Andhra Pradesh (A.A.) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1956 was amended by Amendment Act 16/2013 - According to the Amendment, pattas granted for the service inams burdened with service should be deemed to have been null and void - claim that it was a service inam and patta pass books and title deeds were given and he is owner of the property to alienate - not tenable -even not entitled to remain in possession as he is rendering services now - 2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports



Andhra
Pradesh (A.A.) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
1956 was amended by Amendment Act 16/2013 and is     
retrospective in operation.   

According to the Amendment, pattas
granted for the service inams burdened with service should be
deemed to have been null and void and no effect can be given to
the pattas in that manner.

the land in issue is granted as
Adyapaka Service, the extract of village Resettlement register is
filed.  It would thus show that the inam granted to the ancestors of
the petitioner was service inam.   
In accordance with the mandate
of Section 4(4) of the Act, 1956, even if ryotwari patta was granted
to the petitioner, the same has no legal validity and thus, pattadar
pass books or title deeds issued in terms thereof have no legal
validity.   Having regard to the mandate of Sections 43 and 46(3) of
Act, 1987 and Section 4(4) of Act, 1956, the title continues to  vest
in the temple and petitioner is not entitled to alienate the said
property. 
 According to Section 75 of Act, 1987, sale of land
granted as service inam would be null and void unless such
transaction is effected with the prior sanction of the Government.
In fact, the case of the 6th respondent-temple is that even petitioner
is not entitled to be in possession of the said property as petitioner
is not rendering any service to the temple and the temple is
entitled to claim possession of the property.

as per the Resettlement
Register of the Village, the land is classified as temple Adyapaka
Service and as per the provision of Section 4(4) of the Act, 1956,
no ryotwari patta can be granted and even if it is already granted,
it is null and void and property continues to be vested in the
institution.  Thus, as per the material on record, the property
continues to vest in the 6th respondent temple.    Therefore,
petitioner cannot claim, merely on the factum of his possession or
the earlier inam granted to his ancestors for the service rendered
by them, to contend that he is the owner and entitled to alienate.
Thus, in the facts of this case, the petitioner is not entitled to relief
prayed by him and writ petition is liable to be dismissed and it is
accordingly dismissed.   However, it is left open to the petitioner to
ascertain his title by due process of law and any observations
made in the writ petition do not come in the way in adjudicating
the claim of the petitioner on the title to the property in issue.  No
costs. -2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports

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