Section 31 (1) (b) of the A.P.Excise Act, 1968 - selling non-duty paid beer - stock seized and license was suspended pending enquiry - Writ filed as a peremptory finding was recorded before enquiry - their lordships held that However, in the immediate next sentence he has stated as under:"Thus it calls for initiation of departmental action under Section 31 (1) (b) A.P.Excise Act, 1968, pending further enquiry in the public interest." - dismissed the writ = N.Malla Reddy The Prohibition & Excise Superintendent,Medchal, Ranga Reddy District. Counsel for the petitioner: Mr.S.Niranjan Reddy for Mr.P.Sri Harsha Reddy = 2013 (March. Part) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9743

Section 31 (1) (b) of the A.P.Excise Act, 1968 - selling non-duty paid beer - stock seized and license was suspended pending enquiry - Writ filed as a peremptory finding was recorded before enquiry - their lordships held that However, in the immediate next sentence he has stated as under:"Thus it calls for initiation of departmental action under Section 31 (1)(b) A.P.Excise Act, 1968, pending further enquiry in the public interest." - dismissed the writ =

No doubt, if the sentence preceding the above quoted part of the order passed by
respondent No.1 is read in isolation, it would definitely give an impression
that the respondent has arrived at a final conclusion on the petitioner's
violation of license conditions.  However, if the above quoted sentence is read
along with the previous part of his order, such an impression will get
obliterated.  One needs to be conscious of the fact that the respondent is not a
judicially trained officer.
The petitioner is a retail dealer of Indian Made Liquor holding A.4 license.  On
14-03-2013, the Prohibition and Excise officials inspected the petitioner's
liquor shop and allegedly found 11 boxes of non-duty paid liquor.  Based on the
Panchanama and the report submitted by the Inspecting Officials, the respondent
has initiated proceedings against the petitioner.  Pending those proceedings, he
has initiated departmental action against the petitioner and suspended the
petitioner's license under Section 31 (1) (b) of the A.P.Excise Act, 1968 (for
short 'the Act'), pending enquiry.
under Section 63 of the Act, his client has alternative
remedies of two successive appeals and that however, the reason for the
petitioner filing this Writ Petition bypassing the said remedies is that the
respondent has recorded peremptory finding relating to his involvement in
violation of the license conditions.=
  A perusal of the impugned order would show that the respondent has made an 
observation that the petitioner is involved in violation of the license
conditions.  However, in the immediate next sentence he has stated as under:
        "Thus it calls for initiation of departmental action under Section 31 (1)
(b) A.P.Excise Act, 1968, pending further enquiry in the public interest."

No doubt, if the sentence preceding the above quoted part of the order passed by
respondent No.1 is read in isolation, it would definitely give an impression
that the respondent has arrived at a final conclusion on the petitioner's
violation of license conditions.  However, if the above quoted sentence is read
along with the previous part of his order, such an impression will get
obliterated.  One needs to be conscious of the fact that the respondent is not a
judicially trained officer.
No doubt in M/s.Sree Devi Wines ( 1 supra), a learned single Judge
of this Court has dealt with a similar order and quashed the same only on the
ground that the authority therein should not have rendered peremptory finding at
the enquiry stage.  On the facts of the present case, I am not inclined to
invalidate the impugned order passed by the respondent on that ground for the
reasons already recorded by me herein before.  Since the petitioner has a right
of appeal against the impugned order, I do not find any reason to entertain the
Writ Petition for adjudication on merits.
2013 (March. Part) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9743


The Hon'ble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy

Writ Petition No.9303 of 2013

28.03.2013

N.Malla Reddy

The Prohibition & Excise Superintendent,Medchal, Ranga Reddy District.

Counsel for the petitioner: Mr.S.Niranjan Reddy for Mr.P.Sri Harsha Reddy

Counsel for the respondent: GP for Prohibition & Excise

<Gist:

>Head Note

?Cases referred:
1995 (1) ALD 164

Order:
        This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare the action of the
respondent, in suspending the petitioner's A.4 license, as illegal and
arbitrary.
        I have heard Mr.S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for Sri P.Sri
Harsha Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Government
Pleader for Prohibition and Excise appearing for the respondent.
The petitioner is a retail dealer of Indian Made Liquor holding A.4 license.  On
14-03-2013, the Prohibition and Excise officials inspected the petitioner's
liquor shop and allegedly found 11 boxes of non-duty paid liquor.  Based on the
Panchanama and the report submitted by the Inspecting Officials, the respondent
has initiated proceedings against the petitioner.  Pending those proceedings, he
has initiated departmental action against the petitioner and suspended the
petitioner's license under Section 31 (1) (b) of the A.P.Excise Act, 1968 (for
short 'the Act'), pending enquiry.
        At the hearing, Mr.S.Niranjan Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner,
has not disputed that under Section 63 of the Act, his client has alternative
remedies of two successive appeals and that however, the reason for the
petitioner filing this Writ Petition bypassing the said remedies is that the
respondent has recorded peremptory finding relating to his involvement in
violation of the license conditions.  In support of his submission, the learned
Counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in M/s.Sree Devi Wines vs.
The Deputy Commissioner of Excise, Kakinada and others1.
        A perusal of the impugned order would show that the respondent has made an 
observation that the petitioner is involved in violation of the license
conditions.  However, in the immediate next sentence he has stated as under:
        "Thus it calls for initiation of departmental action under Section 31 (1)
(b) A.P.Excise Act, 1968, pending further enquiry in the public interest."

No doubt, if the sentence preceding the above quoted part of the order passed by
respondent No.1 is read in isolation, it would definitely give an impression
that the respondent has arrived at a final conclusion on the petitioner's
violation of license conditions.  However, if the above quoted sentence is read
along with the previous part of his order, such an impression will get
obliterated.  One needs to be conscious of the fact that the respondent is not a
judicially trained officer.  Even though it is desirable that appropriate
expressions need to be deployed in the orders passed by the
administrative/quasi-judicial bodies, to dispel apprehensions in the minds of
the persons likely to be affected by such orders, the inadequacy in expressions
would not render the orders passed by such authorities ipso facto illegal or
invalid.  The overall circumstances under which such orders are passed and the
context in which such expressions are used need to be understood in right
perspective. No doubt in M/s.Sree Devi Wines ( 1 supra), a learned single Judge
of this Court has dealt with a similar order and quashed the same only on the
ground that the authority therein should not have rendered peremptory finding at
the enquiry stage.  On the facts of the present case, I am not inclined to
invalidate the impugned order passed by the respondent on that ground for the
reasons already recorded by me herein before.  Since the petitioner has a right
of appeal against the impugned order, I do not find any reason to entertain the
Writ Petition for adjudication on merits.
        For the above-mentioned reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed with
liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy of appeal,
As a sequel to dismissal of the Writ Petition, WPMP.No.11601 of 2013, filed by
the petitioner for interim relief, is disposed of as infructuous.
______________________  
C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy, J
Date: 28th March, 2013

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

Or.18, rule 17 and sec.151 C.P.C - petition filed for reopen and examination of the executant of Ex.A1 the sale deed to fill up the lacuna in evidence pointed out at the time of arguments not maintainable = Shaik Gousiya Begum. ..Petitioner Shaik Hussan and others.... Respondents = Published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=10515

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.