The Collector is not authorized under the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (in short the Act) to direct the 3rd respondent to take up the proceedings suo moto and alter the mutation proceedings earlier carried out. There is no such suo moto power available with the 2nd respondent under the provisions of the Act.Sections 2(2), 3, 4, 5 and 9 of the Act. A perusal of the Act would leave no manner of doubt while the Collector under Section 9 of the Act is entitled to suo moto to call for record and take appropriate action in the Act, no such suo moto power is conferred on the Tahasildhar. In that view of the matter, the direction given by the Collector to the Tahasildhar to exercise suo moto powers is totally impermissible. Allowing such direction to be implemented would amount to the conferring of the suo moto power by the Collector, which otherwise not available and not given to the Collector by the statute. In that view of the matter, the order of the 2nd respondent-Collector directing the 3rd respondent cannot be sustained. The notice dated 15.12.2014 issued by the 3rd respondent, being in obedience to the orders of the Collector dated 16.10.2014, the same also cannot stand. Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be allowed.

HONBLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM          

WRIT PETITION No.40504 OF 2014  

21-01-2015

M/s.Satya Sai Builders and Developers, Hyderabad Petitioner

The State of Telangana and three others Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri K. Lakshman

Counsel for the respondents:  Learned Asst.Government
                               Pleader for Revenue (TS)

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM            

WRIT PETITION No.40504 OF 2014  

O R D E R:

     The petitioner challenges the proceedings of the 3rd
respondent-The Special Grade Deputy Collector and Revenue
Divisional Officer, Saroornagar Division, Ranga Reddy
District, dated 16.10.2014 and also the proceedings dated
15.12.2014.  The Petitioner claims to be the purchaser of the
land in Sy.No.91 through a registered sale deed bearing
Document No.3180/2011, dated 27.07.2011.  

     After purchase of the property, the petitioner was put in
possession of the property by the vendors and mutation
proceedings also have been carried on.  While the things
stood thus, petitioner received a notice dated 15.12.2014
from the 3rd respondent directing him to appear for enquiry.
On further verification, he came to be aware of the
proceedings dated 16.10.2014 issued by the 2nd respondent-
District Collector, Ranga Reddy District.  Challenging the
notice, learned counsel for the petitioner Sri K. Lakshman,
raised three legal contentions to the effect
1)      The Collector is not authorized under the A.P. Rights
in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (in short
the Act) to direct the 3rd respondent to take up the
proceedings suo moto and alter the mutation
proceedings earlier carried out.  There is no such suo
moto power available with the 2nd respondent under
the provisions of the Act.
2)      Further, the 2nd respondent himself is not authorized
under the law to issue any such direction, it may be
open for him to exercise the power under Section 9 of
the Act with respect to any of the proceedings, but he
is not empowered to issue any such direction
conferring subordinate authority suo moto powers
de hors the Act.
3)      Further the entire premise on which the suo moto
proceedings was sought to be initiated was on the
ground the original declarant in land ceiling
proceedings alleged surrender of the land which was
in dispute and encumbered.  Since the petitioner is a
bona fide purchaser for consideration his rights
cannot be interfered with.
     He also further raised grounds in relation to the merits
of the matter.  Learned Government Pleader opposed the writ
petition and submits that the Collector being supervisory
authority he is entitled to direct the subordinate authority to
take action.

     For the disposal of the case in issue, in particular with
reference to the specific grounds raised by the petitioner, it
may be useful to refer Sections 2(2), 3, 4, 5 and 9 of the Act.

     A perusal of the Act would leave no manner of doubt
while the Collector under Section 9 of the Act is entitled to
suo moto to call for record and take appropriate action in the
Act, no such suo moto power is conferred on the Tahasildhar.
In that view of the matter, the direction given by the Collector
to the Tahasildhar to exercise suo moto powers is totally
impermissible.  Allowing such direction to be implemented
would amount to the conferring of the suo moto power by the
Collector, which otherwise not available and not given to the
Collector by the statute.  In that view of the matter, the order
of the 2nd respondent-Collector directing the 3rd respondent
cannot be sustained.  The notice dated 15.12.2014 issued by
the 3rd respondent, being in obedience to the orders of the
Collector dated 16.10.2014, the same also cannot stand.
Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be allowed.

      Accordingly, the Writ Petition is allowed.  However, it is
made clear that the authorities are at liberty to take
appropriate action, if so advised in accordance with law.
There shall be no order as to costs.  In sequel, miscellaneous
petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.
-----------------------------------
CHALLA KODANDA RAM, J      
Dated:21.01.2015.

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