A careful analysis of the above reproduced Clause shows that close relatives of the Government employees working in Civil Supplies or Revenue Department or the Civil Supplies Corporation are rendered ineligible for being appointed as fair price shop dealers. In addition to the above-mentioned categories, the close relatives of the Village Administrative Officer of the Village are also rendered ineligible. The Village Administrative Officer is also an employee of the Revenue Department. If the Government intended to include all the functionaries of the Revenue Department irrespective of their cadre in the said Clause, there was no need for it to refer to the category of Village Administrative Officers separately. The main intention behind Clause-12(iii) of the said G.O. appears to be that if the close relatives of the Government employees working in the Civil Supplies or Revenue Departments or Civil Supplies Corporation are appointed, there is a likelihood of the dealers misusing the position of their close relatives. Therefore, from the context in which the phrase the Government employees is used, it is reasonable to construe that the low cadre employees such as Village Servants, who are in no position to wield influence, are excluded. Though the Village Administrative Officer is also not a highly placed employee, considering the hold he may have over the people of the Village, because of importance of the functions he discharges, this category is also included separately despite the same being a part of Revenue Department. At the same time, the Village Servant is not included in the said Clause. Viewed from this perspective, I am of the opinion that respondent No.3 cannot be disqualified merely because her father was the Village Servant of Vavilla Village. For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed. As a sequel to dismissal of the Writ Petition, interim order, dated 01.02.2012, is vacated and WPMP.No.2992 of 2012 and WVMP.No.66 of 2013 are dismissed as infructuous.

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY        

WRIT PETITION No.2411 of 2012  

10-06-2015

Davuluru Prasad,S/o Sanyasayya..... Petitioner

The Revenue Divisional Officer,Kavali, SPSR Nellore District and two
others......Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri Lakkadi Dayaker Reddy

Counsel for the Respondents: AGP for Civil Supplies (AP)

<Gist:

>Head Note:                                            


? Cases Referred:
NIL

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY        

WRIT PETITION No.2411 of 2012  

Date:10.06.2015

The Court made the following:


ORDER:

        This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare the
action of respondent No.1, in appointing respondent No.3 as fair
price shop dealer of Shop No.2 of Vavilla Village, Vidvaluru
Mandal, SPSR Nellore District, vide his proceedings in
Rc.B/157/2007, dated 28.12.2011, as illegal and arbitrary.
        The petitioner, who is one of the card holders attached to
the above-mentioned fair price shop, pleaded that the father of
respondent No.3 is working as a Village Servant of Vavilla
Village and that therefore, she was not eligible to be considered
and appointed as fair price shop dealer. In order to sustain his
challenge, the petitioner has placed reliance on Clause-12(iii) of
G.O.Ms.No.4, Consumer Affairs, Food and Civil Supplies (CS-1)
Department, dated 19.02.2011.
        Before dealing with the aforesaid Clause, I am of the
opinion that the petitioner could not satisfy his locus to question
the appointment of respondent No.3. No doubt, being a card
holder he may be interested in proper distribution of essential
commodities but his interest would not extend beyond this.
Eight persons have applied for fair price shop dealership, out of
whom, five were found eligible for consideration. Respondent
No.3, having been found more suitable than other short-listed
candidates, was appointed as the fair price shop dealer.
Interestingly, none of the unsuccessful candidates have
questioned the appointment of respondent No.3. While
exercising the power of judicial review under Article-226 of the
Constitution of India, I feel that in a case of this nature, where
the really interested parties have not questioned the
appointment of respondent No.3, this Court would not intervene
at the instance of a person who has only a limited concern with
the functioning of the fair price shop dealer. Therefore, I am not
inclined to interfere with the impugned order at the instance of
the petitioner.
        Even otherwise, I am not convinced with the plea of the
petitioner that respondent No.3 is not eligible for being
appointed as fair price shop dealer.
        Clause-12(iii) of G.O.Ms.No.4, which is made the sole
basis for challenging the appointment of respondent No.3, reads
as under:
Close relatives of Government employees especially
those working in Civil Supplies Department or
Revenue Department or the Civil Supplies
Corporation or Village Administrative Officer of the
Village shall not be appointed as F.P. Shop Dealers;
there shall however be no objection to appoint
family members or relatives of employees working
on contractual basis on consolidated pay like
Anganwadi teachers, ANMs, Asha workers, Vidya  
Volunteers, out sourcing employees etc.

        A careful analysis of the above reproduced Clause shows
that close relatives of the Government employees working in
Civil Supplies or Revenue Department or the Civil Supplies
Corporation are rendered ineligible for being appointed as fair
price shop dealers. In addition to the above-mentioned
categories, the close relatives of the Village Administrative
Officer of the Village are also rendered ineligible. The Village
Administrative Officer is also an employee of the Revenue
Department. If the Government intended to include all the
functionaries of the Revenue Department irrespective of their
cadre in the said Clause, there was no need for it to refer to the
category of Village Administrative Officers separately. The main
intention behind Clause-12(iii) of the said G.O. appears to be
that if the close relatives of the Government employees working
in the Civil Supplies or Revenue Departments or Civil Supplies
Corporation are appointed, there is a likelihood of the dealers
misusing the position of their close relatives. Therefore, from the
context in which the phrase the Government employees is
used, it is reasonable to construe that the low cadre employees
such as Village Servants, who are in no position to wield
influence, are excluded. Though the Village Administrative
Officer is also not a highly placed employee, considering the
hold he may have over the people of the Village, because of
importance of the functions he discharges, this category is also
included separately despite the same being a part of Revenue
Department. At the same time, the Village Servant is not
included in the said Clause.
     Viewed from this perspective, I am of the opinion that
respondent No.3 cannot be disqualified merely because her
father was the Village Servant of Vavilla Village.
        For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is
dismissed.
     As a sequel to dismissal of the Writ Petition, interim order,
dated 01.02.2012, is vacated and WPMP.No.2992 of 2012 and  
WVMP.No.66 of 2013 are dismissed as infructuous.
___________________________    
JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY      
10th June, 2015

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