that the material placed

before it is sufficient for prosecution of the public servant,

then it is required to grant sanction. If the satisfaction of the

competent authority is otherwise, then it can refuse sanction.

In either case, the decision taken on the complaint made by a

citizen is required to be communicated to him and if he feels

aggrieved by such decision, then he can avail of appropriate

legal remedy.

46. In Vineet Narain [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC

(Cri) 264] , the Court referred to the allegations made in the

writ petition that the government agencies like CBI and the

Revenue Authorities have failed to perform their duties and

legal obligations inasmuch as they did not investigate into the

matters arising out of seizure of the so-called “Jain Diaries” in

certain raids conducted by CBI. The Court took note of the

allegation that the arrest of some terrorists led to the

discovery of financial support to them by clandestine and

illegal means and a nexus between several important

politicians, bureaucrats and criminals, who were recipients of

money from unlawful sources, and proceeded to observe:

(Vineet Narain case [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 264] ,

SCC pp. 200-01, para 3)

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

“3. The facts and circumstances of the present case do

indicate that it is of utmost public importance that this

matter is examined thoroughly by this Court to ensure

that all government agencies, entrusted with the duty to

discharge their functions and obligations in accordance

with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly the concept of

equality enshrined in the Constitution and the basic tenet

of the rule of law: „Be you ever so high, the law is above

you.‟ Investigation into every accusation made against

each and every person on a reasonable basis, irrespective

of the position and status of that person, must be

conducted and completed expeditiously. This is

imperative to retain public confidence in the impartial

working of the government agencies.”

47. After examining various facets of the matter in detail, the

three-Judge Bench in its final order in Vineet Narain [(1998) 1

SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] observed: (SCC p. 268, paras

55-56)

“55. These principles of public life are of general

application in every democracy and one is expected to

bear them in mind while scrutinising the conduct of every

holder of a public office. It is trite that the holders of

public offices are entrusted with certain powers to be

exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office

is held by them in trust for the people. Any deviation from

the path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach

of trust and must be severely dealt with instead of being

pushed under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to an

offence, it must be promptly investigated and the offender

against whom a prima facie case is made out should be

prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty of law is

upheld and the rule of law vindicated. It is the duty of the

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

judiciary to enforce the rule of law and, therefore, to

guard against erosion of the rule of law.

56. The adverse impact of lack of probity in public life

leading to a high degree of corruption is manifold. It also

has adverse effect on foreign investment and funding from

the International Monetary Fund and World Bank who

have warned that future aid to underdeveloped countries

may be subject to the requisite steps being taken to

eradicate corruption, which prevents international aid

from reaching those for whom it is meant. Increasing

corruption has led to investigative journalism which is of

value to a free society. The need to highlight corruption in

public life through the medium of public interest litigation

invoking judicial review may be frequent in India but is

not unknown in other countries: R. v. Secy. of State for

Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World

Development Movement Ltd. [(1995) 1 WLR 386 : (1995) 1

All ER 611] ”

48. In para 58 of the judgment in Vineet Narain [(1998) 1 SCC

226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] , the Court gave several directions

in relation to CBI, CVC and the Enforcement Directorate. In

para 58(I)(15), the Court gave the following direction: (SCC p.

270)

“58. (I)(15) Time-limit of three months for grant of

sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered to.

However, additional time of one month may be allowed

where consultation is required with the Attorney General

(AG) or any other law officer in the AG's office.”

49. CVC, after taking note of the judgment of the Punjab and

Haryana High Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab [1996

Cri LJ 2962 (P&H)] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

(1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Supt. of Police (CBI) v.

Deepak Chowdhary [(1995) 6 SCC 225 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1095]

, framed guidelines which were circulated vide Office Order

No. 31/5/05 dated 12-5-2005. The relevant clauses of the

guidelines are extracted below:

“2(i) Grant of sanction is an administrative act. The

purpose is to protect the public servant from harassment

by frivolous or vexatious prosecution and not to shield the

corrupt. The question of giving opportunity to the public

servant at that stage does not arise. The sanctioning

authority has only to see whether the facts would prima

facie constitute the offence.

(ii) The competent authority cannot embark upon an

inquiry to judge the truth of the allegations on the basis

of representation which may be filed by the accused

person before the sanctioning authority, by asking the IO

to offer his comments or to further investigate the matter

in the light of representation made by the accused person

or by otherwise holding a parallel investigation/enquiry

by calling for the record/report of his department.

***

(vii) However, if in any case, the sanctioning authority

after consideration of the entire material placed before it,

entertains any doubt on any point the competent

authority may specify the doubt with sufficient particulars

and may request the authority who has sought sanction

to clear the doubt. But that would be only to clear the

doubt in order that the authority may apply its mind

properly, and not for the purpose of considering the

representations of the accused which may be filed while

the matter is pending sanction.

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

(viii) If the sanctioning authority seeks the comments of

the IO while the matter is pending before it for sanction, it

will almost be impossible for the sanctioning authority to

adhere to the time-limit allowed by the Supreme Court in

Vineet Narain case [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri)

307] .”

50. The aforementioned guidelines are in conformity with the

law laid down by this Court that while considering the issue

regarding grant or refusal of sanction, the only thing which

the competent authority is required to see is whether the

material placed by the complainant or the investigating

agency prima facie discloses commission of an offence. The

competent authority cannot undertake a detailed inquiry to

decide whether or not the allegations made against the public

servant are true.

54. It is not possible to appreciate that even though the

appellant repeatedly wrote letters to Respondent 1

highlighting the seriousness of the allegations made in his

first representation and the fact that he had already supplied

the facts and documents which could be made the basis for

grant of sanction to prosecute Respondent 2 and also pointed

out that as per the judgments of this Court, detailed inquiry

was not required to be made into the allegations, the officers

concerned in the PMO kept the matter pending and then took

the shelter of the fact that CBI had registered the case and

the investigation was pending. In our view, the officers in the

PMO and the Ministry of Law and Justice, were duty-bound to

apprise Respondent 1 about seriousness of allegations made

by the appellant and the judgments of this Court including

the directions contained in para 58(I) of the judgment in

Vineet Narain case [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] as

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

also the guidelines framed by CVC so as to enable him to take

appropriate decision in the matter.

55. By the very nature of the office held by him, Respondent 1

is not expected to personally look into the minute details of

each and every case placed before him and has to depend on

his advisers and other officers. Unfortunately, those who were

expected to give proper advice to Respondent 1 and place full

facts and legal position before him failed to do so. We have no

doubt that if Respondent 1 had been apprised of the true

factual and legal position regarding the representation made

by the appellant, he would have surely taken appropriate

decision and would not have allowed the matter to linger for a

period of more than one year.

56. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is

set aside. It is declared that the appellant had the right to file

a complaint for prosecuting Respondent 2. However, keeping

in view the fact that the Court of the Special Judge, CBI has

already taken cognizance of the offences allegedly committed

by Respondent 2 under the 1988 Act, we do not consider it

necessary to give any other direction in the matter. At the

same time, we deem it proper to observe that in future every

competent authority shall take appropriate action on the

representation made by a citizen for sanction of the

prosecution of a public servant strictly in accordance with the

direction contained in Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1998) 1

SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] and the guidelines framed by

CVC.

61. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa [(1998) 6 SCC

411 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] , this Court compared Section 19

of the PC Act with Section 197 of the Code. After considering

several decisions on the point and also considering Section 6

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

of the old PC Act, 1947 which is almost identical with Section

19 of the PC Act, 1988 and also noting the Law Commission's

Report, this Court in para 13 of Kalicharan [(1998) 6 SCC 411

: 1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] came to the following conclusions:

(SCC pp. 415-16)

“13. … The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the

Code concerns a public servant who „is accused of any

offence alleged to have been committed by him while

acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official

duty‟, whereas the offences contemplated in the PC Act

are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly

or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official

duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the

distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding

provision in the former PC Act was materially imported in

the new PC Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the

change made in Section 197 of the Code.”

62. The above passage in Kalicharan [(1998) 6 SCC 411 :

1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] has been quoted with approval

subsequently by this Court in Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar

[(2007) 1 SCC 49 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] SCC at p. 54, para

9. In para 10, this Court held in Lalu Prasad [(2007) 1 SCC 49

: (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] that: (SCC p. 54)

“10. … Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act

operate in conceptually different fields.”

9) That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner would

make a further attempt, to draw the Court into an exercise of

computation and would endeavor to point out that a certain

assets have been excessively valued or over-valued. For

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

instance, the balance available in the bank accounts and the

value of a particular immovable property, are pointed out as

illustrations. Even assuming for argument sake, credit can be

given to such an argument and even if the said amounts are

discounted, still the amount in the hands of the petitioner/

delinquent is highly disproportionate to his known sources of

income. In that view of the matter, this Court does not find

any merit in it.

10) At this juncture, the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd

respondent would submit that the petitioner had preferred a

petition invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C.,

canvassing the merits of the case and a Co-ordinate Bench,

after considering the matter on merits, has been pleased to

reject the same.

11) It is seen that the F.I.R. was registered on 06.10.2010.

Despite the passage of nearly fourteen years, the prosecution is

yet to reach its logical end. If such state of affairs is permitted,

it would only sound the death knell of the A.C.B.‟s efforts to

curb corrupt practices in the State machinery. In that view

also, this Court deems it necessary to direct the concerned

Court i.e., the Special Judge for Special Police Establishment

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

and Anti-Corruption Bureau Cases, Vijayawada, to expedite the

hearing and disposal of the case. The 2nd respondent shall take

all steps to co-operate for early disposal of the case. At any

rate, the Special Court shall endeavor to hear and dispose of

the case within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a

copy of this order.

12) It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove

are for the purpose of disposal of the instant Writ Petition and

the trial Court shall consider the material placed before it

independently and pass appropriate orders and not construe

the observations as a pronouncement on the merits of the case.

13) Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.

Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any,

shall stand closed.

 ________________________

 JUSTICE G.NARENDAR

Date:25.01.2024.

Note:

1) Mark a copy of this order to the jurisdictional trial Court.

2) L.R. copy to be marked.

 B/O

 cs

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

* THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDAR

+ Writ Petition No.30961 of 2018

% Dated 25-01-2024

# K.Srinivasa Rao

….. Petitioner

Vs.

$ 1.The State of A.P., rep. by its Special Chief Secretary,

 Revenue (Vigilance-II) Dept., Velagapudi, A.P. & Anr.

..Respondents

! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri V.R. Machavaram

^ Counsel for the 1st Respondent : Ld.G.P. for Revenue

 Counsel for the 2nd Respondent : Smt.A.Gayathri Reddy,

 Ld.Standing Counsel-cum-

 Spl. P.P. for ACB

<GIST:

> HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred :

1. (2007) 11 SCC 273

2. (2012) 3 SCC 64

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GN, J.

W.P.No.30961 of 2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

+ Writ Petition No.30961 of 2018

K.Srinivasa Rao

….. Petitioner

Vs.

1.The State of A.P., rep. by its Special Chief Secretary,

 Revenue (Vigilance-II) Dept., Velagapudi, A.P. & Anr.

..Respondents

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 25-01-2024

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDER

1) Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

 -Yes2) Whether the copies of judgment may be marked

to

 Law Reporters/Journals

 -Yes3) Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see the

fair copy of the Judgment?

 -YesJUSTICE G. NARENDAR

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