Section 3(1)(x) of the Act reads as under: 3(1)(x). Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Thus, the offence must necessarily have occurred in any place within public view. Admittedly, the offence occurred within the residence of the petitioner. Consequently, whether there was any intimidation or insult is of no consequence inasmuch as it relates to the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR          
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.1770 of 2008  

09-11-2011

D. Santosh Reddy      

The S.H.O., of Shamshabad P.S.,Rep. by Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P.,
Hyderabad and another

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Sri V. Eswaraiah Chowdary      

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.1: Public Prosecutor        
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT NO.2: Pochiraju Rameshwara Prasad              

ORDER:

        The unfortunate second respondent, who is the de facto complainant, was
allegedly abused referring to the community of the second respondent by the
petitioner.  The second respondent consequently lodged a complaint alleging that
the petitioner committed the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short,
'the Act').  Police laid final report closing the complaint and referring the
case.  Consequently, the second respondent filed a protest petition before the
VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Rajendranagar, Ranga Reddy District.  The protest
petition was numbered as P.R.C. No.37 of 2008.  The accused  then laid the
present petition seeking to quash further proceedings in P.R.C. No.37 of 2008 on
the ground that no case has been made out.
        Sri V. Eswaraiah Choudary, learned counsel for the accused/petitioner,
drew my attention to the complaint lodged by the second respondent.  The
complaint is to the effect that on 19.10.2006, at about 10.30 a.m., when the
second respondent went to the house of the petitioner/accused, the
petitioner/accused abused the second respondent with reference to his community
as scheduled caste person and also otherwise has intimidated the second
respondent.
        The background of the case: The second respondent has been working under
one Gurava Reddy.  Admittedly, Gurava Reddy sent the second respondent to the
petitioner asking him to get back the money due by the petitioner to Gurava
Reddy.  Police recorded that there have been cases and counter cases between
Gurava Reddy and the petitioner.  The petitioner filed a case against Gurava
Reddy in C.C. No.818 of 2006 on the file of the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate,
Rajendranagar, Ranga Reddy District.  Similarly, Gurava Reddy in his turn filed
a case against the petitioner in C.C. NO.123 of 2007 on the file of the same
Court.  Both the case are pending trial.
        The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that where there are
cases and counter cases between the petitioner and Gurava Reddy, Gurava Reddy
uses the second respondent to foist a false case against the petitioner.
        I am afraid that whether the case filed by the second respondent is true
or false cannot be examined in this forum.  It is for me to take the facts as
they are and examine whether a case is made out or otherwise.  If a case prima
facie is made out, it is for the parties to fight it out before the trial Court.
        It is the case of the second respondent that the alleged abuse occurred at
the house of the petitioner.  Under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, an offence is
made out if the insult or intimidation as the case may be to a member of
scheduled caste or scheduled tribe occurred "in any place within public view".
        It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
house of the petitioner cannot be treated as a public place or any place within
the public view and that the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act therefore
could not be made out.
        Sri P. Rameswara Prasad, learned counsel for the second respondent,
contended that albeit the incident occurred in a private place there was
intimidation and threat to the second respondent and that consequently a prima
facie case is made out.  I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned
counsel for the second respondent so far as the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of
the Act is concerned.
        Section 3(1)(x) of the Act reads as under:
        3(1)(x). Intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public
view.

        Thus, the offence must necessarily have occurred in any place within
public view.  Admittedly, the offence occurred within the residence of the
petitioner.  Consequently, whether there was any intimidation or insult is of no
consequence inasmuch as it relates to the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the
Act.
        At the same time, the complaint of the second respondent prima facie
establishes a case under Section 506 Indian Penal Code (IPC).  There is no
embargo as in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act for the offence under Section 506 IPC
that the offence should have occurred in a public place.  Mere criminal
intimidation would be sufficient to constitute the offence under Section 506
IPC.
        The averments of the complaint of the second respondent established the
offence under Section 506 IPC.  The case ought to be continued by the trial
Court for the offence under Section 506 IPC.
        Unfortunately, Section 506 IPC is a non-cognizable offence.  Police cannot
investigate the case against the accused without prior permission of the Court.
Such a permission has not been obtained from the Court to proceed with the case.
Consequently, the case cannot be continued even for the offence under Section
506 IPC.  In effect, the very prosecution is misconceived and is unsustainable.
        I, therefore, accept the claim of the petitioner.  This petition
consequently is allowed.  Further proceedings in P.R.C. No.37 of 2008 on the
file of the VIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Rajendranagar, Ranga Reddy District,
are hereby quashed.

________________  
K.G. SHANKAR, J  
9-11-2011

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