Whether the Tribunal/Court can award compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act over and above the amount claimed by the claimants, though subject to the payment of Court fee etc=he Supreme Court in Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others and the question was answered in the affirmative holding that in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only upto the amount claimed by the claimant. In appropriate case, wherefrom the evidence brought on record, if the Tribunal/Court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is it should be just compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. Such observations were made in the light of the provisions contained in Section 166(1) and (4); 158(6) and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This view was thereafter reiterated by the Supreme Court in Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and Others ; Sanjay Verma vs. Haryana Roadways and Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others vs. Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others . Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, the question referred to the Larger Bench must be answered in the affirmative. Order accordingly. The law declared by the Division Bench in Chintnalas case (supra-2), accordingly stands over ruled. The reference is answered accordingly.

HONBLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE DILIP B. BHOSALE THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE R.R. SUBHASH REDDY THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU      
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO AND  THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        
             
C.M.A. No.43 OF 1998 and batch

05-06-2015

Adam Indur Muttemma,W/o. Adam Indur Mallesh,R/o. Gupte Village,Makloor  
Mandal,Niamabad District and others. Appellants

Rathod Reddia,Nizamabad and others.  Respondents  

Counsel for Appellants  :Mr. K.M. Mahender Reddy

Counsel for Respondent No.1 :  None
 Counsel for Respondent Nos.2&3 : Mrs. Nanda R. Rao        

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

? Cases referred :      1)      2001(6) ALD 429 (DB)
                        2)      2002 (3) ALT 194 (DB)
                        3)      (2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 274
                        4)      (2013) 9 Supreme Court Cases 54
                        5)      (2014) 3 Supreme Court Cases 210
                        6)      (2015) 4 Supreme Court Cases 237
                                       

HONBLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE DILIP B. BHOSALE        
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY        
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU      
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO            
AND
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR        


C.M.A. No.43 OF 1998, C.M.A.(SR) No. 26299 of 2001  
 And
L.P.A. No. 249 of 2000

DATED:05.06.2015  


PC: (Per the Honble the Acting Chief Justice Dilip B. Bhosale)

      In view of divergence of opinions expressed by two Division
Benches of this Court, the following question was referred to the
Larger Bench by the then Honble the Chief Justice:
      Whether the Tribunal/Court can award compensation
under the Motor Vehicles Act over and above the amount
claimed by the claimants, though subject to the payment of
Court fee etc.

      The first Division Bench in Pidigala Linga Reddy and
others vs. Satla Srinivas , took a view that the Court can grant
compensation exceeding the claim amount subject to payment of
Court fee, if any, payable.  Another Division Bench of this Court in
New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Chintnala , took
exactly the opposite view holding that the Tribunal/Court is not
empowered to award higher compensation than the compensation  
claimed by the claimants.  The order of reference was made on
28.6.2002.
      Thereafter, the very same question fell for consideration of
the Supreme Court in Nagappa vs. Gurudayal Singh and
Others   and the question was answered in the affirmative holding
that in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there is no restriction that
compensation could be awarded only upto the amount claimed by
the claimant.  In appropriate case, wherefrom the evidence brought
on record, if the Tribunal/Court considers that the claimant is
entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may
pass such award.  The only embargo is it should be just
compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful
nor unjustifiable from the evidence. Such observations were made in
the light of the provisions contained in Section 166(1) and (4);
158(6) and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.  This view was
thereafter reiterated by the Supreme Court in Rajesh and others
vs. Rajbir Singh and Others ; Sanjay Verma vs. Haryana
Roadways  and Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi and Others vs.
Kasam Daud Kumbhar and Others .  
      Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
the aforementioned judgments, the question referred to the Larger
Bench must be answered in the affirmative.  Order accordingly.  The
law declared by the Division Bench in Chintnalas case (supra-2),
accordingly stands over ruled.
      The reference is answered accordingly.
      The registry is directed to place all the appeals before the
Courts which are assigned to hear these appeals and decide the
same in the light of this order.
____________________  
DILIP B. BHOSALE, ACJ  
_______________________  
R.SUBHASH REDDY, J    
___________
K.C. BHANU, J
____________________  
NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO, J        
______________
SANJAY KUMAR, J  
Date:  5th June, 2015

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