Sunday, June 3, 2018

Whether the prior unregistered and non-possessory sale agreement prevails over the subsequent attachment before judgment for recovery of the suit claim based on promissory note and what are the equities in the event of the suit for recovery of money decreed ex parte and the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale also decreed on contest subsequent to the money decree in respect of recovery of money and in enforcement of the specific performance including from execution of sale deed by the Court pursuant to the specific performance decree and whether the Courts below in the concurrent finding upholding the attachment to prevail over the sale agreement are correct, more particularly, from the amendment to Section 64 C.P.C. without any amendment to the two limbs of Order 38 Rule 10 C.P.C. = claim petition filed by the non-possessory unregistered sale agreement holder as claimant by name, Ramayanam Satish Kumar against the decree holder by name, Thamada Bhaskara Rao of the money decree based on a promissory note said to have been executed by the judgment debtor by name, Smt.Pilla Supraja.= right prevails by operation under Section 47 of the Registration Act and Order 38 Rule 10 C.P.C. and the rigour imposed under Section 64 C.P.C. does not prevail is not fully correct from what is discussed supra so also for the case not coming under the spirit of Section 64(2) of the amended C.P.C. 32. Having regard to the above, the above substantial questions of law formulated are answered in saying the Courts below are not fully correct in dismissing the claim petition of the agreement holder, R.Satish Kumar, but for, to say the claim cannot be fully allowed of R.Satish Kumar against T.Bhaskara Rao and P.Supraja, who are the decree holder and judgment-debtor respectively of the money decree, where there was also an attachment before judgment prior to filing of the suit for specific performance and what the right the agreement holder has on the date of filing of the suit for specific performance was having is at best under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, the charge, at best over the property for recovery of the advance sale consideration by virtue of the wording of Section 55 statutorily like a charge to the purchase for recovery on the property of unpaid consideration, in the event of the suit for specific performance filed and on contest decreed by also impleading the money decree holder-cum-person, who attached the property from the deemed notice, it was not done, though otherwise had it been done, the limit of the agreement holder is to the balance sale consideration to answer to the attachment before judgment has right in the property, which is subject to the sale agreement. - it is just to say the claimant, R.Satish Kumar (the specific performance decree holder) has to pay the original suit principal amount of the suit claim of Rs.6,00,000/- to T.Bhaskara Rao (the money decree holder) which amount of Rs.6,00,000/- includes adjustment by receiving back the amount deposited in the suit for specific performance in the Court with accrued interest to meet the same and also that includes any amount earlier paid under any settlement proposal through mediator or any direction of this Court or the Courts below. The said amount has to be paid within eight weeks from today, failing which T.Bhaskara Rao, money decree holder is entitled to execute and recover said Rs.6,00,000/- with interest at 12% p.a. from today onwards for balance after adjustment of what is stated supra. For any further claim of the money decree holder, T.Bhakara Rao is to proceed personally against respondent No.2/judgment debtor, Smt.P.Supraja if there is any other property of her for the reason Section 56 C.P.C., speaks a female is not liable for arrest for any recovery of a money decree.

HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO         

 SECOND APPEAL No.459 of 2017   

03-04-2018

Ramayanam Satish Kumar  .Appellant       
                     
1.Thamada Bhaskara Rao and another. Respondents   

Counsel for the Appellant :  Sri S.Subba Reddy

Counsel  for the Respondent No.1:  A.K.Kishore Reddy
Counsel  for the Respondent No.2:  T.V.Jaggi Reddy

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
  2008(1) ALT 10 (SC)
2 2015(5)ALT 634
3 2002 (3) SCC 676
4 1991(1) SCC 715
5 2004(2) ALD 736
6 1996 (3)SCC 289
7 AIR 1991 Kerala 152
8 1987(1) ALT 718
9 AIR 1935 Madras 193
10 AIR 1917 Madras 4
11 1939(2) MLJ 822
12 2016(1) SCC 411


HONBLE SRI JUSTICE Dr. B. SIVA SANKARA RAO     

SECOND APPEAL No.459 of 2017   

JUDGMENT: 
     This Second Appeal is arisen out of the judgment and
decree dated 31.03.2017 in A.S.No.129 of 2013 on the file of
the IV Additional District Judge, Kakinada, against the
dismissal of the claim petition in E.A.No.245  of 2012 in
E.P.No.115 of 2011 in O.S.No.498 of 2010 on the file of the
 I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada filed by the
non-possessory unregistered sale agreement holder as
claimant by name, Ramayanam Satish Kumar against the   
decree holder by name, Thamada Bhaskara Rao of the money   
decree based on a promissory note said to have been
executed by the judgment debtor by name, Smt.Pilla
Supraja.
2.      Heard both sides.
3.      The parties herein are being referred with their names,
to avoid confusion and for more clarity.
4.      The facts in brief for the purpose of second appeal are
that P.Supraja said to have been entered non-possessory
unregistered contract for sale (agreement of sale) on
28.02.2010 for Rs.2,000/- per square yard for 161.16 square
yards covered by Sy.No.290/2 of Ramanaiahpeta of Kakinada
Rural Mandal within the Kakinada Municipal Corporation
limits, which is a vacant house site surrounded by houses.
The agreement holder, R.Satish Kumar entered the
agreement having paid Rs.2,00,000/- as advance and
maintained the suit in O.S.No.40 of 2012 renumbered as 255
of 2012  before the II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada.
Undisputedly, T.Bhaskara Rao, who stated, lent the amount
under promissory note dated 08.09.2008, was not made a
party to the specific performance suit maintained by R.Satish
Kumar against P.Supraja supra.
5.      The said T.Bhaskara Rao, who  maintained suit for
recovery of the said amount based on a promissory note so
called lending of Rs.6,00,000/- with interest at Rs.2/- p.a.,
maintained the suit claim in O.S.No.498 of 2010 for
Rs.8,82,000/- or so.  It is, at the time of filing of the suit  for
recovery of the amount sought for attachment before
judgment in I.A.No.617 of 2010 ordered on 08.09.2010 and
affected on 20.09.2010.  Even in the money suit of
T.Bhaskara Rao against P.Supraja and R.Satish Kumar, prior
agreement holder thereunder made a party.  The fact further
remains from the above also clear that the suit for specific
performance is subsequent to the date of suit for recovery of
money and attachment before judgment.  So far as the non-
possessory sale agreement concerned, it is difficult to
presume any notice including deemed notice contemplated
by Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act but for so far as
the attachment before judgment since affected before the
date of filing of the suit for specific performance it can be
taken as a deemed notice.
6.      From this, the ex parte money decree was granted
against P.Supraja  in favour of T.Bhaskara Rao vide decree
and judgment and practically with no lapse of time, since, it
was an ex parte decree and consequently, the money decree
holder, T.Bhaskara Rao filed E.P.No.115 of 2011 for
execution of the decree in O.S.No.498 of 2010.  During
pendency of the execution proceedings in E.P.No.115 of
2011, based on the subsequent suit for specific performance
in O.S.No.40 of 2012 preceded by notice issued by R.Satish
Kumar against P.Supraja from her contentions of the reply to
the notice, from the suit filed, filed the claim petition in the
year 2012 based on that unregistered non-possessory sale
agreement dated 28.02.2010, as referred supra, even though,
the suit is, few days or months, filed prior to the claim
petition in E.A.No.245 of 2012; even later in the suit, the
money decree holder, T.Bhaskara Rao is not impleaded as co-
defendant.  However, the suit O.S.No.40 of 2012=O.S.No.255
of 2012 for specific performance of the contract for sale was
decreed on 01.05.2014.
7.      It is, in the meantime, the claim petition in E.A.No.245
of 2012 tried as a suit by the procedure contemplated for
deemed decree to be passed, was disposed of by the learned
I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, on 23.04.2013.  It is
made clear there from that by the time of disposal of the
claim petition, there was no decree for specific performance
of the contract for sale in favour of R.Satish Kumar.  It is
subsequent to the said decree for specific performance
granted on 01.03.2014 R.Satish Kumar-decree holder
pursuant to the non-possessory unregistered sale agreement
dated 28.02.2010 and pursuant to the decree, filed execution
petition for registration of sale deed as contemplated by
Order 21 Rule 34 C.P.C. and obtained sale deed pursuant to
the draft through Court.
8.      It is, from the dismissal of the claim petition supra and
subsequently obtaining of the decree in specific performance
supra, appeal in A.S.No.129 of 2013 against the claim
petition dismissal order maintained by R.Satish Kumar  by
showing T.Bhaskara Rao and P.Supraja, who are the decree
holder and judgment debtor as respondents to the claim
petition and to the appeal.  The appeal was also disposed of
on 31.03.2017 from hearing of both parties.  However, it was
not considered the additional evidence application filed by
the said R.Satish Kumar/appellant,  which is nothing but the
sale deed executed pursuant to the decree for specific
performance as additional evidence. The additional evidence
application is supposed to be decided by the Court in either
way, by virtue  of the provisions of Order 41 Rules 27 to 29 if
not properly explained and if it is otherwise required for the
effective adjudication of the lis by invoking Order 41 Rule 27
(1)(b) C.P.C.  as also held by the Apex Court in KRM Reddy Vs
M/s Net work inc.,  . reiterated by this Court in Cheedella
Padmavati Vs. Cheedella Radha Krishna Murthy .  It was not
done by the lower Court in deciding the appeal against the
dismissal of the claim petition of subsequent specific
performance decree holder pursuant to the sale agreement
supra.  It is there from maintained the present second appeal
by the unsuccessful claim petitioner non-possessory un-
registered agreement holder, who during pendency of the
appeal against dismissal of the claim petition, having
obtained pursuant to the decree for specific performance
sale deed, filed the sale deed that was not referred in the
lower appellate Courts judgment.
9.      From the above factual background, the following
substantial questions of law are framed, while admitting the
second appeal:
1.      Whether the prior unregistered and non-possessory sale
agreement prevails over the subsequent attachment
before judgment for recovery of the suit claim based on
promissory note and what are the equities in the event of
the suit for recovery of money decreed ex parte and the
suit for specific performance of the contract for sale also
decreed on contest subsequent to the money decree in
respect of recovery of money and in enforcement of the
specific performance including from execution of sale
deed by the Court pursuant to the specific performance
decree and whether the Courts below in the concurrent
finding upholding the attachment to prevail over the sale
agreement are correct, more particularly, from the
amendment to Section 64 C.P.C. without any amendment   
to the two limbs of Order 38 Rule 10 C.P.C.
2.      To what result
11.     In deciding the above substantial questions of law
without need of referring to the factual matrix, since
referred supra, the important provisions relevant to extract
are Section 64 C.P.C. prior and subsequent to the C.P.C.
amendment by Act, 2002 w.e.f. 01.07.2002.
"64. Private alienation of property after attachment to be
void.- (1) Where an attachment has been made, any
private transfer of delivery of the property attached or of
any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-
debtor of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to
such attachment, shall be void as against all claims
enforceable under the attachment.
64. Private alienation of property after attachment to
be void.(1) Where an attachment has been made, any
private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of
any interest therein and any payment to the judgement-
debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies contrary to
such attachment, shall be void as against all claims
enforceable under the attachment.
[(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to any private
transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any
interest therein, made in pursuance of any contract for
such transfer or delivery entered into and registered
before the attachment.]
Explanation. For the purposes of this section, claims
enforceable under an attachment include claims for the
rateable distribution of assets.
12.     Further, Order 38 Rules 10 and 11A C.P.C. reads as
follows:
10. Attachment before judgment not to affect rights of
strangers nor bar decree-holder from applying for sale.
Attachment before judgment shall not affect the rights,
existing prior to the attachment, of persons not parties to
the suit, nor bar any person holding a decree against the
defendant from applying for the sale of the property
under attachment in execution of such decree.
11-A. Provisions applicable to attachment. (1) The
provisions of this Code applicable to an attachment made
in execution of a decree shall, so far as may be, apply to
an attachment made before judgment which continues
after the judgment by virtue of the provisions of Rule 11.
(2) An attachment made before judgment in a suit which
is dismissed for default shall not become revived merely
by reason of the fact that the order for the dismissal of
the suit for default has been set aside and the suit has
been restored.
13.     Sections 54 and 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, read
as follows:
54. "Sale" defined :- "Sale" is a transfer of ownership in
exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and
part-promised.
Sale how made :- Such transfer, in the case of tangible
immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees
and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other
intangible things, can be made only by a registered
instrument.
In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value
less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made
either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the
property.
Delivery of tangible immoveable property, takes place
when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he
directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for sale :- A contract for the sale of immoveable
property is a contract that a sale of such property shall
take place on terms settled between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on
such property.
40. Burden of obligation imposing restriction on use of
land, or of obligation annexed to ownership but not
amounting to interest or easement :- Where, for the
more beneficial enjoyment of his own immoveable
property, a third person has independently of any interest
in the immoveable property of another or of any
easement thereon, a right to restrain the enjoyment in
particular manner of the latter property, or
Where a third person is entitled to the benefit of an
obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the
ownership of immoveable property, but not amounting to
an interest therein or easement thereon, such right or
obligation, may be enforced against a transferee with
notice thereof or a gratuitous transferee of the property
affected thereby, but not against a transferee for
consideration and without notice of the right or
obligation, nor against such property in his hands.
14.     Sections 17, 23, 47 and 49 of the Indian Registration
Act read as follows:
17. Documents of which registration is compulsory :-(1)
The following documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a district in
which, and if they have been executed on or after the
date on which, Act No.XVI of 1864, or the Indian
Registration Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act,
1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877, or this Act
came or comes into force, namely :--
(a) ..;
(b) ..;
(c) ..;
(d) ..;
(e) ..;
(f) ..; and
(g) agreement of sale of immovable property of the value
of one hundred rupees and upwards :]
Provided that the State Government may, by order
published in the Official Gazette, exempt from the
operation of this sub-section any leases executed in any
district, or part of a district, the terms granted by which
do not exceed five years and the annual rents reserved by
which do not exceed fifty rupees.
23. Time for presenting documents :- Subject to the
provisions contained in Sections 24, 25 and 26, no
document other than a will shall be accepted for
registration unless presented for that purpose to the
proper officer within four months from the date of its
execution :
Provided that a copy of a decree or order may be
presented within four months from the day on which the
decree or order was made, or, where it is appealable,
within four months from the day on which it becomes
final.
47. Time from which registered document operates :- A
registered document shall operate from the time from
which it would have commenced to operate if no
registration thereof had been required or made, and not
from the time of its registration.
49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to
be registered :- No document required by Section 17 or
by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, to
be registered shall,--
(a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or
(b) confer any power to adopt, or
(c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting
such property or conferring such power, unless it has been
registered :
      Provided that an unregistered document affecting
immovable property and required by this Act, or the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be
received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific
performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act,
1877, [x x x x], or as evidence of any collateral
transaction not required to be effected by registered
instrument.
15.     Had it been impleaded in the suit for specific
performance, the decree holder of the so called promissory
note money decree or atleast filed a third party appeal
against that so called ex parte money decree by the said
agreement holder-cum-decree holder in O.S.No.40 of
2002=255 of 2002, the outcome could be otherwise. It is for
the reason the money decree was ex parte without contest
by the judgment debtor, who is no other than defendant to
the specific performance decree denied in the reply to the
notice before suit for specific performance and even
contested the suit for specific performance, the decree
holder of money decree also did not make any third party
appeal against the decree for specific performance and had
it been also, the things could be otherwise.  However, the
fact remains that with the necessary parties to the suit
though not proper parties impleaded, from the above, there
is even ex parte a money decree and there is on contest, a
specific performance decree against the very judgment
debtor by name, Smt.Pilla Supraja for money decree
obtained by T.Bhaskara Rao for specific performance decree
obtained by R.Satish Kumar respectively.  The Court has to
proceed thereby from the finality attained of the money
decree and specific performance decree against the
judgment debtor and the persons claiming any right through
the said judgment debtor/defendant in both the matters
viz., the so called decree holders either for recovery of
money or for specific performance of contract, as the case
may be.
16.     In this background, with no need of reproduction
from the very Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, it
deals not only of sale but also contract for sale to an
agreement of sale and if it is a possessory sale agreement or
agreement  later evidencing delivery of possession in writing,
there is another protective shield of invoking doctrine of part
performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property
Act irrespective of the suit for specific performance barred
by limitation prescribed by Article 54 of the Indian Limitation
Act as laid down by the Apex Court in Shrimant Shamrao
Suryavanshi & Anr. Vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi .
17.     Coming to Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act,
which also no way requires reproduction again the second
limb relevant for the purpose speaks, where a third person is
entitled to the benefit of an obligation arising out of contract
and annexed to the ownership of immoveable property, but
not amounting to an interest therein or easement thereon,
such right or obligation, may be enforced against a
transferee with notice thereof or a gratuitous transferee of
the property affected thereby, but not against a transferee
for consideration and without notice of the right or
obligation, nor against such property in his hands.  No doubt,
it speaks of the bonafide transferee for consideration.  Thus,
bonafide transfer of a prospective right or enforceable right
is not the wording.
18.     From this now coming to Section 17(1)(g) of the Andhra
Pradesh amendment to the Indian Registration Act came into
force by Act 4/99 w.e.f. 01.04.1999, an agreement of sale of
immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and
upwards is a compulsory registerable one, though the sale
agreement in this case is dated 28.02.2000 subsequent to the
said amendment came into force on 01.04.1999, it was not a
registered one. The consequence of which  as referred in the
proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act with Central
amendment to it equally with Section 53-A of the Transfer of
Property Act by Act 48/2001 w.e.f. 24.09.2001, which also no
way requires reproduction but for to refer to it in saying that
in a suit for specific performance the agreement though
required to be registered not registered can be admitted in
evidence.  However, that concession is not available in the
claim petition and that might be the reason in the claim
petition, the sale agreement was not exhibited even for a
collateral purpose, but for, in the suit for specific
performance for the main purpose from the statutory
concession of Section 49 proviso of the Registration Act
supra.
19.     In the factual scenario with reference to the law supra,
coming to Section 47 of the Registration Act which also no
way requires reproduction from what is stated supra that to
be read at best with Section 23 of the Registration Act, that
also reproduced supra, from the date of the document
executed presented for registration other than for a will the
registration must be affected within four months and not
later and with reference to Section 23 supra. So far as
Section 47 supra, a registered document shall operate from
the time from which it would have commenced to operate if
no registration thereof had been required or made, and not
from the time of its registration, to say, even registration
was later in point of time within four months from the date
of execution, the sale deed even subsequently registered
comes into operation from the date of execution.  From this
though an effort is made by the learned counsel for the
claimant/appellant that the document requires a
comprehensive understanding by giving a liberal construction
of its meaning to trace back to the earlier unregistered sale
agreement as the same is outcome even from decreeing in a
suit for specific performance, based on the unregistered sale
agreement non-possessory dated 28.02.2000.  Such a
contention cannot be accepted from the clear and
unambiguous meaning of Sections 23 and 47 of the
Registration Act supra. Thereby, no credence is given to the
contention and said contention is rejected for all practical
purposes as bound by law, so to reject.
20.     From this, now coming to unamended Section 64 of
C.P.C. prior to 01.07.2002:
"64. Private alienation of property after attachment to be
void.- (1) Where an attachment has been made, any
private transfer of delivery of the property attached or of
any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-
debtor of any debt, dividend or other moneys contrary to
such attachment, shall be void as against all claims
enforceable under the attachment.
      Explanation:- For the purposes of this section,
claims enforceable under an attachment include claims
for the rateable distribution of assets.

Order 38, Rule 10 C.P.C. reads as follows:
"Attachment before judgment shall not affect the rights,
existing prior to the attachment of persons not parties to
the suit, nor any person holding a decree against the
defendant from applying for the sale of the property
under attachment in execution of such decree."
Order 38 Rule 10 CPC speaks, where an attachment has been 
affected, any private transfer or delivery of the property
attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the
judgment debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies
contrary to such attachment shall be void, as against all
claims enforceable under the attachment.  Claims
enforceable under an attachment include claims for the
rateable distribution of assets.  This Section, thereby,
prohibits a private transfer or delivery of property attached
or of any interest therein after attachment contrary to the
attachment order in making it as void against all claims
enforceable under the attachment to say a subsequent
transfer in any manner including of any interest including by
delivery is void. So far as enforceability of the attachment
concerned, however, after the C.P.C. amendment by the Act
of 2002 w.e.f. 01.07.2002 sub-section (2) of Section 64 was
incorporated before the explanation in relation to ratable
distribution by making the other portion supra as sub-section
(1).  What sub-section (2) amended speaks even at the cost
of repetition for the necessity is that nothing in this section
(supra) shall apply to any private transfer or delivery of the
property attached or of any interest therein, made in
pursuance of any contract for such transfer or delivery
entered into and registered before the attachment.
21.     Any ambiguity and cloud is clear by this
incorporation of the amended sub-section (2) of Section 64
C.P.C. in protecting the prior agreements and prior
alienations by transfer, before the attachment affected.
Though it is the contention of the learned counsel for the
claim petitioner/appellant, R.Satish Kumar there from of the
non-possessory sale agreement is saved though it is prior to
the amended Act came into force, the same was relied in the
suit for specific performance vis--vis the claim petition filed
subsequent to the said amendment came into force in his
saying sub-section (2) of Section 64 C.P.C. running in four
contingencies, i.e.,1) of any private transfer, 2) delivery of
property attached, 3) of any interest therein and 4) made in
pursuance of any contract for such transfer or delivery
entered into.  This submission is totally in ignoring the
subsequent words and registered before the attachment,
any of the benefits arose if it is registered before the
attachment and not by mere execution of the written
document.  Once that is missing in the case for the same is
not only non-possessory but also unregistered sale agreement
dated 28.02.2000, the claim petitioner/appellant cannot get
the benefit of the amended sub-section (2) of Section 64
C.P.C.
22.     Coming to the other contentions, the expression of
the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Hamda Ammal v.
Avadiappa Pathar  was based on pre-amended Section 64 
C.P.C. in its saying even an unregistered document can be
received as evidence for all purposes mentioned in the
proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act and the fact that
the document of sale had been registered only after the
attachment makes no difference, when the document is prior
in point of time to the attachment.  Here, the facts different
from that expression are not only the amendment to Section
64(2) C.P.C. but also the amendment to Section 17(1) of the
Registration Act in the State of Andhra Pradesh by
incorporation of clause (g) and the amendment to Section 49
of the Registration Act by Central Act 48 of 2001 referred
supra, thereby, the reliance placed on the expression in
Hamda Ammal (supra) has no application by virtue of
subsequent change of law, even by the time of filing the
claim petition and suit for specific performance by the
appellant herein.
23.     Coming to the other expression placed heavily of
another Single Judge of this Court in Adinarayana v.
S.Gafoor Sab , wherein also referred Hamda Ammal (supra)
among others and the scope of Order 38 Rule 10 and Sections
40 and 64 C.P.C.   In fact, though, the judgment was
subsequent in point of time to the C.P.C. amendment to
Section 64 incorporating sub-section (2) of Section 64 C.P.C.
and also Section 17(g) of the A.P.Registration amended Act
and Section 48 of 2001 Central Amendment to Section 49 of
the Registration Act, those were not discussed nor taken into
consideration therein, though simply reproduced amended
Section 64 C.P.C. in para-13 of the judgment.
24.     Coming to the expressions referred therein besides
Hamda Ammal no way requires repetition among others, one
is in Noordeen v. V.S.Thiru Venkita Reddiar , under the
principle amended Section 64 C.P.C., wherein it is held by
the Apex Court that the attachment before the judgment is
an encumbrance preventing the owner of the property to
create encumbrance, sale or create charge thereon.
Attachment before judgment does not create any right, title
or interest, but it disables the judgment-debtor to create any
encumbrances on the property.  There is no dispute on the
proposition, but for, the person, who claims as a transferee
is a bonafide transferee with absolute transfer and for
consideration and without notice of the prior attachment
before judgment, leave about no one can pretend no
encumbrance from the deemed notice by virtue of the very
attachment once ordered is affected as contemplated by the
C.P.C.  also from the presumption under Section 114 of the
Indian Evidence Act of all official and judicial acts are duly
performed to draw of attachment ordered and affected was
duly affected.
25.     The other expression of the Kerala High Court in
Narayanan Nair Ramakrishnan Nair v. Zacharia Kuriakose ,
a Single Bench held that a judgment made after a contract
for specific performance does not affect a prior agreement to
sell and attachment could only fasten the debtors right to
the unpaid purchase money. Even from this, what the Kerala
High Court held is an agreement holder has to pay the unpaid
purchase money in claiming the relief for specific
performance, has to recognize the right of the person who
attached his property for the balance sale consideration.
26.     Coming to another Single Bench expression of this Court
in D.V.Narsimharao v. P.Ramayyamma , it was observed 
that though agreement for sale does not create any right,
title or interest in the property under Section 54 of the
Transfer of Property Act, it creates an interest in the
property by operation of second paragraph of Section 40 of
the Transfer of Property Act and this right prevails by
operation of Order 38, Rule 10 C.P.C. It referred section 64
C.P.C. saying the rigour imposed under Section 64 C.P.C.
does not prevail and the attachment before judgment does
not prevail over the contract for sale.  In fact, the Kerala
High Court ignored the correct law in  Narayanan Nair
(supra) in its saying the agreement holder in a contract for
specific performance has to recognize the attachment before
judgment of the holder of a suit claim to be decreed so far as
the non-payment of balance sale consideration to pass on
concerned, that is not at all discussed.  In fact, even from
close reading of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act
with Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act, the equitable
enforceable right created in a contract for sale from the
executant denies execution or not coming forward is to
maintain a suit for specific performance, which is, in fact, a
discretionary relief, the Court can decree or not to decree
depending upon the facts of the case. Though, Section 10 of
the Specific Relief Act, particularly, from the explanation (1)
clearly shows in exercize of discretion by the Court in a
specific performance suit, the breach of a contract to
transfer cannot be adequately relieved by compensation of
money in respect of the immovable property. For the same,
as per Section 10(b) an adequate relief for non-performance
to compensate except as otherwise provided in the chapter
from other sections covered by Sections 9 to 25 including
Section 20 of the Act, the discretionary relief, subject to the
foundation including from the pleading laid down under
Section 16 of the Act.
27.     Coming to other expressions referred of the Madras
High Court in Veeraraghavayya v. Kamala Devi , wherein it
was observed that where a purchase is subsequent to the
attachment, but the agreement in pursuance of which the
purchase is made, is prior to attachment, the purchase
prevails against the attachment.
28.     No doubt, in the case on hand, the suit O.S.No.40 of
2012 (255 of 2012) for specific performance in favour of
R.Satish Kumar against P.Supraja was on contest decreed and  
the Court executed registered sale deed, which is pursuant to
the non-possessory unregistered sale agreement dated 
28.02.2010 earlier to the filing of the suit for recovery of
money and attachment before judgment affected in 2010, to
say, though the sale deed executed through the Court in a
decree for specific performance is subsequent in point of
time to the attachment traced back to the sale agreement
prior to the attachment before judgment that can prevail.
However, had it been the money decree holder, who sought
the attachment impleaded in the suit for specific
performance,  it could be different it was not done and
against the money decree, no third party appeal even filed.
29.     The other judgment of the Madras High Court in Rebala
Venkata Reddi v. Yellappa Chetti  referred the same view
and the subsequent Single Bench of the Madras High Court in
Diravyam Pillai v. Veeran Ambalam , the observation
particularly at page 831 referred was the question is not
whether any interest has passed under the contract for sale
but the attaching decree holder attaches not the physical
property, but only the rights of the judgment-debtor in the
property. Even from this, once there is a right of the
judgment debtor in the property attached, which is subject
to the prior sale agreement, it is for the unpaid purchase
money there is a right what is remained as on the date of
attachment. 
30.     Though, a contract for sale, does not having regard to
the terms of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property  Act,
create any interest in or charge on the property, it does give
rise to an obligation which limits the right of the judgment-
debtor and the attachment of the right, title and interest of
the judgment-debtor is subject to any such limitation by
which the judgment-debtor was bound. Therefore, where 
subsequent to a contract to sell certain property, is attached
in execution of a decree, the attachment does not prevail
over the pre-existing contract to sell even though the
attachment creditor has no notice of the contract to sell.
The right of the judgment-debtor in the property is on the
date of the attachment qualified by the obligation incurred
by him under the earlier contract to sell and the attaching
creditor cannot claim to ignore that obligation and proceed
to bring the property to sale as if it remained the absolute
property of the judgment-debtor. This expression also
reiterates that prior contract for sale prevails over
subsequent attachment before judgment or attachment in 
execution of a decree.  However, so far as prevailing of the
agreement for sale concerned, the agreement holder is under
obligation to honour the attachment order out of what is to
be performed under the contract for sale.
31.     The conclusion arrived in the expression of the Single
Bench of this Court in Adinarayana (supra) from the above in
saying right prevails by operation under Section 47 of the
Registration Act and Order 38 Rule 10 C.P.C. and the rigour
imposed under Section 64 C.P.C. does not prevail is not fully
correct from what is discussed supra so also for the case not
coming under the spirit of Section 64(2) of the amended
C.P.C. 
32.     Having regard to the above, the above substantial
questions of law formulated are answered in saying the
Courts below are not fully correct in dismissing the claim
petition of the agreement holder, R.Satish Kumar, but for, to
say the claim cannot be fully allowed of R.Satish Kumar
against T.Bhaskara Rao and P.Supraja, who are the decree 
holder and judgment-debtor respectively of the money
decree, where there was also an attachment before
judgment prior to filing of the suit for specific performance
and what the right the agreement holder has on the date of
filing of the suit for specific performance was having is at
best under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act, the
charge, at best over the property for recovery of the advance
sale consideration by virtue of the wording of Section 55
statutorily like a charge to the purchase for recovery on the
property of unpaid consideration, in the event of the suit for
specific performance filed and on contest decreed by also
impleading the money decree holder-cum-person, who  
attached the property from the deemed notice, it was not
done, though otherwise had it been done, the limit of the
agreement holder is to the balance sale consideration to
answer to the attachment before judgment has right in the
property, which is subject to the sale agreement.
33.     In view of the above and from this Courts duty in the
factual matrix to render equity to both the parties and any
party who received under benefit has to restore that extent
to the other to order restitution with pragmatic approach for
Court should not be oblivious of any unmerited hardship to be
suffered by any party as held by the Apex Court in City Bank
N.A. v. Hiten P.Dalal , it is just to say the claimant,
R.Satish Kumar (the specific performance decree holder) has
to pay the original suit principal amount of the suit claim of
Rs.6,00,000/- to T.Bhaskara Rao (the money decree holder) 
which amount of Rs.6,00,000/- includes adjustment by
receiving back the amount deposited in the suit for specific
performance in the Court with accrued interest to meet the
same and also that includes any amount earlier paid under
any settlement proposal through mediator or any direction of
this Court or the Courts below. The said amount has to be
paid within eight weeks from today, failing which T.Bhaskara
Rao, money decree holder is entitled to execute and recover
said Rs.6,00,000/- with interest at 12% p.a. from today
onwards for balance after adjustment of what is stated
supra. For any further claim of the money decree holder,
T.Bhakara Rao is to proceed personally against respondent
No.2/judgment debtor, Smt.P.Supraja if there is any other
property of her for the reason Section 56 C.P.C., speaks a
female is not liable for arrest for any recovery of a money
decree.
34.     Accordingly and to the above extent, the Second
Appeal is allowed with no costs.
35.     Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any shall
stand closed.  No order as to costs.

___________________________   
JUSTICE Dr. B.SIVA SANKARA RAO     
Date: 03.04.2018

Friday, June 1, 2018

Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking to quash the proceedingsunder Section 420 IPC= Since the trial has already been commenced and five witnesses have been examined, it is not appropriate to quash the proceedings at this stage.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD           

Crl.P.No.4258 of 2013
       
09-04-2018

Kota Gangaram @ Gangarapu Gangaram, s/o. Hanmantha Rao, aged:38 years occ:Nil  R/o.H.No.3-2-193, Ramnagar Picket, Secunderab       

The State of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and another. . Respondents

Counsel for the petitioner: Sri Katam Srinivas

Counsel for Respondent No.1: Public Prosecutor (TG)
Counsel for Respondent No.2: Sri R. Venkata Reddy 


<Gist :

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:

-nil-


THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD           

Crl.P.No.4258 of 2013

ORDER 
       
      This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.302 of 2012 on the file
of VI Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Warangal, against
the petitioner/A3.
2.      The petitioner is A3, who is alleged to have committed the
offence punishable under Section 420 IPC along with A1, A2 and A4
to A6.  On the complaint of the second respondent/de-facto
complainant, the police registered a case in Cr.No.257 of 2011 on
09.12.2011 for the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC.  After
investigation, the police have filed the charge sheet in this case.
3.      Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
petitioner/A3 has nothing to do with the commission of the offence
as his name does not find place in the partnership deed and he is no
way connected with the transaction and therefore, the proceedings
against the petitioner may be quashed.
4.      Learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the
charge sheet was taken on file, CC was numbered and five
witnesses have been examined in this case. He further submitted
that as there is no stay granted by this Court, the trial is being
proceeded with by the trial Court and that there are no grounds to
quash the proceedings in this case.
5.      The arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and
the learned counsel for the second respondent can be considered
only by going through the material evidence.  The question of fact
cannot be decided at this stage. Since the trial has already been
commenced and five witnesses have been examined, it is not 
appropriate to quash the proceedings at this stage.
6.      Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Criminal Petition is disposed of, directing the trial Court to dispose of
C.C.No.302 of 2012 expeditiously.
7.      Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this criminal petition
shall stand closed.

___________________________   
GUDISEVA SHYAM PRASAD, J       
9th April, 2018

The defence of appellant before trial Court was two fold - (i) the alibi and (ii) the deceased has committed suicide. The appellant has failed to prove the defence of alibi by not producing any defence to this effect. The second defence is that he has not killed the deceased but she herself hanged and committed suicide. 19. Now, question is, why the deceased has committed suicide ? The deposition of PW-2 has proved that the appellant used to beat and harass the deceased. On the date of incident also, he beat the deceased. Accordingly, the deceased was fed-up with the harassment caused by the appellant and finished her life. We have no hesitation to say that the appellant was fully aware, while taking second defence, that he may be convicted for the offence under Section 306 of IPC, if not under Section 302 of IPC. Therefore, even if the trial Court has not framed charge under Section 306 of IPC, still, the appellant can be convicted for the aforementioned offence keeping in view the dictum of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Dalbir Singh (supra 1). 20. In view of the above discussion and the legal position, we hereby set aside the conviction of appellant/accused for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. However, we convict the appellant for the offence under Section 306 of IPC.

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT  AND HONBLE SMT. JUSTICE T. RAJANI             

Crl.A.No.829 of 2011

04.04.2018

Bandala Saya Goud...Appellant 
       
The State of A.P..Respondent 

#For Appellant: Ms.C.Vasundhara Reddy, Advocate. 

$For Respondent:Public Prosecutor.     

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?CITATIONS: 

(2004) 5 SCC 334

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SURESH KUMAR KAIT       
AND 
HONBLE SMT. JUSTICE T.RAJANI     

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.829 of 2011   

JUDGMENT : (Per Honble Sri Justice Suresh Kumar Kait) 
        The present appeal is preferred against the order and judgment
dated 29th November 2010, passed in Sessions Case No.335 of 2008 by 
the IX Additional Sessions Judge, Kamareddy, whereby, the appellant
was found guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
302 of IPC.  Accordingly, he was sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of three years for the offence under Section
498-A IPC and to undergo life imprisonment for the offence under
Section 302 of IPC and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-.  In default of
payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three
months.  Both the sentences were to run concurrently.

2.      Brief facts of the case are that about 18 years prior to the incident,
the deceased was given in marriage to the appellant (hereinafter referred
to as the accused).  At the time of marriage, 3 tulas of gold, Rs.70,000/-
cash and other household articles were given.  They led happy marital
life for some time and were blessed with a female child i.e. PW-2.
Subsequently, accused harassed the deceased demanding Rs.3,00,000/-   
and some times Rs.5,00,000/-.  He also suspected her character and used
to beat her frequently.  As the accused continued his harassment, PW-2
stayed at Chittapur village with her grandmother i.e. PW-1 and pursued
her studies.  On 27.12.2007, at the instance of the deceased, PW-2 visited
her and slept there with her paternal grand parents.  In the middle of the
night, on hearing the cries of her mother i.e. deceased, PW-2 went into
the room and questioned her as to why she was weeping.  On that,
accused, who was found in aggressive mood, pushed PW-2.  Being 
frightened, PW-2 left the room and hid herself.  Thereafter, accused
searched for her.  PW-2 got into an auto which was stationed at the road
and went to Ramayampet and from there, to Chittapur and informed
PW-1/mother of the deceased.  Next morning, they were informed by one
Ramagoud about the death of the deceased.  They immediately rushed to 
the scene and found the deceased hanging to the wooden beam on the 
roof with a saree, in the kitchen room.  On that, PW-1 immediately
lodged a report, which is marked as Ex.P-1.

3.      On 28.12.2007, at about 12.30 p.m., on receiving Ex.P-1/report
from PW-1, PW-8/the then ASI of Police, Bhiknoor Police Station,
registered a case in Crime No.242 of 2007 and issued FIR, which is
marked as Ex.P-7.  Investigation was taken over by PW-9/the C.I. of
Police, Bhiknor.  He visited the scene of offence and got the scene
photographed through PW-6.  Ex.P-4 are the photographs.  He then got
removed the body from the ceiling and then held scene of offence
panchanama in the presence of PW-5, which is marked as Ex.P-2.  He 
further held inquest over the dead body of the deceased, which is marked
as Ex.P-3.  During the course of investigation, he recorded the statements
of PWs.2 to 4.  Thereafter, he sent the deadbody for postmortem
examination.

4.      On receiving requisition dated 28th December 2007, PW-7/the then
Civil Assistant Surgeon at Area Hospital, Kamareddy, held autopsy over
the dead body of the deceased and opined that the cause of death was due
to Asphyxia due to hanging.  Ex.P-5 is the postmortem report.

5.      On 06.01.2008, PW-9 apprehended the accused and sent him for 
judicial remand.  After receiving all the relevant documents and on
completion of investigation, he filed the charge sheet.  After furnishing of
copies to the accused, the learned trial Court framed charges under
Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC.  The accused pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.

6.      Learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant does not dispute
the conviction under Section 498-A of IPC and sentencing the appellant
for a period of 3 years since the appellant has already undergone more
than Six years of imprisonment.  However, she submitted that as per the
deposition of PW-7/Doctor who conducted autopsy over the dead body,
two views emerged  (i) it is a suicidal death and (ii) it is a homicidal.
Learned counsel submits, if two views are there, the benefit of the same
is to be given to the accused.  Thus, the appellant deserves to be acquitted
from the charge of Section 302 IPC.

7.      We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record.

8.      In view of arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellant,
discussing the depositions of other witnesses is not necessary, however,
it is important to discuss the deposition of PW-2/B.Rekha, who is the
daughter of accused and the deceased.  She deposed that in the year
2006-07, she studied 10th Class by staying in the house of her grand
mother/PW-1 at Chittapur village, as her father i.e. the accused was
harassing and beating her mother and also was suspecting her character
all the time.  The accused also used to follow her (PW-2) to the school
and see if she was with any boy.  The accused used to lock the house
keeping her mother inside the house when he used to go out.  He never
allowed her mother even to peep from the window.  He used to place
stones on the edges of the curtains in order to see that her mother does
not look through the window.
       
9.      She further deposed that on 26.12.2007, which was a Wednesday, 
her mother rang her up and asked to come home as she was preparing 
sweet chapathi (polelu).  As such, she visited her mother on 27.12.2007
and since it was night, she had her dinner and slept with her paternal
grand parents.  In the middle of her sleep, she heard noise from her
parents room.  She heard her mother crying.  As such, she opened the
door and went into the room of her parents and saw her mother weeping.
When she was questioning her mother as to why she was crying, the 
accused came and questioned her whether she require the answer from 
her mother, and pushed her away in an aggressive mood.  Seeing the
aggressive mood of her father, which was on extreme side, she got
frightened and left the room feeling that he may take some drastic step.
The accused came out of his room, searched for her and again went back
into the room.  At that time, she noticed an Auto on the road.  As such,
she got into the Auto and went to Ramayampet, and from there, to
Chittapur and informed her grand mother i.e. PW-1 that the accused was
beating her mother severely.  PW-1 told her that they will take some
village elders and visit the house of her father on the next day morning.
Early in the morning on the next day, her paternal aunts husband,
namely, Ramagoud came to PW-1s house and informed that her mother   
died.  Later, they came to the house of his father along with other
villagers in a Tractor.  They saw the body of her mother with broken toes
on the left foot, injured finger tips, broken nose and other injuries on the
body.  She further deposed that her father hanged her mother to the
wooden beam on the roof with her saree in the kitchen room.  Her father
i.e. accused himself killed her mother.  Accordingly, her maternal grand
mother i.e. PW-1 lodged complaint to the Police.

10.     The statement of PW-2 is corroborated by PW-1/mother of the
deceased, PW-3/cousin brother of the deceased and PW-4/brother of the
deceased.

11.     PW-7/Dr.Ajay Kumar, who conducted autopsy on the body of the 
deceased, deposed that on 28.12.2007 at 4.10 p.m., he received
requisition from the Police, Bhiknoor for conducting postmortem
examination on the dead body of Bandolla Savithri, aged 35 years.
As such, he conducted the autopsy over her body on the same day from 
4.15 p.m. to 5.30 p.m.  During the said examination, he found the
following ante-mortem injuries :
      1.       An abrasion left great toe measuring  x  cms.
2.      An abrasion over left nostril  measuring  x  cms.
3.      Clotted blood present over the upper teeth and the gums.
4.      An abrasion over the back of left scapula measuring 2x2 cms.
5.      Legature mark on the front of the neck, which is U shape
measuring 30x5 cms. 

6.      Knot mark was present behind the ear on the left side.

12.     PW-7 further deposed that on dissection of the dead body, he
found blood clots in the throat muscles.  He also found the tricia, branchy
and both lungs were conjusted apart from a contusion over the small and
large intestine.  He then sent the viscera for chemical analysis.  On
receiving FSL report, he opined that the death of said Savithri was due to
Asphyxia due to hanging.  Accordingly, he issued certificate vide Ex.P-5.
The FSL report is Ex.P-6.  He stated that injury Nos.1 to 6 were not
possible in case of a suicidal death.  Whereas, in the cross-examination
by the counsel for the accused, he admitted that injury Nos.5 and 6
mentioned in Ex.P-5 were possible by way of hanging a person.

13.     The aforesaid statement was recorded on 17th June 2010.  The
witness was recalled thereafter vide order dated 19th August 2010 for
further cross-examination, in which, he admitted that injury Nos.5 and 6
were possible in a case pertaining to suicide.  He also added that the said
injuries were also possible in case of hanging i.e. homicide.

14.     From the deposition of PW-7/Doctor, it is evident that he was not
sure as to whether injury Nos.5 and 6 were caused due to suicide or
homicide.  The fact remains that there were six injuries as mentioned
above and all were ante-mortem, which is not disputed by the defence
counsel.  As stated by PW-2/daughter of the accused and the deceased,
she saw the dead body of her mother with broken toes on the left foot,
injured finger tips, broken nose apart from other injuries on her body.
This fact has been corroborated by the post-mortem report/Ex.P-5.  It is
also a fact that the death of the deceased was due to Asphyxia.
PW-7/Doctor who conducted autopsy was not clear as to whether injury
Nos.5 and 6, which were the material injuries, were caused by suicide or
by homicide.  But, the fact remains that the accused used to beat and
harass the deceased, and on 27.12.2007, he beat the deceased, which was 
witnessed by PW-2, who is none other than his daughter.  The defence
counsel cross-examined PW-2, but she was consistent with her 
deposition.

15.     As per medical jurisprudence, it is difficult to kill a person and
thereafter hang by a single person.  This can be possible if the deceased is
very weak or a child.  In the present case, the age of the deceased is 35
years and height is 5 feet.  Though weight is not on record, but we can
say from the photographs/Ex.P-4 that it was difficult for the accused to
commit homicide and thereafter hang the deceased.   As per Section 106
of the Evidence Act, explanation has to come from the accused being
husband of the deceased as to what had happened to his wife on the date
of incident.  Though he has taken the plea of alibi, however, there is no
corroborating evidence to prove the same.  Thus, it is established that the
appellant/accused was very much in the house on the date of incident and
that fact is corroborated by the evidence of PW-2/his daughter.  It is also
the fact that the deceased was beaten by the accused on the night of the
incident in the room where they used to sleep, but the deceased was
found in hanging position in the kitchen.
16.     We have perused the record and photographs.  It has come out
from the said photographs that the deceased hanged with saree and knot
of the saree was on the left side of the face.  There is a kitchen slab, from
where, it appears, she hanged and thereafter jumped from the said slab.
Therefore, keeping in view the deposition of PW-7/Doctor who
conducted autopsy, we are of the opinion that the deceased had
committed suicide due to the harassment and frequent beating in the
hands of her husband i.e. the accused.  It seems that after receiving the
beatings of accused on that night, the deceased left the room and went
into kitchen and hanged herself.  Thus, she ended her life.  The hanging
of the deceased was because of the abetment due to beatings given by the
accused/husband. 

17.     Though the learned trial Court has not framed the charge under
Section 306 of IPC, however, the law has been settled in the case of
Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P. , whereby, it is held as under :
There are a catena of decisions of this Court on the same lines
and it is not necessary to burden this judgment by making
reference to each one of them.  Therefore, in view of Section
464 Cr.P.C., it is possible for the appellate or revisional court
to convict an accused for an offence for which no charge was
framed unless the court is of the opinion that a failure of justice
would in fact occasion.  In order to judge whether a failure of
justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine
whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the
offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main
facts sought to be established against him were explained to
him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that Sangaraboina Sreenu
[(1997) 5 SCC 348] was not correctly decided as it purports to
lay down as a principle of law that where the accused is
charged under Section 302 IPC, he cannot be convicted for the
offence under Section 306 IPC.

18.     The defence of appellant before trial Court was two fold - (i) the
alibi and (ii) the deceased has committed suicide.  The appellant has
failed to prove the defence of alibi by not producing any defence to this
effect.  The second defence is that he has not killed the deceased but she
herself hanged and committed suicide.

19.     Now, question is, why the deceased has committed suicide ?  The 
deposition of PW-2 has proved that the appellant used to beat and harass
the deceased.  On the date of incident also, he beat the deceased.
Accordingly, the deceased was fed-up with the harassment caused by the 
appellant and finished her life.  We have no hesitation to say that the
appellant was fully aware, while taking second defence, that he may be
convicted for the offence under Section 306 of IPC, if not under Section
302 of IPC.  Therefore, even if the trial Court has not framed charge
under Section 306 of IPC, still, the appellant can be convicted for the
aforementioned offence keeping in view the dictum of Honble Supreme
Court in the case of Dalbir Singh (supra 1).

20.     In view of the above discussion and the legal position, we hereby
set aside the conviction of appellant/accused for the offence under
Section 302 of IPC.  However, we convict the appellant for the offence
under Section 306 of IPC.
21.     It is on record that apart from the remand period, the appellant
remained in jail for Seven years and thereafter, he was released on bail
vide order dated 12th June 2017.  We hereby sentence him to the
imprisonment already undergone.

22.     Appeal is accordingly allowed in part.
     Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
______________________   
SURESH KUMAR KAIT, J   
_____________ 
t.. RAJANI, J
4th April, 2018

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the Act).= legal representative of a holder in due course has all the rights of the holder in due course. Here, in this case, if the original payee is a holder in due course, his representative has all his rights. Therefore, rights under Sections 138 and 142 are applicable to the legal representative also if he derives title from the holder in due course. the 2nd respondent holds the cheque after the death of his father being the payee and as a legal heir he is entitled to possess the same in his own name and in view of Section 53 he is the holder in due course and can get a full discharge. Section 53 of the Act, a legal representative/heir of the payee or holder in due course can maintain a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. In the above circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the complaint is maintainable. The 2nd respondent being the legal representative of his deceased father i.e., payee or holder in due course can file a complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Act. As such, this Court holds that there are no merits in the criminal petition and the same is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE P. KESHAVA RAO       

CRIMINAL PETITION No.8861 OF 2011   

13-04-2018

M/s. Sri Sai Mourya Estates &   Projects Pvt., Ltd, & others. ..Petitioners

The State of A.P., rep., by its Public Prosecutor,High Court of A.P., Hyderabad & another...Respondents


Counsel for Petitioners: Sri D. Bhaskar Reddy.

Counsel for respondent No.1: Learned Public Prosecutor


<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:   

? Cases referred

1.      2010 Crl. L.J. 2166
2.      II (2004) BC 152 (DB)
3.      IV (2010) BC 181
4.      2004 (2) KCCR 864 
5.      1984 Crl. L.J. 1326
6.      2006 (1) ALD (Crl.) 643 (A.P.)
7.      (2006) 5 SCC 530
8.      2012 (1) ALD (Crl.) 865 (A.P.)
9.      2005 (1) ALD (Crl.) 305 (SC)

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE P. KESHAVA RAO       

CRIMINAL PETITION No.8861 of 2011   

ORDER: 

        Heard counsel for the petitioners as well as the respondents.
        The present criminal petition is filed by the petitioners/
accused Nos.1 to 3 and 5, to quash the proceedings initiated
against them in C.C.No.1375 of 2010 on the file of the Court of the
II Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Nampally,
Hyderabad, for the offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the Act).
        The brief facts of the case are that originally the 2nd
respondent herein filed the above mentioned case i.e., C.C.No.1375
of 2010 against the petitioners and two others.  The case of the 2nd
respondent is that petitioner No.1 is a private limited company
represented by petitioner Nos.2 to 4 and two others and petitioner
Nos.2 to 4 approached his father and requested him to give hand
loan for the purpose of developing the lands in Magadha Venture
situated at Kokapet Village, Ranga Reddy District.  Believing the
version of the petitioners, his father paid a sum of Rs.25 lakhs in
cash as hand loan and in view thereof the petitioners executed a
promissory note, dated 04.10.2007.  In the said promissory note,
Sri M. Chandra Shekar and Sri B. Venu Gopal Reddy acted as  
witnesses, since amount was paid in their presence.  It is also
stated that the petitioners agreed to pay the above said amount
with interest @24% per annum within a period of two years
thereof.  However, after receiving the amount, the petitioners have
changed their colour and started avoiding payment of the said
amount.  It is also specifically stated that the said amount was
obtained by petitioner Nos.2 to 4 and two others for the purpose of
investing in the real estate business of petitioner No.1 company.
Petitioner No.1 is a private limited company, petitioner No.2 is the
Managing Director and petitioner Nos.3, 4 and two others are the
Directors of petitioner No.1 company.  In fact, petitioner Nos.2 to 4
and two other Directors are equally taking part in the business of
the company and also looking after the financial aspects, such as,
negotiating with the customers, issuing of cheques etc., and
therefore all are equally responsible for the day to day affairs of the
1st petitioner company.  The 1st petitioner company represented by
accused Nos.3 and 4, with the consent of accused Nos.2, 5 and 6,
issued a cheque bearing No.332164, dated 16.09.2010, for a sum 
of Rs.25 lakhs drawn on Andhra Bank, Banjara Hills, in favour of
the father of the 2nd respondent towards discharge of the debt.
When the father of the 2nd respondent deposited the above
mentioned cheque for collection through his banker i.e., Bank of
Baroda, Abids branch, Hyderabad, the same was returned unpaid  
with an endorsement funds insufficient and the same was
intimated to him on 17.09.2010.  All the accused persons have
jointly and severally liable for payment of the amount covered
under the dishonoured cheque, but with a view to defeat the
payment, all the accused have committed default in payment of
legally enforceable debt to the father of the 2nd respondent.  In
pursuance of the said dishonour of the cheque, the father of the
2nd respondent got issued statutory notice, dated 07.10.2010,
through his counsel calling upon all the accused, including the
petitioners herein, to pay the amount covered under the above said
cheque within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice.  All
the accused, including the petitioners herein, have received the
notice on 11.10.2010 under the postal acknowledgement, dated 
12.10.2010 and 13.10.2010 respectively, but have not chosen to
give any reply and no amount is paid.  However, after issuance of
the legal notice, unfortunately the father of the 2nd respondent died
on 13.10.2010.  That apart, he also filed a suit for recovery of the
amount covered under the subject cheque before the Chief Judge,
City Civil Court, Hyderabad vide O.S(SR).No.34507 of 2010.  The
original cheque as well as the cheque returned memo were filed
before the civil Court and the same will be produced at the time of
trial before the concerned Court.  In those circumstances, the
private complaint was filed vide C.C.No.1375 of 2010.  Aggrieved
by the filing of the complaint and initiation of proceedings against
all the accused, including the petitioners herein, the present
criminal petition is filed to quash the same.
        Counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the
subject cheque was issued in the name of the father of the 2nd
respondent, who filed a civil suit before the competent civil Court.
Relying on Section 142 of the Act, he would contend that the
complaint has to be filed by the payee or the holder in due course
of the cheque as the case may be.  But, in the present case, the 2nd
respondent is not the holder in due course and therefore he cannot
file a complaint against the petitioners and two others for the
offence under Section 138 of the Act.  As per Section 9 of the Act,
holder in due course means a person who for consideration
became the possessor of a cheque if payable to the bearer before
the amount became payable and since the 2nd respondent is 
neither payee nor the holder in due course is not the possessor of
the cheque for consideration amount, and as such the complaint
filed by him is not maintainable.  He also contended that unless a
succession certificate or letter of administration or a probate of will
is granted, the 2nd respondent, being the legal representative,
cannot initiate the proceedings and the complaint filed by him is
not maintainable. To support his contention the counsel has
brought to the notice of the Court the provisions of Sections 53, 78
and 82(c) of the Act.  The said provisions contemplate that the
holder of a negotiable instrument, who deserves title from a holder
in due course, has the right thereon of that holder in due course
and subjected to provisions of Section 82(c), payment of the
amount due on a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque must
in order to discharge a maker or accepter, be made to the holder of
the instrument.  Section 82(c) of the Act reads as follows:
        by payment:- to all parties thereto, if the instrument is
payable to bearer or has been endorsed in blank, and such maker
acceptor or endorser makes payment in due course of the amount 
due thereon.

        Thus, the counsel contended that the 2nd respondent is
neither the payee nor the holder in due course.  To support his
contention, counsel for the petitioners has relied on the judgment
of the Bombay High Court in Vishnupant Chaburao Khaire v.
Kailash Balbhir Madan .
        The facts of the said case are that the accused/petitioner
therein issued a cheque in favour of the father of the
respondent/complainant on 28.08.2007.  However, the father of
the respondent/complainant died on 05.09.2007 in a vehicular
accident.  On 05.02.2008, the complainant presented the cheque
for encashment, but the same was dishonoured and returned with
an endorsement insufficient funds.  The complainant issued a
legal notice on 03.03.2008 and since the accused failed to pay the
amount, filed a criminal case for the offences under Section 138 of
the Act.  Challenging the said initiation of the proceedings, the
accused therein filed Crl.W.P.No.842 of 2009 before the Bombay
High Court (Aurangabad Bench).  The accused mainly contended 
that the complainant is neither a payee nor a holder in due course
and he is not entitled to file the complaint for the offence
punishable under Section 138 of the Act.  While dealing with the
said issue, the Bombay High Court held that the complainant is
not a payee or holder in due course within the meaning of law and
he has no authority to demand money and lodge a complaint, since
he can not give valid discharge for payment made to him.  The said
finding was arrived at by referring to Sections 211, 273 and 381 of
the Succession Act by holding that unless the complainant is in a
position to give full discharge and indemnity to the drawer of the
cheque, he cannot lodge a complaint.  The relevant paragraphs in
the said judgment are as under:
        The present Respondent-complainant is not the person
named in the instrument nor he is a person to whom or to whose
order money by the instrument is directed to be paid. Admittedly,
there is no endorsement on the cheque by the deceased payee in
favour of the Respondent-complainant. So, it is not that the
amount under the instrument was directed to be paid to him. The
holder in due course is defined as the person who for
consideration is entitled to the possession of the bearer cheque or
payee or endorsee thereof. It is submitted that as a legal
representative of the deceased payee-father, the respondent-
complainant, is entitled to possession of the valuable
security/movable property left by his deceased father and also to
receive or recover the amount thereunder. It is not disputed that
the complainant could have filed a civil suit on the basis of the
dishonoured cheque for recovery of the amount stated in the said
cheque. The question is whether the respondent-complainant
could file complaint in view of specific wording of Section 142(a).
It is argued that the respondent complainant has not become
possessor of the property for consideration, but it is because of
death of his father-payee. He is also not endorsee.

        If we consider the scheme of Chapter XVII of the N.I. Act
regarding penalties in case of dishonour of certain cheques for
insufficieny of funds in the account, it is clear that under proviso
(b) to Section 138 of the N.I. Act the payee or the holder in due
course of the cheque, as the case may be, is to make a demand
for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within [thirty] days of the
receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return
of the cheque as unpaid. As per proviso (c), if the drawer of such
cheque fails to make payment of the amount due under the
cheque to the payee or to the holder in due course as the case
may be within fifteen days of receipt of notice, then the offence is
complete. It may be noted that this requires that the person
demanding the amount must have right to demand the money 
and secondly, he must be in a position to give full discharge to
the person who is to make the payment. If a person to whom
payment is to be made is not in a position in law to give full
discharge and indemnity for payment made, non-payment to him 
cannot be an offence.

        We may refer to certain provisions of the Succession Act in
this respect. Section 211 speaks that the executor or
administrator, as the case may be, of a deceased person is his
legal representative for all purpose, and all the property of the
deceased person vests in him as such. Section 273 of the
Succession Act is regarding conclusiveness of probate or letters of
administration. As per this section, probate or letters of
administration shall have effect over all the property and estate,
movable or immovable, of the deceased, throughout the [State] in
which the same is or are granted, and shall be conclusive as to
the representative title against all debtors of the deceased, and all
persons holding property which belongs to him, and shall afford
full indemnity to all debtors, paying their debts and all persons
delivering up 03-12-2017 (Page 8 of 9) www.manupatra.com
Hon'ble Sri Justice P. Keshava Rao such property to the person to
whom such probate or letters of administration have been
granted. Similarly, under Section 381, succession certificate with
respect to debts and securities specified therein, is conclusive as
against person owing such debts or liable on such securities and
affords full indemnity to all persons as regards all payments made
or dealings had, with the person to whom the certificate is
granted. In other words, only in case the legatee or heir is armed
with succession certificate or probate or letters of administration,
he would be entitled to give full discharge and indemnity to the
drawer of the cheque. Unless he can give such indemnity it
cannot be said that he has authority to issue notice and non
payment of amount mentioned in the notice within 15 days is an
offence.

        However, in the case on hand, it is the specific case of the
2nd respondent that after issuance of the cheque in question by all
the accused including the petitioners herein, his deceased father
issued legal notice, dated 07.10.2010, calling upon all the accused
to pay the amount covered under the cheque.  However, before
lodging the complaint unfortunately he died on 13.10.2010.  In
that regard, it is specifically mentioned in the complaint that after
the demise of his father, on an application, the Tahsildar, Nandyal,
Kurnool District, issued family member certificate showing the
name of the 2nd respondent as legal heir of his deceased father.  By
virtue of the said certificate, the 2nd respondent stepped into the
shoes of his deceased father and is a payee or holder in due course
of the subject instrument.  Therefore, the above said judgment
cited by the counsel for the petitioners is not applicable to the facts
and circumstances of the case on hand.
        Counsel for the 2nd respondent, advancing his arguments,
contended that the 2nd respondent, being the legal representative,
can initiate and continue the proceedings under the provisions of
Sections 138 and 142 of the Act.  The legal representatives will
step into the shoes of the original payee or the holder in due
course and can continue the proceedings.  He also would contend
that the disputed contentions can be raised only during the course
of trial, but not at the threshold.  He also emphasized on the
aspect that as the payee or the holder in due course i.e., the
deceased father of the 2nd respondent has already issued a legal
notice, dated 07.10.2010, the same proceedings can be continued
by the 2nd respondent being the son and legal representative.  He
further contended that any person can initiate action against
anybody to set the law into motion.  That being the position, the
proceedings initiated by the 2nd respondent being the legal
representative are maintainable.  He also relied on the proposition
that legal representative can be brought on record during the
pendency of the criminal proceedings and he can initiate and
continue the proceedings under the Act.
        Counsel for the 2nd respondent brought to the notice of the
Court the definition of Holder and Holder in due course as per
Sections 8 and 9 of the Act and contended that the 2nd respondent
would come within the definition of Holder as well as Holder in
due course, since he is entitled to recover the amount due from
the petitioners being the legal representative of his deceased father.
To support his contention that any person can initiate action
against anybody to set the law into motion, he brought to the
notice of the Court the definition of Complaint in Section 2(d) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.  He also brought to the notice of
the Court Section 256 Cr.P.C., which contemplate non-appearance
or death of the complainant i.e., if the summons have been issued
on a complaint, Section 256(2) Cr.P.C. contemplates that the
provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to
cases where the non-appearance of the complainant due to his
death.  Basing on the above provisions, he would contend that the
proceedings as initiated by the 2nd respondent for the offence
under Sections 138 and 142 of the Act against the petitioners are
maintainable.  To substantiate his contentions, he has relied upon
the following judgments: Chandra Babu v. Ramani , Anup
Jagdish Agarwal v. Nilkunj Lalit Shah and others , Smt.
Bhagava v. Sri Kadasiddeshwara Trading Company and 
another , Maddipatta Govindaiah Naidu and others v.
Yelakaluri Kamalamma and another , Tripuraneni Sai Prasad v.
State of A.P. and another , Balasaheb K. Thackeray and
another v. Venkat Alias Babru and another , Gadala Vasantha
(died) by L.Rs. and another v. Cybermate Infotek Ltd.,
Secunderabad and another  and Jimmy Jahangir Madan v. 
Bolly Cariyappa Hindley (died) by L.Rs. .
        In Chandra Babu (2 supra), a Division Bench of the High
Court of Kerala while considering a similar issue pleased to
observe as under:
        Another important statutory provision in this regard is
Section 53 which is as follows:

        "53. Holder deriving title from holder in due
course:- A holder of a negotiable instrument who derives
title from a holder in due course has the rights thereon
of that holder in due course."

Therefore, a holder deriving title from the holder in due course
has all the rights of a holder in due course.  Therefore, legal
representative of a holder in due course has all the rights of the
holder in due course. Here, in this case, if the original payee is a
holder in due course, his representative has all his rights.
Therefore, rights under Sections 138 and 142 are applicable to
the legal representative also if he derives title from the holder in
due course.

        Next contention is that there may be other legal heirs and,
therefore, complaint by the one legal heir/representative is not
maintainable.  That is a matter for evidence.  Further, they are all
curable defects and that is not a matter to be considered for
quashing a complaint at the initial stage (see M.M.T.C. Ltd., and
Anr. V. Medchil Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., & Anr. (2002 (1) SCC
234).

        In Anup Jagdish Agarwal (3 supra), the High Court of
Bombay observed as follows:
        These views have my respectful concurrence. Moreover,
nothing contrary to brought to my notice. In my view, in the light
of this statutory scheme and the decisions referred above, it can
be safely concluded that a complaint can be filed by the legal
representatives of the payee and merely because it is so filed, it
cannot be held that it is not maintainable. Once, the complaint
can be held to be maintainable, then, any larger issue need not be
gone into at this prima facie stage. Whether the presumption is
applicable or whether burden has been discharged by the
accused by leading evidence to the contrary are all matters which
must be gone into and decided at the trial. Merely because in a
petition challenging the issuance of process, all pleas of the afore
referred nature are raised, does not mean that the presumption is
not available to the complainants at this stage. The stage at
which presumption can be held to be rebutted is not this prima
facie stage of issuance of process. It is not as if the accused will
have no opportunity to prove to the contrary. The complaint is yet
to be tried. However, the order issuing process on the complaint
cannot be faulted on the ground raised in this petition. The first
contention, therefore, must fail.

        In Smt. Bhagava (4 supra), the High Court of Karnataka
held as follows:
        Having regard to the factual aspects and the settled
principles of law in this regard, in the opinion of this Court, on
the death of the payee, his legal heirs steps into the shoes of the
payee for all practical purposes and such a person can also file
and prosecute the complaint after completing the legal
formalities.  It is also necessary to mention that it would be
incumbent upon the complainant to prove that the complainant
is the legal representative of the deceased payee, in the event of
accused disputing the same.  In the case on hand, the payee had
died and the wife of the payee, as the legal heir, had presented
the cheque in question and on the cheque being dishonoured,
legal notice had also been issued and thereafter, the proceedings
had been initiated under Section 138 of the NI Act.

        In Maddipatta Govindaiah Naidu (5 supra), this Court
observed as follows:
        On an examination of all the relevant provisions of the
criminal procedure code and the judicial precedents on the
question, the proposition that criminal proceedings abate on the
death of the complainant appears to be legally unfounded and
unacceptable.  Criminal proceedings legally instituted do not
terminate or abate merely on the death of the complainant.  The
cause of action for civil action bears no analogy to complaints of
crime.

        In Tripuraneni Sri Prasad (6 supra), this Court observed as
follows:
        Thus, in view of the clear legal position, as stated above,
the objection that the son of the deceased cannot come on record
and continue the prosecution cannot be sustained.  The point is
answered accordingly holding that the proceedings in
C.C.Nos.230 of 2004 and 264 of 2004 ipso facto do not come to
an end and could be continued by the son of the deceased.

        In Balasaheb K. Thackeray (7 supra), the Apex Court held
as under:
        At this juncture it is relevant to take note of what has
been stated by this Court earlier on the principles applicable.  In
Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1967 SC 983) 
with reference to Section 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (hereinafter referred to as the old Code) it was held that
the Magistrate had the power to permit a relative to act as the
complainant to continue the prosecution.  In Jimmy Jahangir
Madan v. Bolly Cariyappa Hindley ((2004) 12 SCC 509) after
referring to Ashwin case (1 supra) it was held that heir of the
complainant can be allowed to file a petition under Section 302 of
the Code to continue the prosecution.

        In Gadale Vasantha (died) (8 supra), this Court observed as
follows:
        In view of the above pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in Jimmy Jahangir Madans case (supra), decision of the
Madras High Court in Thothans case (supra) no longer holds the
field.  The lis does not die with death of the complainant in
criminal law.  Any person, whether legal representatives of the
deceased-complainant or any other interested person can
continue the proceedings by coming on record in the place of the
deceased-complainant with permission of the Court and can 
continue the prosecution either under Section 302 or under
Section 495 Cr.P.C.

        By considering the intendment of the provisions as stated
supra and the findings given by the various High Courts, including
the Apex Court, in the above referred judgments, it goes to show
that the legal representative of a deceased can maintain
proceedings for the offences under Sections 138 and 142 of the Act
as a payee or a holder in due course against the drawer.  As per
Sections 138 and 142 of the Act, a payee or a holder in due course
should make a demand for payment of such money by giving a 
notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within the stipulated
period of receiving the information regarding dishonour of the
cheque and in the event of drawer of such cheque failed to make
payment of such amount to the payee or the holder in due course
of the cheque within that stipulated period, entail the payee or the
holder in due course to file a complaint and initiate proceedings.
Further, for the purpose of taking cognizance under Section 142 of
the Act, a complaint should be filed in writing by the payee or the
holder in due course.  Section 7 of the Act defines Payee as
follows:
        The person named in the instrument, to whom or to
whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid,
is called the Payee.

        The holder in due course, as defined under Section 9 of the
Act, is as follows:
        Holder in due course:- Holder in due course means
any person who for consideration became the possessor of a
promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable to bearer,
or the payee or endorsee thereof, if payable to order, before the
amount mentioned in it became payable and without having
sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed to the title of the
person from whom he derived his title.

        The specific contention raised by the petitioners herein, who
are the accused in C.C.No.1375 of 2010, is that admittedly the 2nd
respondent is not a payee or a holder in due course.  The
complaint is filed as a legal representative.  The legal
representative of the payee is not a holder in due course, since the
subject instrument/cheque came into possession of the 2nd
respondent as a legal representative of the deceased and not by
paying consideration by him or an endorsement on the cheque in
his favour by the original payee.  In this context, Section 75 of the
Act contemplates presentment or to agent, representative of
deceased or assignee of insolvent, which reads as follows:
        Presentment or to agent, representative of deceased
or assignee of insolvent:- Presentment for acceptance or
payment may be made to the duly authorized agent of the drawee,
maker or acceptor, as the case may be, or where the drawee,
maker or acceptor has died, to his legal representative, or, where
he has been declared an insolvent, to his assignee.

        The above provision provides that if the maker of the cheque
is dead, payment can be demanded from the legal representatives
of the drawer, maker or acceptor.  The heading of the Section is
very clear and it shows presentment of the negotiable instrument
can be made by the representative of the deceased also.  Section
78 of the Act provides to whom payment should be made.  Per
contra, Section 138 of the Act says that if the amount is paid to the
holder of the instrument, there should be sufficient discharge of
liability.  The Holder as defined under Section 8 of the Act is as
follows:

        Holder:- The Holder of a promissory note, bill of
exchange or cheque means any person entitled in his own name 
to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount
due thereon from the parties thereto.

        Where the note, bill or cheque is lost or destroyed, its
holder is the person so entitled at the time of such loss or
destruction.

        Section 53 of the Act contemplates a holder of a negotiable
instrument who derives title from a holder in due course have the
rights thereon of that of a holder in due course.  Therefore, the
holder deriving a title from the holder in due course have all the
rights of the holder in due course.  Therefore, the legal
representative of a holder in due course have all the rights of the
holder in due course.
        In the case on hand, the deceased father of the 2nd
respondent was the holder in due course.  Therefore, the 2nd
respondent by virtue of being a legal representative is a holder in
due course and he got all the rights to initiate proceedings under
the provisions of Sections 138 and 142 of the Act against the
petitioners herein.  Hence, there is no dispute on the proposition
that the legal representative can file/initiate proceedings for
realizing the amount.
        Section 78 of the Act deals with to whom payment should be
made and the same is as follows:
        To whom payment should be made:- Subject to the  
provisions of Section 82, clause (c) payment of the amount due on
a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque must, in order to
discharge the maker or acceptor, be made to the holder of the
instrument.

        From the above provision, it is clear that the 2nd respondent
holds the cheque after the death of his father being the payee and
as a legal heir he is entitled to possess the same in his own name
and in view of Section 53 he is the holder in due course and can
get a full discharge.  Thus, under Section 53 of the Act, a legal
representative/heir of the payee or holder in due course can
maintain a complaint under Section 138 of the Act.
        The other contention raised by the counsel for the petitioners
that there may be other legal representatives and therefore the
complaint filed by one legal heir i.e., the 2nd respondent is not
maintainable.  However, that is a matter of evidence and the same
can be cured.  Apart from that it is not a matter to be considered
for quashing the complaint at the initial stage.
        In the above circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that
the complaint is maintainable.  The 2nd respondent being the legal
representative of his deceased father i.e., payee or holder in due
course can file a complaint under Section 138 read with Section
142 of the Act.  As such, this Court holds that there are no merits
in the criminal petition and the same is dismissed.  Interim order,
if any, stands vacated.
        In the circumstances, the II Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate at Nampally, Hyderabad is directed to dispose of the
matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of
six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after
appreciating the rival contentions made by the parties, since the
matter is of the year 2010.
        Miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall also stand dismissed.

____________________________   
JUSTICE P. KESHAVA RAO     
Date:13-04-2018.