Saturday, February 13, 2016

Order 7 Rule 11 r/w.Sec.151 CPC, for rejection of plaint on the ground that the same is barred under law. It is the case of petitioner that he has already filed insolvency petition which is pending in I.P.No.34 of 2010, seeking to declare him as insolvent and soon after receipt of summons in the aforesaid I.P., the 1st respondent/plaintiff has filed suit for recovery of money. Precisely, it is the case of petitioner that in view of pendency of insolvency proceedings in I.P.No.34 of 2010, the suit filed by the 1st respondent is barred under Section 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.=Section 28 deals with the effect of an order of adjudication by the competent Court. From a reading of the provision under Section 28(2) of the said Act, it is clear that, on making of an order of adjudication, the whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a receiver as provided in the said Section and shall become divisible among the creditors, and thereafter, after adjudication, it is not open to any creditor to commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court may impose. It is clear from the said provision that Section 28(2) comes into effect only after adjudication of the application filed by the applicant under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Therefore, after adjudication of the application filed by the applicant seeking to declare him as insolvent and during pendency of further proceedings for division of properties to the creditors, no creditor can institute any suit or commence any legal proceedings without the leave of the Court. Pendency of proceedings as referred under Section 28(2) of the Act refers to the pendency of proceedings subsequent to adjudication of the application, but not on mere filing of application seeking declaration of applicant as insolvent. 6. Coming to the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner, Kalamalla Babakkas case (2 supra) deals with the issue of date of vesting of properties of insolvent in the receiver of the Court. Further, in Pentala Githavardhana Raos case (1 supra), a Division Bench of this Court has considered the scope of Section 28(2) of the Act and held that the intendment and purpose of Section 28(2) is broadly two-fold; (i) to make the entire estate of the insolvent vest in the Court or in a receiver the moment an order of adjudication is made and to make it available for distribution among the body of creditors, and (ii) to prohibit any creditor of the insolvent from proceeding against his property in respect of his debt or commence any suit or other legal proceeding, without the leave of the insolvency Court during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings. So, even in this judgment, it is not held that the provision under Section 28(2) of the Act comes into play on mere filing of application for declaration of petitioner as insolvent.

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2003 of 2015  

19-06-2015

M. Linga Murthy...Petitioner
       
R.M.Rama Devi & others...Respondents.  

For petitioner :Sri M. Satish Kumar, Advocate.

For Respondents:None appeared.

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?CITATIONS:

1. AIR 1973 AP 245
2. AIR 1973 AP 312


HONBLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2003 of 2015  

ORDER :
        This civil revision petition is filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India, by the petitioner in I.A.No.777 of 2014 in
O.S.No.2577 of 2010, aggrieved by order dated 03.02.2015, passed by
the V-Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad.
2.      Respondent No.1 herein has filed the aforesaid suit in
O.S.No.2577 of 2010 against the petitioner herein and three others, for
recovery of an amount of Rs.5,00,000/-.  In the aforesaid suit, the
petitioner/1st defendant has filed the present application in I.A.No.777
of 2014 under Order 7 Rule 11 r/w.Sec.151 CPC, for rejection of
plaint on the ground that the same is barred under law.  It is the case
of petitioner that he has already filed insolvency petition which is
pending in I.P.No.34 of 2010, seeking to declare him as insolvent and
soon after receipt of summons in the aforesaid I.P., the 1st
respondent/plaintiff has filed suit for recovery of money.  Precisely,
it is the case of petitioner that in view of pendency of insolvency
proceedings in I.P.No.34 of 2010, the suit filed by the 1st respondent is
barred under Section 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.
3.      The 1st respondent herein has filed counter affidavit in the I.A.,
denying the various allegations made by the petitioner and specifically
pleading that the suit is filed in the year 2010 and after sufficiently
dragging the proceedings for a long time, only to protract the
litigation, the present application is filed though there are no grounds
for rejection of plaint.  It is the case of 1st respondent/plaintiff that in
the absence of any adjudication in the insolvency application, there is
no need to obtain leave of the Court to file the suit.  The civil Court,
by impugned order dated 03.02.2015, has dismissed the petition.  As
against the same, the present revision is filed.
4.      In this civil revision petition, it is contended by Sri M.Satish
Kumar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner that since the
insolvency petition filed by the petitioner is pending consideration, in
the absence of obtaining leave from the insolvency Court, it is not
open to any creditor to file a suit and pursue the same, and in this
case, as there is no leave granted by the competent Court, the suit filed
by the 1st respondent is barred under law.  It is submitted that in view
of the provision under Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC, the Court below
ought to have rejected the plaint by allowing the petition filed by the
petitioner.  Learned counsel, in support of his contentions, has placed
reliance on the Division-Bench-judgments of this Court in Pentala
Githavardhana Rao & others v. The Andhra Bank Ltd. & others
and in Kalamalla Babakka & another v. Official Receiver,
Cuddapah & another .
5.      Having perused the affidavit and counter affidavit and on
hearing the learned counsel, I have closely examined the provision
under Section 28 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.  Section 28
deals with the effect of an order of adjudication by the competent
Court.  From a reading of the provision under Section 28(2) of the
said Act, it is clear that, on making of an order of adjudication, the
whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a
receiver as provided in the said Section and shall become divisible
among the creditors, and thereafter, after adjudication, it is not open to
any creditor to commence any suit or other legal proceeding, except
with the leave of the Court and on such terms as the Court may
impose.  It is clear from the said provision that Section 28(2) comes
into effect only after adjudication of the application filed by the
applicant under the provisions of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920.
Therefore, after adjudication of the application filed by the applicant
seeking to declare him as insolvent and during pendency of further
proceedings for division of properties to the creditors, no creditor can
institute any suit or commence any legal proceedings without the
leave of the Court.  Pendency of proceedings as referred under Section
28(2) of the Act refers to the pendency of proceedings subsequent to
adjudication of the application, but not on mere filing of application
seeking declaration of applicant as insolvent.
6.      Coming to the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for
petitioner, Kalamalla Babakkas case (2 supra) deals with the issue
of date of vesting of properties of insolvent in the receiver of the
Court.  Further, in Pentala Githavardhana Raos case (1 supra), a
Division Bench of this Court has considered the scope of Section
28(2) of the Act and held that the intendment and purpose of Section
28(2) is broadly two-fold; (i) to make the entire estate of the insolvent
vest in the Court or in a receiver the moment an order of adjudication
is made and to make it available for distribution among the body of
creditors, and (ii) to prohibit any creditor of the insolvent from
proceeding against his property in respect of his debt or commence
any suit or other legal proceeding, without the leave of the insolvency
Court during the pendency of the insolvency proceedings.  So, even in
this judgment, it is not held that the provision under Section 28(2) of
the Act comes into play on mere filing of application for declaration
of petitioner as insolvent.  Both the aforesaid judgments would not
render any assistance in support of the case of petitioner in the present
case, as much as the application of the petitioner seeking declaration
as insolvent, is still pending and the same is not yet adjudicated.
Apart from the same, it is clear from the material on record that the
suit is filed in the year 2010 and nearly two long years after filing of
the suit, written statement is filed and instead of proceeding with trial
in the suit, it appears, the petitioner herein is trying to protract the
litigation by filing this kind of applications nearly after more than 3
years of filing suit.
7.      For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find merit in this revision
and the same is accordingly dismissed.  No costs.
     Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________  
R. SUBHASH REDDY, J    
19th June 2015

Or.VII, rule 11 read with Or.9, rule 9 C.P.C. - earlier suit was dismissed for default , fresh suit on the same cause of action is maintainable ? = The principle underlying Order IX Rule 9 is that no one shall be vexed twice with the same cause of action and it is also a settled law that this rule does not prohibit the plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit on different cause of action as per the principles laid down in Shivashankar Prasad Sah and another V. Baikunth Nath Singh and others (4 supra) and Raj Kumar and others V. Mutsaddi Lal and others . It is also a settled law that dismissal of suit under Order IX Rule 8 of CPC bars fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. It is also a settled law that the operation of this rule is confined to the cases where the second suit is brought for the same subject and on the same cause of action and it does not preclude fresh suit if a cause of action is separate and distinct. While considering whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is or is not the same as the cause of action in the previous suit, the test to be applied is are the causes of action in the two suits in substance and not technically identical as laid down in M/s. Parasram Harnand Rao V. M/s. Shanti Parsad Narinder Kumar Jain and another . It is also to be noted that as to the identity of cause of action one workable test though not conclusive is whether the same evidence would support the claim in both the suits and if the reply is affirmative, a fresh suit will be barred and if it is negatived, a fresh suit will lie. It is also settled law that the fact that the mode of relief claimed in the subsequent suit is different than claimed in the previous suit, it will not be a ground for refusing to apply the bar of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC as held in Aziz Din V. Moti Ram and others . At the same time, there is absolutely no dispute with regard to the principles laid down in the judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents and in fact the Court below had no occasion to deal with the same. There is absolutely no dispute that both the suits are eventually for the reliefs of declaration of title and injunction in respect of the same subject property. The distinction is subsequent developments and the relief pertaining to the revenue entries. The instant application is for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC. It is the case of the petitioners herein that in view of the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC the present suit is barred, since the earlier suit i.e., O.S.No.195 of 1982 filed by the plaintiffs herein on the same foundation and cause of action was dismissed for default. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the cause of action referred to include any cause of action flowing from the main cause of action.- the basis and foundation of the earlier suit and the cause of action set out therein and the effect of dismissal of the said suit O.S.No.195 of 1982 and the impact of provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC on the present suit and the Court below had also no occasion to consider the principles laid down on the issue in the above referred judgments. In fact, no exercise was undertaken by the Court below in the light of the principles laid down in the authoritative pronouncements. Therefore, this Court, after anxious and thoughtful consideration and taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances deems it appropriate to remand the matter for fresh consideration to the Court below.

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI    

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3243 of 2014  

16-04-2015

1. Yachamaneni Chandra Mohan Rao & another...Petitioners

1. Edmala Narsamma @ Narsavva & 28 others...Respondents    

Counsel for Petitioners: Sri Bodduluri Srinivasa Rao

Counsel for Respondents 1 & 2: Sri N. Ashok Kumar

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred
1.      2012 (6) ALD 36 (SC)
2.      (2009) 1 Supreme Court Cases 689
3.      AIR 1984 Orissa 187
4.      AIR 1969 Supreme Court 971
5.      AIR 1978 Punjab and Haryana 216
6.      2014 (2) ALD 149
7.      AIR 1952 Punjab 190
8.      (1980) 3 Supreme Court Cases 565
9.      AIR 1926 Lahore 563



HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.V. SESHA SAI    

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.3243 of 2014  

Date: April 16, 2015

O R D E R:

        The application which is the genesis for the present revision
filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is one under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).  In the
present revision filed by the defendants 28 and 29 challenge is to
the order dated 31.07.2014 passed by the Court of the Senior Civil
Judge, Siricilla, dismissing I.A.No.219 of 2014 in O.S.No.139 of 2013.

2.      The circumstances, leading to the filing of the instant
revision are as infra:
        Respondents 1 and 2 herein instituted the above mentioned
suit against the petitioners and the other respondents herein for
declaration of title and declaration of registered sale deeds
standing in the name of the defendants as fraudulent, illegal, null
and void and for perpetual injunction and mandatory injunctions
in respect of the suit schedule property.  In the said suit,
defendants 28 and 29, who are the petitioners herein, filed the
present I.A.No.219 of 2014 under the provisions of Order VII Rule
11 of CPC, praying the Court below to reject the plaint.  Plaintiffs 1
and 2/respondents 1 and 2 herein opposed the said application by
filing counter-affidavit.  The learned Senior Civil Judge, Siricilla, by
virtue of order dated 31.07.2014, dismissed the said application.
3.      Calling in question the validity and the legal sustainability of
the said order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Siricialla,
the present revision has been filed.

4.      Heard Sri Bodduluri Srinivasa Rao, learned counsel for the
petitioners and Sri N. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for
respondents 1 and 2 apart from perusing the material made
available before this Court.

5.      Submissions/contentions of the learned counsel for the
petitioners:
(1)     The order impugned in the instant revision is
erroneous, contrary to law and is opposed to the very
spirit and object of the provisions of Order VII Rule 11
and Order IX Rule 9 of CPC.
       
(2)     The learned Judge failed to take into consideration the
contents of the affidavit filed in support of the
application and had the same been taken into
account, the order under challenge would not have
emanated.
       
(3)     In view of the dismissal of O.S.No.195 of 1982 filed by
the plaintiffs/respondents herein for the same relief,
the present suit is hit by the provisions of Order IX
Rule 9 of CPC.
(4)     The learned Judge ought to have taken into account
the aspect of filing of the present suit i.e., O.S.No.139
of 2013 based on the sale deed dated 23.12.1964 and
seeking possession in the year 2003 and should have
allowed the application.

6.      Submissions/contentions of the learned counsel for the
respondents:
(1)     The order under challenge is in conformity with the
provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC.
       
(2)     There is no illegality nor any material infirmity in the
order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge,
Siricilla, and in the absence of the same, the present
revision is not maintainable and the petitioners herein
are not entitled for any relief from this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
       
(3)     The cause of action for instituting the present suit is
different from the cause of action for filing the earlier
suit i.e., O.S.No.195 of 1982 as such the petitioners
herein are not entitled for any relief.
       
(4)     Since there are no ingredients of Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC in the case of the petitioners herein, the plaint
cannot be rejected.
(5)     The application for partial rejection of plaint at the
instance of certain defendants only is not
maintainable.

7.      In support of his submissions and contentions the learned
counsel for the respondents places reliance on the judgments in
Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable
Society V. Ponniamman Educational Trust ; State of Uttar Pradesh
V. Jagdish Sharan Agrawal ; Lingaraj Samantarayk and others V.
Sri Sidhabaladevjew ; Shivashankar Prasad Sah and another V.
Baikunth Nath Singh and others ; Manphool and others V. Surja
Ram and others  and Kasani Narsimulu V. Sathagowni Srinivas
Goud and others .

8.      In the above background, now the issues that emerge for
consideration of this Court in the present revision are:
(1)     Whether the order under revision is in
conformity with the provisions of Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC?
       
(2)     Whether the order impugned warrants any
interference of this Court under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India?

9.      The provisions of law which are germane and relevant for
the purpose of consideration of the issues involved in the present
revision are Order VII Rule 11 and Order IX Rules 8 and 9 of CPC
which read as under:
        Order VII Rule 11 of CPC:
        Rejection of plaint.--- The plaint shall be
rejected in the following cases:--
       
     (a)        where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b)     where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
correct the valuation within a time to be fixed
by the Court, fails to do so;
       
(c)     where the relief claimed is properly valued but
the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by
the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to
do so;
       
(d)     where the suit appears from the statement in the
plaint to be barred by any law;
       
     (e)        where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f)     where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions
of rule 9;
        [Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the
correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-
paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be
recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause
of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying
the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time
fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would
cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.]
Order IX Rules 8 and 9 of CPC:
     8. Procedure where defendant only appears:---
Where the defendant appears and the plaintiff does
not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the
Court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed,
unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof,
in which case the Court shall pass a decree against
the defendant upon such admission, and, where part
only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the
suit so far as it relates to the remainder.
       
     9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh
suit.--- (1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed
under rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from
bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of
action.  But he may apply for an order to set the
dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there
was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the
suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make
an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms
as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall
appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.
       
     (2)No order shall be made under this rule
unless notice of the application has been served on
the opposite party.
10.     Under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, courts are
authorized and empowered to reject plaints.  Since this is a
drastic remedy provided by the Code to non-suit the parties at
threshold, the said power is required to be exercised with great
amount of care, caution and circumspection and the same shall
not be used in a routine and mechanical manner.  It is settled law
that when a serious dispute is raised by the parties with regard to
the cause of action and limitation as to the dispute the same is to
be resolved only after framing the issue and conducting trial on
the said aspect, but not by rejecting the plaint.  It is also a settled
principle of law that while examining the application filed under
Rule 10 or Rule 11 of Order VII, the Court has to take the
averments in the plaint on their face value and the plaint cannot
be rejected on the basis of written statement or the application
filed under the said provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC.  Unless
a party applying for thoroughly and completely satisfies the Court
and proves the existence of necessary ingredients of law, the
exercise of the power under these provisions is impermissible to
the Court.

11.     The issues in the present case are required to be examined
in the light of the above aspect.  In the instant revision it is the
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the
objection of the petitioners squarely falls under Order VII Rule 11
of CPC and the plaint is liable to be rejected in view of the
mandatory provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC. While
elaborating the same, it is contended by the learned counsel that
as the earlier suit, O.S.No.195 of 1982, filed by the same plaintiffs
on the same foundation was dismissed for default and no steps
were taken for getting the same restored, the present suit filed on
the same basis cannot be permitted to be prosecuted in the teeth
of provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC.

12.     On the contrary, it is the case of the plaintiffs/respondents
herein that since the cause of action which compelled them to file
the instant suit is different from the cause of action in O.S.No.195
of 1982, the said provisions of law cannot be pressed into service
for non-suiting them.  

13.     In order to appreciate the same, this Court finds it
appropriate to refer to the provisions of Order IX Rules 8 and 9
of CPC.  According to Order IX Rule 8 of CPC where the
defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit
is called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order that the
suit be dismissed, unless the defendant admits the claim, or part
thereof.  As per Rule 9 of Order IX of CPC where a suit is wholly
or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded
from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action.
But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside.
Therefore, it is evident from the above provisions of law that
when a suit is dismissed for default due to non-appearance of the
plaintiff, the second suit on the same cause of action is not
maintainable and is barred.

14.     At this juncture, it may be appropriate to extract paragraph
5 of the plaint in O.S.No.195 of 1982 which dealt with the cause of
action.  The said paragraph reads as under:
      That the cause of action arose to the plaintiffs to
institute this suit against the defendants on 5.9.1982 at
Tangallapalli village of Sircilla taluk when the defendants
came to the suit land and interfered with the possession
of the plaintiffs over the suit land and withstanding
green and black gram crops.

It may also be appropriate to extract paragraph 3 of the plaint in
O.S.No.195 of 1982 which reads as under:
      That the plaintiffs are owners, possessors,
enjoyers and cultivators of the dry land bearing S.No.76
measuring 5A-24G situated at Tangallapalli Village of
Sircilla taluk, (herein after called the suit property).
The suit land was purchased by the plaintiff No.1s father
Edamala Bhuchi Ramaiah and the plaintiff No.2 jointly
from the defendants and other shareholders on
23.12.1954 for a consideration of rs.1,500/- executing on
stamped sale deed worth of Rs.1.50 p.  That the
plaintiffs are in possession and enjoyment of the suit
land since the date of purchase by paying land revenue
regularly.  The said stamped sale deed dated 23.12.1954
got impounded and certified by the Revenue Divisional
Officer, Jagtial vide his proceeding No.F/3667/82 dated
17.08.1982.  The plaintiff No.1s father and the plaintiff
No.2 are in possession and enjoyment of the suit land
continuously and after the death of plaintiff No.1s
father, the plaintiff No.1 and the plaintiff No.2 are in
the continuous possession and their names were also
recorded in the revenue records for the years 1964-65,
1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68, 1970-71, 1976-77, 1977-78,
1980-81 and 1981-82 and the certified copies of pahani
patrikas for the said years in respect of the suit land are
filed herewith.  The plaintiffs were also issued LR
receipts for the years from 1970-71 to 1981-82
contained in the ryot pass is enclosed herewith.  The
plaintiffs were also issued record of right, ryot pass
books by the Tahsil Officer, Sircilla, are also enclosing
herewith.  Thus the plaintiffs are the absolute owners,
possessors, enjoyers and cultivators of the suit land by
paying land revenue regularly.  That the defendants have
no rights whatsoever the suit land.
       
15.     In the present suit i.e., O.S.No.139 of 2013 paragraph 4 of
the plaint deals with cause of action and it reads as under:
      Cause of action arose to the suit, on 23.12.1964,
when the fathers/grandfathers of defendants 1 to 24
got executed simple sale deed in favour of Edmala Budhi
Ramaiah and Mallaiah, in respect of land, in Sy.No.76, to
the extent of Ac.5.24 guntas, on 19.12.1966, when Budhi
Ramaiah got executed Will deed in favour of plaintiff
No.1, on 17.8.1982, when the simple sale deed got
impounded, on 05.09.1982, when the
fathers/grandfathers of defendants 1 to 24 got
interfered in to suit land and a suit, in O.S.No.195 of
1982 was filed and on 15.07.1988, when the suit was
dismissed for default, on 05.09.1996, when the Mandal
Revenue Officer, Sircilla got mutated the name of
plaintiff No.1, by entering the same in the mutation
register, for the year 1996-97, vide Proceedings
No.1962/1996, on 02.09.1995, when the defendant No.25
got obtained regd. Sale deed, on 30.03.1996, when the
defendants 26 and 27 got obtained regd. Sale deed, vide
Document No.833/1996 from the other batch of Lingam
Pedda Yellaiah, s/o Lasmaiah and others, on 01.4.1996,
when the same defendants 26 and 27 got obtained regd.
Sale deed, vide Document No.846/1996, on 25.04.1997,
when the defendants 26 and 27 ------- revenue appeal
before R.D.O., Sircilla and on the R.D.O., Sircilla, without
mentioning the date of orders, pronounced the judgment,
by setting aside the orders of M.R.O., Sircilla, on
25.11.2002, when the plaintiff No.1 has preferred
revision petition before District Collector, Karimnagar, on
25.07.2005, when the District Collector (ROR),
Karimnagar was pleased to remand the matter to the
Mandal Revenue Officer, Sircilla, for conducting of
DENOVA enquiry, vide Revision Petition
No.D1/7329/1999, on 25.02.2006, when Mandal Revenue  
Officer, Sircilla, by conducting DENOVA enquiry, by
elaborately discussing the rights of the contesting
parties got confirmed the earlier orders, vide
Proceedings No.B/679/2005, on 27.01.2007, when the
defendant No.26 got preferred second appeal before
Revenue Divisional Officer, Sircilla, vide Appeal
No.D/60/2007, on 17.01.2011, when the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Sircilla, without appreciating the
DENOVA enquiry of M.R.O., Sircilla was allowed the
appeal, on    .02.2011, when the plaintiff No.1 has
preferred revision petition, vide Revision Petition
No.D1/602/2011, before Joint Collector, Karimnagar and
during the pendency of revision petition, on 23.06.2011,
the Mandal Revenue Officer, Sircilla, without taking into
consideration of the pending of revision petition as well
as pending of stay application got ordered, for mutation
of the names of defendants 27 to 29, in respect of suit
land, in Sy.No.76 to the extent of Ac.1.16 guntas, in the
name of defendant No.26; Ac.1.10 guntas in the name of
defendant No.27; Ac.1.14 guntas each in the names of
defendants 28 and 29, for the pahanies from 2009-2010,
2010-2011, 2011-12 and 2012-13 though the plaintiff No.1
has been in physical possession and enjoyment of the suit
land, on 05.01.2013, when the Joint Collector, Karimnagar
got dismissed the revision petition and against which on
writ petition No.18270/2013 has filed and the same is
pending, before Honble High Court of Judicature of A.P.,
at Hyderabad, on 28.7.2013, in spite of pending of the
writ petition, by denying the title of the plaintiff No.1,
the defendants 26 to 29 came to the suit land with an
intention to convert the suit land into residential plots,
with an intention to alienate the same with the sole
intention to deprive the legitimate right of plaintiff No.1
in respect of the suit property.

16.     Paragraph 1 of the plaint narrates the circumstances leading
to the dismissal of earlier O.S.No.195 of 1982 and to the extent of
relevancy, the pleadings read as under:
      By taking into consideration of the enjoyment of
the plaintiff No.1 on the spot, the revenue authorities
got recorded the name of plaintiff No.1, as possessor to
the extent of Ac.2.32 guntas, in Sy.No.76, in the pahani,
for the year 1981-82.  While it was so, in the month of
September, 1982, some of the vendors of the father of
plaintiff No.1 got interfered into the suit land, due to
which, she along with her paternal uncle got filed a suit
for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, in
O.S.No.195 of 1982, on the file of District Munsiff, at
Sircilla, against 1) Lingam Ellaiah, 2) Lingam Chandraiah,
3) Longam Rajaiah, 4) Longam Balaiah, 5) Longam Kotaiah,
6) Longam Lasumaiah and 7) Longam Narsaiah and in the  
mean while, due to the intervention of the elders, they
had repented for their illegal acts and assured the
plaintiff No.1 that, they would not interfere into suit land
and got compromised with the plaintiff No.1 and her
junior paternal uncle, in respect of the suit land and due
to which, they did not proceed with the suit and
moreover, from the beginning Edmala Mallaiah, the junior
paternal uncle was only dealing with the said suit, since he
only engaged advocate and briefed the case, as such, she
did not enquire, so as to know, what happened to her suit.
In the mean while, on 12.05.2011, it was coming to her
notice that, on 15.07.1988 itself, the above said suit was
dismissed for default.  However, the plaintiff No.1 has
been in physical possession and enjoyment of the suit
land, as usual like earlier, without any interruption, from
any corner.  Though the plaintiff No.1 has been in
possession and enjoyment of the suit land, the reasons
are best known to the revenue authorities only, they did
not care to show the name of plaintiff No.1, in the
possession column of pahanies, for the years from 1988-
89 to 1996-97.  It appears that, the village patwari of
Thangallapalli revenue village, who was in enemical terms
with the plaintiff No.1 though she has been in physical
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule A land, he
kept the possession column of the pahanies, as blank, for
the years from 1988-89 to 1996-97.  Due to which on
05.10.1996, the plaintiff No.1 has made her application
with the District Collector, Karimnagar, with a request to
issue mutation proceedings, in her name in respect of suit
schedule A land in Sy.No.76 to the extent of Ac.2.32
guntas situated at Thangallapally village of Sircilla
Mandal, Karimnagar, as well as issue passbook and title
deed in her name.  By responding to the above letter, the
then District Collector, Karimnagar was pleased to
forward the same to the M.R.O., Sircilla, for issuing of
ROR proceedings, as per the procedure as laid down in
the R.O.R. Act.  By duly observing the procedure as laid
down under ROR Act, the then Mandal Revenue Officer,
Sircilla got validated the simple sale deed, dt.23.12.1964
and mutated the name of plaintiff No.1 vide Proceedings
No.1962/96 and her name was recorded in the mutation
register for the year 1997-98 and subsequently the
revenue authorities got issued pass book and title deeds,
by duly collecting stamp duty of Rs.150/- and registration
fee of Rs.50/- vide challan No.1789 and 1790
respectively, on 29.03.1997.  By obtaining the pass book
and title deed, as usual like earlier, the plaintiff No.1 has
been cultivating the above said land without any
interruption from any corner.

17.     The principle underlying Order IX Rule 9 is that no one
shall be vexed twice with the same cause of action and it is also a
settled law that this rule does not prohibit the plaintiff from
instituting a fresh suit on different cause of action as per the
principles laid down in Shivashankar Prasad Sah and another V.
Baikunth Nath Singh and others (4 supra) and Raj Kumar and
others V. Mutsaddi Lal and others .  It is also a settled law that
dismissal of suit under Order IX Rule 8 of CPC bars fresh suit in
respect of the same cause of action.  It is also a settled law that
the operation of this rule is confined to the cases where the
second suit is brought for the same subject and on the same
cause of action and it does not preclude fresh suit if a cause of
action is separate and distinct.  While considering whether the
cause of action in the subsequent suit is or is not the same as the
cause of action in the previous suit, the test to be applied is are
the causes of action in the two suits in substance and not
technically identical as laid down in M/s. Parasram Harnand Rao
V. M/s. Shanti Parsad Narinder Kumar Jain and another .  It is
also to be noted that as to the identity of cause of action one
workable test though not conclusive is whether the same evidence
would support the claim in both the suits and if the reply is
affirmative, a fresh suit will be barred and if it is negatived, a
fresh suit will lie.  It is also settled law that the fact that the mode
of relief claimed in the subsequent suit is different than claimed
in the previous suit, it will not be a ground for refusing to apply
the bar of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC as held in Aziz Din V. Moti
Ram and others .  At the same time, there is absolutely no dispute
with regard to the principles laid down in the judgments referred
to by the learned counsel for the respondents and in fact the
Court below had no occasion to deal with the same.

18.     There is absolutely no dispute that both the suits are
eventually for the reliefs of declaration of title and injunction in
respect of the same subject property.  The distinction is
subsequent developments and the relief pertaining to the revenue
entries.  The instant application is for rejection of plaint under
Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.  It is the case of the petitioners
herein that in view of the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC
the present suit is barred, since the earlier suit i.e., O.S.No.195 of
1982 filed by the plaintiffs herein on the same foundation and
cause of action was dismissed for default.  It is also the contention
of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the cause of action
referred to include any cause of action flowing from the main
cause of action.

19.     A perusal of the order under revision shows that the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Siricilla, taking into consideration the
averments at page 9 of the plaint held that the objection is
unsustainable and in fact did not discuss in detail the basis and
foundation of the earlier suit and the cause of action set out
therein and the effect of dismissal of the said suit O.S.No.195 of
1982 and the impact of provisions of Order IX Rule 9 of CPC on
the present suit and the Court below had also no occasion to
consider the principles laid down on the issue in the above
referred judgments.  In fact, no exercise was undertaken by the
Court below in the light of the principles laid down in the
authoritative pronouncements.  Therefore, this Court, after
anxious and thoughtful consideration and taking into
consideration the totality of the circumstances deems it
appropriate to remand the matter for fresh consideration to the
Court below.

20.     For the aforesaid reasons, this revision is allowed, setting
aside the order dated 31.07.2014 passed by the Court of the Senior
Civil Judge, Siricilla, in I.A.No.219 of 2014 in O.S.No.139 of 2013
and consequently the said I.A.No.219 of 2014 is remanded to the
Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Siricilla, Karimnagar District, for
fresh consideration in the light of the observations made supra
and in the light of the judgments referred to above after giving
opportunity of hearing to all the stakeholders within two months
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

21.     Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand
dismissed in consequence.  No order as to costs.

________________  
A.V.SESHA SAI, J
Date: April 16, 2015.

Rejection of plaint as the amendment of plaint petition for declaration and recovery of possession was dismissed = the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code on the ground of principle of res judicata, by any stretch of imagination, can neither be sustained nor can be approved by this Court. Yet another contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the filing of I.A.No.3167 of 2007 by the plaintiff under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code for amendment of the relief portion as a suit for recovery of possession and declaration and dismissal of the same and confirmation of the said order by this Court in C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008 and the findings recorded therein, further continuation of the proceedings in the suit would be absurd and tantamounts to abuse of process of law and vexatious and cannot be permitted, in considered and definite view of this Court is also not sustainable and tenable. In view of the settled law that the pleadings in the plaint should be the criterion for consideration of the application under Order VII rule 11 of the Code, but not the defence set up by the defendants, the dismissal of I.A.No.3167 of 2007 and the confirmation of the same by this Court in C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008 by any stretch of imagination cannot be the basis nor can it be used as a foundation for maintaining the present application or for rejecting the plaint. In fact, in a suit for injunction, the only aspect, which requires to be examined, is possession as on the date of the suit.;delay is certainly one of the grounds which disentitles the petitioner from claiming this extraordinary relief under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1872 of 2014  

20-02-2015

Emundla Lingaiah..Petitioner

Kokkula alias Burra Narsavva and others.. Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri P.V. Narayana Rao.

Counsel for Respondent No.1:  Sri V.V.Ramana Rao.
Counsel for  Respondent No.3: Sri Pulla Karthik.
Counsel for Respondents 4 to 7:   --

<Gist :

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:
  (1977) 4 SCC 467
2 2007 (5) ALD 565
3 2014(4) ALD 63 (SC)
4 AIR 1974 PATNA 153  
5 2007(6) ALD 388 (DB)
6 2013 (5) ALD 439 (DB)
7 2013(5) ALD 72


THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1872 of 2014  

ORDER  
        Defendant No.2 in O.S.No.740 of 2004 on the file of the Court
of Principal Junior Civil Judge at Karimnagar, is the petitioner in the
present revision filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
This revision assails the order dated 24.04.2014, passed by the said
Court, dismissing I.A.No.1827 of 2012 filed by the petitioner under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
called the Code).

2.      The facts and circumstances, in nutshell, leading to the filing
of the present revision are as under;
      First respondent herein instituted O.S.No.740 of 2004 on the
file of the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge at Karimnagar, for
perpetual injunction.  In the said suit, second defendant filed
I.A.No.1827 of 2012 under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, seeking
rejection of the plaint on the ground of absence of cause of action.
The plaintiff/respondent herein filed a counter, resisting the said
application.  The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, by virtue of an
order, dated 24.04.2014, dismissed the said application.  This
revision challenges the said order.

3.       Heard Sri P.V.Narayana Rao, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri V.V.Ramana Rao, learned counsel for the first
respondent apart from perusing the material available before this
Court.

4.      Contentions/submissions of the learned counsel for the
petitioner are;
(i) The order under revision is erroneous, contrary to law and is
opposed to the very spirit and object of the provisions of Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code;
(ii) Since no cause of action is available to the plaintiff for
prosecuting the suit further, the learned Judge ought to have
allowed the application by rejecting the plaint;
(iii) In view of the filing of I.A.No.3167 of 2007 under Order VI
Rule 17 of the Code and the order passed thereon and the order
of this Court in C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008, the cause does not
survive for the plaintiff to further prosecute the suit;
(iv) The order in C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008 operates as res judicata
as it is an order passed by this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India;
(v) Plaintiff/first respondent has to file a suit for partition and
cannot proceed further with the present suit as per Section 8 of
Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

 5.     To bolster his submissions and contentions, learned counsel
for the petitioner places reliance on the decisions reported in
T.ARIVANDANDAM v. T.V.SATYAPAL ; PRATHIBHA v.        
VEDVATHI ; SOUMIK SIL v. SUBHAS CHANDRA SIL ;      
RAMSARUP DASS v. PYARE DAS ; and GADIYARAM          
PADMAVATHI v. ADDEPALLI HANUMANTHA RAO .          

6.      Contentions/submissions of the learned counsel for the first
respondent/plaintiff are;
(i) The order impugned is in accordance with the provisions of Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code;
(ii) There is no illegality nor there is any jurisdictional error in the
impugned order, as such, the present revision is not maintainable
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India;
(iii) The present application is also liable to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and no plausible explanation is forthcoming for the
abnormal delay in filing the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the Code;
(iv) As per Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, the averments in the plaint
alone need to be taken into consideration, but not the defence set up
by the defendants;
(v) Since the plaint discloses the cause of action, the plaint cannot
be rejected at threshold and the plaintiff filed title deeds and
pahanies, as such, he is entitled to prosecute the suit on merits;
(vi) Res judicata is not a ground for rejection of plaint under Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code;
(vii) judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not
relevant to the facts and circumstances of the case.

7.      In support of his submissions and contentions, learned
counsel for the first respondent takes the support of the judgments
reported in REEMANA KAUSHIK v. SHOBHIT KAUSHIK  ; and      
SYED ALI v. SYED NOOR MOHAMMED .        

8.      In the above background, now the issues, which this Court is
called upon to answer in the present revision, are;
(i)     Whether the order under revision is in accordance with the
provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code?
(ii)    Whether the order under revision warrants any interference of
this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

9.      In order to appreciate the rival contentions and for arriving at a
just and reasonable conclusion, it may be opt and appropriate to
refer to the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code, which reads
as under;
       Rejection of plaint:-The plaint shall be rejected in the
following cases:-
       (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
       (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
       (c )where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint
is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
       (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint
to be barred by any law;
       (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
       (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of
rule 9;
       Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction
of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not
be extended unless the Court, for the reasons to be recorded, is
satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an
exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed
by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause
grave injustice to the plaintiff.

From a plain reading of the above provision of law, it is quite limpid
that only under the conditions and contingencies as stipulated under
Clause (a) to (f) of Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code, plaint can be
rejected.  Since this provision of law empowers the Court to non-suit
a party at threshold, strict compliance of the ingredients is
mandatory and this power is required to be utilized and made use of
very sparingly and with great care, caution and circumspection.
Unless the party applying for thoroughly and completely satisfies and
proves the existence of necessary ingredients of law, the exercise of
power under these provisions of law is impermissible to the Court.
The issue in the present revision is required to be examined in the
light of these aspects.

10.     As per the plaint presented by the first respondent herein, the
petitioner is the owner and possessor of the agricultural lands,
admeasuring Ac.1.17 gts in Sy.Nos.358/A and 371/C situated at
Velichala Village, Ramadugu Mandal, Karimnagar District and that
suit lands are compact lands and that the plaintiff and the first
respondent are the natural sisters and in the partition, plaintiff was
given the suit lands and that the mother of the plaintiff and the first
defendant relinquished their rights in the suit lands and the revenue
records are in the name of the plaintiff, and in view of the hike in the
value of the lands, the first defendant in collusion with defendants 2
and 3 hatched a plan to occupy the land and without any manner of
right, the defendants tried to dispossess the plaintiff from the lands.

11.     Earlier, the first respondent/plaintiff filed I.A.No.3167 of 2007
under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code seeking amendment of the main
relief portion to the following effect;
       Therefore it is just and necessary that an order is passed
permitting me to amend the suit by adding relieves in claim
portion, court fee para No.3 and prayer portion in addition to main
relief of perpetual injunction as under:
       (i) for recovery of possession of land measuring 1331 sq.
yards in Sy.No.358/A and for declaration that the registered sale
deed document No.1155/04 dated 16.08.2004 executed by  
defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3 in respect of land
measuring 1331 sq. yards in Sy.No.358/A and another registered
sale deed No.1032/04 dated 26.07.2007 executed by defendant
No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of land measuring 605
sq. yards in suit Sy.No.358/A are null and void and not binding on
the plaintiff in claim portion at its end
       (ii) The value of land to an extent of 1331 sq. yards which
is sought to be recovered is Rs.66,550/- and 3/4th of it is
Rs.49,912/- and upon which a Court Fee of Rs.2,386/-is paid
u/s.29 of APCF and SV Act and the value of relief of declaration
that the registered documents for which they were executed as
null and void and not binding is fixed at Rs.3,000/- each i.e., total
Rs.6,000/- and upon which a court fee of Rs.261/-each i.e., total
Rs.522/-is paid u/s.26(d) of APCF and SV Act and total of
Rs.2,908/- is paid in SBH Court Complex, Karimnagar through
challan in para No.8 as its end and
       (iii) to pass judgment and decree for recovery of
possession of land to an extent of 1331 sq. yards in Sy.No.358/A
against defendant No.3
       iv) to pass judgment and decree for declaration that the
registered sale deed document No.1155/04 dated 16.08.2004
executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3 in
respect of land to an extent of 1331 sq. yards in suit Sy.No.358/A
and a registered sale deed No.1032/04 dated 26.07.2004
executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 in
respect of land admeasuring 605 sq.yards out of suit Sy.No.358/A
are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff in prayer portion
at the end and permit me to amend consequential amendments.

12.     In the affidavit filed in support of the said I.A.No.3167 of 2007,
the plaintiff stated that while the order of injunction was in force,
defendants 3 and 4 to 7 raised a temporary shed in the suit land
illegally.  The learned Principal Junior Civil Judge, by way of an
order dated 17.07.2008, dismissed the said application. Assailing
the said order, plaintiff filed C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008. In the said
order, this Court in the penultimate paragraph observed that when
first respondent in her written statement took a plea that the suit
schedule property belongs to her and she sold away the same to
defendants 2 and 3 through registered sale deeds dated 20.04.2004
and 26.07.2004, no steps have been taken by the revision petitioner
and this Court also observed that in the event of the proposed
amendment being permitted, the same would go beyond the scope  
of the suit and would change the nature of the suit.  While referring
to the said observations made by this Court, filing of I.A.No.3167 of
2007 and dismissal of the same and the confirmation of the same by
this Court, it is the case of the petitioner that there is no cause of
action for the petitioner and the order of this Court in the said
revision operates as res judicata. Now, these contentions are
required to be considered in the light of the judgments cited by the
learned Advocates.

13.     In T. ARIVANDANDAMs case (1 supra), the Apex Court held  
as under;
       We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the
petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the Court
repeatedly and unrepentenly resorted to.  From the statement of
the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly
plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsifs Court,
Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in
receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a
meaningful-not-formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear
right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order VII, Rule
11 CPC, taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is
fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause
of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the
party searchingly under Order X CPC. An activist Judge is the
answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Courts would insist
imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that
bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage.  The Penal
Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Cr.XI) and
must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to
his cost realized what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi:
       It is dangerous to be too good
       We regret the infliction of the ordeal upon the learned
Judge of the High Court by a callous party.  We more than regret
the circumstance that the party concerned has been able to
prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the Court a case
which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable
contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly
fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by
dubious clients.  And remembering that an advocate is an officer
of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions.
The Bar Council of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We
are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-
opertaion of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the Bench for
spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the
distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of.
Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible
grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy
courts. A judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure is unmerited
cases helps devalue the judicial process. We must appreciate Shri
Ramasesh for his young candour and correct advocacy


In PRATHIBHAs case (2 supra) this Court held as under;
       The real object of Order VII Rule 11 of CPC is to keep out
of Courts irresponsible law suits. Therefore, the Order 10 of the
Code is a tool in the hands of the Courts by resorting to which and
by searching examination of the party in case the Court is prima
facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process of the
Court in the sense that it is a bogus and irresponsible litigation,
the jurisdiction under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be
exercised.

In SOUMIK SILs case (3 supra) the Apex Court held as under;
       After perusing the order passed by the High Court and the
reasoning given therein, it appears to us that the High Court has
correctly perused the plaint in its entirety and after deletion of the
name plaintiff No.1 from the said title suit, held that the plaint
discloses no cause of action after taking into account the fact that
the very purpose of the suit has become infructuous in view of the
order passed by the High Court to handover the possession of the
rooms in question. Therefore, the foundation of the suit was not
subsisting after the handing over of possession to the defendant
by plaintiff No.1 in terms of the order. Hence, in these
circumstances, the High Court held that the plaint discloses no
cause of action.

In RAMSARUP DASSs case (4 supra) it was held as under;  
       Learned counsel, however, submitted that the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court was an extraordinary jurisdiction and,
therefore, any decision given by this Court in exercise of the
revisional powers would not amount to res judicata for entertaining
the same objection or ground in a regular appeal. It is difficult to
accept this contention. Learned counsel referrred to the decision
of the Supreme Court in Satyadhvan Ghosal v. Smt Deorajin Debi
AIR 1960 SC 941.  In that case, however, the facts were entirely
different. The Supreme Court was considering the scope of
Section 105(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was held that
a special provision was made as regards orders of remand and
that was to the effect that if an appeal lay and still the appeal was
not taken, the correctness of the order of remand could not later
be challenged in an appeal from the final decision. If however an
appeal did not lie from the order of remand, the correctness
thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision.
In that case, an order of remand was made by the Calcutta High
Court in exercise of its revisional power under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed by the Supreme Court
after referring to the various decisions of the Privy Council that the
order of remand was an interlocutory order and did not purport to
dispose of the case, and a party was not bound to appeal against
every interlocutory order which was a step in the procedure that
leads up to a final decision and as such the correctness of the
same could be challenged in an appeal from the final order. It was
specifically held in that case that the order of the Calcutta High
Court was not appealable to the Supreme Court and, therefore,
the bar under sub-section (2) of Section 105 of the Code of Civil
Procedure was not attracted.  The Supreme Court, accordingly,
set aside the order of the Calcutta High Court. In my opinion, the
decision of the Supreme Court in the above case is of no
assistance to the appellants. In this very decision, the Supreme
Court has laid the foundation for applying the principles of res
judicata. In paragraph 8 of the report, their Lordships have clearly
observed that the principle of res judicata applies also as between
two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a court,
whether the trial Court or a higher Court, having at an earlier stage
decided a matter in one way, will not allow the parties to re-agitate
the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings.
       In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it
is no necessary for me to advert to any other authority. But suffice
it to state that a similar view has been taken by the Punjab High
Court in Balkrishan Dass v. Parmeshri Dass, AIR 1963 Punj 187
and by a Full Bench (sic) of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Shyamacharan Raghubar Prasad v. Sheojee Bhai Jairam Chattri  
AIR 1964 Madh Pra 288. I am in respectful agreement with the
views expressed by the Punjab and Madhya Pradesh High Courts.  
In view of the binding effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court
referred to above, I am of the definite view that the contention
raised by Mr. Prem Lall that the decision in Civil Revision No.1025
of 1968 will not amount to a res judicata in this appeal has got no
substance.


In GADIYARAM PADMAVATHIs case (5 supra), this Court held as    
under;
       From a conjoint reading of the judgments of the apex
Court in Liverpool and Londons case and R. ARivandanandams
case (supra), it is clear that a plaint can be rejected if it is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a
clear right to sue and by way of clever drafting, an illusory cause
of action has been created to institute a suit. Such a suit should be
thrashed out at the outset instead of subjecting the other party to
unnecessary hardship and lying unnecessary burden of
conducting trial by the Courts or if it is perceptible that the party,
who instituted the suit, is apparently found to be having an
intention to cause undue loss for other party and gain undue
advantage for self.
       The scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which has been
interpreted by the apex Court time and again, may not be in strict
terms of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. But, it is obvious from the
interpretations made by the apex Court that in order to slash
unnecessary litigation or an artificial litigation for an undue gain,
the same should be treated as an abuse and the Court is vested
with the power to curtail such a litigation.
       At this juncture, we may also point out that not only
depending upon the various facts and circumstances but also
keeping in view the trend of the litigation, which is on increasing
side,  for various reasons should be dissuaded from being initiated
if no substantial cause action to try the suit. This would enable the
Court from avoiding any unnecessary expenditure of time and
money not only of the Court but also the parties to the litigation.
Therefore, whenever the Court found that there is an apparent
reason on record i.e., the plaint and the relevant material filed
along with it that there is no real cause of action, the same can be
decided as almost a preliminary question.
       It is also well settled law that rejection of a suit can be
sought for at any time during the pendency of the suit and no
material except the plaint averments and the supporting
documents can be gone into while exercising the power under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
        Virtually in the present plaint, the plaintiffs are going hot
and cold. On one hand, they are seriously disputing the Will,
dated 14.02.1975, said to have been executed by late GVN
Murthy in favour of their deceased aunt Vedavathi and on the
other, they are claiming rights by way of succession without
impeaching the said Will.  Therefore, the contentions of this
nature, obviously, are incompatible.
        Even if the relief sought in the plaint i.e., partition is
granted in favour of the plaintiffs, the effect of the Will, dated
14.02.1975, and the rights that flowed out of the said Will
executed by late GVN Murthy in favour of Smt Vedavathi would
remain the same, which would run contrary to the decision if
rendered in favour of the plaintiffs. We are of the view that this
situation is something absurd.
       Therefore, we have to hold that filing a suit after more than
three decades for this relief cannot be accepted and the conduct
of the plaintiffs in this regard cannot be appreciated, and the
consequential litigation has to be dissuaded from progressing any
further, which is one among the main objects of the provisions of
Order VI Rule 11 CPC.

14.     Coming to the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the
first respondent, in REEMANA KAUSHIKs case (6 supra), this
Court held as under;
        In the context of dealing with an application under Rule 11
of Order 7 CPC, the Court has to take the pleadings in the plaint
or the O.P., as the case may be, on their face value. Even if there
is any dispute, that needs to be resolved after trial. It is only when
the contents of the plaint or O.P. are taken on their face value and
still they do not constitute cause of action or the suit or the O.P.
becomes barred by law, that the application filed under that
provision can be allowed.

In SYED ALIs case (7 supra) it was held as under;
       Rule 11 of Order Vii CPC, provides for an exceptional
remedy to the defendant in a suit, to get the proceedings
terminated without the necessity of trial. In the ordinary course of
things, once a suit is filed, the issues are to be framed on the
basis of pleadings and the Court has to determine the issues, after
conducting trial and it is thus the suit comes to be terminated, with
a decree on merits.  The facility created under Rule 11 of Order
VII CPC is that, if the grounds mentioned therein are attracted, in
a given case, the plaint can be rejected, and thereby, the
necessity to undertake trial is obviated. The provision reads:
        Rejection of plaint:-The plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases:-
        (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
        (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the
Court, fails to do so;
        (c )where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is
written
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the
court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the
Court,
fails to do so;
        (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred
by any law;
        (e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
        (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9;
        Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the
valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless
the Court, for the reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was
prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature for correcting the valuation or
supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed
by
the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to
the
plaintiff.

From a perusal of this, it is evident that res judicata is not
mentioned as a ground for rejection of plaint.
        Section 11 of CPC is devoted to define the concept of res
judicata. The Legislature, which claborated the principle of res
judicata in minute detail in Section 11, did not choose to treat it as
a ground for rejection of plaint, and obviously for that reason, it
was not included in Rule 11 of Order VII CPC.  The reason is not
difficult to discern.
        In a suit, the relief of comprehensive nature is prayed for. It
is in relation to the relief, and based upon the pleading, that
several issues are framed in a suit. The result of a suit would
depend upon the answer to various issues. Even if one or few
issues are answered against the plaintiff, there may be
circumstances where the suit can still be decreed, on the basis of
finding on the other issues.
        The starting sentence of Section 11 CPC makes it clear
that the provision deals with the determination of issues in a suit,
and not the result thereof. What Section 11 prohibits is, raising of
issues in a subsequent suit, in case they have been decided as
between the same parties by a Court of competent jurisdiction, in
an earlier suit.
        The principle of res judicata cannot be pressed into service
for rejection of the plaint. The reasons are more than one. Firstly,
the question as to whether the issue that is framed in a
subsequent suit is the same, as or substantially similar to, the one
that fell for consideration in an earlier suit, and whether the parties
are one and the same, is a question of fact, which can be
determined only on evidence and the principle of law gets
attracted depending upon the answer on facts. In that view of the
matter, it is a mixed of question of fact and law. It may be that the
volume of evidence could determine such question may be
relatively small. All the same, the evidence as such, must be
adduced to prove the contention.
       Secondly, even where one of the issues framed in a
subsequently filed suit is found to have been barred by res
judicata, the other issues need to be dealt with and answered. The
matter can be demonstrated through the present suit itself. The
respondent claimed the relief of title and possession. Assuming
that the question of title has been determined in earlier suit, the
one relating to possession remains. Even if a plaintiff in a suit of
this nature fails to prove title, he can be granted the relief of
perpetual injunction, in case he proves possession over the suit
schedule property.
       Thirdly, Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which has the effect of
denying or barring access to the plaintiff to a civil Court, must be
interpreted strictly.  Any doubt, or second opinion, in this behalf,
needs to be extended to the plaintiff, so that, the power of the civil
Court to decide the suits remains in tact.  On general principles
also, the right or competence of civil Court is almost taken for
granted that an aggrieved individual can seek redressal from a
civil Court, unless the suit is specifically barred. Once res judicata
is not included as a ground in Rule 11 of Order VII CPC, it cannot
be added, nor can the relief under the provision be extended
through implication.

15.     The principles which can now be deduced from a reading of
the above judgments are that; since the power conferred on the
Courts under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code are extraordinary,
drastic, the same is required to be exercised very sparingly and with
great care, caution and circumspection and that the same should be
considered in the light of the pleadings in the plaint and not based
on the defence set up by the defendants in the written statement and
that the res judicata cannot be a ground for non suiting the plaintiff at
threshold and the Court is required to invoke these provisions of law
when the further continuation of the proceedings would be absurd.

16.     In view of the express language of the provisions of Order VII
Rule 11 of the Code and in the light of the ratio laid down in the
judgments referred to supra, it can be safely concluded that the
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the plaint is
liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code on the
ground of principle of res judicata, by any stretch of imagination, can
neither be sustained nor can be approved by this Court. Yet another
contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in
view of the filing of I.A.No.3167 of 2007 by the plaintiff under Order
VI Rule 17 of the Code for amendment of the relief portion as a suit
for recovery of possession and declaration and dismissal of the
same and confirmation of the said order by this Court in
C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008 and the findings recorded therein, further
continuation of the proceedings in the suit would be absurd and
tantamounts to abuse of process of law and vexatious and cannot
be permitted, in considered and definite view of this Court is also not
sustainable and tenable.  In view of the settled law that the
pleadings in the plaint should be the criterion for consideration of the
application under Order VII rule 11 of the Code, but not the defence
set up by the defendants, the dismissal of I.A.No.3167 of 2007 and
the confirmation of the same by this Court in C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008
by any stretch of imagination cannot be the basis nor can it be used
as a foundation for maintaining the present application or for
rejecting the plaint. In fact, in a suit for injunction, the only aspect,
which requires to be examined, is possession as on the date of the
suit.

17.     As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the first
respondent, the suit was instituted in the year 2004, the petitioner
filed I.A. for amendment in the year 2007 and the same was
dismissed in 2008 and C.R.P.No.3913 of 2008 was dismissed on  
20.10.2008 and the present application was filed on 23.11.2012 and
there is absolutely no plausible explanation forthcoming from the
petitioner for such a delay.  The said delay is certainly one of the
grounds which disentitles the petitioner from claiming this
extraordinary relief under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code.

18.     A perusal of the order under revision vividly and candidly
discloses that the learned Judge thoroughly and scrupulously
considered all the aspects and assigned cogent and convincing
reasons and arrived at a conclusion, which in the considered opinion
of this Court is not in deviation and breach of any law. Another
significant aspect, which needs mention at this juncture, is that
unless the order impugned suffers from fundamental infirmity and
jurisdictional error, the invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is impermissible. In the
facts and circumstances of the case, this Court has absolutely no
scintilla of hesitation nor any traces of doubt to hold that the order
under challenge does not suffer from any such jurisdictional error
which warrants interference of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.  The judgments cited by the learned counsel
for the petitioner, in the facts and circumstance of the case, would
not render any assistance in the present factual and circumstantial
scenario of the case.

19.     In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. It is made
clear that the Court below shall dispose of the suit as expeditiously
as possible without being influenced by any of the observations
made either in the impugned order or in the present order. There
shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any,
pending in this revision shall stand dismissed.
________________  
A.V.SESHA SAI, J
20th February, 2015

Tuesday, February 9, 2016

rejected on the ground that it was already barred by time. But, such a bar would work in perpetuity , so filing of fresh plaint as per Delhi Wakf Boards case does not arise =The order of the Supreme Court in Delhi Wakf Boards case, referred to supra, has been rendered in a different context. That is a case where the fresh plaint presented on the second occasion was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that a similar plaint was rejected earlier. In that context, the Supreme Court clarified that rejection of a plaint earlier once before does not prevent the plaintiff to present a suit afresh, as per the provision contained under Rule 13 of Order VII C.P.C. But, in the instant case, the earlier plaint in O.S.S.R.No.1156 of 2007, (numbered as O.S.No.7 of 2008) has been rejected on the ground that it was already barred by time. But, such a bar would work in perpetuity against the present plaintiff/petitioner. Therefore, the ratio in Delhi Wakf Boards case would not get attracted to the cases of rejection of plaint under Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C,

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.1874 OF 2015    

07-10-2015

Nalla Raji Reddy Petitioner

Venkatanantha Chary. Respondent  

Counsel for the petitioner :Sri Mohd. Adnan
                                       
Counsel for the respondents  :
               
<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred

1. (1997) 10 SCC 192

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1874 of 2015  

ORDER:
       
        This revision is preferred by the plaintiff, whose plaint
bearing O.S.S.R No.639 of 2009 has been rejected by the Court
of the Senior Civil Judge, Vikarabad, Ranga Reddy District,
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of C.P.C.
        O.S.S.R No.639 of 2009 has been preferred for directing
the sole defendant to execute sale deed and to register the same
in favour of the plaintiff or his nominees in respect of the land
comprising of Ac.33-41 cts situate in various survey numbers of
Aloor Village, Chevella Mandal, Ranga Reddy district. The
plaintiff also sought for a perpetual injunction for restraining the
defendants and his men from causing interference with the
peaceful possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule land.
It appears, the suit was presented on or around 12.03.2009 and
it was rejected by a detailed order passed on 18.02.2015.
        It is the case of the plaintiff/petitioner that he entered into
an agreement of sale with the defendant on 25.01.1992 for
purchasing the suit schedule property and it is his case that in
compliance with the terms, he paid the balance sale
consideration amount of Rs.1,80,000/- on 22.03.1992, within
the stipulated period of time and that the defendant has
executed a receipt in respect thereof. It is also the case of the
plaintiff that the defendant earlier instituted O.S.No.77 of 2006
on the file of the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Chevella
seeking perpetual injunction against the plaintiff/petitioner
herein. On 16.03.2006, in I.A.No.226 of 2006 moved therein, a
temporary injunction was granted restraining the present
plaintiff/petitioner from interfering with the possession of the
suit schedule property and against the said order, the present
plaintiff/petitioner carried the matter in CMA No.22 of 2006
before the Sub-Court, Vikarabad, which court allowed CMA
No.22 of 2006 and dissolved the interim injunction granted in
I.A.No.226 of 2006 by the Trial Court. Then, the
respondent/defendant carried the matter by way of revision in
C.R.P.No.1705 of 2007 to this Court and that civil revision
petition was dismissed on 08.08.2007 confirming the order
passed by the Sub-Court, Vikarabad. Thereafter, the present
plaintiff filed civil suit bearing O.S.S.R.No.1156 of 2007 on
21.12.2006 seeking specific performance of agreement of sale
dated 25.01.1992.  The Court of the Senior Civil Judge,
Vikarabad, by its order dated 03.04.2007 rejected the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C holding that it is barred by
limitation. Against that order of rejection of the plaint dated
03.04.2007, the present plaintiff/petitioner carried the matter by
way of revision in C.R.P.No.4249 of 2007 to this Court. This
Court allowed the revision and thereupon the Sub-Court
numbered the plaint as O.S.No.7 of 2008.  However, the
respondent herein, who is the defendant in that case carried the
matter by way of Civil Appeal No.1322 of 2009 to the Supreme
Court of India. The Supreme Court by its order dated 27.02.2009
allowed the civil appeal on the ground that a perusal of the plaint
makes it clear that the cause of action for filing the suit for
specific performance accrued to the plaintiff on 31.03.1992 and
the period of limitation prescribed for filing such suit is three
years and hence, the suit instituted 11 years thereafter in the
year 2006 is clearly barred by limitation and hence, the Trial
Court was justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground of
limitation and the High Court committed an error in reversing
the said order of the Trial Court. By virtue of the order of the
Supreme Court dated 27.02.2009, the said civil suit
O.S.S.R.No.1156 of 2007, since numbered as O.S.No.7 of 2008  
stood rejected. It would also be appropriate to notice that the
petitioner/plaintiff herein has filed Review Petition (C) No.1079 of
2013 in Civil Appeal No.1322 of 2009.  That review petition was
considered by the Supreme Court on 16.07.2013 and dismissed
the same as the earlier order passed in Civil Appeal No.1322 of
2009 does not suffer from any error apparent warranting its
reconsideration and also for the reason that the review petition is
barred by time also. Notwithstanding the same, once again the
present suit O.S.S.R.No.639 of 2009 was presented on
12.03.2009.
        Now, once again, this plaint is rejected under Clause (d) of
Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C, as it is barred by limitation. It is this
order which is sought to be revised in this revision.
        Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that Rule
13 of Order VII C.P.C made it very clear that the rejection of the
plaint on any of the grounds therein mentioned shall not of its
own force preclude the plaintiff from presentation of a fresh
plaint in respect of the same cause of action and hence, the
rejection of the present plaint based upon the order of earlier
rejection of the plaint in O.S.No.7 of 2008 is erroneous. The
learned counsel for the petitioner would also place reliance upon
the order passed by the Supreme Court in Delhi Wakf Board
vs. Jagadish Kumar Narang  and would submit that in view of
the clear legal position contained in Rule 13 of Order VII, the
rejection of the present plaint is totally illegal, unjust and
unsustainable.
        Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C has dealt with various aspects
relating to rejection of plaint and hence, it has spelt out the types
of cases in which the plaint shall be rejected. Clause (a) thereof
sets out that a plaint is liable to be rejected where it does not
disclose any cause of action, inasmuch as, upon a careful and
meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole in a non-formal
manner and if the same is found to be manifestly vexatious and
meritless, in the sense that it failed to disclose a clear right to
sue such a plaint is liable to be rejected under Clause (a) of Rule
11 Order VII C.P.C.  The rejection in such cases is for want of the
necessary cause of action accruing the right to sue or it could be
for the reason that it was not disclosed clearly in the plaint.
Therefore, if a plaint is rejected once before for want of non-
disclosure or for not accruing of cause of action, the provision
contained in Rule 13 of Order VII will certainly come to the
rescue of such a plaintiff to present a fresh plaint clearly
disclosing the cause of action and the right to sue, which may
have either occurred prior to the filing of the earlier suit or even
thereafter. Therefore, cases where a plaint is rejected in view of
Clause (a) of Rule 11 Order VII C.P.C does not present any
serious difficulty, for purposes of applicability of Rule 13 of the
said order.
        Same is the case with Clauses (b), of Rule 11 which deal
with cases where the relief claimed is undervalued and inspite of
being required by the Court to correct the valuation, within a
time fixed by the Court, the plaintiff fails to do so and in such
cases, the plaint itself is liable to be rejected. In such cases,
upon proper valuation of the relief claimed, perhaps, the issue
relating to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court will get settled
and hence, even in cases of rejection of plaint under Clause (b) of
Rule 11 would not come in the way for presentation of a fresh
plaint in respect of the same cause of action in terms of Rule 13
of the same order.
        Clause (c) of Rule 11 deals with cases where the relief
claimed is properly valued by the plaintiff but however, the
plaintiff inspite of being required by the Court to sufficiently
stamp it within the time prescribed, fails to do so, then the plaint
is liable to be rejected. In such cases, there would be no difficulty
whatsoever for presentation of a fresh plaint properly valuing the
relief claimed therein and also properly stamping it. Therefore,
the principle contained in Rule 13 of Order VII would present no
difficulty whatsoever.
        But, however, when it comes to the rejection of a plaint
where it appears to have been barred by any law, can such a
plaint be liable to be presented once again, is the question that is
required to be addressed. It will be important to notice the fact
that Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has clearly spelt out
that every suit instituted after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed although limitation has not been set-up as a defence.
Thus, the language employed in Section 3 of the Limitation Act,
1963, is in mandatory terms. When once, the prescribed time for
institution of a suit for a particular relief sought for therein has
expired, such a suit shall be dismissed irrespective of the fact
whether limitation has been set-up as a defence or not. In the
instant case, the petitioner earlier instituted a suit seeking an
identical relief, i.e. O.S.S.R.No.1156 of 2007 (later on numbered
as O.S.No.7 of 2008) and that was found to have been barred by
the Supreme Court by its judgment on 27.02.2009 in Civil
Appeal No.1322 of 2009.  A Review Petition (C) No.1079 of 2013
moved therein was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on
16.07.2013.  Therefore, the suit for specific performance of the
agreement of sale dated 25.01.1992 by the plaintiff herein, if it is
barred in the year 2006 itself, the question of the same plaintiff
presenting another civil suit for an identical relief on 12.03.2009
would not simply arise. Once, the period of limitation
commences, it does not stop, unless, by a statutory provision it
has been done so. In cases where a plaint is rejected once before
on the ground that the relief claimed therein is barred by
limitation, the provision contained under Rule 13 of Order VII
C.P.C would not come to the rescue of such a plaintiff for
presentation of a fresh plaint for the reason that the period of
limitation which has expired earlier remains to be the same even
on the subsequent occasion and consequently, the subsequent
plaint is also bound to be rejected. A time barred relief cannot be
got enforced through the process of the Court.
        The order of the Supreme Court in Delhi Wakf Boards
case, referred to supra, has been rendered in a different context.
That is a case where the fresh plaint presented on the second
occasion was rejected by the Trial Court on the ground that a
similar plaint was rejected earlier. In that context, the Supreme
Court clarified that rejection of a plaint earlier once before does
not prevent the plaintiff to present a suit afresh, as per the
provision contained under   Rule 13 of Order VII C.P.C.  But, in
the instant case, the earlier plaint in O.S.S.R.No.1156 of 2007,
(numbered as O.S.No.7 of 2008) has been rejected on the ground
that it was already barred by time. But, such a bar would work
in perpetuity against the present plaintiff/petitioner. Therefore,
the ratio in Delhi Wakf Boards case would not get attracted to
the cases of rejection of plaint under Clause (d) of Rule 11 of
Order VII C.P.C,
       
        Therefore, I do not see any merit in this revision and it is
accordingly dismissed, but however without costs.
        Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any,
shall also stand dismissed. No costs.
_______________________________________      
JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO          
07.10.2015

Order XLI Rule 28 of the CPC reads as under: Under Rule 27 (1), the parties to appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court except under the circumstances envisaged under sub- clauses (a), (aa) and (b) thereof. Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 27, whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appellate Court, the Court shall record the reasons for its admission. Rule 28 prescribed the procedure for taking additional evidence. Under this Rule, wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the appellate Court may either record such evidence by itself or direct the Court, from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other sub-ordinate Court to take such evidence and forward the same to it. Mode of taking additional evidence- Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the Appellate Court may either take such evidence, or direct the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate Court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the Appellate Court. As the lower appellate Court has committed a serious procedural illegality in remitting the case to the trial Court, the judgment and decree under appeal cannot be sustained and the same is, accordingly, set aside. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. The lower appellate Court is directed to decide as to whether it will itself record the evidence or direct the trial Court to record the evidence and forward the same to it. After recording of the evidence either by itself or by the trial court, the lower appellate Court shall dispose of the appeal on merits. This process shall be completed within three months from the date of receipt of this order.

The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1058 of 2014

06-02-2015

Kesava ReddyAppellant  

A.Visupaksha Reddy (died) and 7 others  Respondents  

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr.M.Radha Krishna

Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 6: Mr.K.Sita Ram

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases cited:

2010 (2) ALD 86 (SC)

The Honble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1058 of 2014

Dated 06.02.2015

The Court made the following:

Judgment:
        This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises out of the judgment
and decree, dated 25-08-2014, in AS.No.60 of 2012, on the file of
the Court of the learned II Additional District Judge, Kurnool at
Adoni, whereby he has remanded the case to the Court of the
Junior Civil Judge, Aluru, for considering the additional
documentary evidence filed by respondent Nos.2 to 6, who are
the appellants before it, and to answer the issues afresh.
        I have heard Mr.M.Radha Krishna, learned Counsel for the
appellant, and Mr.K.Sitaram, learned Counsel for respondent
Nos.2 to 6.
        One Virupaksha Reddy filed OS.No.170 of 2006 for
declaration of his title to the plaint schedule property and also for
permanent injunction restraining the petitioner and respondent
Nos.7 and 8 herein from interfering with his peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.  After filing the
suit, the sole plaintiff died.   Respondent Nos.2 to 6, who have
come on record as his legal representatives, have pursued the suit.
By judgment and decree, dated 23-04-2012, the trial Court has
dismissed the suit.  Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and
decree, respondent Nos.2 to 6 have filed AS.No.60 of 2012.   In
the appeal, respondent Nos.2 to 6 have filed certain additional
documents viz., certified copy of registered sale deed bearing
document No.1826/69, certified copy of the judgment and
decree in AS.No.17 of 2005, certified copy of 1-B register,
statement of sub-division and the Adangal for the fasli 1421.  The
lower appellate Court marked these documents as Exs.A.6 to
A.10 respectively.  It has also framed three points and after
discussing those points, it has felt that in the absence of Ex.A.6,
the lower Court was justified in rejecting the relief of declaration
of title and that the said document cannot be examined by the
appellate Court without giving a fair opportunity to both parties
to adduce evidence in respect thereof.  It has further observed
that if the appeal is allowed based on Ex.A.6, it will deny the
defendants the opportunity to question the said document.  The
lower appellate Court has, therefore, remitted the matter to the
trial Court for considering the additional documentary evidence
filed by the appellants before him and deciding the suit afresh
after giving a fair opportunity to both the parties.  Feeling
aggrieved by the said judgment, the first defendant has filed this
Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.
        The learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that
the lower appellate Court has committed a grave procedural
illegality in remanding the case for fresh disposal by the trial
Court.  In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on
Rule 28 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(CPC) and also on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
H.V.Vedevyasachar vs. Shivashankara and another .
        The learned Counsel for respondent Nos.2 to 6 sought to
support the procedure followed by the lower appellate Court.
        I have carefully considered the respective submissions of
the learned Counsel for the parties.
        Order XLI CPC deals with Appeals from original decrees.
Under this Order, the appellate Court is conferred with the power
to remand the appeals in three different situations.  First, under
Rule 23, where an appeal is preferred against a decree, based
upon a preliminary point, and in case that decree is reversed in
appeal, the appellate Court may, by order, remand the case for
disposal on merits.  Second, under Rule 23-A, where an appeal is
preferred against a decree, based on issues other than the
preliminary point, and in case that decree is reversed in appeal
and a re-trial is considered necessary, the appellate Court will
have the same powers as it has under Rule 23.  Third, under Rule
25 also, the appellate Court may remand the case after framing
certain additional issues.
        However, where additional evidence is produced for the
first time before the appellate Court, as in the instant case, Rules
27 and 28 of Order XLI CPC govern the situation.  Under Rule
27 (1), the parties to appeal shall not be entitled to produce
additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate
Court except under the circumstances envisaged under sub-
clauses (a), (aa) and (b) thereof.  Under sub-rule (2) of Rule 27,
whenever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an
appellate Court, the Court shall record the reasons for its
admission.  Rule 28 prescribed the procedure for taking
additional evidence.  Under this Rule, wherever additional
evidence is allowed to be produced, the appellate Court may
either record such evidence by itself or direct the Court, from
whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other sub-ordinate
Court to take such evidence and forward the same to it.
        In Para 4 of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, it
has observed that during the course of the arguments, the
Counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs filed the certified copies of
Sale Deed No.1826/69, judgment and decree in AS.No.17/05, 1-
B register, statement of sub-division and the adangal for the fasli
1421 and that they were marked as Exs.A.6 to A.10.
        The learned Counsel for the parties are unable to state as to
whether any order, recording the reasons for admitting those
documents, was passed in terms of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 27 by the
lower appellate Court.  In the face of the unequivocal language in
sub-rule (2) of Rule 27, no additional evidence can be allowed and
admitted unless the Court records reasons therefor.
        Be that as it may, even if the lower appellate Court has felt
that the additional evidence produced by respondent Nos.2 to 6
is relevant for the purpose of proper and effectual adjudication of
the appeal, it is left with two options under Rule 28.  Either it has
to record the evidence by itself or direct the Court, from whose
decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate Court to
take such evidence and forward the same to it.  It, therefore,
necessarily means that in either case, the lower appellate Court
itself has to dispose of the appeal on merits after recording of
further evidence.  It has no jurisdiction to remit the case to the
trial Court for adjudication of the suit afresh on the ground of
taking on record the additional evidence.  This position is well
crystallized by the judgment of the Supreme Court in
H.V.Vedavyasachar (cited supra).  Dealing with a similar
situation, the Supreme Court held as under:
        9. However, so far as the second contention
raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is
concerned, in our opinion, the same has substance.
When an application for adducing additional
evidence is allowed, the appellate Court has two
options open to it.  It may record the evidence itself
or it may direct the trial Court to do so.  Order XLI
Rule 28 of the CPC reads as under:
28. Mode of taking additional evidence-
Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be
produced, the Appellate Court may either take
such evidence, or direct the Court from whose
decree the appeal is preferred, or any other
subordinate Court, to take such evidence and
to send it when taken to the Appellate Court.
        10. For the aforementioned purpose, in our
considered opinion, the High Court could not have
directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit after
taking evidence.  Such an order of remand could be
only in terms of Order XLI Rule 23, Order XLI
Rule 23A or Order XLI Rule 25 of the Code.  None
of the said provisions have any application in the
instant case.
        11. This Court in Shanti Devi and others v.
Daropti Devi and others (2006) 13 SCC 775, has
held as under:
But the same by itself could not be a ground
for remitting the entire suit to the learned trial
Judge upon setting aside the decree of the
learned trial Court.  The power of remand
vests in the appellate Court either in terms of
Order 41 Rules 23 and 23A or Order 41 Rule
25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Issue 4
was held to have been wrongly framed.  Onus
of proof was also wrongly placed and only in
that view of the matter, the High Court
thought it fit to remit it to the learned trial
Judge to determine a question of fact, which
according to it was essential upon reframing
the issue.

        As the lower appellate Court has committed a serious
procedural illegality in remitting the case to the trial Court, the
judgment and decree under appeal cannot be sustained and the
same is, accordingly, set aside.
        The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed. The lower
appellate Court is directed to decide as to whether it will itself
record the evidence or direct the trial Court to record the
evidence and forward the same to it.   After recording of the
evidence either by itself or by the trial court, the lower appellate
Court shall dispose of the appeal on merits.   This process shall
be completed within three months from the date of receipt of this
order.
        As a sequel to disposal of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal,
CMAMP.No.1764 of 2014, filed by the appellant for interim
relief, is disposed of as infructuous.
_____________________  
(C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J)
Dt: 6th February, 2015