Sec.17 (1)(ii)(a)A.P. CIVIL COURTS Act -verses - Sec.49 -Expl. 3 of A.P.C.F &S.V. Act - Appeal Jurisdiction - objection as the suit is filed for 5 lakhs , appeal lies to District court - the appellant replied that as the subsequent interest has been added, the value of the appeal has come to Rs.9,76,465/- which exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court. - their lordships held that the office objection was correct and order to return the appeal to present in proper District court = M.Mohan Reddy, S/o N.Guruva Reddy..... Appellant D.Rajamallu, S/o Odelu and three others......Respondents = 2014 (March. Part) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11011

Sec.17 (1)(ii)(a)A.P. CIVIL COURTS Act -verses -  Sec.49 -Expl. 3 of A.P.C.F &S.V. Act - Appeal Jurisdiction - objection as the suit is filed for 5 lakhs , appeal lies to District court - the appellant replied that as the subsequent interest has been added, the value of the appeal has come to Rs.9,76,465/- which exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court. - their lordships held that the office objection was correct and order to return the appeal to present in proper District court =

Explanation-(3) to Section 49 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, which envisages inclusion of interest awarded
subsequent to the institution of the suit and that the same shall be deemed to
be the subject matter of the appeal.
Section 49 of the said Act deals with payment of Court fees. The said provision
therefore cannot be relied upon for the purpose of determining the pecuniary
jurisdiction of an appellate Court.=
Section 17 of the Act being the substantive provision, which determines the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts, the jurisdiction of the Courts has to be
determined with reference to the said provision.
Section 17(1)(ii)(a) of the Act prescribed the amount or the value of the
subject matter of the suit or the proceeding as the criterion for determining
the pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate Court and not the value of the
appeal, increased on account of addition of interest to the value of the suit.
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Office objections are sustained. The
Registry is directed to return the appeal to the appellant for being presented
before the District Court.

2014 (March. Part) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=11011

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY        

CCCA(SR).No.1172 of 2014  

06-03-2014

M.Mohan Reddy, S/o N.Guruva Reddy..... Appellant

D.Rajamallu, S/o Odelu and three others......Respondents

Counsel for the appellant: Sri Vanam Vishwanatham

Counsel for the Respondents: ---

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases Referred:
NIL

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY        

CCCA(SR).No.1172 of 2014  

Date:06.03.2014


ORDER:
        The Office has raised an objection on the maintainability of this appeal
on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction.
The suit was valued at Rs.5 lakhs under Section 17(1)(ii)(a) of the Andhra
Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 (for short 'the Act').
From the decree of the trial Court, an appeal lies to the District Court when
the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit or proceeding is not more
than Rs.5 lakhs. The Registry has, therefore, raised an objection to which the
learned counsel for the appellant replied that as the subsequent interest has
been added, the value of the appeal has come to Rs.9,76,465/- which exceeds the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court.
At the hearing, Sri Vanam Vishwanatham, the learned counsel for the appellant,
has relied upon Explanation-(3) to Section 49 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees
and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, which envisages inclusion of interest awarded
subsequent to the institution of the suit and that the same shall be deemed to
be the subject matter of the appeal.
Section 49 of the said Act deals with payment of Court fees. The said provision
therefore cannot be relied upon for the purpose of determining the pecuniary
jurisdiction of an appellate Court.
Section 17 of the Act being the substantive provision, which determines the
pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts, the jurisdiction of the Courts has to be
determined with reference to the said provision.
Section 17(1)(ii)(a) of the Act prescribed the amount or the value of the
subject matter of the suit or the proceeding as the criterion for determining
the pecuniary jurisdiction of the appellate Court and not the value of the
appeal, increased on account of addition of interest to the value of the suit.
For the above-mentioned reasons, the Office objections are sustained. The
Registry is directed to return the appeal to the appellant for being presented
before the District Court.
____________________________    
JUSTICE C.V. NAGARJUNA REDDY      
06th March, 2014

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