Saturday, March 27, 2021

INJUNCTION SUIT - PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY PROVE HIS POSSESSION BUT ALSO PROVE THE ALLEGED INTERFERANCE BY THE DEFENDANTS It is well settled law and principle that when a person came to the court and seek a relief of permanent injunction, he has to establish the possession over the plaint schedule property as on the 3 date of filing of the suit and also interference of opposite party into his peaceful possession and enjoyment, but though D5, who is plaintiff in OS 130/08 filed suit for seeking a relief of permanent injunction against plaintiff herein, who is D3 in OS 130/08 failed to prove his possession over plaint schedule property as well as alleged interference of plaintiff and her children. “37. As per the version of D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff 2 and her children who are D1 to D3 in OS130/08, along with 5 others, came to the suit schedule property on 23.02.08 at about 6:00 p.m., without any manner of right, title, possession try to occupy the same and at the intervention of one Pothuraju and others, D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) could resist the illegal acts committed by the plaintiff and her children, but to prove the said interference of plaintiff and her children, D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) neither choose to adduce any corroborative oral evidence nor marked any supportive document. If really plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) committed the alleged illegal acts against D5 and the same was resisted with the help of one Pothuraju and others, what prevented D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to get examine said Pothuraju or any others person who allegedly resisted plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) on his behalf to prove the alleged interference of plaintiff and her children. But no positive evidence is placed by D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to establish the alleged inference of plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008). In absence of any positive evidence, the version of D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) that while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) came to schedule property and interfered into his possession of property is not tenable. Further more once D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) failed to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property, the question of interfere does not arise.

INJUNCTION SUIT - PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY PROVE HIS POSSESSION BUT ALSO PROVE THE ALLEGED INTERFERANCE BY THE DEFENDANTS

It is well settled law and principle that when a person came to the court and seek a relief of permanent injunction, he has to establish the possession over the plaint schedule property as on the 3 date of filing of the suit and also interference of opposite party into his peaceful possession and enjoyment, but though D5, who is plaintiff in OS 130/08 filed suit for seeking a relief of permanent injunction against plaintiff herein, who is D3 in OS 130/08 failed to prove his possession over plaint schedule property as well as alleged interference of plaintiff and her children.

“37. As per the version of D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff 2 and her children who are D1 to D3 in OS130/08, along with 5 others, came to the suit schedule property on 23.02.08 at about 6:00 p.m., without any manner of right, title, possession try to occupy the same and at the intervention of one Pothuraju and others, D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) could resist the illegal acts committed by the plaintiff and her children, but to prove the said interference of plaintiff and her children, D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) neither choose to adduce any corroborative oral evidence nor marked any supportive document. If really plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) committed the alleged illegal acts against D5 and the same was resisted with the help of one Pothuraju and others, what prevented D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to get examine said Pothuraju or any others person who allegedly resisted plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) on his behalf to prove the alleged interference of plaintiff and her children. But no positive evidence is placed by D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to establish the alleged inference of plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008). In absence of any positive evidence, the version of D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) that while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) came to schedule property and interfered into his possession of property is not tenable. Further more once D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) failed to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property, the question of interfere does not arise.

AP HIGH COURT 

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL NO.278 OF 2020

K. Raghavamma,
Versus

K K MOHAN DIED

JUDGMENT:

This Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and

decree dated 11.03.2020 passed in A.S.No.96 of 2016 on the

file of VI Additional District Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam

by dismissing the appeal suit and confirming the common

judgment and decree dated 21.06.2016 passed in O.S.Nos.95

and 130 of 2008 on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge,

Machilipatnam.

2. The appellant herein is the appellant in the lower

appellate Court and plaintiff in O.S.No.95 of 2008. The

respondents herein are respondents in the lower appellate

Court and defendants in O.S.No.95 of 2008.

3. The suit in O.S.No.95 of 2008 is filed by the plaintiff to

grant permanent injunction against the defendants and his

men restraining them from interfering with the plaintiff’s

possession over the plaint schedule property and for costs of

the suit.

4. The trial Court having considered the entire material on

record and after hearing both sides, while dismissing the suit

held in para Nos.37 and 38 of the common judgment dated

21.06.2016 that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief

sought in the main suit which is extracted hereunder.

“37. As per the version of D5 (Plaintiff in OS

130/2008) while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff 

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and her children who are D1 to D3 in OS130/08,

along with 5 others, came to the suit schedule

property on 23.02.08 at about 6:00 p.m., without any

manner of right, title, possession try to occupy the

same and at the intervention of one Pothuraju and

others, D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) could resist the

illegal acts committed by the plaintiff and her

children, but to prove the said interference of plaintiff

and her children, D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) neither

choose to adduce any corroborative oral evidence nor

marked any supportive document. If really plaintiff

and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008)

committed the alleged illegal acts against D5 and the

same was resisted with the help of one Pothuraju and

others, what prevented D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008)

to get examine said Pothuraju or any others person

who allegedly resisted plaintiff and her children (D1 to

D3 in OS 130/2008) on his behalf to prove the alleged

interference of plaintiff and her children. But no

positive evidence is placed by D5(Plaintiff in OS

130/2008) to establish the alleged inference of

plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS

130/2008). In absence of any positive evidence, the

version of D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) that while he

is enjoying the property, plaintiff and her children

(who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) came to schedule

property and interfered into his possession of property

is not tenable. Further more once D5(Plaintiff in OS

130/2008) failed to establish his possession over the

plaint schedule property, the question of interfere does

not arise.

38. It is well settled law and principle that when a

person came to the court and seek a relief of

permanent injunction, he has to establish the

possession over the plaint schedule property as on the 

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date of filing of the suit and also interference of

opposite party into his peaceful possession and

enjoyment, but though D5, who is plaintiff in OS

130/08 filed suit for seeking a relief of permanent

injunction against plaintiff herein, who is D3 in OS

130/08 failed to prove his possession over plaint

schedule property as well as alleged interference of

plaintiff and her children. Though D5 examined Dw1

to 4 and marked Exs.B1 to B3 on his behalf, but

nothing is elicited to prove his possession over plaint

schedule property and alleged interference. Therefore

the plaintiff failed to produce any proper and cogent

evidence to prove his possession over the disputed

property as well as alleged interference of plaintiff and

others. Therefore D5, who is plaintiff in OS 130/08 is

not entitled to seek any relief sought for. Accordingly,

2nd issue is determined and decided against D5, who

is plaintiff in OS 130/2008.”

5. Aggrieved by the same the plaintiff in O.S.No.95 of 2008

preferred an appeal in A.S.No.96 of 2016 on the file of the

learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Krishna,

Machilipatnam. The lower Appellate Court upon hearing both

the parties framed issues No.1 to 4 at para No.7 of the

judgment and after examining all the issues came to a

conclusion that the appellant therein who is plaintiff in

O.S.No.95 of 2008 is not entitled for any relief and

accordingly dismissed the appeal by confirming the common

judgment and decree dated 21.06.2016 passed in O.S.Nos.95

and 130 of 2008 on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge,

Machilipatnam against which the present second appeal is 

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filed with the following grounds which are in the nature of

appeal grounds:

1. Whether both the Courts below are right in giving

a finding that the oral contract of sale is not a sale

and after lapse of 18 years filing a suit for Specific

Performance is fatal to seeking such relief by the

appellant/plaintiff?

2. Whether both the Courts below are right in

denying 18 years possession of the appellant over

the suit property, in as much as the same was also

admitted by the respondent No.1?

3. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

considering Ex.A3 to A6 and A17 to A24, which

were issued by the competent authority?

4. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

applying the direct decision rendered in AIR 2000

AP 504 on similar facts when the parties are close

relatives under an oral contract of sale?

5. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

applying the direct decision of Clacutta High Court

in AIR 2001 Cal 42 in which AIR 1946 F.C. 97 was

followed on oral contract of sale?

6. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

coming to conclusion that in view of the spiraling

price, now in the Town due to coming of Port, the

respondents colluded together and brought Ex.B1

agreement of Sale-Cum-Power of Attorney which is

not bonafide one and invalid in view of the

judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court

reported in AIR 2009 SC 3077?

7. Whether both the Courts below are right in holding

that suit is filed for specific performance on the

basis of Ex.A1? 

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8. Whether the lower Appellate Court is holding the

decisions of Trial Court and its findings?

6. Heard Sri Kancharlapalli Siva Rama Prasad, learned

counsel for the appellant.

7. Having heard and perused the material on record, this

Court opines that the learned counsel for the appellant had

miserably failed in showing that the substantial question of

law is involved for seeking any indulgence of this Court in the

present second appeal.

8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case, as no substantial question of law is framed or evaluated

seeking indulgence of this Court in judgment passed by the

lower appellate Court confirming the judgment of the Court

below, this Court is of the view that this Second Appeal is

liable to be dismissed at admission stage.

9. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is dismissed. There

shall be no order as to costs.

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any,

pending shall stand closed.

 ________________________

B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J

Date: 30.11.2020

IKN 

6

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

S.A.No.278 of 2020

30.11.2020

IKN 

Friday, March 26, 2021

when the defendant disputed the title of the plaintiff’s vendors, the suit ought to have been filed for declaration of title and mere seeking of a permanent injunction will not entitle the plaintiff for a decree. In the absence of establishment of possession and enjoyment of the said property, it cannot be decreed.

 when the defendant disputed the title of the plaintiff’s vendors,  the suit ought to have been filed  for declaration of title and mere seeking of a permanent injunction will not entitle the plaintiff for a decree. In the absence of establishment of possession and enjoyment of the said property, it cannot be decreed.

AP HIGH COURT 

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL NO.280 OF 2020

Sodisetty Subramanyam

     -VS-

Poola Balanchendraiah

JUDGMENT:

This Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and

decree, dated 20.03.2020 passed in A.S.No.23 of 2018 on the

file of the III Additional District Judge at Rajampet dismissing

the appeal by confirming the judgment and decree dated

23.04.2018 passed in O.S.No.9 of 2014 on the file of Junior

Civil Judge, Railway Kodur.

2. The appellant herein is the appellant before the lower

appellate Court and plaintiff in O.S.No.9 of 2014. The

respondent herein is the respondent before the lower

appellate Court and defendant in the said suit.

3. The suit in O.S.No.9 of 2014 is filed before the Junior

Civil Judge, Railway Kodur against the defendant for grant of

permanent injunction restraining him, his men and agents

from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and

enjoyment over the suit schedule property i.e. land

admeasuring Ac.0-05 cents in survey No.58/6 of Kodur

village and costs of the suit.

4. The case of the plaintiff is that an extent of Ac.0-41

cents of land in survey No.58/6 is an ancestral property of

one Katikam Seshaiah and during his life time, he sold away

Ac.0-36 cents out of Ac.0-41 cents by retaining Ac.00-05

cents of the land. After his death, the property devolved upon

the legal heirs of said Katikam Seshaiah and from them, the 

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plaintiff purchased Ac.00-05 cents i.e. the suit schedule

property. The suit schedule property is a part and parcel of

Ac.0-41 cents. But the same was opposed by the defendant.

5. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs1 and 2 were examined

and Exs.A1 to A5 were marked. On behalf of the defendants,

DWs1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 to B5 were marked.

After hearing both the sides, the Court below came to a

conclusion that in a suit for permanent injunction, the

plaintiff has to prove his possession and enjoyment over the

suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit basing

on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of

the defendant’s case. The plaintiff admittedly relied upon

Ex.A3 and considering the merits, the Court below came to a

conclusion that the plaintiff could not establish his

possession over the suit schedule property of the land

admeasuring Ac.00-05 cents and as such the suit was

dismissed observing further that it is a misconceived one, as

the plaintiff sought only for permanent injunction when there

is a title dispute between the parties. Aggrieved by the same,

the plaintiff preferred the first appeal in A.S.No.23 of 2018

before the III Additional District Judge, Rajampet.

6. The lower appellate Court after hearing both the sides,

gave a finding to the effect that prior to the instant case,

under Ex.B5 itself, the defendant disputed the title of the

plaintiff’s vendors, as such the suit ought to have been filed 

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for declaration of title and mere seeking of a permanent

injunction will not entitle the plaintiff for a decree. In the

absence of establishment of possession and enjoyment of the

said property, it cannot be decreed. Hence, the lower

appellate Court has dismissed the appeal and confirmed the

judgment of the trial Court against which the present second

appeal is preferred raising some grounds purported to be the

substantial questions of law. Two of such questions are

hereunder:

“(L) Whether or not the Gift Settlement Deed dated

22.08.1958 produced and marked on behalf of the

defendant as Ex.B1 confers any right to conclude

the title and possession over the suit schedule

property although the oral transfer of the Suit

Schedule Property is invalid?

(N) Whether or not the Courts are justified in

shifting the onus of the plaintiff for disproving the

knowledge about the Gift Settlement Deed dated

22.08.1958?”

7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff

and perused the record.

8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case, taking into consideration of the judgments rendered by

the Courts below wherein it was held that the plaintiff has

miserably failed in establishing the possession over the suit

schedule property as on the date of initiating an action, the

suit for granting permanent injunction can’t be decreed and 

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that apart as the appellant/plaintiff has not made out any

grounds to frame any substantial questions of law, this Court

finds no reason to interfere with the judgments of the lower

Courts and accordingly this Second Appeal is dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any,

pending shall stand closed.

 ________________________

B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J

Date: 30.11.2020

IKN 

5

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

S.A.No.280 of 2020

30.11.2020

IKN 

whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction for eviction of a tenant by landlord as the SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by the bank aganist the landlord ? - No The appellants herein/the tenants are neither the guarantors nor any person inducted into the possession of the secured asset/suit schedule property by way of a lease after notice under Section 13 (2) was given and default committed. Admittedly they have been inducted into the possession of the plaint schedule property on 01.11.2011 by virtue of an oral lease and they have committed default of payment of rent with effect from 01.12.2012 and the creditor bank took symbolic possession of the secured asset/plaint schedule property of the borrower/landlord on 18.09.2015 under the provisions of SARFAESI Act which was not injucted by the Courts below. The present case which was dealt by the Courts below is totally falls outside the purview of the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act and the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below do not hit or inject the Debt Recovery Tribunal or any other Appellate Tribunal to function under the provisions of SARFAESI Act with reference to the very same plaint schedule property which is a secured asset mortgaged by the borrower/the landlord/the respondent herein. There is no conflict of orders passed by the Courts below with the orders that may be passed under SARFAESI Act and RDBI Act 1993.

whether  the civil Court has no jurisdiction for eviction of a tenant by landlord as the SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by the bank aganist the landlord ? - No

The appellants herein/the tenants are neither the guarantors nor any person inducted into the possession of the secured asset/suit schedule property by way of a lease after notice under Section 13 (2) was given and default committed. Admittedly they have been inducted into the possession of the plaint schedule property on 01.11.2011 by virtue of an oral lease and they have committed default of payment of rent with effect from 01.12.2012 and the creditor bank took symbolic possession of the secured asset/plaint schedule property of the borrower/landlord on 18.09.2015 under the provisions of SARFAESI Act which was not injucted by the Courts below.

The present case which was dealt by the Courts below is totally falls outside the purview of the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act and the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below do not hit or inject the Debt Recovery Tribunal or any other Appellate Tribunal to function under the provisions of SARFAESI Act with reference to the very same plaint schedule property which is a secured asset mortgaged by the borrower/the landlord/the respondent herein. There is no conflict of orders passed by the Courts below with the orders that may be passed under SARFAESI Act and RDBI Act 1993. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL No.28 OF 2021

Between:

Barigala Kotesh, S/o. Peturu & another

… APPELLANTS

AND

Bandaru Yedukondalu, S/o. Venkateswarlu


... RESPONDENT

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 12.02.2021

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the order? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of order may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the

fair copy of the order? Yes/No

_________________________

JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN 

 2 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

*HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

+ SECOND APPEAL No.28 OF 2021

% Dated : 12.02.2021

Between:

# Barigala Kotesh, S/o. Peturu & another

… APPELLANTS

AND

$ Bandaru Yedukondalu

... RESPONDENT

! Counsel for appellants : Mr. G. Rama Chandra Reddy

^Counsel for Respondent : Mr. Phani Teja Cheruvu

<GIST :

>HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred:

1 Dt.11.09.2019 in Criminal Appeal Nos.1371 of 2019

2 Dt. 27.08.2020 in Civil Appeal Nos.2843-2844 of 2010

3 Dt. 21-01-2021 in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.15870 of 2020

4 Dt.06-05-2016 in CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4083-4084 of 2016

5 Dt. 25-11-2014 in CIVIL APPEAL No.10589 OF 2014

6 Dt. 17-07-2017 in CIVIL APPEAL No.9151 of 2017

7 Dt. 27-01-2021 in CIVIL APPEAL No.6744 of 2013

8 Dt.18.01.2016 in Civil Appeal No.167 of 2007

 3 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL No.28 OF 2021

JUDGMENT:

This second appeal is filed against the Judgment and decree in

A.S.No.82 of 2020 on the file of the V Additional District Judge,

Guntur, FAC III Additional District Judge, Guntur, dated 21.12.2020

confirming the Judgment and decree in O.S.No.122 of 2016 on the file

of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, dated 05.05.2020 ordering the

eviction of the appellants herein/tenants to deliver the vacant

possession of the plaint schedule property to the respondent

herein/landlord and comply with the other reliefs granted by the

Courts below.

2. The appellants herein are the appellants in the first appeal and

the defendants in the suit. The respondent herein is the respondent

in the first appeal and the plaintiff in the suit.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned

counsel for the respondent.

4. The plaintiff initiated an action in O.S.No.122 of 2016 on the

file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri against the defendants for

eviction and delivery of the vacant possession of the plaint schedule

property, for the payment of arrears of Rs.4,25,700/- and damages

for use and occupation unauthorisedly from 01.03.2016 to 31.05.2016 

 4 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month with interest at the rate of 24%

per annum from the date of suit till the date of realisation and costs.

5. The plaintiff contends that he is the absolute owner of the

plaint schedule property, the defendants herein took the said

property/apartment/flat on 01.11.2011 for a monthly rent of

Rs.8,000/- under an oral lease and the rent was enhanced to

Rs.12,900/- per month with effect from 01.12.2012, in-spite of

enjoying the possession of the said property as tenants, the

defendants have committed default in payment of monthly rent with

effect from 01.12.2012, due to which the plaintiff became a defaulter

before the creditor bank of ICICI Bank, in those circumstances he filed

a case in RCC No.4 of 2013 before the Rent Controller, Mangalagiri for

eviction against the 1st defendant and the same was allowed and the

appeal preferred by the 1st defendant/tenant in RCA was allowed

setting aside the order in RCC on the point of jurisdiction, as such the

defendants continued as tenants in the schedule premises without

paying any rents with effect from December, 2012 and that apart the

defendants filed a suit in O.S.No.291 of 2015 on the file of the

Principal Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri for permanent injunction

against the landlord/plaintiff herein which is being contested by the

plaintiff herein. Subsequently the plaintiff got issued a statutory

notice, dated 03.02.2016 to the defendants terminating the lease of

the schedule property/apartment by the end of the month of

February, 2016 calling upon them to vacate the plaint schedule

property within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice by 

 5 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

paying the arrears of rent since December, 2012 till the date of

vacation of the premises at the rate of Rs.12,900/- per month and

payment of damages for the unauthorised occupation at the rate of

Rs.20,000/- per month till the premises is vacated. Since the

defendants did not comply with the said demand notice, the plaintiff

was constrained to file the suit for eviction, for damages and recovery

of arrears of rent since December, 2012 to till the date of eviction.

6. Then, the defendants filed a written statement denying the

averments and contentions of the plaintiff contending further that the

plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property/the apartment under

a valid registered sale deed obtaining loan from ICICI Bank, Bandar

Road Branch, Vijaywada, became a defaulter in payment of loan

installments and as such the plaintiff intended to sell the said

property, then one Mr. Barigala Suresh, purchased the said property

for an amount of Rs.18 lakhs by paying an advance amount of

Rs.5 lakhs under an agreement of sale dated 13.10.2011, the said

purchaser is none other than the brother of the 1st defendant, the

plaintiff delivered the possession of the suit schedule property and

the brother of the 1st defendant/the purchaser has let out the said

property to the 1st defendant and as such, they have been in

possession and enjoyment of the same on a rent of Rs.5,000/- per

month and the 2nd defendant filed a complaint in crime No.159 of

2015, dated 29.06.2015 against the plaintiff and others under Sections

323, 427, 506, 509 r/w 34 of IPC, Section 3-1-1, 3-1-X SC, ST POA Act

which is pending before the Mangalagiri Town police station. 

 6 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

7. Basing upon the above said rival averments and contentions, the

trail Court framed the issues as follows :-

(1) Whether the plaintiff has got title over the

plaint schedule property or not ?

(2) Whether the defendants are tenants of plaintiff

with regard to the plaint schedule property or

not ?

(3) Whether the defendants committed wilful

default in payment of rent for the plaint

schedule property or not ?

(4) Whether the defendants are liable to pay the

damages as prayed by the plaintiff or not ?

(5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the eviction

as sought for or not ?

(6) To what relief ?

8. During the course of trial on behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 and 2

were examined and Exs.A1 to A13 were marked. On behalf of the

defendants, DW1 was examined and no document was marked.

9. The plaintiff in his deposition besides relying upon the

averments of the plaint further stated that he became the chronic

defaulter in repayment of loan due to non payment of rents by the

defendants and as such the ICICI bank took symbolic possession of the

plaint schedule property under SARFAESI Act on 18.09.2015 and the

bank is trying to auction the same for realisation of their debt. In

furtherance of the same, the bank has also filed O.A No.716 of 2016

before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam which is pending

for trial. 

 7 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

10. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court gave a

finding that there is no proof to show that the plaint schedule

property belongs to the said Barigala Suresh as contended by the

defendants and they miserably failed in proving the said

contention/transaction and the defendants have committed default in

payment of rent and they are due for arrears of payment of rent and

damages along with the vacation of the premises. Ultimately the suit

is decreed with costs vide it’s judgment dated 05.05.2020 directing

the defendants to vacate and deliver the plaint schedule property, to

pay the arrears of rent of Rs.4,25,700/-, to pay damages of

Rs.20,000/- per month from 01.03.2016 to 31.05.2016 for an

unauthorized occupation of the premises from the date of the suit till

the date of realization and deliver the vacant possession to the

plaintiff with interest thereupon at the rate of 6% per annum from the

date of suit till the date of realisation.

11. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants therein/tenants

preferred an appeal in A.S.No.82 of 2020 on the file of the III

Additional District Judge, Guntur. While considering the same, the

lower appellate Court framed the following points :

1. Whether there is a landlord and tenant

relationship existed between the plaintiff and

defendants ?

2. Whether the defendants committed wilful

default in payment of rents for the plaint

schedule property ?

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of

defendants as prayed for ? 

 8 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

4. Whether this appellate Court finds any reasons

to interfere with the findings on the trial Court?

5. To what relief ?

12. It has observed that the appellants therein/the tenants raised

an additional plea that the civil Court has no jurisdiction as the

SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by the bank and the bank has

also filed O.A.No.716 of 2016 against their landlord/the respondent

therein and service of summons was also marked as Ex.A13 before the

trial Court. While considering the case on merits, the lower appellate

Court gave a finding that in case of any grievance for the appellants

as tenants they can approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the

relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act and with regard to the

findings of the trial Court, the same was confirmed, dismissing the

appeal vide it’s Judgment, dated 21.12.2020. Against the said

confirming Judgments and decrees the appellants herein/the tenants

filed the Second Appeal before this Court by framing a ground as

“substantial question of law” to the effect that “the jurisdiction of

the civil Court is barred and the proceedings under SARFAESI Act are

alone available to proceed against the appellants herein/the tenants

and the respondent herein/the landlord cannot continue the eviction

proceedings against them and as such the Judgments of the Courts

below are liable to be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.”

13. To substantiate the same, the learned counsel for the

appellants refers to the following Sections of law under the provisions 

 9 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

Section 13 :

13. Enforcement of security interest.—(1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or

section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of

1882), any security interest created in favour of any

secured creditor may be enforced, without the

intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in

accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a

secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any

default in repayment of secured debt or any installment

thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is

classified by the secured creditor as non-performing

asset, then, the secured creditor may require the

borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his

liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from

the date of notice failing which the secured creditor

shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights

under sub-section (4).

1[Provided that—

(i) - - -

(ii) - - -

 (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in

full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the

secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the

following measures to recover his secured debt,

namely:—

(a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower

including the right to transfer by way of lease,

assignment or sale for realising the secured asset;

[(b) - - -

(c) - - -

(d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person

who has acquired any of the secured assets from the 

 10 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

borrower and from whom any money is due or may

become due to the borrower, to pay the secured

creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the

secured debt.

(5) Any payment made by any person referred to in

clause (d) of sub-section (4)to the secured creditor shall

give such person a valid discharge as if he has made

payment to the borrower.

17. 1[Application against measures to recover secured

debts].—(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved

by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of

section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his

authorised officer under this Chapter,2

[may make an

application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,]to

the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the

matter within forty-five days from the date on which

such measures had been taken:

1

[(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether

any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of

section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement

of security are in accordance with the provisions of this

Act and the rules made thereunder.

2

[(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the

facts and circumstances of the case and evidence

produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that

any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of

section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in

accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules

made thereunder, and require restoration of the

management or restoration of possession, of the secured

assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may,

by order,—

(a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures

referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by

the secured creditor as invalid; and 

 11 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

(b) restore the possession of secured assets or

management of secured assets to the borrower or

such other aggrieved person, who has made an

application under sub-section (1), as the case may be;

and

(c) pass such other direction as it may consider

appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the

recourse taken by the secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13.]

(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse

taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of

section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this

Act and the rules made thereunder, then,

notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for

the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be

entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures

specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover

his secured debt.

1

[(4A) Where—

(i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1),

claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured

asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the

facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in

relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of

enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to

examine whether lease or tenancy,—

(a) has expired or stood determined; or

(b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882(4 of 1882); or

(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or

(d) is created after the issuance of notice of default

and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of

section 13 of the Act; and

(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy

right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls

under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause

(c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding 

 12 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

anything to the contrary contained in any other law for

the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may

pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the

provisions of this Act.]

(5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be

dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as

expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty

days from the date of such application:

Provided that - - -

34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.—No civil court

shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or

proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts

Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is

empowered by or under this Act to determine and no

injunction shall be granted by any court or other

authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in

pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or

under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).

35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws.—

The provisions of this Act shall have effect,

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith

contained in any other law for the time being in force or

any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.

37. Application of other laws not barred.—The

provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall

be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the

Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Securities Contracts

(Regulation) Act, 1956(42 of 1956), the Securities and

Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992), the

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions

Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or any other law for the time

being in force.

 13 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

14. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent refers to

some of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the

Hon’ble High Court – Jodhpur as follows :

01. Criminal Appeal Nos.1371 of 2019, Dt.11.09.20191

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.20 of Page 14 as.,

“While Section 13 (13) of SARFAESI prohibits a

borrower from leasing out any of the secured assets

after receipt of a notice under Section 13 (2) without

the prior written consent of the secured creditor”.

02. Civil Appeal Nos.2843-2844 of 2010, Dt. 27.08.20202

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.25 of Page 11 as.,

“25. A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal

is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is

conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a

substantial question of law. If statute confers a

limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the

scope of the appeal. It was not open to the

Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or to call

upon the High Court to reanalyze or re-appreciate

evidence in a Second Appeal.”

03. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.15870 of 20203

, Dt. 21-01-2021 on

the file of Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.18 OF

Page 6 as.,

“18. The Court must interpret a statute in a manner

which is just, reasonable and sensible. If the

grammatical construction leads to some absurdity or

some repugnancy or inconsistency with the legislative

intent, as may be deducted by reading the provisions

of the statute as a whole, the grammatical

construction may be departed from to avoid anomally,


1 Dt.11.09.2019 in Criminal Appeal Nos.1371 of 2019

2 Dt. 27.08.2020 in Civil Appeal Nos.2843-2844 of 2010

3 Dt. 21-01-2021 in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.15870 of 2020

 14 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

absurdity or inconsistency. To quote Venkatarama

Aiyar, J. In Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh. AIR 1955

SC 830 (at 833), “where the language of a statute, in

its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,

leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent

purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience

or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not

intended, a construction may be put upon it which

modifies the meaning of the words, and even the

structure of the sentence.” This view has been

reiterated by this Court.”

04. CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4083-4084 of 2016, Dt.06-05-20164

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held as in Para No.14 as.,

“The issues of facts once finally determined will

however, stare at the parties and bind them on

account of earlier judgments or for any other good

reason where equitable principles of estoppel are

attracted.”

05. CIVIL APPEAL No.10589 OF 2014, Dt. 25-11-20145

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.13 as.,

“13. In the present case, we find this statement of law

would apply on all fours. The judgment of the Trail

Court has been decided issue wise, on the merits,

after hearing both parties. The suit has finally been

decreed. Consequently this judgment cannot be

reversed purely on technical grounds unless there is a

failure of justice, which we have seen, is nobody’s

case.”

06. CIVIL APPEAL No.9151 of 2017, Dt. 17-07-20176

 on the file of Hon’ble

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in Para No.48 as.,

“48)We sincerely feel that the eviction matters should

be given priority in their disposal at all stages of


4 Dt.06-05-2016 in CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4083-4084 of 2016

5 Dt. 25-11-2014 in CIVIL APPEAL No.10589 OF 2014

6 Dt. 17-07-2017 in CIVIL APPEAL No.9151 of 2017 

 15 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

litigation and especially where the eviction is claimed

on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. We

hope and trust that due attention would be paid by all

courts to ensure speedy disposal of eviction cases.”

07. CIVIL APPEAL No.6744 of 2013, Dt. 27-01-2021 7on the file of Hon’ble

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in Para No.8 as.,

“The first appeal is a valuable right, and, at that

stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the

trial court are open for re-consideration. The

judgment of the appellate court must, therefore,

reflect conscious application of mind and must record

the court’s findings, supported by reasons for its

decision in respect of all the issues, along with the

contentions put forth and pressed by the parties.”

08. In Civil Appeal No.167 of 2007, Dt.18.01.20168

 on the file of Hon’ble

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para Nos.22, 23, 24, as.,

“22) That apart, we find that the appellants were

able to prove their ownership through their

predecessor-in-title on the strength of sale deed

(Ex.P.6/7) of the suit premises whereas the

respondents failed to prove their defence. Indeed, the

burden being on them, it was necessary for the

respondents to prove that the sale in favour of the

appellants’ predecessor-in-title of suit premises was a

transaction of mortgage and not an outright sale.

Since the respondents did not adduce any

documentary or oral evidence to prove their defence,

the first appellate Court was justified in allowing the

eviction petition. In our view, the evidence adduced

by the appellants to prove their title over the suit

premises was sufficient to maintain eviction petition

against the respondents and it was, therefore, rightly

accepted by the first appellate Court.


7 Dt. 27-01-2021 in CIVIL APPEAL No.6744 of 2013

8 Dt.18.01.2016 in Civil Appeal No.167 of 2007 

 16 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

23) As observed supra, the first appellate Court

having recorded categorical findings that the

relationship of landlord-tenant was proved and

secondly, the respondents had committed a wilful

default in payment of monthly rent and its arrears

from 01.06.1987, these findings were binding on the

High Court while deciding the revision petition. It was

more so when these findings did not suffer with any

jurisdictional error which alone would have entitled

the High Court to interfere.

24) Learned counsel for the respondents lastly argued

that there was an encroachment made by the

appellants on the suit premises and document (Ex-P-6)

was inadmissible in evidence, hence the eviction

petition was liable to be dismissed on these two

grounds also. These submissions, in our considered

view, deserve to be rejected at their threshold

because the same were not raised in the written

statement filed by the respondents before the Rent

Controller and nor were urged at any stage of the

proceedings. We cannot, therefore, allow such factual

submissions to be raised for the first time in this

appeal.”

09. The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur in I.C.I.C.I. Bank

Limited Vs. Krishna Kumar & Others on 27 April, 2018 held as.,

“Before incorporation of sub-section (4-A) and

substitution of sub-section (3) in Section 17 of the

SARFAESI Act as above, there was no remedy

available to a tenant who was being dispossessed

(25 of 25) [CW-16965/2017] under the SARFAESI Act

and hence, it was in those circumstances that the

judgment in the case of Vishal N. Kalsaria (supra)

was passed. The amended Act and incorporation of

sub-section (4-A) in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act as

well as sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI

Act sufficiently empowered the tenant to challenge 

 17 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

the proceedings qua his dispossession as a lessee or

a tenant, in case, action is being initiated against

him for dispossession under the SARFAESI Act.”

15. As stated supra, Section 13 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 speaks

about the power of a secured creditor to enforce any security interest

without interference of the Court or Tribunal.

 Section 13 (2) of the said Act speaks about the power of the

secured creditor to issue notice calling upon to discharge the full

liability of the borrower within 60 days in case of default and

declaration of the account as non-performing asset.

 Section 13 (4) (a) empowers the creditor to recover the secured

debt by taking possession of the secured assets of the borrower

including the right of transfer by way of lease, assignment of sale

etc., in the case of default and violation of Section 13 (2).


 Section 13 (4) (d) empowers the secured creditor to issue a

notice to any person who acquired the security asset to pay money to

the creditor to satisfy the secured debt of the borrower. As per

Section 13 (5) any payment made by such a person as per Section 13

(4) (d) to the secured creditor is a valid discharge.

 As stated supra, Section 17 (1) enables to file an application by

any person (including the borrower) to question the measures taken

by the secured creditor under Section 13 (4) within 45 days from the

date of such measures taken. 

 18 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

 Under Section 17 (4A) the Debt Recovery Tribunal would go into

the issues and examine the facts of the case with reference to the

situations enshrined in sub clause (a) to (d) of Section 17 (4A) (i)

provided either any tenant or lessee files an application under Section

17 (1).

 Section 34 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain any

suit or proceedings in respect of the matters having jurisdiction of the

Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal under the provisions

of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the RDBI Act, 1993 and no injunction can

be granted for the action taken under the said Acts.

16. It is to be carefully seen that all the above said provisions of the

SARFAESI Act do not come to the rescue of the appellants/tenants

herein as none of the situations and circumstances are applicable to

the facts and circumstances of the present case. The appellants

herein/the tenants are neither the guarantors nor any person

inducted into the possession of the secured asset/suit schedule

property by way of a lease after notice under Section 13 (2) was given

and default committed. Admittedly they have been inducted into the

possession of the plaint schedule property on 01.11.2011 by virtue of

an oral lease and they have committed default of payment of rent

with effect from 01.12.2012 and the creditor bank took symbolic

possession of the secured asset/plaint schedule property of the

borrower/landlord on 18.09.2015 under the provisions of SARFAESI Act

which was not injucted by the Courts below. At least it is not the 

 19 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

case of the appellants/the tenants that they have made an

application under Section 17 (1) seeking shelter under sub Clause (4A)

of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Obviously they could not do so,

because they are not inducted into the suit schedule property

subsequent to the notice issued under Section 13 (2) and symbolic

possession taken under Section 13 (4). Hence they can’t be termed as

any person or tenant under the provisions of SARFAESI Act.

17. The present case which was dealt by the Courts below is totally

falls outside the purview of the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act and

the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below do not hit or inject

the Debt Recovery Tribunal or any other Appellate Tribunal to

function under the provisions of SARFAESI Act with reference to the

very same plaint schedule property which is a secured asset

mortgaged by the borrower/the landlord/the respondent herein.

There is no conflict of orders passed by the Courts below with the

orders that may be passed under SARFAESI Act and RDBI Act 1993.

From the above said facts and circumstances and legal position, it is

obvious and evident that the appellants’ relationship is only with their

landlord and they are nothing to do with the secured creditor/the

banker who advanced housing loan to their landlord as a borrower.

Just because their landlord has become the defaulter before the bank

with reference to payment of equated monthly installments of a

housing loan with respect to the plaint schedule property, the tenants

cannot take undue advantage of the same and exploit by refraining to 

 20 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

make payments of rents flouting their oral lease and understanding

between the parties.


18. In view of the forgoing reasons, the Second Appeal has to fail as

there is no substantial question of law for interference of this Court

under Section 100 C.P.C. and the appellants herein are directed to

vacate the plaint schedule property within four (4) months from today

by complying with the other terms of the decree of the trial Court as

it is. It is needless to mention that the respondent shall bring it to

the notice of the secured creditor and the learned Debt Recovery

Tribunal in which the proceedings are pending about this Judgment of

this Court enabling them to take necessary action and passing of

orders suitably with respect to the secured asset of the respondent

herein/borrower under the provisions of SARFAESI Act r/w RDBI Act.

19. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no

order as to costs.

 As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in the

Second Appeal, shall stand closed.

 _________________________

JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

12th February, 2021.

Note:-

L.R. Copy to be marked.

(B/o)

Yvk 

Thursday, March 25, 2021

Or.26 rule 9 of CPC - Petition for Advocate Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule - suit for mandatory injunction & permanent Injunction - for demolition of illegal construction of shops allegedly made by the defendants in the plaint schedule site- Tiral Court dismissed on the main ground that the plaintiff failed to file any document to show about the disputed measurements and she filed the plaint schedule basing on the boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 09.10.2006 and she has not filed any document to show the disputed measurements. The Court further observed that the plaintiff could now show prima facie evidence either oral or documentary to show that there was a dispute regarding the remaining extent of 28 feet x 1.50 feet site - Their Lordships of AP High Court held that the suit is at the inceptional stage and the trial has not yet commenced.-this Court is of the considered view that after the trial is completed and if the plaintiff is able to establish that originally she purchased 3 RCC shops in an extent of 28 feet x 12 feet and the constructions made by the defendants fall within any portion of the aforesaid extent purchased by her, she is at liberty to file a fresh application seeking appointment of the Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint plan as ABCD marked portion and to make measurements and note down the boundaries etc, in which case the trial Court shall consider the same and pass an appropriate order.


Or.26 rule 9 of CPC - Petition for Advocate  Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule - suit for mandatory injunction & permanent Injunction - for demolition of illegal construction of shops allegedly made by the defendants in the plaint schedule site- Tiral Court dismissed on the main ground that the plaintiff failed to file any document to show about the disputed measurements and she filed the plaint schedule basing on the boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 09.10.2006 and she has not filed any document to show the disputed measurements. The Court further observed that the plaintiff could now show prima facie evidence either oral or documentary to show that there was a dispute regarding the remaining extent of 28 feet x 1.50 feet site - Their Lordships of AP High Court held that the suit is at the inceptional stage and the trial has not yet commenced.-this Court is of the considered view that after the trial is completed and if the plaintiff is able to establish that originally she purchased 3 RCC shops in an extent of 28 feet x 12 feet and the constructions made by the defendants fall within any portion of the aforesaid extent purchased by her, she is at liberty to file a fresh application seeking appointment of the Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint plan as ABCD marked portion and to make measurements and note down the boundaries etc, in which case the trial Court shall consider the same and pass an appropriate order.


AP High Court 

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO

Civil Revision Petition No.68 of 2021

Samanthula Vasanthalaxmi 

-verses-

Althi Kishore

ORDER:

 Heard Smt. Taddi Sowmya Naidu, counsel representing Sri

Taddi Nageswara Rao, learned counsel for petitioner, and Sri Ambati

Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. As can be seen, the trial Court dismissed I.A.No.181/2020, filed

by the petitioner/plaintiff, seeking appointment of the Commissioner

to note the physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint

plan mentioned ABCD marked portion on the main ground that the

plaintiff failed to file any document to show about the disputed

measurements and she filed the plaint schedule basing on the

boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 09.10.2006 and she has

not filed any document to show the disputed measurements. The

Court further observed that the plaintiff could now show prima facie

evidence either oral or documentary to show that there was a dispute

regarding the remaining extent of 28 feet x 1.50 feet site. On these

observations the trial Court expressed its disinclination to appoint the

Commissioner.

3. As can be seen, the suit is at the inceptional stage and the trial

has not yet commenced. The suit is for mandatory injunction for

demolition of illegal construction of shops allegedly made by the

defendants in the plaint schedule site, morefully shown in the plaint 

2

plan mentioned ABCD red marked portion, and for permanent

injunction.

4. Having regard to the nature of the suit and considering that the

suit is in the neonatal stage, this Court is of the considered view that

after the trial is completed and if the plaintiff is able to establish that

originally she purchased 3 RCC shops in an extent of 28 feet x 12 feet

and the constructions made by the defendants fall within any portion

of the aforesaid extent purchased by her, she is at liberty to file a fresh

application seeking appointment of the Commissioner to note the

physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint plan as

ABCD marked portion and to make measurements and note down the

boundaries etc, in which case the trial Court shall consider the same

and pass an appropriate order.

5. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of with the above

observations. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any

pending, shall stand closed.

__________________________

U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J

20.03.2021

MVA 

Friday, March 12, 2021

the very appointment of the petitioners as Village Revenue Assistants is in dispute as the respondents contending that the appointment of the petitioners is contrary to the Rules, thereby the respondents addressed a letter to the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada inviting certain clarifications, but successfully Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada avoided to clarify any of the issues while directing the Revenue Department to take action in accordance with the Rules. Till date, no action was taken to find out whether the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or in violation of rules. Even according to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020 certain guidelines were given for promotion of the Village Revenue Assistants as Village Revenue Officers, Grade –II and necessary qualification is prescribed in paragraph No.7 of the said Government Order. = Here, it is not the question of doubtful integrity and the dispute is with regard to appointment of the petitioners in violation of the rules. Therefore, such question of fact has to be examined by the competent authority and this Court cannot undertake such exercise of deciding the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or otherwise. At best, this Court can issue a direction to the respondents to enquire into the alleged illegalities in the appointment of the petitioners and if the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the law and rules, the case of the petitioners be considered subject to fulfilling other conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020, within four (4) weeks from today.

the very appointment of the petitioners as Village Revenue Assistants is in dispute as the respondents contending that the appointment of the petitioners is contrary to the Rules, thereby the respondents addressed a letter to the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada inviting certain clarifications, but successfully Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada avoided to clarify any of the issues while directing the Revenue Department to take action in accordance with the Rules. Till date, no action was taken to find out whether the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or in violation of rules. Even according to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020 certain guidelines were given for promotion of the Village Revenue Assistants as Village Revenue Officers, Grade –II and necessary qualification is prescribed in paragraph No.7 of the said Government Order. =

Here, it is not the question of doubtful integrity and the dispute is with regard to appointment of the petitioners in violation of the rules. Therefore, such question of fact has to be examined by the competent authority and this Court cannot undertake such exercise of deciding the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or otherwise. At best, this Court can issue a direction to the respondents to enquire into the alleged illegalities in the appointment of the petitioners and if the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the law and rules, the case of the petitioners be considered subject to fulfilling other conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020, within four (4) weeks from today. 

AP HIGH COURT

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

WRIT PETITION Nos.01 of 2021 and 25859 of 2020

1) K.Sathipandu,

-VERSES-

1) Government of Andhra Pradesh

COMMON ORDER:

The writ petition No.01 of 2021 is filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India seeking the following relief:

“to issue a writ, order or direction particularly one in the nature of Writ

of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in not considering the

claims of the Petitioners for promotion for the post of Village Revenue Officers

Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list dated 04.02.2020 is illegal,

arbitrary and violation of Article 14, 16, 21 of the Constitution of India. The

petitioners further pray that they are entitled to promotion to the post of

Village Revenue Officers Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list

dated 04.02.2020 with all consequential benefits on par with their juniors

and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the circumstances of the case”.

The writ petition No.25859 of 2020 is filed under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:

“to issue a writ, order or direction particularly one in the nature of Writ

of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in not considering the

claims of the Petitioners for promotion for the post of Village Revenue Officers

Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list dated 04.02.2020 is illegal,

arbitrary and violation of Article 14, 16, 21 of the Constitution of India. The

petitioners further pray that they are entitled to promotion to the post of

Village Revenue Officers Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list

dated 04.02.2020 with all consequential benefits on par with their juniors

and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the circumstances of the case”.

 Since the relief claimed in both the petitions is identical,

it is expedient to decide both the writ petitions by common order.

 The petitioners were appointed as Village Revenue Assistants

(VRAs) in West Godavari District under the jurisdiction of respondent

Nos.3 and 4. Ever since, their appointment till date, they have been

discharging their duties with utmost devotion and dedication,

without any complaint from any one.

 The village servants are being paid very low amount.

Subsequently, when it is sought to regularize their services by paying 

MSM,J

WPs_1_2021 and 25859_2020

2

Rs.1,180/- plus Rs.50/- D.A., they are being paid honorarium and

were never paid pay scales. In view of the arduous nature of work

and also very low emoluments, normally the Village Revenue

Assistants posts are being filled on compassionate appointment and

also by giving preference to the family members whose

parents/family members are related since they would be acquainted

with the nature of duties. Subsequently, the honorarium is being

increased from time to time i.e. Rs.5,000/- and presently the

petitioners are being paid Rs.10,500/- plus Rs.300/- D.A. plus

Rs.100/- T.A. per month.

 It is further contended that out of 75 Village Revenue

Assistants, who are included in the provisional seniority list dated

04.02.2020 at appropriate place, respondent No.3 has promoted

nearly 30 candidates along with all other candidates and promotions

are given to 415 candidates including several persons who are

juniors to the petitioners vide Ref.No.A1/251/2019 dated

25.06.2020. Whereas, the case of the petitioners is totally ignored by

the respondents, such denial of promotion to the petitioners is illegal

and arbitrary, requested to issue a direction.

 Respondents filed counter mainly contending that the very

appointment of the petitioners is irregular and it is pending for

taking action by the concerned authorities. Unless the action is

taken in accordance with law, in terms of the directions issued by

the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Vijayawada, the

petitioners cannot be promoted to next higher cadre, requested to

dismiss the writ petitions.

 During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn

the attention of this Court to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III)

Department dated 27.01.2020 and requested to consider the case of 

MSM,J

WPs_1_2021 and 25859_2020

3

the petitioners with reference to said Government Order and

clarification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration, Vijayawada in Ref.No.Ser.IV(2)/160/2020-1 dated

29.09.2020, requested to issue a direction for promoting the

petitioners as Village Revenue Officers Grade-II.

 Learned Government Pleader for Services – I reiterated the

contentions urged in the counter and contended that the very

appointment of the petitioners is in dispute, unless action is taken in

accordance with law, in terms of the directions issued by the Chief

Commissioner of Land Administration, Vijayawada, the petitioners

cannot be promoted to next higher cadre, requested to dismiss the

writ petitions.

 As seen from the rival contentions, the very appointment of the

petitioners as Village Revenue Assistants is in dispute as the

respondents contending that the appointment of the petitioners is

contrary to the Rules, thereby the respondents addressed a letter to

the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh,

Vijayawada inviting certain clarifications, but successfully Chief

Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada

avoided to clarify any of the issues while directing the Revenue

Department to take action in accordance with the Rules. Till date, no

action was taken to find out whether the appointment of the

petitioners is in accordance with the rules or in violation of rules.

Even according to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated

27.01.2020 certain guidelines were given for promotion of the Village

Revenue Assistants as Village Revenue Officers, Grade –II and

necessary qualification is prescribed in paragraph No.7 of the said

Government Order. 

MSM,J

WPs_1_2021 and 25859_2020

4

 Learned counsel for the petitioners requested to issue a

direction to follow the procedure prescribed in paragraph No.7 of

G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020 and

specifically drawn the attention of this Court to clause (ix) of

paragraph No.7 of the said Government Order, where the District

Collector reserves right to reject the promotion of any candidate with

doubtful integrity and whose performance as Village Revenue

Assistant is not satisfactory or any disciplinary case is pending. No

doubt, a right is vested with the District Collector to reject the

candidature of any candidate, if his/her integrity is doubtful etc.

 Here, it is not the question of doubtful integrity and the

dispute is with regard to appointment of the petitioners in violation

of the rules. Therefore, such question of fact has to be examined by

the competent authority and this Court cannot undertake such

exercise of deciding the appointment of the petitioners is in

accordance with the rules or otherwise. At best, this Court can issue

a direction to the respondents to enquire into the alleged illegalities

in the appointment of the petitioners and if the appointment of the

petitioners is in accordance with the law and rules, the case of the

petitioners be considered subject to fulfilling other conditions

contained in G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated

27.01.2020, within four (4) weeks from today.

 With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No

costs.

The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand

closed.

_________________________________________

JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

08.02.2021

Ksp 

Friday, March 5, 2021

levying GST on the value of broken rice, bran and husk obtained by the petitioners on custom milling of the paddy.= the assessment orders passed by the 1st respondent levying GST on the value of by-products i.e., broken rice, bran and husk treating them as part of the consideration paid to the petitioners for custom milling of the paddy, are set aside.

levying GST on the value of broken rice, bran and husk obtained by the petitioners on custom milling of the paddy.= the assessment orders  passed by the 1st respondent levying GST on the value of by-products i.e., broken rice, bran and husk treating them as part of the consideration paid to the petitioners for custom milling of the paddy, are set aside.

AP HIGH COURT

 HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO

AND

HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE J. UMA DEVI

Writ Petition Nos.3108, 3114 of 2020 & 3970, 3980 and

3988 of 2021

M/S SRI KALI PRASADBABU RICE TRADERS

-VERSES-

THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER

COMMON ORDER: (per UDPR,J)


 These batch of writ petitions are filed challenging the

assessment orders passed by the 1st respondent levying GST on the

value of broken rice, bran and husk obtained by the petitioners on

custom milling of the paddy.

2. Heard learned counsel for petitioners, Sri G. Narendra Chetty,

learned Government Pleader for Commercial Tax representing on

behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2, Sri P.Hema Chandra, learned

standing counsel representing on behalf of respondent No.3 and

learned Assistant Solicitor General of India representing on behalf of

respondent No.4.

3. When the matter is taken up for hearing, learned counsel for

petitioners would submit that the subject matter in these writ petitions

is squarely covered by the order passed by this Court in

W.P.No.45971 of 2018, dated 20.11.2020 and the same order may be

passed in these writ petitions also. Learned Government Pleader for

Commercial Tax representing on behalf of respondents has not

disputed the said fact.

4. Following the above said order and for the reasons recorded

therein, these writ petitions are also allowed and the assessment orders 

2

passed by the 1st respondent levying GST on the value of

by-products i.e., broken rice, bran and husk treating them as part of

the consideration paid to the petitioners for custom milling of the

paddy, are set aside. However, it is made clear that the petitioners are

liable to pay tax on sale of by-products if they are statutorily taxable.

 As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending for

consideration, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.

_________________________

U.DURGA PRASAD RAO, J

_______________

J.UMA DEVI, J

Dt:19.02.2021

 MS 

whether family members of misssing employee can claim family pension etc., ? her husband, who was missing for last seven years, may be deemed not to be alive, the respondent approached the petitioners for grant of terminal benefits, pension/family pension etc.= the scope of grant of retiral benefits to family members of a missing employee as provided in OM No.F.No.1/17/2011-P&PW(E), dated 24/25.06.2013 issued by the Department of Pension and Pensioners Welfare, which reads as follows: “4. In the case of a missing employee/pensioner/family pensioner, the family can apply for the grant of family pension, amount of salary due, leave encashment due and the amount of GPF and gratuity (whatever has not already been received) to the Head of office of the organisation where the employee/pensioner had last served, six months after lodging of police report. The family pension and/or retirement gratuity may be sanctioned by the Administrative Ministry/Department after observing the following formalities:- (i) The family must lodge a report with the concerned Police Station and obtain a report from the Police, that the employee/pensioner/family pensioner has not been traced despite efforts made by them. The report may be a First Information Report or any other report such as a Daily Diary/General Diary Entry (ii) An Indemnity Bond should be taken from the nominee/dependants of the employee/pensioner/family pensioner that all payments will be adjusted against the 4 payments due to the employee/pensioner/family pensioner in case she/he appears on the scene and makes any claim. 5. In the case of a missing employee, the family pension, at the ordinary or enhanced rate, as applicable, will accrue from the expiry of leave or the date up to which pay and allowances have been paid or the date of the police report, whichever is later. In the case of a missing pensioner/family ‘pensioner, it will accrue from the date of the police report or from the date immediately succeeding the date till which pension/family pension had been paid, whichever is later. 6. The retirement gratuity will be paid to the family within three months of the date of application. In case of any delay, the interest shall be paid at the applicable rates and responsibility for delay shall be fixed. The difference between the death gratuity and retirement gratuity shall be payable after the death of the employee is conclusively established or on the expiry of the period of seven years from the date of the police report.” In similar circumstances, Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No.1577 of 2016 had granted full pension to the eligible family members of the deceased employee. Relying on the aforesaid proposition of law and applying it to the factual matrix of the case, the Tribunal had granted necessary relief to the respondent widow. We do not find any reason to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the Tribunal.

whether family members of misssing employee can claim family pension etc., ?

her husband, who was missing for last seven years, may be deemed not to be alive, the respondent approached the petitioners for grant of terminal benefits, pension/family pension etc.= the scope of grant of retiral benefits to family members of a missing employee as provided in OM No.F.No.1/17/2011-P&PW(E), dated 24/25.06.2013 issued by the Department of Pension and Pensioners Welfare, which reads as follows: “4. In the case of a missing employee/pensioner/family pensioner, the family can apply for the grant of family pension, amount of salary due, leave encashment due and the amount of GPF and gratuity (whatever has not already been received) to the Head of office of the organisation where the employee/pensioner had last served, six months after lodging of police report. The family pension and/or retirement gratuity may be sanctioned by the Administrative Ministry/Department after observing the following formalities:- (i) The family must lodge a report with the concerned Police Station and obtain a report from the Police, that the employee/pensioner/family pensioner has not been traced despite efforts made by them. The report may be a First Information Report or any other report such as a Daily Diary/General Diary Entry (ii) An Indemnity Bond should be taken from the nominee/dependants of the employee/pensioner/family pensioner that all payments will be adjusted against the 4 payments due to the employee/pensioner/family pensioner in case she/he appears on the scene and makes any claim. 5. In the case of a missing employee, the family pension, at the ordinary or enhanced rate, as applicable, will accrue from the expiry of leave or the date up to which pay and allowances have been paid or the date of the police report, whichever is later. In the case of a missing pensioner/family ‘pensioner, it will accrue from the date of the police report or from the date immediately succeeding the date till which pension/family pension had been paid, whichever is later. 6. The retirement gratuity will be paid to the family within three months of the date of application. In case of any delay, the interest shall be paid at the applicable rates and responsibility for delay shall be fixed. The difference between the death gratuity and retirement gratuity shall be payable after the death of the employee is conclusively established or on the expiry of the period of seven years from the date of the police report.” In similar circumstances, Delhi High Court in W.P.(C) No.1577 of 2016 had granted full pension to the eligible family members of the deceased employee. Relying on the aforesaid proposition of law and applying it to the factual matrix of the case, the Tribunal had granted necessary relief to the respondent widow. We do not find any reason to interfere with the well reasoned order passed by the Tribunal.

AP HIGH COURT

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE JOYMALYA BAGCHI

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

WRIT PETITION No.4332 of 2021

1.The Senior Superintendent of Post Offices and others

-VERSES-

Smt.M.Kumari

(Taken up through video conferencing)

ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Joymalya Bagchi)

Order dated 09.01.2020 in O.A.No.20/757/2019 passed by

the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, (for short,

‘the Tribunal’) directing the petitioners to grant pension to the

respondent from 06.10.2000 to 05.10.2007 and other retrial

benefits and thereafter, family pension to her as per Rules by

reckoning the date of missing as 06.10.2000 is the subject matter

of challenge.

The husband of the respondent was working as Postal

Assistant. He went missing on and from 06.10.2000. The

respondent sent a complaint to the police station on 14.05.2015 by

registered post, but no steps were taken. Accordingly, she

approached Judicial First Class Magistrate, Parchur with a prayer

for initiation of investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C.

Pursuant to the order passed by the Magistrate, the police

undertook investigation and submitted a report whereupon the

learned Magistrate by order dated 14.11.2017 recorded as follows:

“The Defacto Complainant/ Madugula Kumari, w/o. Ravi

Kumar has filed a report in this Court and the same was

forwarded to the S.H.O. Inkollu PS for investigation and report

about missing of Ravi Kumar. Police have conducted investigation

and filed a refer report as “Action Dropped” as the missing man is

not traced. As per Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,

the burden of proving that a person, who is unheard for 7 years

by his close relatives and friends is alive, is on the person who

asserts that he is alive. Nobody is asserting that Madugula Ravi 

 2

Kumar is alive. He is unheard from October 2000. So, this Court

is bound to presume that missing man is no more. Hence, the

refer charge sheet filed by Police can be accepted.”

In view of the aforesaid finding of the Magistrate that her

husband, who was missing for last seven years, may be deemed

not to be alive, the respondent approached the petitioners for grant

of terminal benefits, pension/family pension etc. Petitioners

denied such relief, hence the respondent was constrained to

approach the Tribunal. The Tribunal after hearing the parties and

referring to OM No.F.No.1/17/2011-P&PW(E), dated

24/25.06.2013 of the Department of Pension and Pensioners

Welfare passed the aforesaid direction.

Learned Assistant Solicitor General argues that there is no

clear finding that the respondent’s husband is missing. On the

other hand, he had absconded from duty and proceedings had

been initiated against him. Hence, the order requires to be set

aside.

We have given anxious consideration to such submission in

the light of the facts on record. Admittedly, the husband of the

respondent was missing on and from 06.10.2000. Proceedings

were initiated ex parte and his services were unilaterally

terminated on 29.07.2005 without service of charge memo upon

the employee.

It is apposite to note that the so-called order of termination

was void abinitio as no notice including charge memo had been

served upon the employee in the manner as contemplated under

the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules

(for short, ‘CCS (CCA) Rules’). No effort had been made to publish 

 3

notice in respect of the charge memo in accordance with CCS

(CCA) Rules, particularly, Chapter 12 thereof requiring publication

of charge memo or gist thereof in the local newspaper or uploading

the same in the website of the organisation or pasting it in the

notice board of the organisation.

On the other hand, police investigation showed that the

employee was missing and pursuant to such investigation, the

Judicial First Class Magistrate passed order on 14.11.2017 that

the missing person, who was unheard for the last seven years, may

be deemed to have died. The aforesaid factual matrix clearly falls

within the scope of grant of retiral benefits to family members of a

missing employee as provided in OM No.F.No.1/17/2011-P&PW(E),

dated 24/25.06.2013 issued by the Department of Pension and

Pensioners Welfare, which reads as follows:

“4. In the case of a missing employee/pensioner/family

pensioner, the family can apply for the grant of family pension,

amount of salary due, leave encashment due and the amount of

GPF and gratuity (whatever has not already been received) to the

Head of office of the organisation where the employee/pensioner

had last served, six months after lodging of police report. The

family pension and/or retirement gratuity may be sanctioned by the

Administrative Ministry/Department after observing the following

formalities:-

(i) The family must lodge a report with the concerned Police

Station and obtain a report from the Police, that the

employee/pensioner/family pensioner has not been traced

despite efforts made by them. The report may be a First

Information Report or any other report such as a Daily

Diary/General Diary Entry

(ii) An Indemnity Bond should be taken from the

nominee/dependants of the employee/pensioner/family

pensioner that all payments will be adjusted against the 

 4

payments due to the employee/pensioner/family pensioner

in case she/he appears on the scene and makes any claim.

5. In the case of a missing employee, the family pension, at

the ordinary or enhanced rate, as applicable, will accrue from the

expiry of leave or the date up to which pay and allowances have

been paid or the date of the police report, whichever is later. In the

case of a missing pensioner/family ‘pensioner, it will accrue from

the date of the police report or from the date immediately

succeeding the date till which pension/family pension had been

paid, whichever is later.

6. The retirement gratuity will be paid to the family within

three months of the date of application. In case of any delay, the

interest shall be paid at the applicable rates and responsibility for

delay shall be fixed. The difference between the death gratuity and

retirement gratuity shall be payable after the death of the employee

is conclusively established or on the expiry of the period of seven

years from the date of the police report.”

In similar circumstances, Delhi High Court in

W.P.(C) No.1577 of 2016 had granted full pension to the eligible

family members of the deceased employee. Relying on the

aforesaid proposition of law and applying it to the factual matrix of

the case, the Tribunal had granted necessary relief to the

respondent widow. We do not find any reason to interfere with the

well reasoned order passed by the Tribunal.

The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to

costs. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the

Writ Petition shall stand closed.

______________________________

JUSTICE JOYMALYA BAGCHI

__________________________

JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

Date: 23.02.2021

Ivd 

as per the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Government of Andhra Pradesh/APERC notified minimum compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the bereaved family in case of nondepartmental fatal electrical accidents vide the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission Compensation to Victims of Electrical Accidents Regulation, 2017 (Regulation No.2 of 2017). Therefore, the respondents are under an obligation to pay the compensation amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to the petitioner for loss of her husband as a result of electrocution. Learned counsel would also submit that the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the common High Court, in similar set of facts and circumstances, directed the electricity authorities to consider the case of the parties for payment of compensation.

 Ambati Eswar Reddy, while trying to switch on starter of motor pump set to irrigate the agricultural field, met with fatal electrical accident due to high voltage and electrical short circuit and died instantaneously. The said accident is a non-departmental fatal accident. Police also registered a case in Crime No.111 of 2019, and conducted inquest. The autopsy conducted by the Civil Assistant Surgeon, District Headquarters Hospital, Nandyal, revealed that the cause of death is ‘electrical shock’. The petitioner’s family is eking out livelihood by doing agriculture. The petitioner approached the concerned authorities several times for payment of ex-gratia/compensation, but in vain. Therefore, the 2 MGR,J WP_4310_2021 petitioner submitted representation, dated 21.12.2020 to the respondents. Inspite of receipt of the said notice, no action is taken by the respondents. Hence, assailing the inaction of the respondents to pay the compensation, this writ petition is filed.

as per the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Government of Andhra Pradesh/APERC notified minimum compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the bereaved family in case of nondepartmental fatal electrical accidents vide the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission Compensation to Victims of Electrical Accidents Regulation, 2017 (Regulation No.2 of 2017). Therefore, the respondents are under an obligation to pay the compensation amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to the petitioner for loss of her husband as a result of electrocution. Learned counsel would also submit that the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the common High Court, in similar set of facts and circumstances, directed the electricity authorities to consider the case of the parties for payment of compensation.


AP HIGH COURT

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. GANGA RAO

Writ Petition No.4310 of 2021

AMBATI SAVITHRI

-VERSES-

SOUTHERN POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY OF A.P. LIMITED

ORDER

 This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is filed

seeking the following relief/s:

“…to issue a Writ in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or an appropriate

writ or order or direction to the respondents herein, holding that the

inaction on the part of the respondents for not paying minimum

compensation of Rs.5.00 Lakhs (Rupees five Lakhs only) to the petitioner

herein, for the death of her husband Ambati Eswar Reddy, due to

“Electric Shock” on 15.08.2019 as per A.P Gazette notification No.241,

Date 29.05.2017, and in terms of the principle of law laid down by the

Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Hyderabad, in a similar case, in its

orders dated 24.12.2012 in W.P.No.35215 of 2012, even after lapse of

considerable time as illegal, arbitrary and violation of fundamental rights

guaranteed under the Constitution and consequently to direct the

respondents to pay exgratia of Rs.5.00 lakhs to the petitioner herein,

within a time bound period and pass such other order or orders…”

 Heard Sri Hari Kishan Kudikala, learned counsel for the petitioner, and

Sri Y. Nagi Reddy, learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents.

Perused the material on record.

 The case of the petitioner is that, on 15.08.2019, her husband Ambati

Eswar Reddy, while trying to switch on starter of motor pump set to irrigate

the agricultural field, met with fatal electrical accident due to high voltage

and electrical short circuit and died instantaneously. The said accident is a

non-departmental fatal accident. Police also registered a case in Crime No.111

of 2019, and conducted inquest. The autopsy conducted by the Civil Assistant

Surgeon, District Headquarters Hospital, Nandyal, revealed that the cause of

death is ‘electrical shock’. The petitioner’s family is eking out livelihood by

doing agriculture. The petitioner approached the concerned authorities several

times for payment of ex-gratia/compensation, but in vain. Therefore, the 

2

MGR,J

WP_4310_2021

petitioner submitted representation, dated 21.12.2020 to the respondents.

Inspite of receipt of the said notice, no action is taken by the respondents.

Hence, assailing the inaction of the respondents to pay the compensation, this

writ petition is filed.

 Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per the provisions of

the Electricity Act, 2003, the Government of Andhra Pradesh/APERC notified

minimum compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to the bereaved family in case of nondepartmental fatal electrical accidents vide the Andhra Pradesh Electricity

Regulatory Commission Compensation to Victims of Electrical Accidents

Regulation, 2017 (Regulation No.2 of 2017). Therefore, the respondents are

under an obligation to pay the compensation amount of Rs.5,00,000/- to the

petitioner for loss of her husband as a result of electrocution. Learned counsel

would also submit that the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh and the

common High Court, in similar set of facts and circumstances, directed the

electricity authorities to consider the case of the parties for payment of

compensation. Non consideration of the representation, by way of legal

notice, of the petitioner for payment of ex-gratia/compensation as per the

Regulations and earlier orders of the High Court is illegal and arbitrary.

 Learned sanding counsel submits that for quantifying the compensation,

the petitioner has to approach the civil Court.

 The said contention is untenable. For payment of ex-gratia and other

benefits under the schemes, public law remedy is available before this Court.

 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, submissions of

both the counsel and on perusal of the material record, this Court, in the

interests of justice, felt it appropriate to dispose of the writ petition directing

the respondents to consider the representation submitted by the petitioner, in

terms of Regulation No.2 of 2017 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory 

3

MGR,J

WP_4310_2021

Commission, for payment of ex-gratia within a period of six weeks from the

date of receipt of a copy of this order.

 With the above directions, the Writ Petition is disposed of. There shall

be no order as to costs.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand

closed.

______________

M.GANGA RAO, J

23.02.2021

Vjl 

4

MGR,J

WP_4310_2021

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M. GANGA RAO

Writ Petition No.4310 of 2021

23.02.2021

Vjl 

whether the legal heir of a contract employee, who sustained grave injury in the accident while in service, is entitled to claim compassionate appointment ? This issue is squarely covered by the order dated 02.01.2018 in the case of T. Suseela vs. The State represented by the Secretary to Government, Rural Development Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 [W.P(MD)No.10238 of 2020 and MP(MD)Nos.1 & 2 of 2010] passed by the Single Judge of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, wherein the Single Judge after considering various judgments of Supreme Court decided the issue against the petitioner therein. However, the request of this petitioner is limited i.e., to consider the representation dated 24.07.2017. Hence, the 4th respondent is requested to dispose of the representation dated 24.07.2017 submitted by the petitioner to the District Collector, Guntur keeping in view the law laid down by the Single Judge of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in T. Suseela’s case (referred supra) and the law declared therein, within a period of four (04) weeks, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order

whether the legal heir of a contract employee, who sustained grave injury in the accident while in service, is entitled to claim compassionate appointment ?

This issue is squarely covered by the order dated 02.01.2018 in the case of T. Suseela vs. The State represented by the Secretary to Government, Rural Development Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9 [W.P(MD)No.10238 of 2020 and MP(MD)Nos.1 & 2 of 2010] passed by the Single Judge of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, wherein the Single Judge after considering various judgments of Supreme Court decided the issue against the petitioner therein. However, the request of this petitioner is limited i.e., to consider the representation dated 24.07.2017. Hence, the 4th respondent is requested to dispose of the representation dated 24.07.2017 submitted by the petitioner to the District Collector, Guntur keeping in view the law laid down by the Single Judge of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in T. Suseela’s case (referred supra) and the law declared therein, within a period of four (04) weeks, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

AP HIGH COURT

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

WRIT PETITION NO.1394 OF 2021

R PEDABABU

-verses-

The State of Andhra Pradesh

ORDER:

 This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India seeking the following relief:-

“….to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate

writ order or direction declaring the Award dated

15042014 passed in Lok Adalat Case No.23 of 2014 on the

file of Lok Adalat Bench Macherla against FIR No.92/2013

on the file of Durgi Police Station Guntur District which

was registered as C.C.No.445/2013 on the file of Junior

Civil Judge Macherla and further inaction of the

respondents in providing any employment without

assigning any reason or passing any order by following the

due process of law against representation dated 15.11.2019

as illegal arbitrary non-est in the eye of law and violative of

Articles 14 16 21 of Constitution of India principles of

natural justice and pass such other order.”

2. The main grievance of this petitioner is that his father by name

Koteswara Rao worked as lineman on contract basis under

respondents 8 and 9 in the department of respondents 2 to 7, he met

with an accident and sustained grave injury while in service as

contract employee under respondents 8 and 9, totally disabled and

he is not in a position to discharge his duties. Therefore, the

petitioner made a representation dated 15.11.2019 to the

Superintendent of Police, Guntur Rural and not to any of the

respondents. However, he made another representation allegedly to

the District Collector, Guntur on 24.07.2017 for his appointment on

compassionate ground. Non-consideration of his request to appoint

on compassionate grounds is now questioned before this Court and

requested to declare the same as illegal and arbitrary. 

2

3. During the course of hearing, Sri T.Ramakoteswara Rao,

learned counsel for the petitioner requested this Court to issue a

direction to the respondents to consider the representation of the

petitioner dated 24.07.2017 submitted to the District Collector,

Guntur, without touching the merits of the case.

4. On the other hand, Sri Y.Nagi Reddy, learned Standing

Counsel for A.P.S.P.D.C.L appearing for the respondents contended

that the representation dated 15.11.2019 was addressed to the

Superintendent of Police, Guntur Rural and not to any of the

respondents, but he marked copies to the Deputy Superintendent of

Police, Gurazala, Circle Inspector of Police, Macherla Rural and

Sub-Inspector of Police, Durgi Police Station, the same cannot be

taken into consideration. However, the representation made to the

District Collector, Guntur dated 24.07.2017 is not in dispute. But,

now the question is whether the legal heir of a contract employee,

who sustained grave injury in the accident while in service, is

entitled to claim compassionate appointment.

5. This issue is squarely covered by the order dated 02.01.2018

in the case of T. Suseela vs. The State represented by the

Secretary to Government, Rural Development Department,

Secretariat, Chennai-9 [W.P(MD)No.10238 of 2020 and

MP(MD)Nos.1 & 2 of 2010] passed by the Single Judge of Madurai

Bench of Madras High Court, wherein the Single Judge after

considering various judgments of Supreme Court decided the issue

against the petitioner therein. However, the request of this petitioner

is limited i.e., to consider the representation dated 24.07.2017. 

3

Hence, the 4th respondent is requested to dispose of the

representation dated 24.07.2017 submitted by the petitioner to the

District Collector, Guntur keeping in view the law laid down by the

Single Judge of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in T. Suseela’s

case (referred supra) and the law declared therein, within a period of

four (04) weeks, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

5. With the above direction, this Writ Petition is disposed of.

There shall be no order as to costs.

 Consequently miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall

also stand closed.

_________________________________________

JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

Date: 20.01.2021

IS 

4

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

WRIT PETITION NO.1394 OF 2021

Dated 20.01.2021

IS 

permitting the petitioners to collect the rates of admission as mentioned in their respective representations to the respondents for the Telugu movie “RED” which is proposed to be released soon, subject to strictly adhering to the circular instructions issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh from time to time and Standard Operating Procedure issued by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India dated 06.10.2020 for exhibition of films on preventive measures to contain spread of Covid-19 and subject to compliance of direction issued in earlier order passed in W.P.No.9734 of 2019 and batch, following the order of Division Bench in W.P.No.18779 of 2014.

permitting the petitioners to collect the rates of admission as mentioned in their respective representations to the respondents for the Telugu movie “RED” which is proposed to be released soon, subject to strictly adhering to the circular instructions issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh from time to time and Standard Operating Procedure issued by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India dated 06.10.2020 for exhibition of films on preventive measures to contain spread of Covid-19 and subject to compliance of direction issued in earlier order passed in W.P.No.9734 of 2019 and batch, following the order of Division Bench in W.P.No.18779 of 2014. 

Wednesday, March 3, 2021

Section 457 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”) for grant of interim custody of his vehicle = whether a vehicle seized in connection with crime registered under the provisions of the NDPS Act is liable for confiscation or not only at the time of convicting, acquitting or discharging the accused. But there is no mention that interim custody of a vehicle cannot be ordered. Further, if the vehicle is kept idle it will render useless and there is every likelihood of the vehicle getting damaged.

 Section 457 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”) for grant of interim custody of his vehicle =  whether a vehicle seized in connection with crime registered under the provisions of the NDPS Act is liable for confiscation or not only at the time of convicting, acquitting or discharging the accused. But there is no mention that interim custody of a vehicle cannot be ordered. Further, if the vehicle is kept idle it will render useless and there is every likelihood of the vehicle getting damaged.

AP HIGH COURT 

THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.150 of 2021

BATHINA ANAND MOHAN RAO
Versus
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

ORDER:

 Challenging the order dated 04.01.2021 in Crl.M.P.No.176 of

2020 on the file of Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-I Additional

District & Sessions Judge-Special Judge for Trial of Offences under

NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam in connection with Crime No.487 of

2020 of Duvvada Police Station, Visakhapatnam City, dismissing

the petition filed by the petitioner herein under Section 457 of

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”) for grant of

interim custody of his vehicle i.e. Maruthi Celerio ZXI Car bearing

Registration No.AP 39 AE 3378, this criminal revision case under

Section 397 & 401 of Cr.P.C. has been filed.

2. Heard Sri T.D.Phani Kumar, learned counsel for the

petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing

on behalf of the 1st respondent-State.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the

Court below dismissed the application filed under Section 457 of

Cr.P.C on the ground that the vehicle is likely to be confiscated to

the State, if ultimately the case results in conviction. It has further

observed that the vehicle was used for transportation of Ganja and

as the investigation is still pending, the petitioner is not entitled for

interim custody of the vehicle during the pendency of the case.

Learned counsel submits that the Court below has failed to

exercise its jurisdiction under Section 457 of Cr.P.C and moreover,

there is no dispute about the ownership of the vehicle and that the

petitioner is not involved in the crime. Learned counsel submits 

2

that just because the investigation is pending, that cannot be a

ground to refuse the petition filed under Section 457 of Cr.P.C.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that even if a

vehicle is seized under NDPS Act for being used in transporting

narcotic goods, the owner is entitled for interim custody of the

vehicle and this Court has granted interim custody of the vehicles

in similar cases. Hence, this petition may be allowed.

5. It is appropriate to extract Section 457 of Cr.P.C which reads

thus:

457. Procedure by police upon seizure of property.

 (1) Whenever the seizure of property by any police officer

is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code,

and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court

during an inquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such order

as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the

delivery of such property to the person entitled to the

possession thereof, or if such person cannot be ascertained,

respecting the custody and production of such property.

(2) If the person so entitled is known, the Magistrate

may order the property to be delivered to him on such

conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit and if such

person is unknown, the Magistrate may detain it and shall, in

such case, issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which

such property consists, and requiring any person who may

have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish his

claim within six months from the date of such proclamation.

6. As per Section 457 of Cr.P.C., if the person is known and

when there is no dispute about the ownership of the vehicle, the

Magistrate may order property be delivered to him on such

conditions as the Magistrate thinks fit.

7. In this case, there is no dispute with regard to the ownership

of the petitioner in respect of the seized vehicle. It is clear that 

3

there is no bar under the NDPS Act on the Courts to order for

interim custody of a vehicle which is seized in a crime registered

under the provisions of NDPS Act. Section 63 of the NDPS Act

reads thus:

“(1) In the trial of offences under this Act, whether the accused

is convicted or acquitted or discharged, the court shall decide

whether any article or thing seized under this Act is liable to

confiscation under section 60 or section 61 or section 62 and,

if it decides that the article is so liable, it may order

confiscation accordingly.

(2) Where any article or thing seized under this Act appears to

be liable to confiscation under section 60 or section 61 or

section 62, but the person who committed the offence in

connection therewith is not known or cannot be found, the

court may inquire into and decide such liability, and may order

confiscation accordingly: Provided that no order of confiscation

of an article or thing shall be made until the expiry of one

month from the date of seizure, or without hearing any person

who may claim any right thereto and the evidence, if any,

which he produces in respect of his claim: Provided further

that if any such article or thing, other than a narcotic drug,

psychotropic substance, 1[controlled substance,] the opium

poppy, coca plant or cannabis plant is liable to speedy and

natural decay, or if the court is of opinion that its sale would

be for the benefit of its owner, it may at any time direct it to be

sold; and the provisions of this sub-section shall, as nearly as

may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of the sale.

8. From the above, it is clear that the Court shall decide

whether a vehicle seized in connection with crime registered under

the provisions of the NDPS Act is liable for confiscation or not only

at the time of convicting, acquitting or discharging the accused.

But there is no mention that interim custody of a vehicle cannot be

ordered. Further, if the vehicle is kept idle it will render useless

and there is every likelihood of the vehicle getting damaged.

9. Taking into consideration the submissions made by the

learned counsel for the petitioner and in view of settled law, this 

4

Court feels it appropriate to grant interim custody of the vehicle to

the petitioner by imposing certain conditions.

10. Accordingly, the criminal revision case is allowed and the

order dated 04.01.2021 in Crl.M.P.No.176 of 2020 on the file of

Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-I Additional District & Sessions

Judge-Special Judge for Trial of Offences under NDPS Act,

Visakhapatnam is set aside. The vehicle i.e. Maruthi Celerio ZXI

Car bearing Registration No.AP 39 AE 3378 is ordered to be given

interim custody to the petitioner on condition of his executing a

self bond for a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs only)

with one surety for a likesum to the satisfaction of learned

Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-I Additional District & Sessions

Judge-Special Judge for Trial of Offences under NDPS Act,

Visakhapatnam.

As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications are

closed.

___________________________

LALITHA KANNEGANTI, J

26th February, 2021

PVD 

5

THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

Allowed

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.150 of 2021

26th February, 2021

PVD