Revision Court cannot and ought not step into the shoes of the trial Court in re-appreciating the material that weighed with the trial Court for passing the order under revision, whenThe order impugned speaks for itself to the required extent and there ought not to be abstract application of principles of law from the decisions relied upon by the trial Court. On the short ground that the order impugned suffers from lack of reasons = Advocate commissioner was appointed without assigning any reasons except on the ground that no prejudice would be caused to other side.

CRP 1881 / 2016
CRPSR 10571 / 2016CASE IS:DISPOSED
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
M SUBRAMANYAM, SPSR NELLORE DIST  VSKATURU VENKATESWARLU, SPSR NELLORE DIST & ANR
PET.ADV. : RAVINDRARESP.ADV. : GANGA RAMI REDDY


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE S.V.BHATT
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1881 OF 2016
ORDER:
Heard learned counsel for petitioner and respondents.
2. The revision is directed against the order dated 29.02.2016 in I.A.No.450 of 2015. The respondents herein filed I.A.No.450 of 2015 under Order 26 Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for appointment of Advocate Commissioner for inspection, measuring and noting down the physical features of plaint schedule property.
3. The trial Court through the impugned order in the revision has accepted the prayer. Hence, the revision petition.
4. Mr. M. Ravindra, appearing for petitioner, contends that the order impugned in the revision, by any stretch of liberal consideration, does not reflect either application of mind by the trial Court much less application of principles of law laid down in the decisions adverted to in the order under revision. In other words, briefly stated, his grievance is that though the order runs into a few pages, it is bereft of reasoning and hardly any ground is made out and merely on the ground that no prejudice is occasioned to revision petitioner, Advocate Commissioner cannot and could not have been appointed at this stage of the matter.
5. Mr. P. Gangarami Reddy, appearing for respondents, however, tried to persuade this Court by referring to other material placed along with the revision petition to contend that even if the order under revision does not give reasons; the same can be appreciated from the totality of circumstances. He, however, submits that if this Court is of the view that the said material cannot and ought not to be looked into, the matter can be remanded to the trial Court for consideration afresh.
6. I am afraid, this Court cannot and ought not step into the shoes of the trial Court in re-appreciating the material that weighed with the trial Court for passing the order under revision. The order impugned speaks for itself to the required extent and there ought not to be abstract application of principles of law from the decisions relied upon by the trial Court. On the short ground that the order impugned suffers from lack of reasons, the civil revision petition is allowed and the matter is remanded to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law within eight (8) weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs. ____________ S. V. BHATT, J April 18, 2016 DSK

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.

cancellation of the sale deeds = Under the Registration Act, 1908 and the Rules framed thereunder, which provide that registration/cancellation of document is only with reference to the executant and the claimant under a document, which is already registered. Petitioner, being a third party, is, therefore, not entitled to approach the registering authority and seek cancellation of the documents executed by third party in favour of any other party. Petitioner’s reliance upon Rule 26 of the Rules framed under the Registration Act is also misconceived inasmuch as Rule 26(k)(i) of the Rules specifically refer to the duty of the registering authority to ensure that the deed of cancellation is executed by all the executants and the claimants, who are parties to previously registered document and only on mutual consent a deed of cancellation can be registered. Since petitioner is not a party to the impugned sale transactions between two different individuals, he is not entitled to seek cancellation thereof and in any case, the petitioner does not satisfy even the requirement of Rule 26, referred to above.