HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
TUESDAY ,THE FIFTH DAY OF DECEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE
PRSENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B SYAMSUNDER
SECOND APPEAL NO: 255 OF 2000
Between:
1. K.VEDAVATHI & 2 OTHERS -
...PETITIONER(S)
AND:
1. V.CHENCHAMMA & 2 OTHERS -
...RESPONDENTS
Counsel for the Petitioner(s): M RAVINDRANATH REDDY
Counsel for the Respondents: M P CHANDRAMOULI
The Court made the following: ORDER
2023:APHC:51833
1
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
S.A.No.255 OF 2000
Between:
1.Konduru Vedavathi, W/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
50 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
2.Konduru Nagarathnamma (Died)
3.Konduru Krishnavenamma, D/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
28 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
4.K.Radha Reddy, S/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
65 years, R/o.Kovvur, Nellore District.
5.K.Srinivasulu Reddy S/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
62 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
6.Smt K.Bhanumathamma, W/o.Bhasker Reddy,
54 years, R/o.Attapalem, Naidupet,
Nellore District.
7.K.Narayan Reddy, S/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
52 years, R/o.Naidupet, Nellore District.
8.Smt Y.Sada Lakshmi, W/o.Y.Gopal Reddy,
48 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
(Appellant Nos.4 to 8 are brought on record as L.Rs of the deceased
appellant No.2, vide Court Order, dated 26.07.2016 in SAMP No.280
of 2016)
….Appellants/Defendants.
Versus
2023:APHC:51833
2
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
1.Volipi Chenchamma, W/o.V.Venkata Ramanaiah,
31 years, Coolie, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
….Respondent/Plaintiff.
2.The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by the District Collector,
Nellore District.
3.The Mandal Revenue Officer, Kota.
(2nd and 3rd respondents are not necessary)
….Respondents/Defendants.
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 05.12.2023
2023:APHC:51833
3
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER
1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes/No
2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No
________________________
BANDARU SYAMSUNDER, J
2023:APHC:51833
4
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER
+ S.A.No.255 OF 2000
% Dated 05.12.2023
# Between:
1.Konduru Vedavathi, W/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
50 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
2.Konduru Nagarathnamma (Died)
3.Konduru Krishnavenamma, D/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
28 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
4.K.Radha Reddy, S/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
65 years, R/o.Kovvur, Nellore District.
5.K.Srinivasulu Reddy S/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
62 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
6.Smt K.Bhanumathamma, W/o.Bhasker Reddy,
54 years, R/o.Attapalem, Naidupet,
Nellore District.
7.K.Narayan Reddy, S/o.Venkatarami Reddy,
52 years, R/o.Naidupet, Nellore District.
8.Smt Y.Sada Lakshmi, W/o.Y.Gopal Reddy,
48 years, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
(Appellant Nos.4 to 8 are brought on record as L.Rs of the deceased
appellant No.2, vide Court Order, dated 26.07.2016 in SAMP No.280
of 2016)
….Appellants/Defendants.
Versus
2023:APHC:51833
5
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
1.Volipi Chenchamma, W/o.V.Venkata Ramanaiah,
31 years, Coolie, R/o.Chendodu village, Kota mandal,
Nellore District.
….Respondent/Plaintiff.
2.The State of Andhra Pradesh,
Rep.by the District Collector,
Nellore District.
3.The Mandal Revenue Officer, Kota.
(2nd and 3rd respondents are not necessary)
….Respondents/Defendants.
! Counsel for the Appellants : Sri M.Ravindra Nath Reddy
^ Counsel for the
Respondent : Sri M.P.Chandramouli
2023:APHC:51833
6
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
< Gist:
> Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. C.A.No.Nil/2022, dt.22.09.2022
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8736/2016)
2. C.A.No.3142/2010, dt.09.08.2023 (SC)
This Court made the following:
2023:APHC:51833
7
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER
SECOND APPEAL NO.255 of 2000
JUDGMENT:
The defendant Nos.1 to 3 in O.S.No.159 of 1988 on the
file of District Munsif, Kota of Nellore District are the
appellants. The 2nd appellant died, and then the appellant
Nos.4 to 8 brought on record as legal representatives of the
deceased-2
nd appellant. The 1st respondent is the plaintiff in
the suit. Originally, the suit was instituted by the 1st
respondent/plaintiff against the appellant Nos.1 to 3 for
declaration of her title over plaint schedule property, and also
for possession of the same from the appellants/defendants.
2. The appellant Nos.1 to 3, 2nd respondent, 3rd respondent
and the 1st respondent hereinafter referred to as defendant
Nos.1 to 5 and plaintiff as arrayed before the trial Court.
3. The plaintiff instituted the suit against the defendant
Nos.1 to 5 for declaration of her title over plaint schedule
property, and also for possession. The plaint schedule property
as shown in the plaint, which reads as under:
2023:APHC:51833
8
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
SCHEDULE
Nellore District Registration – Kota – Sub-Registration
house site of 30 ankanams with 3 ankanams, thatched house
in Chendodu village, Kota mandal, Nellore District within the
following boundaries:
East : Garden land of Vasudevarao;
West : House of Malli Sundaraiah;
South : Lane leading to plaintiff’s house to some
extent and house of Alla Bhakshu;
North : Garden land of Ogilli Seetharamaiah.
Market value Rs.1,250/-.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the plaint
schedule property occupied by her long back, which is a
Gramakantam site. The plaintiff submits that prior to that her
father was in occupation of the same, and in the year 1979
she constructed 3 ankanams of thatched house in that site,
and she had been in possession and enjoyment of the same.
The plaintiff submits that in the year 1981, the sons of the 2nd
defendant, and brothers of 1st and 2nd defendants by name
Mr.Dhananjaya Reddy and Mr.Narayana Reddy with active
support of the then Revenue Minister tried to occupy the plaint
2023:APHC:51833
9
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
schedule property accompanied by the Taluk Surveyor, and
then she filed suit before the District Munsif Court, Gudur in
OS No.107 of 1981 to protect her possession, which was
decreed on 02.11.1981 restraining the defendants therein and
the Government to interfere with her possession and
enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. It is also the
contention of the plaintiff that when herself and her family
members along with her father went to her relatives house in
the first week of January, 1988, in her absence, the
defendants with the active support of Mr.Konduru Narayana
Reddy and Mr.Dananjaya Reddy entered into the plaint
schedule site and thrown-out her articles in front of her
father’s house, which the plaintiff questioned the defendants
about their high-handed behaviour, but the defendants gave
an adamant reply and refused to vacate the house taking
advantage of her helpless condition, due to that she got issued
legal notice, dated 11.06.1988, who gave reply with false
allegations. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of
her title and for recovery of possession from the defendant
Nos.1 to 3.
2023:APHC:51833
10
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
4. The 3
rd defendant filed written statement resisting the
claim of the plaintiff, which also adopted by the defendant
Nos.1 and 2. It is the contention of the 3rd defendant that they
are not aware of the previous suit filed by the plaintiff against
Mr.Dananjaya Reddy and Mr.Narayana Reddy. She also
submits that the 2nd defendant is in possession and enjoyment
of house site since long time, due to that on 25.04.1981 the
Government granted patta for the site to an extent of Ac.0.6
1/3 cents equivalent to 38 ankanams, which house plot is
described as plot No.16B and Block No.155 under patta
bearing No.RCA 5/245/75, and thereafter the 2nd defendant
constructed a thatched house, wherein all her family members
living, but due to misunderstandings between the family of the
plaintiff and her family, the plaintiff filed the suit with malafide
intention to grab the property. She prays to dismiss the suit.
5. The trial Court at the time of pronouncing Judgment felt
that the Government is a proper and necessary party to decide
the actual question involved in the suit with regard to granting
of patta in favour of the 2nd defendant, directed the plaintiff to
implead the Government also as party to the suit, and
2023:APHC:51833
11
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
thereafter the plaintiff added the defendant Nos.4 and 5 as
defendants in the suit.
6. The 5th defendant/Mandal Revenue Officer filed written
statement, which adopted by the 4th defendant by filing a
memo. It is the contention of the 5th defendant/Mandal
Revenue Officer that the plaint schedule site is a
Gramakantam site, which was not in occupation of any person
prior to granting of patta in favour of the 2nd defendant. They
submit that prior to granting of patta to the 2nd defendant, the
Taluk Surveyor measured the extent of the site, prepared a
plan and submitted the report to the Tahsildar, Gudur, and
after considering the actual possession of the sit and report of
the Revenue Inspector and Taluk Surveyor, the then Tahsildar,
Gudur issued patta on 25.04.1981 in favour of the 2nd
defendant, wherein she constructed a thatched house and
residing therein. They categorically stated that the plaintiff is
no way concerned with the said site and they also pray to
dismiss the suit.
7. The trial Court basing on the above pleadings, settled the
following issues and additional issue for trial:-
2023:APHC:51833
12
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
1. “Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration as
prayed for?
2. Whether the 2nd defendant has been granted patta by the
Revenue authorities?
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession
of the plaint schedule property?
4. To what relief”?
ADDITIONAL ISSUE:
“Whether the plaintiff was not in possession of plaint
schedule site prior to granting of patta to the 2nd
defendant”?
8. The parties went to trial. On behalf of the plaintiff,
PWs.1 to PW.6 were examined. Exs.A1 to A12 were marked.
On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to DW.7 were examined.
Exs.B1 to B16 were marked.
9. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the
trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff with an
observation that the plaintiff failed to prove her title over the
entire plaint schedule site to an extent of 38 ankanams as
claimed by her.
10. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the
trial Court, the plaintiff presented AS.No.9 of 1995 on the file
2023:APHC:51833
13
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
of Additional Senior Civil Judge’s Court, Gudur, which was
allowed by the first Appellate Court, setting aside the
Judgment and Decree passed by the trial Court and decreed
the suit, and directed the defendants to deliver the possession
of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within three
months, on the ground that the plaintiff able to prove
possessory title.
11. In these circumstances, the present Second Appeal is
presented.
12. I have heard learned Counsel Mr.P.Rama Koteswara Rao,
representing on behalf of Mr.M.Ravindranath Reddy, learned
Counsel for the appellants through virtual hearing as well as
learned Counsel for the respondent. There is no representation
today for the respondent. The learned Counsel for the
respondent already submitted his arguments on previous
occasion.
13. The learned Counsel for the appellants would submit that
the trial Court rightly dismissed the suit, which was
erroneously decreed by the Appellate Court, though there is no
pleading and proof with regard to possessory title by the
2023:APHC:51833
14
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
plaintiff. He would further submit that all Gramakantam sites
are vested with the Government, which has got authority to
issue pattas to landless poor persons, which also deposed by
the Mandal Revenue Officer, who was examined as DW.7 in
the suit. He relied on the following precedent law:
1) Banne Gandhi and others vs. District Collector,
Ranga Reddy District and others. 2007 SCC OnLine AP 136,
wherein the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court while
considering the Writ Petition with regard to Gramakantam sites
held at Para No.7, which reads as under:
“7. A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 58 of the Act would show
that only certain classes of lands described therein which are not
required by the Government for any specific purpose shall vest in
the Gram Panchayat. The village site poramboke/Grama Kantam
land is conspicuous by its absence in the category of lands
enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 58 of the Act. Therefore,
Section 58(1) of the Act is not attracted. In an unreported
judgment, being W.P. No. 18865 of 2006, dated 25.9.2006, this
Court has considered this aspect having regard to the Sarpanch,
Polakala Gram Panchayat, Irala Mandal, Chittoor District v.
District Collector, Chittoor (supra), and also Board Standing
Order 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue Standing Orders.
This Court rejected a similar contention observing as under:
A bare perusal of Section 58 of the Act would show that
grazing grounds, threshing floors, burning and burial
grounds, cattle stands, carts tanks and topes at the disposal
of the Government vests in the Gram Panchayat. If the
Government requires these lands for any specific purpose,
sub-section (2) of Section 58 of the Act requires the
Government to direct that the poramboke land referred to
hereinabove is mentioned in Section 58(1) of the Act and
shall cease to vest in the Gram Panchayat. When only
2023:APHC:51833
15
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
specific items of land find place in sub-section (1) of Section
58 of the Act, it is not possible to enlarge these items by
including the Government land classified as grama kantam
land. Learned Counsel for petitioner placed reliance on
judgment of this Court in Sarpanch, Polakala Gram
Panchayat, Irala Mandal, Chittoor District v. District
Collector, Chittoor. (supra). The judgment appears to
have been rendered per incuriam without noticing subsection (1) of Section 58 of the Act and there is no discussion
or reference to any precedent. Therefore, the judgment being
subsilentio is not binding precedent. Secondly under Paras 2
and 3 to BSO 15 of the Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue
Standing Orders, village site poramboke land (grama natham
area/grama kantam land) always vests in the Government
and is intended for being allotted as house sites in future”.
2) Krishnamurthy S.Setlur (Dead) by LRs. vs.
O.V.Narasimha Setty and others. (2007) 3 Supreme Court
Cases 569, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in the
matter of adverse possession, the Courts have to find out the
plea taken by the plaintiff in the plaint. In the plaint, the
plaintiff who claims to be owner by adverse possession has to
plead actual possession. He has to plead the period and the
date from which he claims to be in possession. The plaintiff
has to plead and prove that his possession was continuous,
exclusive and undisturbed to the knowledge of the real owner
of the land. He has to show a hostile title. He has to
communicate his hostility to the real owner. None of these
aspects have been considered by the High Court in its
2023:APHC:51833
16
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
impugned judgment. As stated above, the impugned judgment
is under Section 96 CPC, it is not a judgment under Section
100 CPC. As stated above, adverse possession or ouster is an
inference to be drawn from the facts proved that work is of the
first Appellate Court. (part of para 13)
3) G.Saraswathi and another vs. Rathinammal and
others. (2018) 3 Supreme Court Cases 340, wherein it is held
that while disposing of appeals, the Appellate Court has to
follow Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC by framing necessary points
and shall decide the same.
4) Corporation of City of Bangalore vs. Zulekha Bi and
others. (2008) 11 Supreme Court Cases 306, wherein it is
held that when suit is filed for declaration of title, it is for the
plaintiff to prove its title and possession by producing
document in their possession.
5) Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative
Housing Society Limited and others. (2014) 2 Supreme Court
Cases 269, wherein it is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that
burden is on the plaintiff to establish its case, irrespective of
whether defendants prove their case or not.
2023:APHC:51833
17
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
He prays to allow the Second Appeal.
14. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent/plaintiff would
submit that the plaintiff occupied Gramakantam land, which is
not belong to the Government, which vested with the village,
due to that the Tahsildar has no authority to issue Ex.B1/patta
to the 2nd defendant. He would further submit that as per
Section 58 (1) of A.P.Panchayat Raj Act, the Tahsildar has no
right to grant patta in favour of the 2nd defendant, and the
evidence of the plaintiff’s witnesses coupled with documentary
evidence produced by the plaintiff proved her contention with
regard to long possession, which rightly considered by the First
Appellate Court. He prays to dismiss the Second Appeal.
15. This Second Appeal was admitted on the following
substantial questions of law, which are:
“1.Whether in the light of the Provisions of Order 41,
Rule 31 of CPC, Appellate Court can render a Judgment
without framing points for consideration (vide Judgment
Order 41, Rule 31, 1997 (3) ALT 266; 1999 (1) ALT 821;
1997 (2) ALT 785 and 1999 (2) ALT 256. Whether the
Provisions of Order 41, Rule 31 of CPC are mandatory
and hence, the Decree and Judgment of 1st Appellate
Court are not legal?
2023:APHC:51833
18
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
2.Whether in a suit filed for declaration of title and
recovery of possession of which plaintiff has no title that
plaint schedule land belongs to Government, possession
cold be granted in favour of the plaintiff and admittedly
the land was gone to Government?
3.Whether the suit filed for declaration of title and
recovery of possession with respect to the Government
poramboke land, which is hit for not issuing notice under
Section 80 of CPC and hence the suit itself is not
maintainable”?
16. As per Section 100 of CPC, this Court can interfere with
the Judgment of the Appellate Court, if it is satisfied that case
involves a substantial question of law.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Chandrabhan (Deceased)
Through LRs. And Others – Appellants vs. Saraswati and
Others – Respondent(s) in Civil Appeal No.NIL of 2022
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.8736 of 2016) Judgment dated
22.09.2022, explained the scope of Section 100 of CPC and
laid down the principles relating to Section 100 of CPC at Para
No.33 of the Judgment, which reads as under:
"33. The principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC relevant for
this case may be summarised thus:
(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a
document is question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a
2023:APHC:51833
19
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
document is a question of law. Construction of a document
involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of
law. Therefore, when there is a misconstruction of a document or
wrong application of a principle of law in constructing a document,
it gives rise to a question of law. (Emphasis supplied)
(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves
a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A
question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the
case (that is, a question, answer to which effects the rights of
parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not
covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle
emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal
issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary
situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of
express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court
below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to
such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial
question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but
because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the
settled position of law.
(iii) The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere
with findings of facts arrived at by the Courts below. But it is not an
absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i)
the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no
evidence; (ii) the Courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved
facts by applying law erroneously; or (iii) the Courts have wrongly
cast the burden of proof. When we refer to "decision based on no
evidence," it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth
of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken
as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding."
18. In the present case, the claim of the plaintiff is based on
possession who admittedly failed to plead adverse possession
in the plaint. When the plaintiff is claiming declaration of title
basing on her possession, she has to prove her possession for
a period of 30 years, as she is claiming adverse possession
over Gramakantam land, and she shall prove that her
2023:APHC:51833
20
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
possession is hostile, open and uninterrupted. The Hon’ble
Apex Court in Government of Kerala and another. Appellants
vs. Joseph and others. Respondents in Civil Appeal No.3142
of 2010, Judgment dated 09.08.2023 extensively discussed
the ‘principles’ of adverse possession at Para Nos.20, 21, 21
(1) to 21 (8), which reads as under:
“20. The principle of adverse possession has been defined by the
Privy Council in Perry v. Clissold in the following terms:
“It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in
the assumed character of the owner and exercising
peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly
good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if
the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title
by the process of law within the period prescribed by the
provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the case,
his right is forever extinguished and the possessory owner
acquires an absolute title.”
21. Before proceeding to do so, it is essential to take note of the
law governing such a claim. After a perusal and consideration of
various judgments rendered by this Court, the following principles
can be observed:
21.1 Possession must be open, clear, continuous and hostile to the
claim or possession of the other party; all three classic
requirements must coexist- nec vi, i.e., adequate in continuity; nec
clam, i.e., adequate in publicity; and nec precario, i.e., adverse to a
competitor, in denial of title and knowledge;
(a) In Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of Khulna, the Privy
Council held that-
“The possession required must be adequate in
continuity, in publicity, and in extent to show that it is
possession adverse to the competitor.”
2023:APHC:51833
21
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
(b) Further, the Council Maharaja Sri Chandra Nandi v.
Baijnath Jugal Kishore observed-
“It is sufficient that the possession should be overt and
without any attempt at concealment, so that the
person against whom time is running ought, if he
exercises due vigilance, to be aware of what is
happening.”
(c) A Bench of three judges of this Court in Parsinni v.
Sukhi held that
“Party claiming adverse possession must prove that his
possession must be ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’ i.e.
peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must
be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to
show that their possession is adverse to the true
owner.”
(d) In Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India (twoJudge Bench) it was held:-
“It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming
adverse possession must prove that his possession is
“nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open
and continuous. The possession must be adequate in
continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their
possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start
with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and
be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over
the statutory period.”
This case was relied on in the case of M.Venkatesh v.
Bangalore Development Authority (three-Judge Bench),
Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (three-Judge
Bench).
(e) This Court in a recent case of M Siddiq (D) through LRs
v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors. (five-Judge Bench) reiterated
this principle as under –
“748. A person who sets up a plea of adverse
possession must establish both possession which is
peaceful, open and continuous - possession which
meets the requirement of being ‘nec vi nec claim and
nec precario’. To substantiate a plea of adverse
2023:APHC:51833
22
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
possession, the character of the possession must be
adequate in continuity and in the public because the
possession has to be to the knowledge of the true
owner in order for it to be adverse. These
requirements have to be duly established first by
adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient
evidence.”
21.2 The person claiming adverse possession must show clear and
cogent evidence substantiate such claim;
This Court in Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (twoJudge Bench) held that –
“5. A possession of a co-owner or of a licensee or of an agent
or a permissive possession to become adverse must be
established by cogent and convincing evidence to show
hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of
real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time
does not result in converting the permissive possession into
adverse possession…”
Reference may also be made to M. Siddiq (supra).
21.3 Mere possession over a property for a long period of time does
not grant the right of adverse possession on its own;
(a) In Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr.Nirmal Chander and Anr.
(two-Judge Bench), this court observed-
“1… It is not merely unauthorised possession on termination
of his licence that enables the licensee to claim title by
adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the
part of the licensee to show that he is claiming adverse title.
It is possible that the licensor may not file an action for the
purpose of recovering possession of the premises from the
licensee after terminating his licence but that by itself cannot
enable the licensee to claim title by adverse possession.
There must be some overt act on the part of the licensee
indicating assertion of hostile title. Mere continuance of
unauthorised possession even for a period of more than 12
years is not enough.”
Reference may also be made to Arvind Kumar (supra);
Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah (two-Judge Bench); Uttam Chand
(supra).
2023:APHC:51833
23
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
21.4 Such clear and continuous possession must be accompanied
by animus possidendi - the intention to possess or in other words,
the intention to dispossess the rightful owner; in Karnataka Board
of Wakf (supra) it was observed-
“…Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus
possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner
are the most important factors that are to be accounted in
cases of this nature…”
(a) The case of Annakili v. A. Vedanayagam (two-Judge Bench)
also shed light on this principle as under -
“24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the
possession of the defendant should become adverse to the
plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in
possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus
possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of
adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law
that mere possession of the land would not ripen into
possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have
animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of
the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus
possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be
shown to exist at the commencement of the possession…”
(b) In Des Raj and Others v. Bhagat Ram (two-Judge Bench)
this Court observed –
“21. In a case of this nature, where long and continuous
possession of the plaintiff-respondent stands admitted, the
only question which arose for consideration by the courts
below was as to whether the plaintiff had been in possession
of the properties in hostile declaration of his title vis-a-vis his
co-owners and they were in know thereof.”
(c) This court in L.N. Aswathama v. P. Prakash (two- Judge
Bench) had observed that permissive possession or possession in
the absence of Animus possidendi would not constitute the claim of
adverse possession.
(d) It was also held in the case of Chatti Konati Rao v. Palle
Venkata Subba Rao (two-Judge Bench) –
“15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite
ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not
ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the
property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said
2023:APHC:51833
24
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is
required to establish the date on which he came in
possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession,
knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that
possession was open and undisturbed…”
(Emphasis supplied)
Referring to the above judgement Subha Rao (supra) this
Court has reiterated the cardinality of the presence of Animus
possidendi in a case concerning adverse possession in Brijesh
Kumar & Anr. v. Shardabai (dead) by LRs.(two- Judge Bench).
21.5 Such a plea is available not only as a defence when title is
questioned, but is also available as a claim to a person who has
perfected his title;
The prior position of law as set out in Gurudwara Sahab v.
Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala (two-Judge Bench) was that
the plea of adverse possession can be used only as a shield by the
defendant and not as a sword by the plaintiff. However, the position
was changed later by the decision of this Hon’ble Court in the case
of Ravinder Kaur (supra) had held that - “…Title or interest is
acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a
shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any
person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can
file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession…”
The position in Ravinder Kaur (supra) was followed in
Narasamma & Ors. v. A. Krishnappa (Dead) Through LRs.
(three-Judge Bench).
21.6 Mere passing of an ejectment order does not cause brake in
possession neither causes his dispossession;
In Balkrishna v. Satyaprakash (two-Judge Bench) this
Court held:
“…Mere passing of an order of ejectment against a person
claiming to be in adverse possession neither causes his
dispossession nor discontinuation of his possession which
alone breaks the continuity of possession.”
21.7 When the land subject of proceedings wherein adverse
possession has been claimed, belongs to the Government, the Court
is duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, effectiveness, care
and circumspection as it may lead to Destruction of a right/title of
2023:APHC:51833
25
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
the State to immovable property. In State of Rajasthan v.
Harphool Singh (two-Judge Bench) it was held:
“12. So far as the question of perfection of title by adverse
possession and that too in respect of public property is
concerned, the question requires to be considered more
seriously and effectively for the reason that it ultimately involves
destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property and
conferring upon a third-party encroacher title where he had
none.”
Further, in Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah
(two-Judge Bench) it was stated:
“…It is our considered view that where an encroacher, illegal
occupant or land grabber of public property raises a plea that
he has perfected title by adverse possession, the court is
duty-bound to act with greater seriousness, care and
circumspection. Any laxity in this regard may result in
destruction of right/title of the State to immovable property
and give an upper hand to the encroachers, unauthorized
occupants or land grabbers.”
21.8 A plea of adverse possession must be pleaded with proper
particulars, such as, when the possession became adverse. The
court is not to travel beyond pleading to give any relief, in other
words, the plea must stand on its own two feet. This Court has held
this in the case of V. Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava(twoJudge Bench):
“…A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at
the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for
the first time at the stage of appeal…”
It has also been held in the case of State of Uttrakhand v.
Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj (two-Judge Bench):
“…The courts below also should have seen that courts can
grant only that relief which is claimed by the plaintiff in the
plaint and such relief can be granted only on the pleadings
but not beyond it. In other words, courts cannot travel
beyond the pleadings for granting any relief…”
Mandir Sri Laxman Sidh Maharaj (supra) was relied on in
Dharampal (Dead) v. Punjab Wakf Board (two-Judge Bench) on
the same principle”.
2023:APHC:51833
26
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
19. A perusal of plaint, it is nowhere mentioned by the
plaintiff that she acquired the property by adverse possession
in respect of Gramakantam land and her only contention in the
plaint is that she occupied the plaint schedule property long
back, which is Gramakantam site and prior to that also her
father was in occupation of the same. It is nowhere explained
when her father occupied the plaint schedule property. She
also pleaded that in the year 1979 she constructed 3
ankanams of thatched house in that site, but rightly discussed
by the learned trial Judge that house tax receipts, marked as
Exs.A7 to A9 are not disclosing the door number of the house
and assessment number or any other particulars in order to
establish that tax was collected for the house existing in the
plaint schedule property. A perusal of Judgment of the
Appellate Court, which shows that from Para Nos.2 to 9, the
learned Appellate Judge re-produced the Judgment of the trial
Court, but failed to frame any points as required under Order
41, Rule 31 of CPC, which reads as under:
2023:APHC:51833
27
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
“31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.-
The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing
and shall state—
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or
varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and
shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and
dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring there
in”.
20. The first Appellate Court’s Judgment should show
application of mind and reflect the reasons on the basis of
which it agrees or disagrees with the trial Court. It is the duty
of the first Appellate Court to appreciate the entire evidence
and arrive at its own independent conclusion for the reasons
assigned, either of affirmance or difference. So, the Appellate
Court must address itself to the dispute and so frame the
points for consideration, which is mandatory, which failed to
follow by the learned Appellate Judge. Though, the plaintiff has
not specifically pleaded in her plaint that she acquired title by
adverse possession, the Appellate Judge declared the title of
the plaintiff by observing that the plaintiff filed the suit on the
2023:APHC:51833
28
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
basis of possessory title and proved her possession by filing
Ex.A1, which is certified copy of Decree in previous suit, and
failed to consider Ex.B1/patta admittedly granted to the 2nd
defendant, which deposed by DW.7/Mandal Revenue Officer.
As per the ratio laid by the Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court
in Banne Gandhi and others case referred supra, who
interpreted Section 58 (1) of AP.Panchayat Raj Act and
categorically held that “as per Paras 2 and 3 to BSO 15 of the
Andhra Pradesh Board of Revenue Standing Orders, village site
poramboke land (Gramanatham area/Gramakantam land)
always vests in the Government and is intended for being
allotted as house sites in future”. Therefore, it cannot be said
that the 5th defendant has no authority to issue Ex.B1, though
DW.7.Mandal Revenue Officer has deposed that Ex.B1 was
stayed, that itself is not a ground to grant the relief of
declaration of title and possession in favour of the plaintiff,
when she failed to plead and prove possessory title in respect
of plaint schedule property.
21. The learned trial Judge elaborately discussed the oral
evidence available on record and documents produced by the
2023:APHC:51833
29
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
trial Court came to right conclusion that the plaintiff failed to
prove her title over plaint schedule property before alleged
dispossession. There is no dispute that Ex.B1/patta was
granted in favour of the 2nd defendant in respect of plaint
schedule property, and thereafter the 2nd defendant along with
her family members have been residing in the plaint schedule
property and they also filed Exs.B6 to B15/electricity
consumption charges in respect of plaint schedule property. As
rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants/
defendant Nos.1 to 3 that in a suit for declaration of title and
recovery of possession, the plaintiff has to succeed on its own
contention, irrespective of defendants’ proving their case or
not. When the plaintiff is claiming possessory title over the
plaint schedule property, she has to specifically plead and
prove the same, which failed by the plaintiff as seen from the
averments in the plaint and evidence, which failed to consider
by the learned Appellate Judge.
22. Therefore, this Court is of an opinion that the Judgment
of the first Appellate Court, declaring possessory title of the
plaintiff and granting the relief of recovery of possession is
2023:APHC:51833
30
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
erroneous. Even when the plaintiff filed the suit in respect of
Gramakantam site, she failed to add the Government as one of
the defendants in the suit, which noticed by the learned trial
Judge and rightly directed the plaintiff to add the Government
as one of the defendants, who supported the contention of the
defendant Nos.1 to 3. As the Government is added as one of
the defendants in the suit by the plaintiff after filing the suit
before pronouncing the Judgment, there is no requirement of
issuing Section 80 of CPC notice, as no relief is claimed by the
plaintiff in the plaint at the first instance, and the relief is
claimed against the defendant Nos.1 to 3 only.
23. The substantial questions of law 1, 2 framed by this
Court for consideration are answered in favour of the
appellants/defendants.
24. In the result, this Second Appeal is allowed. The
Judgment and Decree in AS No.9 of 1995 are set aside.
Consequently, OS No.159 of 1988 on the file of District Munsif,
Kota is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Consequently, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall
2023:APHC:51833
31
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
stand closed. The Interim Orders granted earlier, if any, shall
stand vacated.
___________________________
JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER
Dt:05.12.2023.
Bsv
LR Copy.
2023:APHC:51833
32
BSS,J
S.A.No.255 of 2000
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BANDARU SYAMSUNDER
S.A.No.255 of 2000
Date: 05.12.2023
Bsv
2023:APHC:51833
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.