Evidence Act- admissibility of previous Depositions made in earlier proceedings in respect of disputes issue - Trial court refused to receive and to mark the depositions under sec.33 of INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT - A.P.High court held that it is a settled law that sec.33 not apply to depositions - but held that where if a party has made certain admissions in the previous proceeding instituted between the same parties, such evidence can be marked as an exhibit in subsequent suit. -2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS

The respondent filed the above-mentioned suit for eviction of
the petitioner from the suit schedule property.  During the trial, the
petitioner sought to mark the deposition of the respondent given in
O.S.No.751 of 2005.  The petitioner was not allowed the mark the
said deposition on the ground that the respondent has not satisfied
the requirements of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for
short the Act).  Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner
filed this revision petition.
The petitioner wanted to mark the said
deposition in the present suit on the ground that the respondent has
made certain admissions in the said suit relating to the tenancy of
the building from which the petitioner is sought to be evicted in the
present suit.

 Dealing with Section 33 of the Act, the Supreme 
 held that in a given case
Section 33 of the Act may not in terms apply where if a party has
made certain admissions in the previous proceeding instituted
between the same parties, such evidence can be marked as an  
exhibit in subsequent suit.  Though the nature of the suits in the
instant case varies, the purpose for which the petitioner sought
marking of evidence of the respondent is evidently to plead that in
the face of the purported admission made by him that the firm was
the tenant and not the petitioner, the suit filed without impleading
the firm is not maintainable.  In the light of the purpose for which the
petitioner seeks to mark the evidence of the respondent, it cannot
be said that the said evidence has no relevance to the present suit.
In my opinion, the lower Court has misdirected itself in not permitting
the petitioner to mark the said deposition of the respondent in
O.S.No.751 of 2005 in evidence. - 2015 A.P.(2014) MSKLAWREPORTS


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