court can creat charge on movables under special circumstances - their lordships created charge on retirement benefits of husband for permanent alimony claims of wife and daughter under sec.25 of Hinu Marriage Act

court can creat charge on movables under special circumstances - their lordships created charge on retirement benefits of husband for permanent alimony claims of wife and daughter under sec.25 of Hinu Marriage Act
Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short, 'the Act)
for grant of Rs.25,00,000/- towards her permanent alimony and
Rs.20,00,000/- to Kumari K. Navya, (the daughter of the
petitioner and the respondent), towards her maintenance,
education and marriage expenses.
The petitioner requests this
Court to create a charge over the G.P.F. and other retiral
benefits of the respondent,
While Section 25 of the Act provides for creation of a
charge on immovable property for securing payment of
permanent alimony, the respondent denies having any
immovable property and, despite alleging that he has a house
and a plot at Vanasthalipuram and Desaipet, the petitioner has
been unable to produce any evidence in this regard.  In the
absence of any evidence in support of the petitioners plea, this
Court must proceed on the premise that the respondent does
not have any immovable property.
 Should this Court then fold
its hands, and express its inability to come to the aid of a single
mother who has been struggling for the past seventeen years not
only to make both ends meet, but also to provide for the
education of their daughter for the past several years?
 The
answer can only be in the negative.  It cannot be lost sight of
that the law does not remain static, and does not operate in a
vacuum. As social norms and values change, laws too have to be
reinterpreted, and recast. Law is really a dynamic instrument
fashioned by society for the purposes of achieving harmonious
adjustment, human relations by elimination of social tensions
and conflicts. Law does not stand still; it moves continuously.
Once this is recognised, then the task of a judge is put on a
higher plane. He must consciously seek to mould the law so as
to serve the needs of the time


we direct that the permanent alimony, payable
by the respondent to the petitioner in terms of the order now
passed by this Court, shall be secured by way of a charge over
the retiral/terminal benefits of the respondent.  The charge
shall, however, be limited only to such of those retiral benefits
for which there is no statutory prohibition for creation of a
charge or attachment.

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