Thursday, November 28, 2013

Services of Khazi is an optional one - choice of bride and bridegroom - he has no judicial functions - he can issue marriage certificates before whom the marriages performed - he is not for fee - he is appointed by Govt. directly under Khazi Act - Wakf board has no business to interfere with the functions of Khazi - Hence the circular is in valid = The A.P. State Wakf Board rep. by its Chief Executive Officer Razzak Manzil Haj House Nampally, Hyderabad Hafiz Syed Saleem Basha and another = published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydispfree.aspx?filename=7897

Services of Khazi are an optional one - choice of bride and bridegroom - he has no judicial functions - he can issue marriage certificates before whom the marriages performed - he is not for fee - he is appointed by Govt. directly under Khazi Act - Wakf board has no business to interfere with the functions of Khazi - Hence the circular is in valid =

 A Circular issued by the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board (for short, "the
Board") vide its No.9/Qazat/2000 dated 30-11-2002 determining the fee payable to
the Kazis/Naib Kazis for performance of a marriage and requiring Kazis to obtain
marriage booklets, shianamas and registers from the Inspector Auditors, A.P.
State Wakf Board of the respective Districts for a sum of 510/- for ten
marriages, =
 No doubt, the provisions aforementioned invest the Government with the
power to appoint a Kazi and the Kazi in turn to appoint a Naib Kazi, but the Act
neither confers any legal right on Kazi nor does it cast any duty on him.  A
glance at the provisions of the Act leaves no room for doubt that appointment of
a Kazi/Naib Kazi is not an employment and to put it precisely it is a simple
empowerment to perform marriages.  =
The Act does not guarantee any clientele to a
Kazi, and on the contrary it leaves to the discretion of the bride/bridegroom to
choose anybody as their Kazi and from any place, immaterial whether he is
appointed as a Kazi by the Government or not. 
 It is not part of marriage to pay
any fee to the Kazi and under the provisions of the Act, one who needs services
of a Kazi is free to choose a Kazi of his choice and there is no mandate from
the Act to pay him the fee.  =
Coming to the challenge thrown to the Circular requiring the Kazi to
purchase marriage booklets, we do not find any power traceable to the provisions
of the Act, rightly so because the Act does not confer any legal right on him by
such appointment and does not mandate performance of marriages by him alone.  
More so, as stated above, the Act leaves the parties free to make a choice of a
Kazi, and it is only the nikkanama (the deed of nikka) which is recognized to be
the only legally valid document.  =

 the Wakf Act was primarily
concerned with administration of wakfs and the matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto. 
 Obviously, impugned Circular regulating Kazis and their
functioning was beyond the scope of the Wakf Boards constituted under the Wakf 
Act and thereby the Circular of the Board mandating the Kazis to purchase
marriage booklets, shianamas and registers from Inspector Auditors of A.P. State
Wakf Board is clearly beyond the scope of the Wakf Board constituted under the
Wakf Act.  Thus, we rule that the impugned Circular insofar as it determines
payment of fee of Kazi for performance of marriages and making it obligatory
upon the Kazi to purchase marriage booklet from the Wakf Board is not
sustainable in law.

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI NISAR AHMAD KAKRU AND THE HON HON'BLE SRI                
WRIT APPEAL No.70 of 2011  

30-04-2011

The A.P. State Wakf Board rep. by its Chief Executive Officer Razzak Manzil Haj
House Nampally, Hyderabad  

Hafiz Syed Saleem Basha and another

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Mr. M.A.K. Mukheed        

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT No.1: Mr. P. Veera Reddy        
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT No.2:   -      

:JUDGMENT: (per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Shri Nisar Ahmad Kakru)

1.      A Circular issued by the Andhra Pradesh State Wakf Board (for short, "the
Board") vide its No.9/Qazat/2000 dated 30-11-2002 determining the fee payable to
the Kazis/Naib Kazis for performance of a marriage and requiring Kazis to obtain
marriage booklets, shianamas and registers from the Inspector Auditors, A.P.
State Wakf Board of the respective Districts for a sum of 510/- for ten
marriages, came to be questioned by medium of a Writ Petition No.634 of 2005 and
the Writ Petition succeeded on the strength of a Division Bench judgment of this
Court in Qazi Syed Abdullah Mohammadi and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh1,  
the relevant paragraph whereof may be noticed.
        "For the reasons mentioned above, and in view of the above conclusions as
arrived at, we hold that under the provisions of the Act, no power is conferred
either on the State Government or even on the A.P. Wakf Board to deal with, fix
or meddle with or otherwise the fee structure in respect of duties or functions
of Kazis or Naib Kazis."

2.      Fixation of fee being in utter disregard to the above said judgment of the
Division Bench, we record our concurrence with the impugned judgment of learned
single Judge.  While doing so, we would like to add to the reasoning that
supports the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court.
3.      The authoritative commentaries of Ameer Ali's Mohommedan Law, Fifth 
Edition, traces the genesis of the Kazis Act, as follows:
        "In the Hedaya, Book XX the principal powers and duties of Kazi have been
stated at some length.  
Kazi was chiefly a Judicial Officer.  
He was appointed
by the State and may be said to have corresponded to a Judge or Magistrate. 
 In
addition to his functions under the Muhammadan Law, the Kazi in this country,
before the advent of British rule, appeared to have performed certain other
duties, partly of a secular and partly of a religious nature.
On the
introduction of the British rule, Judges and Magistrate took the place of Kazis,
and the Kazi in his judicial capacity disappeared, but the British Government,
though no longer recognizing the judicial functions of the Kazi, did not abolish
the office.
By certain Regulations the appointment of Kazi-ul-Kuzzat and Kazis
by the State was provided for, and the performance of their non-judicial duties
was recognized by law.
 In 1864 by Act 11 of that year all the Regulations
relating to the appointments of Kazis by Government and the duties to be
discharged by them were repealed.  Act 11 of 1864, however, raised a difficulty
of a sort which was not anticipated at the time it was passed. 
 To remove the
difficulties being faced by Muslim Community by Kazis Bill was introduced in the
Legislature."

4.      While enacting the Kazis Act, 1880 (for short, 'the Act') the statement of
objects and reasons therein clearly reflect that the said Act "confers no legal
rights or duties on Kazis and simply in order to satisfy the wants of the
Muhammadan community, provides for appointment of Kazis by Government, leaving   
the position and duties of Kazis, whatever they may be as they now are, and to
prevent any misapprehension on this point, a saving clause has been added to the
effect that 
nothing in the Bill confers any judicial or other powers on a kazi,
or makes his presence necessary at any marriage or other ceremony at which his presence is not now necessary." 
5.      The Select Committee which had examined the Bill, preceeding the Kazis
Act, also recorded that the "result of the Bill as it now stands will be that
there will be a Kazi appointed by the Government for those who choose to avail
themselves of the services, but that those who prefer to employ any other so
called Kazi will be at liberty to do so."
6.      It would be appropriate to reproduce the Kazis Act, 1880 (for short, 'the
Act').
        An Act for the appointment of persons to the office of Kazi.
        Whereas by the preamble to Act No.11 of 1864.
An Act to repeal the law
relating to the offices of Hindu and Muhammadan Law officers and to the offices
of Kazi-ul-Kuzaat and of Kazi, and to abolish the former offices it was among
other things declared that it was inexpedient that the appointment of the Kazi-
ul-Kuzaat, or of City, Town or Pargana Kazis should be made by the Government,
and by the same Act the enactments relating to the appointment by Government of 
the said officers were repealed; and whereas by the usage of the Muhammadan 
community in some parts of India the presence of Kazis appointed by the
Government is required at the celebration of marriages and the performance of
certain other rites and ceremonies, and it is therefore expedient that the
Government should again be empowered to appoint persons to the office of Kazi;
It is hereby enacted as follows:

        1. Short title.-
This Act may be called The Kazis Act,1880;

          Local extent.- 
It extends, in the first instance, only to the
territories administered by the Governor of Fort St. George in Council.  But the
Government of any other State may, from time to time, by notification in the
Official Gazette, extend it to the whole or any part of the territories under
its administration.

        2.  Power to appoint Kazis for any local area.-
Wherever it appears to the
State Government that any considerable number of the Muhammadans resident in any   
local area desire that one or more Kazis should be appointed for such local
area, the State Government may, if it thinks fit, after consulting the principal
Muhammadan residents of such local area, select one or more fit persons and
appoint him or them to be Kazis for such local area.

        If any question arises whether any person has been rightly appointed Kazi
under this section, the decision thereof by the State Government shall be
conclusive.

        The State Government may, if it thinks fit, suspend or remove any Kazi
appointed under this section who is guilty of any misconduct in the execution of
his office, or who is for a continuous period of six months absent from the
local area for which he is appointed, or leaves such local area for the purpose
of residing elsewhere, or is declared an insolvent, or desires to be discharged
from the office, or who refuses or becomes in the opinion of the State
Government unfit, or personally incapable, to discharge the duties of the
office.

        3.  Naib Kazis.- 

Any Kazi appointed under this Act may appoint one or more
persons as his naib or naibs to act in his place in all or any of the matters
appertaining to his office throughout the whole or in any portion of the local
area for which he is appointed, and may suspend or remove any naib so appointed.

        When any Kazi is suspended or removed under section 2, his naib or naibs
(if any) shall be deemed to be suspended or removed, as the case may be.

        4. Nothing in Act to confer judicial or administrative powers; or to
render the presence of Kazi necessary; or to prevent any one acting as Kazi.-

Nothing herein contained, and no appointment made hereunder, shall be deemed- 

(a) to confer any judicial or administrative powers on any Kazi or Naib Kazi
appointed hereunder; or
(b) to render the presence of a Kazi or Naib Kazi necessary at the celebration
of any marriage or the performance of any rite or ceremony; or
(c) to prevent any person discharging any of the functions of a Kazi."

7.      The preamble, report of the Select Committee and the Objects of the Bill
as well as the provisions of the Act quoted above make it manifest that it is
entirely for the persons relevant to the ceremony to avail the services of the
Kazi appointed by the Government or even the one who has no appointment to his 
credit to act as Kazi.
8.      No doubt, the provisions aforementioned invest the Government with the
power to appoint a Kazi and the Kazi in turn to appoint a Naib Kazi, but the Act
neither confers any legal right on Kazi nor does it cast any duty on him.  A
glance at the provisions of the Act leaves no room for doubt that appointment of
a Kazi/Naib Kazi is not an employment and to put it precisely it is a simple
empowerment to perform marriages.  
The Act does not guarantee any clientele to a
Kazi, and on the contrary it leaves to the discretion of the bride/bridegroom to
choose anybody as their Kazi and from any place, immaterial whether he is
appointed as a Kazi by the Government or not. 
 It is not part of marriage to pay
any fee to the Kazi and under the provisions of the Act, one who needs services
of a Kazi is free to choose a Kazi of his choice and there is no mandate from
the Act to pay him the fee.  
The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has
not joined the issue in respect of the legal position that the Act does not
mandate payment of fee to a Kazi/Naib Kazi.
Examining from any angle, fixation
of fee of a Kazi by the Government is absolutely contrary to the provisions of
the Act and without any power.
9.      Coming to the challenge thrown to the Circular requiring the Kazi to
purchase marriage booklets, we do not find any power traceable to the provisions
of the Act, rightly so because the Act does not confer any legal right on him by
such appointment and does not mandate performance of marriages by him alone.
More so, as stated above, the Act leaves the parties free to make a choice of a
Kazi, and it is only the nikkanama (the deed of nikka) which is recognized to be
the only legally valid document.
10.   The objects and reasons for enactment
of Wakf Act 1995 as well as earlier Wakf Act, 1954 (now repealed by 1995 Act)
were to set up Wakf Boards with power of superintendence and control over the
management of individual wakfs.
Thus it emerges that the Wakf Act was primarily
concerned with administration of wakfs and the matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto. 
 Obviously, impugned Circular regulating Kazis and their
functioning was beyond the scope of the Wakf Boards constituted under the Wakf 
Act and thereby the Circular of the Board mandating the Kazis to purchase
marriage booklets, shianamas and registers from Inspector Auditors of A.P. State
Wakf Board is clearly beyond the scope of the Wakf Board constituted under the
Wakf Act.  Thus, we rule that the impugned Circular insofar as it determines
payment of fee of Kazi for performance of marriages and making it obligatory
upon the Kazi to purchase marriage booklet from the Wakf Board is not
sustainable in law.
11.     The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.  No costs.

?1 2011 (1) ALD 116 (DB)

MADRAS HIGH COURT - Writ of Habeas Corpus by divorced mother - who lost custody of minor children to the husband under Muslim divorce decree before Khazi - not maintainable as it is binding on her until cancelled through proper course of law = Tmt.Aisha Rahman Ali .. Petitioner vs 1. The Inspector of Police, = published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=43315

Writ of Habeas Corpus by divorced mother - who lost custody of minor children to the husband under Muslim divorce decree before Khazi - not maintainable as it is binding on her until cancelled through proper course of law = 

a decree of divorce came to be passed by the Government Khazi, of Karur District on 22.01.2013. It is useful to reproduce the following portion of the decree of divorce, dated: 22.01.2013:
"It is further ordered, that the plaintiff, is the designated legal custodian and is responsible for the care and upbringing of children that were born issue of their marriage Zainab Ansari and Juveria Ansari. 
It is further ordered, that the plaintiff, to provide the expenses of the defendant and the two children during the separated period (6-Jan-2012 to 11-Jan-2013), the settlement amount of Seven hundred and fifty thousand Indian Rupees only (INR 750,000/-) on or before 24-Jan-2013. 
It is further ordered, both parties shall hereafter continue to live separately and neither shall annoy, molest, interfere with or harass each other in anyway or any manner either directly or indirectly. 
May Allah The Al-Mightly forgive the unrighteous behaviours of both sides and bestow them an enjoyful new life."
A letter of undertaking on non-judicial Stamp Paper undertaking to act in keeping with the terms of divorce, has been executed by the petitioner's father on 22.01.2013. A copy thereof also is enclosed in the typed set of papers. In support of the contentions on certain wrongful acts committed by the petitioner-party on 20.06.2013, copy of complaint, dated 04.07.2013  lodged with the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, is produced.
the custody of the children had been duly agreed upon and confirmed by the decree of divorce passed by the Government Khazi, Karur District on 11.01.2013. 
As the personal law as applicable to the parties had been availed of, it would not be open for the petitioner to move this Court by way of the present HCP. 
If at all the petitioner had any grievance against the decree of divorce passed by the Government Khazi, she would have to challenge the same and seek custody of the children only under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act.

9. We have considered the rival submissions. 
We find that no reasonable cause is shown for custody of the children in the hands of petitioner. They have been placed in the hands of second respondent/father/natural guardian under a decree of divorce granted by the Government Khazi, a person authorised to grant divorce under the personal law applicable in the instant case.
It is to be noted that the petitioner has not disputed that such decree of divorce stood granted.
 She only contends that the same came to be granted upon deceiving her and  under threat and coercion. 
 Apex Court in Gohar Begam Vs. Suggi alias Nazma Begam and others (AIR 1960 SC 93 = AIR 1960 SCR(1) 597), 
wherein, as against the order of the High Court permitting custody of the minor children to the opposite party, the Apex Court had permitted custody of the child in the hands of the appellant, informing that though the appellant had a right under the Guardians and Wards Act to seek the custody of the child, the same would not be justification for denying her the right of custody of the child under Section 491 Cr.P.C. (Section 491 Cr.P.C. of the old code dealt with power to issue directions of the nature of a habeas corpus).
The decision relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is one wherein it was found that the appellant before the Apex Court was the mother of an illegitimate child. It was held that under  Muslim Law, she was entitled to custody and in circumstance where the respondents before the Apex Court had absolutely no right, custody was ordered in favour of the mother. 
We do not find the decision applicable in  the facts of the present case.
For the aforesaid reasons, this petition shall stand dismissed. It shall be open for the petitioner to take recourse to such remedy as available to her in law. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 19.08.2013
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.DHANAPALAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.SELVAM

H.C.P.No.1445 of 2013

Tmt.Aisha Rahman Ali .. Petitioner

vs

1. The Inspector of Police,
    Kuniamuthur Police Station,
    Coimbatore District.

2. Thiru.Jamal Mohammed Ansari .. Respondents

Habeas Corpus Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus to direct the first respondent to produce the bodies of (1) Kumari Jainab, aged about 3 years, (2) Kumari Jawveria, aged about 1 year, who are daughters of the petitioner, before the Court and direct to be handed over to the petitioner.

For petitioner :  Mr.P.Saravanan
For respondents :  Mr.A.N.Thambidurai,
  Additional Public Prosecutor (R1)
            Mr.M.Abdul Razack for
  M/s.Razhaq Associates (R2)


O R D E R

(The Order of the Court was made by C.T.Selvam,J)

The petitioner is the mother of the detenu-children, while second respondent is her husband. They have two minor children, namely Jainab, aged about 3 years and Jawveria, aged about 1 year. By way of this petition, the petitioner seeks production of the detenu-minor children.

2. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for first respondent as also learned counsel for second respondent.

3. It is alleged that the marriage between petitioner and second respondent was solmenised on 21.12.2008 at Dubai and registered at Personal Status Court, Dubai. After marriage, they lived jointly at Australia. Out of their wedlock, the first detenu-child was born on 31.08.2010 at Mercy Hospital for Women, Heidelberg and the second detenu-child was born at Ganga Hospital, Coimbatore on 06.06.2012. 
The Government Kazhi, Karur, granted divorce to them on 22.01.2013 and further ordered second respondent to provide expenses of the petitioner and the two detenu-children during the separation period from 06.01.2012 to 11.01.2013 and a settlement amount of Rs.7,50,000/-, on or before 24.01.2013.
It is contended by the petitioner that she was forced to sign papers which were written in Tamil. Though her place of birth is Coimbatore, she was brought up at Australia and cannot read or write Tamil.
On 22.01.2013, second respondent kidnapped petitioner's daughters, namely the detenu-children and immediately, she contacted her relatives to rescue her daughters. In the meantime, she went to Dubai. On 22.07.2013, petitioner lodged a complaint against second respondent to first respondent-Police, who have not taken action and hence, the present petition.

4. The petitioner has filed additional affidavit stating that she has filed divorce petition before Court at Dubai and on 30.10.2012, such Court granted divorce and ordered maintenance. To evade paying maintenance, second respondent forced petitioner to appear before the Government Khazi, who granted divorce on 22.01.2013 and ordered him to provide the expenses of the petitioner, etc., as stated above.

5. Pursuant to the direction of this Court, second respondent is present today along with the minor detenu-children. The counter affidavit of second respondent admits to marriage between second respondent and petitioner and that the children were born out of wedlock. Due to incompatibility, both of them decided to get legally separated and approached the Government Khazi, Karur and obtained a decree of divorce by consent on 11.01.2013 in the presence of seven witnesses. As per the terms of the said decree of divorce, second respondent agreed to pay a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- towards alimony to petitioner on or before 24.01.2013 and further, it was mutually agreed that two children shall be in second respondent's care and custody. As per the decree of divorce, a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- was paid to petitioner through her father on 22.01.2013 in the presence of Government Khazi, Karur District. The translated copy of the decree of divorce was also issued by the Government Khazi of Karur District on 22.01.2013 both to petitioner and second respondent. Hence, the contention of petitioner that she is not well versed in Tamil and was forced to sign on paper written in Tamil, is only an after-thought. On 22.01.2013, petitioner's father Rahman Ali and his brother Abdul Rahman received a sum of Rs.7,50,000/- towards alimony for petitioner in the presence of the Government Khazi, Karur District and they also acknowledged receipt thereof. The custody of the two children was voluntarily handed over to second respondent on 11.01.2013 itself when the decree of divorce was signed by second respondent and petitioner and she is fully aware that the custody of the children was lawfully given to second respondent under the said decree of divorce. The petitioner suppressing the facts, approached this Court after seven months, with mala-fide intention of getting custody of the children without availing the alternative remedy available under law. This petition is not maintainable, since second respondent is the father and natural guardian of the two minor children and their custody was lawfully given under the decree of divorce, dated 11.01.2013. The petitioner has  approached this Court by wrongfully informing that the children are in the unlawful detention of second respondent. The petitioner, on 20.06.2013, along with her mother, maternal grandmother and maternal uncle, along with four or five persons, alleged to be the members of Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), came to second respondent's house with an intention to unlawfully take the minor children with them and since second respondent strongly protested, they left the house. However, the children were shown to the petitioner as per her request. Anticipating further unlawful acts by them, second respondent lodged a complaint dated 04.07.2013 with the Commissioner of Police, Chennai on 05.07.2013 about the said incident and the said complaint is pending enquiry at the Maduravoyal Police Station. The petitioner suppressed the aforesaid incident that took place on 20.06.2013 in the residence of second respondent. The petitioner is having efficacious remedy under Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, for custody of the children and hence, this HCP is not maintainable.

6.  In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the second respondent placed reliance on a typed set of papers, which depicts the position that pursuant to an agreement for divorce, dated 11.01.2013, a decree of divorce came to be passed by the Government Khazi, of Karur District on 22.01.2013. It is useful to reproduce the following portion of the decree of divorce, dated: 22.01.2013:
"It is further ordered, that the plaintiff, is the designated legal custodian and is responsible for the care and upbringing of children that were born issue of their marriage Zainab Ansari and Juveria Ansari. 
It is further ordered, that the plaintiff, to provide the expenses of the defendant and the two children during the separated period (6-Jan-2012 to 11-Jan-2013), the settlement amount of Seven hundred and fifty thousand Indian Rupees only (INR 750,000/-) on or before 24-Jan-2013. 
It is further ordered, both parties shall hereafter continue to live separately and neither shall annoy, molest, interfere with or harass each other in anyway or any manner either directly or indirectly. 
May Allah The Al-Mightly forgive the unrighteous behaviours of both sides and bestow them an enjoyful new life."
A letter of undertaking on non-judicial Stamp Paper undertaking to act in keeping with the terms of divorce, has been executed by the petitioner's father on 22.01.2013. A copy thereof also is enclosed in the typed set of papers. In support of the contentions on certain wrongful acts committed by the petitioner-party on 20.06.2013, copy of complaint, dated 04.07.2013  lodged with the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, is produced.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner does not know Tamil and she had been threatened and coerced to sign the agreement for divorce on 11.01.2013. He further submitted that having required the relatives to rescue the minor daughters from the clutches of second respondent, petitioner had gone over to Dubai owing to certain predicaments. Since no action was taken, she lodged a complaint with first respondent Police on 22.07.2013. Having had no response, she has preferred the present HCP. The delay in moving the same is owing to genuine reasons. Learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Gohar Begam Vs. Suggi alias Nazma Begam and others (AIR 1960 SC 93 = AIR 1960 SCR(1) 597), 
wherein, as against the order of the High Court permitting custody of the minor children to the opposite party, the Apex Court had permitted custody of the child in the hands of the appellant, informing that though the appellant had a right under the Guardians and Wards Act to seek the custody of the child, the same would not be justification for denying her the right of custody of the child under Section 491 Cr.P.C. (Section 491 Cr.P.C. of the old code dealt with power to issue directions of the nature of a habeas corpus).

8. Learned counsel for second respondent submitted that the custody of the children had been duly agreed upon and confirmed by the decree of divorce passed by the Government Khazi, Karur District on 11.01.2013. 
As the personal law as applicable to the parties had been availed of, it would not be open for the petitioner to move this Court by way of the present HCP. 
If at all the petitioner had any grievance against the decree of divorce passed by the Government Khazi, she would have to challenge the same and seek custody of the children only under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act.

9. We have considered the rival submissions.
We find that no reasonable cause is shown for custody of the children in the hands of petitioner. They have been placed in the hands of second respondent/father/natural guardian under a decree of divorce granted by the Government Khazi, a person authorised to grant divorce under the personal law applicable in the instant case.
It is to be noted that the petitioner has not disputed that such decree of divorce stood granted.
 She only contends that the same came to be granted upon deceiving her and  under threat and coercion.
The decision relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner is one wherein it was found that the appellant before the Apex Court was the mother of an illegitimate child. It was held that under  Muslim Law, she was entitled to custody and in circumstance where the respondents before the Apex Court had absolutely no right, custody was ordered in favour of the mother. 
We do not find the decision applicable in  the facts of the present case.

10. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition shall stand dismissed. It shall be open for the petitioner to take recourse to such remedy as available to her in law. We record the submission of the learned counsel for second respondent that second respondent has no objection to the petitioner visiting the minor children. Without prejudice to the petitioner's rights to move appropriate forum for relief, we record that the petitioner accompanied by her mother, shall be entitled to visit the minor detenu-children from time to time.

(V.D.P.J)   (C.T.S.J)
19.08.2013  
Index: Yes/no
Internet: Yes/no
cs/kpr

To

1.The Inspector of Police,
   Kuniamuthur Police Station,
   Coimbatore District.

2.The Public Prosecutor,
   High Court,
   Madras.








V.DHANAPALAN,J
  and    
C.T.SELVAM,J

cs/kpr










H.C.P.No.1445 of 2013











19.08.2013

Monday, November 25, 2013

Sec.302 ,341 r/w 34 I.P.C. = No grounds to interfere the acquittal orders of lower court - Appeal is dismissed Appreciation of Evidence = P.Ws.1 and 2 are not eye witnesses to the incident and Other witnesses turned hostile and there is no other evidence to show that the accused are the assailants of the deceased; that opinion of P.W.19 does not lead to draw an inference that it is the accused, who committed the murder of the deceased = THE STATE OF AP REP BY ITS PP HYD., VS MALLAVARAM SANKAR REDDY, & 6 OTHERS, = http://hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.jsp?mtype=CRLA&mno=574&year=2013

 Sec.302 ,341 r/w 34 I.P.C. = No grounds to interfere the acquittal orders of lower court - Appeal is dismissed
Appreciation of Evidence = P.Ws.1 and 2 are not eye witnesses to the incident and Other witnesses turned hostile  and there is no other evidence to show that the accused are the assailants of the deceased; that opinion of P.W.19 does not lead to draw an inference that it is the accused, who committed the murder of the deceased =

P.W.1 admitted that he was residing in Harijanawada along with his wife and two children.  
The incident is alleged to have taken place at about 11 p.m.  
In view of the fact that he is having wife and children, in normal circumstances, P.W.1 would have been present at his house.  If he was present at his house, there was no scope or possibility for him to witness the incident.  
He had not given any convincing reason for staying in the upstairs of the house of the deceased on the fateful day of the incident.  
Therefore, that is the reason why the trial Court doubted his presence.
P.W.2 admitted that he was residing in Harijanawada, which is at a distance of two furlongs from the house of the deceased.  
There is no other acceptable reason for P.W.2 to be present at the house of the deceased.  
Further, when his house is located at a distance of two furlongs from the house of the deceased, it is not possible for him to hear the commotion or cries from the house of the deceased.
It is the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that after P.Ws.2 to 5 came to the spot and some other villagers came there, A-1 and A-2 ran away from the scene of occurrence.  If that is the case, again, A-1 and A-2 obstructing P.W.1 from taking the deceased to the hospital does not arise.  
It is the case of the prosecution that P.Ws.1 to 5 had taken the injured to the road and stopped the auto of P.W.12 and lifted the injured into the auto.  But P.W.12 did not support the case of the prosecution.   If really the accused had taken the injured high handedly in the auto with a view to take her to the hospital, nothing prevented P.Ws.1 and 2 to lodge a complaint. 


Chance prints =

According to P.W.19, he developed chance prints at the scene of occurrence.  
On 16.12.2006, he received finger print slips of the accused along with a requisition letter from the police for comparison with the chance prints. 
The evidence of P.W.19 appears to be incorrect because Ex.P-21 report does not reveal about the lifting of chance prints and it does not give the detailed data.  
He has not sent the developed photographs of the chance prints either to the Court or to the concerned police.  He retained with him.  
The receiving of fingerprint slips from A-1 to A-3 appears to be false because P.W.20 had stated that on 14.12.2006, P.W.19 obtained fingerprints of A-1 to A-3 in the Court hall, which is contradictory to the evidence of P.W.19.  
It is in evidence that on 16.12.2006, he received the fingerprints of A-1 to A-3.  
Therefore, in view of these contradictory statements, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of P.W.19 and Ex.P-21.  Therefore, the trial Court rightly acquitted the accused and that order needs no interference by this Court.


CRLA 574 / 2013
CRLASR 32259 / 2008
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
THE STATE OF AP REP BY ITS PP HYD.,  VSMALLAVARAM SANKAR REDDY, & 6 OTHERS,
PET.ADV. : PUBLIC PROSECUTORRESP.ADV. : UGRANARASIMHA
SUBJECT: U/s.302 I.P.C AcquittalDISTRICT:  CHITTOOR


                        HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU

AND
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.574 OF 2013



JUDGMENT:- (per Hon’ble Sri Justice K.C.Bhanu)



This Criminal Appeal, under Section 378(3)& (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C."), is directed against the judgment, dated 15.05.2008, in Sessions Case No.102 of 2007 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Tirupathi by the State whereunder and whereby, respondent Nos.1 to 3/A-1 to A-3 were found not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 302  and 341 I.P.C; and respondent Nos.5 to 7/A-5 to A-7 were found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 341 read with 34 I.P.C.

2.       Case of the prosecution, as delineated by the prosecution witnesses, may be stated as follows:

          A-1 and A-2 are the brothers of one Manjulamma (hereinafter, referred to as “the deceased”).  
A-3 is the elder daughter of the deceased, who was given in marriage to A-1.  
On 26.08.2006, at about 11 p.m., A-1 to A-3 picked up a quarrel with the deceased in her house with regard to her behaviour with her farm servant – Kaki Sivaiah (P.W.1) and also her giving Ac.1.00cs of landed property to him. 
 In that quarrel, an altercation took place between them as a result, the accused beat the deceased indiscriminately.  
On hearing the cries of the deceased, the farm servant, who was sleeping over the roof of the house, came down and noticed the accused beating the deceased.  
Thereupon, P.W.1 raised cries.  The neighbourers – P.Ws.2 to 5 came to the house of the deceased.  
As A-1 and A-2 threatened them to go away, they left the place. 
As some more villagers came to the place of occurrence, A-1 to A-3 fled away.  
When P.W.1 tried to shift the injured to the hospital, A-1 and A-2 along with A-4 to A-7 obstructed him to do so.  
A-1 and A-2 took away the injured in an auto belonging to P.W.12 on the pretext of admitting her in the hospital and abandoned her on a railway track resulting in her death.  
Basing on the complaint given by P.W.1, the Sub Inspector of Police, Renigunta Police Station registered a case. 
Basing on the information received from the Deputy Station Superintendent, Renigunta Railway Station about the presence of an unknown female dead body on the railway track between Renigunta and Mamundur Railway Stations, on 27.08.2006, at 11 a.m., the Railway Police Head Constable registered a case under  Section 174 Cr.P.C. and the dead body was sent to S.V.Medical College, Tirupathi for Post Mortem Examination.  
On the same day, P.W.1, P.W.8, who is another daughter of the deceased, and one Venkatamuni Reddy identified the dead body of the deceased and then, the section of law was altered from 174 Cr.P.C. to 302 and 341 read with 34 I.P.C.  
The police held inquest over the dead body of the deceased under Ex.P-9.  Police also observed the scene of occurrence and after receipt of reports from the Doctor and from the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, the Inspector of police, Renigunta filed the charge sheet.   

3.       The charges levelled against A-1 to A-3 are that they beat the deceased in her house and A-1 and A-2 obstructed P.W.1 and drove him away while he was attempting to shift the injured to the hospital and took her in the same auto and abandoned her on the railway track resulting in her death and hence, liable for punishment under Sections 302 and 341 I.P.C., 
while A-4 to A-7 obstructed the auto in which P.W.1 tried to shift the injured to the hospital and thereby, aided A-1 and A-2 to take her in the same auto and hence, A-4 to A-7 are liable for punishment under Section 341 read with 34 I.P.C.

4.       When the above charges were read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

5.       During the pendency of the case, A-4 died.  Therefore, the case against him was abated.

6.       To substantiate the charges, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 20 and got marked Exs.P-1 to P-23 besides case properties-M.Os.1 to 13.

7.       After closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of prosecution witnesses.  They denied the same and reported no oral evidence, but Ex.D-1 was got marked.

8.       The trial Court, after considering the evidence available on the record, came to a conclusion that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and accordingly, acquitted them.  Challenging the same, State filed the present appeal.

9.       The points for determination are:
“Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt for the charges under Sections 302 and 341 I.P.C. against A-1 to A-3, and 341 read with 34 I.P.C. against A-5 to A-7 beyond all reasonable doubt and whether there are any compelling and substantial reasons to interfere with the order of acquittal?”


10.     POINTS:- Learned Public Prosecutor contended that P.Ws.1 and 2 are the direct witnesses to the incident and their presence at the scene of occurrence is found to be acceptable; that basing on the evidence of eye witnesses coupled with the opinion of the Finger Print Expert – P.W.19, the prosecution proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned judgment and convict the accused.
11.     On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that P.Ws.1 and 2 are not eye witnesses to the incident and there is no other evidence to show that the accused are the assailants of the deceased; that opinion of P.W.19 does not lead to draw an inference that it is the accused, who committed the murder of the deceased, and the trial Court, after considering the evidence on record, rightly acquitted the accused as there are no compelling and substantial reasons and the order of acquittal needs no interference by this Court and hence, they pray to sustain the impugned judgment. 
12.     Ordinarily, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal.  The court of appeal is required to take into consideration the reasons given by the trial Court in passing the judgment of acquittal very carefully, and if such reasons are consistent with the evidence, as a matter of prudence, this Court should not interfere with the impugned judgment by                                 re-appreciating the evidence and to take some other view.  

(A) In Chadrappa v. State of Karnataka[1]

wherein it is held thus:

“From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge.


(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4)   An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.

(5)   If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.”


13.     It is not in dispute before this Court that P.W.1 is the Farm Servant of the deceased.   A-1 and A-2 are the brothers of the deceased and A-3 is her elder daughter, who is the wife of A-1.  
P.W.1 admitted that he was residing in Harijanawada along with his wife and two children.  
The incident is alleged to have taken place at about 11 p.m.  
In view of the fact that he is having wife and children, in normal circumstances, P.W.1 would have been present at his house.  If he was present at his house, there was no scope or possibility for him to witness the incident.  
He had not given any convincing reason for staying in the upstairs of the house of the deceased on the fateful day of the incident.  
Therefore, that is the reason why the trial Court doubted his presence.

14.     P.W.2, who is the brother of P.W.1, did not speak about the presence of P.W.1 at the house of the deceased.  
P.Ws.3 to 5, who are the neighbourers rushed to the scene of occurrence, did not support the case of the prosecution.  
They were declared as hostile to the prosecution.  
Even after cross examination by the learned Public Prosecutor, nothing has been elicited in their evidence to connect the accused with the crime.  
P.W.2 admitted that he was residing in Harijanawada, which is at a distance of two furlongs from the house of the deceased.  
There is no other acceptable reason for P.W.2 to be present at the house of the deceased.  
Further, when his house is located at a distance of two furlongs from the house of the deceased, it is not possible for him to hear the commotion or cries from the house of the deceased.

15.     Barring the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, there is no other evidence to show that the accused were the assailants of the deceased.  
It is the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that after P.Ws.2 to 5 came to the spot and some other villagers came there, A-1 and A-2 ran away from the scene of occurrence.  If that is the case, again, A-1 and A-2 obstructing P.W.1 from taking the deceased to the hospital does not arise.  
It is the case of the prosecution that P.Ws.1 to 5 had taken the injured to the road and stopped the auto of P.W.12 and lifted the injured into the auto.  But P.W.12 did not support the case of the prosecution.  
If really they were present at the scene of occurrence and had taken the deceased in the auto of P.W.12 to the hospital, there was no explanation from the case of the prosecution as to how the dead body of the deceased was found lying in between the two railway stations.  That means, P.Ws.1 to 5 are not eye witnesses to the incident.  If really the accused had taken the injured high handedly in the auto with a view to take her to the hospital, nothing prevented P.Ws.1 and 2 to lodge a complaint. 

16.     The other circumstance is 
the evidence of P.W.19 with regard to the taking of the chance prints at the scene of occurrence. 
According to P.W.19, he developed chance prints at the scene of occurrence.  
On 16.12.2006, he received finger print slips of the accused along with a requisition letter from the police for comparison with the chance prints. 
The evidence of P.W.19 appears to be incorrect because Ex.P-21 report does not reveal about the lifting of chance prints and it does not give the detailed data.  
He has not sent the developed photographs of the chance prints either to the Court or to the concerned police.  He retained with him.  
The receiving of fingerprint slips from A-1 to A-3 appears to be false because P.W.20 had stated that on 14.12.2006, P.W.19 obtained fingerprints of A-1 to A-3 in the Court hall, which is contradictory to the evidence of P.W.19.  
It is in evidence that on 16.12.2006, he received the fingerprints of A-1 to A-3.  
Therefore, in view of these contradictory statements, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of P.W.19 and Ex.P-21.  Therefore, the trial Court rightly acquitted the accused and that order needs no interference by this Court.

17.     In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the judgment, dated 15.05.2008, in Sessions Case No.102 of 2007 on the file of the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, (Fast Track Court), Tirupathi.

18.     Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Criminal Appeal shall stand closed.
                             ___________________

                                                             JUSTICE K.C.BHANU


____________­­­________________________

JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM



17th July, 2013                            
AMD

                         

                         

                         


                     



AMD




[1] (2007) 4 SCC 415