Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act (for short the Act) seeking directions to the defendants to handover physical possession of the suit schedule property= an order which is passed which would sub-serve and promote the interest of justice should be preserved rather than the one which is likely to produce the opposite result. The 1st petitioner herein has admitted to have sold a part of the suit schedule property namely 73 square yards to the respondent herein through Ex.B2(=Ex.A2). Whereas the case of the respondent is that he has purchased the entire suit schedule property comprising of 150 square yards. Ex.B2 document, which is a registered sale deed and the covenant contained therein together with the description of schedule-B property and the plan annexed thereto clearly support the case of the respondent that he purchased the whole of 150 Sq.yds and was put in possession of a dilapidated building standing thereon. To dislodge this claim, the 1st petitioner herein has filed O.S.No.2592/2008, but that suit was dismissed. This apart O.S.No.2102 of 2009 was filed by one of the tenants of the respondent herein seeking injunction against the 1st petitioner herein, that suit is decreed. It presupposes, therefore, that it is tenant of the respondent herein who was found in possession of the suit schedule property in the year 2009 and hence, the averment of the plaintiff/respondent herein that it is during June 2010, the 1st petitioner herein started unauthorized improvements to the suit schedule property with a view to induct the other defendants as tenants, stands to reason to be accepted. He has succeeded in that attempt, as is reflected from Ex.A13, copy of the judgment rendered in W.P.No.15415 of 2010 dated 03.08.2010 instituted by the respondent herein. It is, therefore, clear that during June 2010, the respondent herein has been unjustly deprived of his possession of a dilapidated house by unauthorizedly undertaking improvements thereto so as to realise huge sums of money as monthly rents therefrom. Therefore, I am of the view that the order passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge in O.S.No.1515/2010 does not call for any interference as there is no failure of exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the said Court. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any shall stand dismissed. No costs.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4234 of 2015  

04-03-2016

N.Sivaraj Madiga and 3 others Petitioners


M.Durga Redy Respondent  

Counsel for the Petitioners:Sri Vedula Srinivas

Counsel for the Respondent: Sri V.Ravi Kiran Rao                      
                               
<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Citations:
1.      AIR 1953 SC 23
2.      (2004) 4 SCC 664
3.      AIR 1966 SC 153
4.      (2002) 1 SCC 535

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4234 of 2015  

ORDER:
      This revision is preferred by the defendants in O.S.No.1515
of 2010 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judges Court,
Ranga Reddy District.
      The sole respondent herein is the plaintiff in the suit.  The
said suit is instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act (for
short the Act) seeking directions to the defendants to handover
physical possession of the suit schedule property comprising of 77
square yards in plot No.10, survey No.11/1 situated at Harijan
Colony, Habsiguda, Uppal Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.  The 1st
petitioner/1st defendant herein was the predecessor-in-interest and
title of the suit schedule land.  It is the case of the
respondent/plaintiff that the 1st petitioner/1st defendant has
purchased the suit schedule land forming Plot No.10 admeasuring
150 square yards through a registered sale deed dated 16.04.2003
bearing document No.4431 of 2003 from Sri S.Anand George and  
his brother Sri S.Dilip George.  It is the case of the
respondent/plaintiff that he has purchased a total extent of 450
square yards site comprising of adjacent plot Nos.9 and 10 of
Harijan Colony, Habsiguda, Uppal Mandal, Ranga Reddy District
through a registered sale deed dated 14.09.2005 bearing document
No.9547/2006 (9258/2005).  To this document Smt. S.Suhasini,
Sri B.I. Jhon Wesley and Sri N. Shivaraj Madiga, the 1st
petitioner/1st defendant herein are shown as vendors while the
respondent/plaintiff is shown as vendee/purchaser.  In the
preamble of this document, it is described that vendor Nos.1 and 2
have purchased the schedule-A property on 16.12.2002 while
vendor No.3 has purchased a collapsed house bearing No.1-10
corresponding to new No.1-1-10, plot No.10 forming part of survey
No.11/1 admeasuring 150 square yards situated at Harijan
Colony.  Two separate schedules called schedule-A and schedule-B
property are appended to this document.  Since there is no dispute
whatsoever with regard to schedule-A property comprising of 300
square yards, it is not relevant to deal with it any further.
      Schedule-B property is described as under:
SCHEDULE OF THE PROPERTY        

        All that the collapsed house bearing No.1-10, corresponding to
new No.1-1-10, on Plot No.10, forming part of Sy.No.11/1 admeasuring
150 Sq.Yds., or 125.4 Sq.Mtrs., Situated in Harijan Colony, Habsiguda
Village, Uppal Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, and bounded by:-

 NORTH   ::     30 Wide Road        
                        SOUTH   ::      Plot No.20      
 EAST            ::     30 Wide Road
                        WEST            ::      Plot No.9 of S. Suhasini

      A plan was appended to this sale deed duly reflecting the
whole of plot No.9 comprising of 300 square yards and plot No.10
comprising of 150 square yards, thus totalling to 450 Sq.yds.  The
plan appended as well as the Schedule-B and rest of the sale deed
bears the signatures of all the 3 vendors including the 1st
petitioner/1st defendant herein.
      It will be relevant to note that a 30 feet wide road is lying to
the North of plot No.9 while plot No.10 also has the same road on
its Northern side while it has also a 30 feet road on its Eastern
side.
      It will also be relevant to notice covenant No.3 of the
registered sale deed, document No.9547/2006 which runs as
under:
      3. THAT the VENDORS in pursuance to the above
conveyance had delivered the vacant, physical and peaceful
possession of the schedule property to the VENDEE for his
enjoyment without any hindrance or obstructions whatsoever from
anybody.

      It will be also relevant to notice that this document which is
presented for registration on 14.09.2005 has been subjected to a
scrutiny for deficit stamp duty and consequently, the differential
stamp duty was paid on 14.06.2006 and thereafter the document
was assigned the number No.9547/2006 on 28.06.2006, though it
was assigned initially No.9258 of 2005.
      The suit is instituted on the premises that in June 2010 the
defendant No.1 forcefully commenced modifying works in suit
schedule property to induct the other defendants as tenants into
the suit schedule property and when the plaintiff made protest and
raised objections for the same the 1st petitioner/1st defendant
threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences and also
threatened to file false criminal case under the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act.  It was also
the case of the plaintiff, the respondent herein, that he approached
the High court and instituted W.P.No.15415 of 2010 when the 2nd
petitioner herein/2nd defendant is sought to be inducted as tenant
to carryon the retail liquor outlet.  However, the said writ petition
did not survive for adjudication as the 2nd petitioner/2nd defendant
has been granted a license by the State Government for carrying
on retail outlet of liquor at the suit schedule premises, during the
pendency of the said writ petition.  Since the said suit is decreed
now, the present revision is preferred, as under sub section 3 of
section 6 of the Act, no appeal is provided against any such
judgment and decree passed.  
      It will be relevant to notice that the 1st petitioner/1st
defendant has filed O.S.No.2592/2008 for cancellation of sale deed
bearing document No.9547/2006 in respect of part of house
bearing No.1-10 admeasuring 77 square yards comprising of plot
No.10 in survey No.11/1 situated at Harijan Colony, Habsiguda.
The 1st petitioner/1st defendant has also filed another suit
O.S.No.915/2010 seeking perpetual injunction to restrain 3
persons namely V.Yadagiri, Suresh and B.Kailashpathi Goud from
ever interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
plaintiff in the plaint schedule property.  It will be also relevant to
notice that earlier thereto a firm by name M/s. Kailash Printers
represented by its proprietor B.Kailashpathi has filed suit
O.S.No.2102/2009 seeking perpetual injunction to restrain the
sole defendant therein from ever interfering with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in the plaint schedule
property.  The 1st petitioner/1st defendant herein was impleaded as
the sole defendant to O.S.No.2102 of 2009.  All the four suits
bearing O.S.Nos.2592/2008, 1515/2010, 915/2010 and
2102/2009 were clubbed and tried together.  By a common
judgment rendered on 27.07.2015, the learned Principal Senior
Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District, decreed the suit
O.S.Nos.1515/2010 and 2102/2009 and dismissed O.S.Nos.2592    
of 2008 and 915 of 2010.  As was already noticed supra, the 1st
petitioner herein was the plaintiff in both the suits
O.S.Nos.2592/2008 and 915/2010.
      While the 1st petitioner was examined as PW.1, the
respondent herein was examined as DW.1.  Exs.A.1 to A.15 were  
marked on behalf of the 1st petitioner herein while Exs.B.1 to B.6
were marked on behalf of the respondent herein.  Ex.A1 is the sale
deed dated 16.04.2003 bearing document No.4431/2003 through  
which the 1st petitioner herein has purchased the suit schedule
property comprising of 150 Sq.Yds.  To this document bearing
No.4431/2003 the schedule of property is described as under:
SCHEDULE OF THE PROPERTY      

        All that the Collapsed House No.1-10 on Plot No.10, in Survey
No.11/1, admeasuring 150 Sq.yds., or 125.4 Sq.Mts., Situated at Harijan
Colony, Habsiguda Village, Uppal Kalan Municipality, Uppal Mandal,
Ranga Reddy District, within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar, Uppal,
Ranga Reddy District and bounded by:-

  NORTH   ::    30 Wide Road        
                         SOUTH   ::     Plot No.20      
  EAST    ::    30 Wide Road
                         WEST    ::     Plot No.9

And more clearly shown in the plan and Red colour annexed herewith

      Ex.A2 is a copy of the sale deed bearing document No.9547
of 2006 dated 14.09.2005.  The original of Ex.A2 is marked on
behalf of the respondent herein as Ex.B2.  Exs.A.3 to A.10 and
A.15 are electricity demand bills while Ex.A.11 and A.12 are the
payment receipts while Ex.A13 is the copy of the order passed in
W.P.No.15415 of 2010 dated 03.08.2010 referred to supra.
Ex.A.14 is a copy of the proceedings of the Deputy Director of
Social Welfare Department dated 26.06.2003 marked to 1st
petitioner herein.
      It is not dispute that through Ex.A1, the 1st petitioner herein
has acquired right, title and interest in respect of the suit schedule
property.  The claim of the respondent herein is that the same
property has been purchased by him through Ex.B2, copy of which
is marked also as Ex.A2.  The description of the schedule property
found in Ex.A.1 and Ex.B.2 (A.2) tallies in all respects. Ex.B2 is
disputed by the 1st respondent herein on the premises that he has
sold only 73 square yards, but not 150 square yards, which has
been purchased by him under Ex.A1.  That is the reason why the
1st petitioner has filed O.S.No.2592/2008 seeking cancellation of
Ex.B2 (=Ex.A2) to the extent of 77 square yards, and that suit has
now been dismissed.  It can be seen that the suit schedule
property was described as lying in dilapidated condition as is
reflected in Ex.A1 as well as Ex.B2.  Ex.B2 never described that
only 73 square yards out of 150 square yards has been sold by the
1st petitioner herein to the respondent.  Even the plan annexed to
Ex.B2 does not reflect that only 73 square yards out of 150 square
yards was sold.  On the contrary, it reflects as if the entire 150
square yards has been sold.  As was already noticed supra, the
whole of 150 square yards is abutting 2 roads on North as well as
on the Eastern side and that is how the boundaries have been
reflected in Ex.B2.  In view of the principle contained under
Sections 61, 62, 64, 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, it
follows that once Ex.B2 (=Ex.A2) is admitted in evidence, the
contents of that document are also liable to be treated as admitted
in evidence though the contents may not be conclusive evidence of
the fact.
      In one of the earliest decision of the Supreme Court in
Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria  the contours
of the power exercisable under Section 115 CPC was considered in
great detail and it was laid down by a 4-Judge Bench as under:
        We now proceed to consider whether a revision was
competent against the order of 25-4-1945 when no appeal lay. It
seems to us that in this matter really the High Court entertained
an appeal in the guise of a revision. The revisional jurisdiction of
the High Court is set out in s. 115 Code of Civil Procedure in
these terms :
"The High Court may call for the record of any case which has
been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and
in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court
appears -
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with
material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in
the case as it thinks fit."
A large number of cases have been collected in Edn. 4 of
Chitaley & Rao's Code of Civil procedure (vol. I), which only serve
to show that the High Courts have not always appreciated the
limits of the jurisdiction conferred by this section. In Mohunt
Bhagwan Ramanuj Das v. Khetter Moni Dassi, 1 Cal. W. N. 617,
the High Court of Calcutta expressed the opinion that sub-cl. (c)
of s. 115, Code of Civil Procedure , was intended to authorise the
High Courts to interfere and correct gross and palpable errors of
subordinate Courts, so as to prevent grave injustice in non,
appealable cases. This decision was, however, dissented from by
the same High Court in Enat Mondul v. Baloram Dey, 3 Cal. W.
N. 581, but was cited with approval by Lord-Williams J. in
Gulabchand Bangur v. Kabiruddin Ahmed, 58 Cal. -111. In
these circumstances, it is worth-while recalling again to mind
the decisions of the Privy Council on this subject and the limits
stated therein for the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by this
section on the High Courts.
As long ago as 1894, in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh  
Singh, 11 Ind. App. 237, the Privy Council made the following
observations on s. 622 of the former Code of Civil Procedure,
which was replaced by s.115 of the Code of 1908:
"The question then is, did the Judges of the lower Courts in this
case, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, act illegally or with
material irregularity. It appears that they had perfect jurisdiction
to decide the case, and even if they decided wrongly, they did not
exercise their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity."

In 1917 again in Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, 44 Ind.
App. 261, the Board observed:

"It will be observed that the section applies to jurisdiction alone,
the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal
assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusions
of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not
involved."

In 1949, in Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious
Endowments Board, Madras, 76 Ind. App. 67, the Privy Council
again examined the scope of s. 115 and observed that they could
see no justification for the view that the section was intended to
authorise the High Court to interfere and correct gross and
palpable errors of subordinate Courts so as to prevent grave
injustice in non-appealable cases and that it would be difficult to
formulate any standard by which the degree of error of
subordinate Courts could be measured. It was said :

"Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies, and,
where the Legislature has provided no right of appeal, the
manifest intention is that the order of the trial Court, right or
wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to
satisfy itself on three matters, (a) that the order of the
subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is
one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction: and (c)
that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally,
that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material
irregularity, that is, by committing same error of procedure in
the course of the trial which is material in that it may have
affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied on
those three matters, it has no power to interfere because it
differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the
subordinate Court on questions of fact or law."

Later in the same year in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha
Chaudhury, 76 Ind. App. 131, their Lordships had again
adverted to this matter and reiterated what they had said in
their earlier decision. They pointed out :

"There have been a very large number of decisions of Indian High
Courts on S. 115 to many of which their Lordships have been
referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observation that
High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in
a decision of a subordinate Court does not by itself involve that
the subordinate Court has acted illegally or with material
irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under sub-s.
(c), nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the
subordinate court exercising a jurisdiction so vested, a case for
revision arises under sub-s. (a) or sub-s. (b) and sub-s.(c) can be
ignored.

7. REFERENCE may also be made de to the observations of Bose  
J. in his order of reference in Narayan Sonaji v. Sheshrao
Vithoba, A. I. R. 1948 Nag. 258 wherein it was said that the
words "illegally" and "material irregularity" do not cover either
errors of fact or law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at
but to the manner in which it is reached. The errors
contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to
errors of either law or fact after the formalities which the law
prescribes have been complied with.

We are therefore of the opinion that in reversing the order of the
executing Court dated 25-4-1945 reviving the execution, the
High Court exercised jurisdiction not conferred on it by s. 115 of
the Code. It is plain that the order of the Subordinate Judge
dated 25-4-1945 was one that he had jurisdiction to make, that
in making that order he neither acted in excess of his
jurisdiction nor did he assume jurisdiction which he did not
possess. It could not be said that in the exercise of it he acted
with material irregularity or committed any breach of the
procedure laid down for reaching the result.
      It is, therefore, for the 1st petitioner herein to impeach that
document and its contents thereof in an appropriate manner.  In
other words, the burden is on him to impeach the contents of
Ex.B2, and he has failed to discharge the said burden.  Covenant
No.3 of Ex.B2 has clearly demonstrated that the 1st petitioner
herein has delivered possession of the suit schedule property to the
respondent herein.  Therefore, the petitioners herein have failed to
dislodge the veracity of the claim of the respondent herein, that he
was in possession pursuant to Ex.B.2 (A.2).
      It will be also relevant to notice that the 1st petitioner herein
has filed another suit O.S.No.915/2010 seeking injunction against
3 others, who are the tenants of the respondent herein.  The 1st
petitioner herein has lost the said suit also.  On the contrary one of
those 3 persons namely Kailashpathi has earlier instituted
O.S.No.2102/2009 against the 1st petitioner herein seeking
injunction as the 1st petitioner herein was allegedly interfering with
his possession.  That suit is now decreed.
      It is true that a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Act is
considered as a summary proceedings and it is only intended for
securing restoration of possession to the plaintiff who has been
disposed not in accordance with law.  The respondent/plaintiff has
specifically averred that it is during June 2010, the 1st petitioner
herein started making unauthorized improvements to the suit
schedule property with a view to induct the other defendants as
tenants therein and when the plaintiff resisted, he was threatened
with dire consequences.  It is, therefore, a clear case where the
plaintiff has set up that he was unjustly dispossessed during June
2010 by undertaking improvements to the dilapidated building and
hence he instituted the suit O.S.No.1515 of 2010 in three months
thereafter.
      The Supreme Court has clearly brought out the scope and
ambit of provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act in Sanjay
Kumar Pandey and others Vs. Gulbahar Sheikh and others , in
the following words:
       A suit under Section 6 of the Act is often called a
summary suit inasmuch as the enquiry in the suit under
Section 6 is confined to finding out the possession and
dispossession within a period of six months from the date of the
institution of the suit ignoring the question of title.  Sub-Section
(3) of Section 6 provides that no appeal shall lie from any order
or decree passed in any suit instituted under this Section.  No
review of any such order or decree is permitted.  The remedy of a
person unsuccessful in a suit under Section 6 of the Act is to file
a regular suit establishing his title to the suit property and in
the event of his succeeding he will be entitled to recover
possession of the property notwithstanding the adverse decision
under Section 6 of the Act.  Thus, as against a decision under
Section 6 of the Act, the remedy of unsuccessful party is to file a
suit based on title.  The remedy of filing a revision is available
but that is only by way of an exception; for the High Court would
not interfere with a decree or order under Section 6 of the Act
except on a case for interference being made out within the well
settled parameters of the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under
Section 115 of the Code.
       A perusal of the order of the High Court shows that the
High Court has for the purpose of reversing the decree of the
trial Court relied on the oral statements of Natai Sheikh, PW-3
and Ram Sevak Ram, PW-5.  One sentence each from the two    
depositions has been extracted and set out by the High Court in
its order for the purpose of forming an opinion that they are not
the plaintiffs but the defendants who were in possession of the
suit property before six months from the date of the institution
of the suit.  The High Court has not looked into all the material
available on record and has also not indicated clearly the
availability of any of the grounds within the parameters of
Section 115 of the Code so as to exercise revisional jurisdiction
calling for reversal of the decision of the trial Court under
Section 6 of the Act.  The revision filed before the High Court
cannot be said to have been satisfactorily disposed of.
      But, however, it is for the petitioners to establish that the
judgment and decree passed in the suit is liable to be revised
within the well laid out parameters contained in Section 115 CPC.
Unless it is demonstrated that the subordinate Court has acted in
exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the
revision is not maintainable.  It may be true that instead of
preferring the revision under Section 115 CPC, it has been
preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution so that there can be
wider scope for the scrutiny of this Court in exercise of its power of
superintendence.
      It is a settled principle of law that if a subordinate court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate a list brought before it, may decide it
rightly or wrongly, whether the question be one of law or of fact.
That itself would not make such a case fall under any of the 3
clauses mentioned in Section 115(1) CPC. It is wholly apt to recall
at this moment, the words of P.B.Gajendragadkar, Chief Justice,
speaking for the constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in
Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and others Vs. Maruti Hari
Jadhav and others  as under:
        The provisions of S. 115 of the Code have been examined by
judicial decisions on several occasions. While exercising its
jurisdiction under S. 115, it is not competent to the High Court
to correct errors of fact, however gross they may be, or even
errors of law, unless the said errors have relation to the
jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. As Cls. (a), (b)
and (c) of S. 115 indicate, it is only in cases where the
subordinate Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by
law. or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has
acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court can
be properly invoked. It is conceivable that points of law may
arise in proceedings instituted before subordinate Courts which
are related to question of jurisdictions. It is well-settled that a
plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata is a plea of law which
concerns the jurisdiction of the Court which tries the
proceedings. A finding on these please in favour of the party
raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the Court, and so, an
erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be concerned
with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the purview of S.
115 of the Code. But an erroneous decision on a question of law
reached by the subordinate Court which has no relation to
questions of jurisdiction of that Court, cannot be corrected by
the High Court under S. 115.
      Further, it has been settled that material irregularity in
exercise of jurisdiction does not cover either errors of fact or law
(Madanlal Vs. Shyamlal ).
      Keeping these principles in mind, while conceding that the
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 is wider than the one
provided under Section 115 CPC, all I need to observe is that an
order which is passed which would sub-serve and promote the
interest of justice should be preserved rather than the one which is
likely to produce the opposite result.  The 1st petitioner herein has
admitted to have sold a part of the suit schedule property namely
73 square yards to the respondent herein through Ex.B2(=Ex.A2).
Whereas the case of the respondent is that he has purchased the
entire suit schedule property comprising of 150 square yards.
Ex.B2 document, which is a registered sale deed and the covenant
contained therein together with the description of schedule-B
property and the plan annexed thereto clearly support the case of
the respondent that he purchased the whole of 150 Sq.yds and
was put in possession of a dilapidated building standing thereon.
To dislodge this claim, the 1st petitioner herein has filed
O.S.No.2592/2008, but that suit was dismissed.  This apart
O.S.No.2102 of 2009 was filed by one of the tenants of the
respondent herein seeking injunction against the 1st petitioner
herein, that suit is decreed.  It presupposes, therefore, that it is
tenant of the respondent herein who was found in possession of
the suit schedule property in the year 2009 and hence, the
averment of the plaintiff/respondent herein that it is during June
2010, the 1st petitioner herein started unauthorized improvements
to the suit schedule property with a view to induct the other
defendants as tenants, stands to reason to be accepted.  He has
succeeded in that attempt, as is reflected from Ex.A13, copy of the
judgment rendered in W.P.No.15415 of 2010 dated 03.08.2010
instituted by the respondent herein.  It is, therefore, clear that
during June 2010, the respondent herein has been unjustly
deprived of his possession of a dilapidated house by
unauthorizedly undertaking improvements thereto so as to realise
huge sums of money as monthly rents therefrom.
      Therefore, I am of the view that the order passed by the
learned Principal Senior Civil Judge in O.S.No.1515/2010 does not
call for any interference as there is no failure of exercise of
jurisdiction on the part of the said Court.
      Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed.
      Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any shall stand
dismissed.  No costs.
_______________________________________      
JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO          
04.03.2016

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Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

Or.18, rule 17 and sec.151 C.P.C - petition filed for reopen and examination of the executant of Ex.A1 the sale deed to fill up the lacuna in evidence pointed out at the time of arguments not maintainable = Shaik Gousiya Begum. ..Petitioner Shaik Hussan and others.... Respondents = Published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=10515

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.