About Me

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Monday, May 10, 2021

ORDER 39 RULE 1 &2 - SPECIFIC PERFROMANCE SUIT - NOT TO DEMOLISH OR TO CONSTRUCT ANY BUILDING PENDING SUIT - admittedly by the time the application was filed, substantial portion of the construction was completed. Even assuming that the entire construction is completed, it will not cause any loss or prejudice to the appellant. As rightly observed by the Court below that in the event the appellant succeeds in the suit, the respondents have to execute a sale deed along with the structures. Moreover, when the respondents have given an undertaking in the counter that they are not going to alienate the schedule property to any third parties and they have no intention to alienate the same, the apprehension of the appellant is absolutely baseless. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the well considered order passed by the Court below.

AP HIGHCOURT

THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.168 of 2020

Thumati Venkata Suresh Babu

-VS-

Kavuri Madhava Rao,

ORDER:-

 Challenging the order dated 16.07.2020 passed in I.A.No.146

of 2020 in O.S.No.31 of 2018 on the file of the Court of X

Additional District & Special Sessions Judge, Krishna at

Machilipatnam, this appeal has been filed by the appellant /

plaintiff.

2. The appellant, who is the plaintiff has filed the suit in

O.S.No.31 of 2018 for specific performance of agreement of sale

dated 05.07.2011.

3. The case of the appellant / plaintiff is that late Kavuri

Venkateswara Rao for the purpose of family needs offered to sell

the suit schedule property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.20 lakhs

and the plaintiff paid an amount of Rs.12 lakhs as advance on the

same day itself and the balance amount has to be paid on or before

05.07.2013. On 03.07.2013 the petitioner has paid an amount of

Rs.6 lakhs, out of Rs.8 lakhs. Later, the father of defendants died

on 17.03.2014. Subsequently, when the defendants are evading to

receive the balance of sale consideration, the plaintiff filed the suit.

4. During pendency of the suit, I.A.No.146 of 2020 is filed

seeking temporary injunction restraining the 1st respondent from

demolishing any part of the plaint schedule building or raising any

new construction in the schedule property pending disposal of the

suit. The Court below after hearing both parties, dismissed the

application on the ground that admittedly as on the date of filing of

the petition substantial portion of the construction is completed, 

2

without expressing any merits of the rival parties in the suit,

considering the conduct of the petitioner in approaching the Court

almost five years from the date of endorsement and seven years

from the date of agreement of sale, there is no balance of

convenience in favour of the petitioner. The Court below has also

observed that if the 1st respondent continues to make construction,

in the event of succeeding in the suit, the petitioner is entitled for a

registered sale deed in respect of suit schedule property with

possession including any constructions which are made pending

disposal of the suit.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that if the

respondents are permitted to raise the construction, it would cause

irreparable loss to the appellant and there is every possibility of

alienating and creating third party interest. Further, it is stated

that the Court below has failed to appreciate that there is prima

facie case and balance of convenience in favour of the appellant.

6. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent would submit that

the agreement of sale is of the year 2011 and in fact by the time of

filing the application substantial portion of the construction is

completed. He submit that it is specifically averred in the counter

filed in I.A. before the Court below that the respondents never

made any attempt to alienate the plaint schedule property pending

disposal of the suit and further they undertook that they will not

alienate the schedule property or enter into any agreement with

third parties in future till the disposal of the suit. Learned counsel

for the 1st respondent would submit that the construction is made

after obtaining necessary permission from the Municipality. 

3

7. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and

learned counsel for the 1st respondent, admittedly by the time the

application was filed, substantial portion of the construction was

completed. Even assuming that the entire construction is

completed, it will not cause any loss or prejudice to the appellant.

As rightly observed by the Court below that in the event the

appellant succeeds in the suit, the respondents have to execute a

sale deed along with the structures. Moreover, when the

respondents have given an undertaking in the counter that they

are not going to alienate the schedule property to any third parties

and they have no intention to alienate the same, the apprehension

of the appellant is absolutely baseless. Therefore, there are no

grounds to interfere with the well considered order passed by the

Court below.

8. In the result, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed.

No order as to costs.

 As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall

stand closed.

___________________________________

JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI


21st October, 2020

PVD


 

4

THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.168 of 2020

21st October, 2020

PVD 

0RDER 39 RULE 1 & 2 - PARTITION SUIT - NOT TO ALIENATE PENDING SUIT = Defendants 1, 4 and 5 who are the appellants herein filed counter, wherein they stated that pursuant to the settlement deed dated 12.09.1994, they executed a number of 6 documents and entered into various transactions. It is not in dispute that the appellant herein did not get the settlement deed dated 12.09.1994 marked. In fact, all the documents, on which the appellants herein sought to rely upon, are the documents emanated on the basis of the alleged settlement deed dated 12.09.1994. In fact, the 1st respondent herein is strongly disputing the genuineness of the said settlement deed. The learned District Judge, only after taking into consideration all the contentions advanced by both the parties and taking into consideration the non-marking of the settlement deed dated 12.09.1994 and in order to avoid further complications in the matter, granted the order of injunction in favour of the 1st respondent herein. It is a settled proposition of law that the relief of injunction is a discretionary and equitable relief. A perusal of the order passed by the trial Court shows that the learned I Additional District Judge has assigned cogent and convincing reasons in the impugned order. 9. Having regard to the apprehension expressed by the learned senior counsel, Sri P.Veera Reddy, that the 1st respondent-plaintiff is taking steps to get the revenue records mutated taking advantage of the injunction orders, this Court is inclined to modify the injunction order as an order of status quo in all respects with regard to the subject property.

AP HIGH COURT

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

THE HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.235 OF 2020

 Shamshunnisa Begum

-VS-

Khamrunnisa Begum,

JUDGMENT: (per AVSS,J)

Defendants 1, 4 and 5 in O.S. No.20 of 2019 on the file of

the Court of I Additional District Judge, Kurnool, are the

appellants in the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, preferred

under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

(C.P.C.). This appeal challenges the order dated 03.11.2020

passed by the said Court in I.A. No.166 of 2019 in O.S. No.20 of

2019. The 1st respondent herein instituted the said suit against

the appellants and respondents 2 and 3 herein for partition of

the plaint schedule property and for allotment of 1/8th share to

her and for mesne profits. Along with the suit, the 1st

respondent herein filed I.A. No.166 of 2019 under the provisions

of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., praying the trial Court to

grant ad interim injunction to restrain the defendants or

anybody, claiming through them from creating third party

interest, like sale, mortgage, gift, relinquishment and such other

transactions in respect of petition schedule property.

Respondents 1, 4 and 5 in the interlocutory application, who are

the appellants herein resisted the said application by filing a

counter. The learned I Additional District Judge, Kurnool, by 

 2

way of an order dated 03.11.2020, allowed the injunction

application, granting ad interim injunction, restraining the

defendants from alienating the petition schedule property

pending disposal of the suit. This appeal calls in question the

said order passed by the learned I Additional District Judge,

granting ad interim injunction in favour of the 1st respondent

herein.

 2. Heard Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned senior counsel

representing Sri M.Chinnappa Reddy, learned counsel for the

appellants and Sri G.Sravan Kumar, learned counsel for the 1st

respondent, apart from perusing the material available on

record.

 3. Learned senior counsel maintains that the questioned

order is highly erroneous, contrary to law and opposed to the

very spirit and object of the provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1

and 2 C.P.C. It is further contended that in the absence of

necessary ingredients of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C., the

leaned I Additional District Judge grossly erred in granting

equitable relief of injunction. It is further submitted that in view

of the family arrangement dated 11.09.1994 entered into among

the family members, the very suit instituted by the 1st

respondent herein is not maintainable. It is further contended

by the learned counsel that though the respondents-defendants 

 3

produced voluminous evidence, in support of their possession

and the transactions entered into subsequent to the family

settlement, the learned I Additional District Judge failed to take

the same into consideration. It is further contended that the

main suit is barred by limitation and the interest of the 1st

respondent, if any, is well protected by Section 52 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Learned senior counsel further

submits that taking advantage of the injunction granted by the

learned trial Court, the 1st respondent-plaintiff is actively

contemplating to approach the revenue authorities to get the

entries changed in the revenue records and if the same is

permitted, the appellants herein and their successors will have

to suffer irreparable loss and hardship. It is also submitted by

the learned senior counsel that for having slept over the matter

from 1994, the 1st respondent herein instituted the suit in the

year 2019 and there are no bona fides on the part of the

plaintiff.


 4. On the contrary, it is contended by Sri G.Sravan

Kumar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent that there is

absolutely no infirmity nor there exists any error in the order

passed by the learned District Judge and in the absence of the

same, the discretionary relief granted by the learned Judge is

not amenable for any interference under Order XLIII Rule 1 

 4

C.P.C. It is further contended by the learned counsel that since

all the issues raised by the appellants herein were thoroughly

answered by the learned District Judge in the impugned order,

the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. It is further

submitted by the learned counsel that in order to avoid

multiplicity of litigation, learned District Judge granted

discretionary relief of injunction, as such, the same does not

warrant any interference of this Court.

 5. In the above background, now the issue that falls for

consideration of this Court in the present Civil Miscellaneous

Appeal is “Whether the order passed by the learned District

Judge is sustainable and tenable and whether the same

warrants any interference of this Court?”

 6. Appellants and the respondents herein are the

children of late Sri Mohammad Ghouse and late Smt. S.Ghousia

Bee of Kurnool town, appellant No.1 and respondents 1 to 3 are

their daughters and appellants 2 and 3 are the sons of Sri

Mohammad Ghouse and Smt. S.Ghousia Bee.

 7. The information available on record discloses, in clear

and vivid terms, that there is absolutely no controversy with

regard to the reality that Smt. Ghousia Bee owned the subject

property. Smt. Ghousia Bee died intestate on 26.01.1990, 

 5

leaving behind her husband and the parties to the present

litigation. Sri Mohammad Ghouse also passed away on

06.06.1996. According to the learned counsel for the 1st

respondent-plaintiff, appellants 2 and 3 used to apportion total

income derived from all the properties to all the shares including

the plaintiff upto the end of 2017 and they dodged to give her

share of income at the end of 2018 and when she insisted for a

share in the income, the defendants 4 and 5 who are the

appellants 2 and 3 herein postponed the same on some pretext

or the other. The plaintiff also pleaded that in the last week of

March, 2019, appellants 2 and 3 herein approached her for her

signature on some papers to apply for family members certificate

in favour of their mother to sell the property and for such course

of action, the plaintiff refused and demanded her 1/8th share in

the property. It is her further case that since the appellants 2

and 3 refused to partition the property, she instituted the

instant suit. As stated supra, along with the main suit, the 1st

respondent herein filed the instant application under Order

XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 C.P.C. to restrain the defendants from

alienating the properties.

 8. Defendants 1, 4 and 5 who are the appellants herein

filed counter, wherein they stated that pursuant to the

settlement deed dated 12.09.1994, they executed a number of 

 6

documents and entered into various transactions. It is not in

dispute that the appellant herein did not get the settlement deed

dated 12.09.1994 marked. In fact, all the documents, on which

the appellants herein sought to rely upon, are the documents

emanated on the basis of the alleged settlement deed dated

12.09.1994. In fact, the 1st respondent herein is strongly

disputing the genuineness of the said settlement deed. The

learned District Judge, only after taking into consideration all

the contentions advanced by both the parties and taking into

consideration the non-marking of the settlement deed dated

12.09.1994 and in order to avoid further complications in the

matter, granted the order of injunction in favour of the 1st

respondent herein. It is a settled proposition of law that the

relief of injunction is a discretionary and equitable relief. A

perusal of the order passed by the trial Court shows that the

learned I Additional District Judge has assigned cogent and

convincing reasons in the impugned order.

 9. Having regard to the apprehension expressed by the

learned senior counsel, Sri P.Veera Reddy, that the 1st

respondent-plaintiff is taking steps to get the revenue records

mutated taking advantage of the injunction orders, this Court is

inclined to modify the injunction order as an order of status quo

in all respects with regard to the subject property. It is also 

 7

made clear that the Original Suit shall be disposed of without

being influenced by any of the observations made by the learned

I Additional District Judge in the impugned order or by this

Court in the present order.

 10. With the above modification, this appeal is disposed

of. There shall no order as to costs of this appeal.

Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, in this case shall

stand closed.


 __________________________

 JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI


 ________________________

 JUSTICE J. UMA DEVI

25.03.2021

siva 

 8

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

THE HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.235 OF 2020

Date: 25.03.2021

siva 

Section 9-A applies when any entertainment shows escaped assessment of tax under Section 4 or 4-A. In such an event, the prescribed authority shall assess to the best of its judgment, the tax due on such entertainment shown under section 4 or section 4A after making such enquiry as it considers necessary within a limited 6 period. Section 9-A does not apply as no assessment was done previously and the appellant is not assessed under Section 4 or Section 4(1-A) or Section 4A earlier. If any entertainment tax was assessed under section 4 or section 4(1-A), and if tax escaped the assessment in such past assessment, the invocation of section 9-A comes into picture so as to assess the escaped tax. Since, the proceedings of the Entertainment Tax Officer are assessed for the first assessment, the provisions of Section 9A have no relevance. In the instance case, enquiry, as required under Section 9, has been carried out by giving a notice, but no objections were filed. Therefore, it cannot be said there was any illegality in invoking Section 9, more so, when there is escaped assessment.


AP HIGH COURT 

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

C.M.A. Nos.591, 594, 596, 598, 599, 600,

603, 604, 609, 590, 607 and 608 of 2019

 DEVATHA MAHAL

-VS-

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

    Advocate - GP FOR COMMERCIAL TAX (AP)

COMMON JUDGMENT : (per the Hon’ble Sri Justice C.Praveen Kumar)

1. The present appeals are filed under Section 9E of A.P.

Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 (for short, ‘the Act’) questioning the

orders dated 26.09.2018 passed by the Appellate Deputy

Commissioner, Tirupati, in ADC Order Nos.3634/28-09-2018,

3634/28-09-2018, 3633/28-09-2018, 3632/28-09-2018,

3635/28-09-2018, 3632/28-09-2018, 3634/28-09-2018,

3635/28-09-2018, 3635/28-09-2018, 3633/28-09-2018,

3633/28-09-2018 and 3632/28-09-2018 respectively.

2. The facts in issue are as under :

 The appellant theatres - Kavali management, have

screened films and filed weekly returns in Form-V along with

Daily Collection Reports under Andhra Pradesh Entertainment

Tax Act, 1939. The details of which are reflected in the order. It

is said that exhibitors have exhibited high budget/dubbing films

in the guise of low budget films and thereby evaded

entertainment tax to the Government, violating Section 4(1-A) of

Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act and conditions of

G.O.Ms.No.604 (Revenue (CT-IV) Department, dated 22.4.2008.

After careful consideration of the objections filed by the

managers of the theaters, Form-A was issued directing to pay 

2

the balance of tax after deducting the tax paid. Orders passed

by the Entertainment Tax Officer, Kavali, came to be challenged

before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, who, after going

through the facts in issue and also considering the objection

raised with regard to the applicability of Section 4 vis-à-vis

Section 9, dismissed the appeals. Challenging the same, these

appeals are filed under Section 9E of the Act.

3. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the

appellants is that in the facts and circumstances of the case,

entertaining an application under Section 4 of the Act without

invoking Section 9-A of the Act is illegal and incorrect. The

second ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is

that the appellants herein are entitled to certain exemptions

under the G.O., which were not properly brought to the notice of

the authorities. These two objections were dealt with by the

appellate authority and negatived the same.

4. In so far as entitlement to avail concessions or exemptions

under the entertainment tax, it is to be noted that though

notices were given to the appellants on four occasions on

13.7.2015, 13.6.2016, re-assessment show cause notice on

10.5.2017 and final notice on 12.6.2017, the appellants herein

failed to file objections. The material on record show that if the

appellants intend to differ with the proposal, they have to follow

the conditions laid down in G.O.Ms.No.604, dated 22.4.2008.

They have to file documentary evidence of certified copy of the

feature film/low budget film along with certified copy of 

3

certification obtained from A.P. Film Development Corporation to

the effect the feature film/low budget film is produced in the

State of Andhra Pradesh. The material indicate that the

exhibitors should inform the Entertainment Tax Officer in

advance, in writing, the particulars of screening the feature

film/low budget film produced in A.P. in the application form

represented in G.O.Ms.No.604, dated 22.4.2008. It is clear from

the record that appellants neither filed any objections nor filed

any documentary evidence to contradict the movies screened as

per the UFO, Chennai, even after receiving the detailed date

wise/movie wise information furnished by the Entertainment

Tax Officer, Kavali. Therefore, the argument of the learned

Government Pleader that appellants are not entitled for any

exemptions cannot be brushed aside.

5. At the same time, learned counsel for appellants would

contend that if a reasonable opportunity is given to appellants,

they will file all the objections and documentary evidence

contradicting the movies screened as per the UFO, Chennai.

6. In so far as the applicability of Section 4 and Section 9 of

the Act is concerned, it will be useful to refer to Section 4(1-A)

and Section 9-A of the Act, which are as under :

Section 4(1-A) : There shall be levied and paid to the state

government a tax on the gross collection capacity on every show

(hereinafter referred to as the Entertainments Tax) in respect of

entertainments held in the theatres specified in column (2) of the

table below and located in the local areas specified in the

corresponding entry in column (1) of the said table, calculated at 

4

the rates specified in the corresponding entry in column (3)

thereof for the number of shows prescribed therein for every week.

Local Authority Theatre Rate of tax on the

gross collection

capacity per show

(1) (2) (3)

a) First Grade

 Municipality

All categories of

theatres

10% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 21.

b) Second Grade

 Municipality

All categories of

theatres

9% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 21

c) Third Grade

 Municipality

All categories of

theatres

8% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 17

d)Gram Panchayats

townships and any

local authorities


(1) with a

population of

15,000 and above

i) permanent and

semi-permanent

ii) Touring and

Temporary

7% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 14

7% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 10.

(2) with a

population of 7,500

and above but

below of 15,000.

i) permanent and

semi-permanent

ii) Touring and

Temporary

6% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 14.

6% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 10.

(3) with a

population of less

than 7,500

i) permanent and

semi-permanent

ii) Touring and

Temporary

5% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 14.

5% of the gross

collection capacity

per show multiplied

by 7.

 

5

“Section 9A : Payment for Admission, etc., escaping

assessments :

 “(1) Where, for any reason any entertainment show has

escaped assessment to tax under section 4 or section 4A, the

prescribed authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-section

(3) and at any time within such period as may be prescribed,

assess to the best of its judgment the tax due on such

entertainment show under section 4 or section 4A, as the case

may be, after making such enquiry as it considers necessary and

after giving the proprietor a reasonable opportunity to show cause

against such assessment

 (2) Where, for any reason any entertainment show has

been assessed at a rate lower than the rate at which it is

assessable under section 4 or Section 4-A, as the case may be,

the prescribed authority may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3) and at any time within such period as may be

prescribed, re-assess the tax due on such payment or

entertainment show under section 4 or Section 4-A as the case

may be, after making such enquiry as it may consider necessary

and after giving the proprietor a reasonable opportunity to show

cause against such re-assessment.

 (3) When making an assessment to the best of Judgment

under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) the prescribed authority

may also direct the proprietor to pay in addition to the tax

assessed, a penalty as specified in sub-section (4).

 (4) The penalty leviable under sub-section (3) shall,--

 (a) in a case where the prescribed authority is satisfied

that the failure of the proprietor to disclose the whole or part of

the particulars correctly or to submit the return before the

prescribed date, was willful, not exceed one and half times the

entertainments tax or the tax on entertainment shows due;

 (b) in a case where such failure was not wilful, not exceed

on half of such tax :

 Provided that where such failure occurred due to a

bonafide mistake on the part of the proprietor, no such penalty

shall be levied.

 Provided further that no penalty under this sub-section

shall be imposed unless the proprietor affected has had a

reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such

imposition.”


7. A reading of the two provisions makes it clear that Section

9-A applies when any entertainment shows escaped assessment

of tax under Section 4 or 4-A. In such an event, the prescribed

authority shall assess to the best of its judgment, the tax due on

such entertainment shown under section 4 or section 4A after

making such enquiry as it considers necessary within a limited 

6

period. Section 9-A does not apply as no assessment was done

previously and the appellant is not assessed under Section 4 or

Section 4(1-A) or Section 4A earlier. If any entertainment tax

was assessed under section 4 or section 4(1-A), and if tax

escaped the assessment in such past assessment, the invocation

of section 9-A comes into picture so as to assess the escaped tax.

Since, the proceedings of the Entertainment Tax Officer are

assessed for the first assessment, the provisions of Section 9A

have no relevance. In the instance case, enquiry, as required

under Section 9, has been carried out by giving a notice, but no

objections were filed. Therefore, it cannot be said there was any

illegality in invoking Section 9, more so, when there is escaped

assessment.

8. The main plea of the learned counsel for appellants

appears to be that if an opportunity is given to appellants, they

would fulfil the requirements by claiming exemptions or

concessions as per the said G.O.

9. The same is strongly opposed by the learned Government

Pleader for Commercial Taxes contending that enough

opportunities have been given to appellants, but, in spite of the

same, they never utilized. She also contends that there is any

amount of doubt as to whether really the appellants are entitled

to any exemptions or concessions as urged by them. According

to her, even if such exemptions or concessions are given, still

appellants would be liable to pay certain amounts. 

7

10. A perusal of the orders impugned shows that it is not as if

the appellants have not paid any money. They have paid some

amount which was adjusted and thereafter the amount due is

reflected in the orders. Having regard to the facts and

circumstances of the case and with a view to give the appellants

an opportunity, we feel that it is a fit case where the matter can

be remanded back directing the appellants to fulfil the

requirements as pleaded here on certain terms and conditions

within a period of four weeks from today. In which event, the

primary authority shall pass appropriate orders within a period

of four weeks thereafter.

11. As the orders of the appellate authority indicate that the

appellants have paid some amounts out of disputed amounts,

and with a view to give an opportunity to appellants (only to the

extent of producing material for availing concessions or

exemptions) the matter shall be remanded back, setting aside the

orders under challenge, subject to appellants paying ½ (half) of

the demanded (disputed) amount, which would be inclusive of

the disputed amount already paid. Further, the appellants

shall comply with the order within four weeks from today, in

which event the primary authority shall pass orders in

accordance with law within four weeks thereafter. If the

appellants fail to deposit the amount within four weeks, as

directed above, the authorities shall proceed further basing on

the earlier orders passed. 

8

12. With the above directions, the Appeals are allowed. No

orders as to costs.

 Consequently, interlocutory applications pending, if any,

shall stand closed.

______________________________

JUSTICE C.PRAVEEN KUMAR

_____________________________

JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

Date : 24.03.2020

skmr 

Saturday, April 24, 2021

while the amendment prayer allowed by the trial Court , the trial Court is to afford an opportunityto both parties to adduce evidence both oral and documentary in connection with the future mesne profits and after hearing argumentsof both sides, pass an appropriate order in final decree petition.

while the amendment prayer allowed by the trial Court , the trial Court is  to afford an opportunityto both parties to adduce evidence both oral and documentary in connection with the future mesne profits and after hearing argumentsof both sides, pass an appropriate order in final decree petition.

AP HIGH COURT

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.333 of 2021

Sadhu Annapoornamma

-vs-

Pelluri Venkata Hanumanth Krishna Murthy Sarma

ORDER:

The challenge in the Civil Revision Petition is to the order

dated 09.03.2021 in I.A.No.168 of 2021 in I.A.No.565 of 2011 in

O.S.No.30 of 2002 on the file of the II Additional District Judge,

Vijayawada, allowing I.A.No.168 of 2021 and amending the prayer

and incorporating the words ‘future mesne profits’ in the place of

‘past mesne profits’ wherever they occur in I.A.No.565 of 2011.

2. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioners Sri Gudiseva

Narasimha Rao and learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2

Sri S. Satyanarayana Murthy.

3. The main submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners is

that the petitioners have no objection for allowing I.A.No.168 of 2021

and amending the prayer incorporating the words ‘future mesne

profits’ in the place of ‘past mesne profits’. However, the petitioners’

submission is that since in I.A.No.565 of 2011 prayer was made in

respect of past mesne profits, taking the prayer as such, evidence was

adduced with reference to the past mesne profits only and no evidence

was adduced in connection with the future mesne profits, because

there was no prayer in that regard. Learned counsel would thus

request that the order in I.A.No.168 of 2021 may be modified and

while allowing the amendment, the trial Court may be directed to

afford an opportunity to both parties to adduce evidence with 

2

UDPR,J

CRP No.333 of 2021

reference to the future mesne profits also for effective disposal of the

matter.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents Sri S. Satyanarayana

Murthy reported no objection.

5. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is partly allowed and

the order in I.A.No.168 of 2021 passed by the trial Court is modified

to the effect that while the amendment prayer allowed by the trial

Court is maintained, the trial Court is directed to afford an opportunity

to both parties to adduce evidence both oral and documentary in

connection with the future mesne profits and after hearing arguments

of both sides, pass an appropriate order in final decree petition. No

costs.

As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall

stand closed.

U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J

20th March, 2021

krk 

3

UDPR,J

CRP No.333 of 2021

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.333 of 2021

 20th March, 2021

krk 

Tuesday, April 13, 2021

 


Wishing you all

a happy & prosperous 

Plava nama UGADI new year 

God bless you all

with great health & wealth & prosperity

                                     with regards

                                        advocatemmmohan

Saturday, March 27, 2021

INJUNCTION SUIT - PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY PROVE HIS POSSESSION BUT ALSO PROVE THE ALLEGED INTERFERANCE BY THE DEFENDANTS It is well settled law and principle that when a person came to the court and seek a relief of permanent injunction, he has to establish the possession over the plaint schedule property as on the 3 date of filing of the suit and also interference of opposite party into his peaceful possession and enjoyment, but though D5, who is plaintiff in OS 130/08 filed suit for seeking a relief of permanent injunction against plaintiff herein, who is D3 in OS 130/08 failed to prove his possession over plaint schedule property as well as alleged interference of plaintiff and her children. “37. As per the version of D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff 2 and her children who are D1 to D3 in OS130/08, along with 5 others, came to the suit schedule property on 23.02.08 at about 6:00 p.m., without any manner of right, title, possession try to occupy the same and at the intervention of one Pothuraju and others, D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) could resist the illegal acts committed by the plaintiff and her children, but to prove the said interference of plaintiff and her children, D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) neither choose to adduce any corroborative oral evidence nor marked any supportive document. If really plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) committed the alleged illegal acts against D5 and the same was resisted with the help of one Pothuraju and others, what prevented D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to get examine said Pothuraju or any others person who allegedly resisted plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) on his behalf to prove the alleged interference of plaintiff and her children. But no positive evidence is placed by D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to establish the alleged inference of plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008). In absence of any positive evidence, the version of D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) that while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) came to schedule property and interfered into his possession of property is not tenable. Further more once D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) failed to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property, the question of interfere does not arise.

INJUNCTION SUIT - PLAINTIFF NOT ONLY PROVE HIS POSSESSION BUT ALSO PROVE THE ALLEGED INTERFERANCE BY THE DEFENDANTS

It is well settled law and principle that when a person came to the court and seek a relief of permanent injunction, he has to establish the possession over the plaint schedule property as on the 3 date of filing of the suit and also interference of opposite party into his peaceful possession and enjoyment, but though D5, who is plaintiff in OS 130/08 filed suit for seeking a relief of permanent injunction against plaintiff herein, who is D3 in OS 130/08 failed to prove his possession over plaint schedule property as well as alleged interference of plaintiff and her children.

“37. As per the version of D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff 2 and her children who are D1 to D3 in OS130/08, along with 5 others, came to the suit schedule property on 23.02.08 at about 6:00 p.m., without any manner of right, title, possession try to occupy the same and at the intervention of one Pothuraju and others, D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) could resist the illegal acts committed by the plaintiff and her children, but to prove the said interference of plaintiff and her children, D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) neither choose to adduce any corroborative oral evidence nor marked any supportive document. If really plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) committed the alleged illegal acts against D5 and the same was resisted with the help of one Pothuraju and others, what prevented D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to get examine said Pothuraju or any others person who allegedly resisted plaintiff and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) on his behalf to prove the alleged interference of plaintiff and her children. But no positive evidence is placed by D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) to establish the alleged inference of plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008). In absence of any positive evidence, the version of D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) that while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) came to schedule property and interfered into his possession of property is not tenable. Further more once D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) failed to establish his possession over the plaint schedule property, the question of interfere does not arise.

AP HIGH COURT 

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL NO.278 OF 2020

K. Raghavamma,
Versus

K K MOHAN DIED

JUDGMENT:

This Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and

decree dated 11.03.2020 passed in A.S.No.96 of 2016 on the

file of VI Additional District Judge, Krishna at Machilipatnam

by dismissing the appeal suit and confirming the common

judgment and decree dated 21.06.2016 passed in O.S.Nos.95

and 130 of 2008 on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge,

Machilipatnam.

2. The appellant herein is the appellant in the lower

appellate Court and plaintiff in O.S.No.95 of 2008. The

respondents herein are respondents in the lower appellate

Court and defendants in O.S.No.95 of 2008.

3. The suit in O.S.No.95 of 2008 is filed by the plaintiff to

grant permanent injunction against the defendants and his

men restraining them from interfering with the plaintiff’s

possession over the plaint schedule property and for costs of

the suit.

4. The trial Court having considered the entire material on

record and after hearing both sides, while dismissing the suit

held in para Nos.37 and 38 of the common judgment dated

21.06.2016 that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief

sought in the main suit which is extracted hereunder.

“37. As per the version of D5 (Plaintiff in OS

130/2008) while he is enjoying the property, plaintiff 

2

and her children who are D1 to D3 in OS130/08,

along with 5 others, came to the suit schedule

property on 23.02.08 at about 6:00 p.m., without any

manner of right, title, possession try to occupy the

same and at the intervention of one Pothuraju and

others, D5 (Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) could resist the

illegal acts committed by the plaintiff and her

children, but to prove the said interference of plaintiff

and her children, D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) neither

choose to adduce any corroborative oral evidence nor

marked any supportive document. If really plaintiff

and her children (D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008)

committed the alleged illegal acts against D5 and the

same was resisted with the help of one Pothuraju and

others, what prevented D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008)

to get examine said Pothuraju or any others person

who allegedly resisted plaintiff and her children (D1 to

D3 in OS 130/2008) on his behalf to prove the alleged

interference of plaintiff and her children. But no

positive evidence is placed by D5(Plaintiff in OS

130/2008) to establish the alleged inference of

plaintiff and her children (who are D1 to D3 in OS

130/2008). In absence of any positive evidence, the

version of D5(Plaintiff in OS 130/2008) that while he

is enjoying the property, plaintiff and her children

(who are D1 to D3 in OS 130/2008) came to schedule

property and interfered into his possession of property

is not tenable. Further more once D5(Plaintiff in OS

130/2008) failed to establish his possession over the

plaint schedule property, the question of interfere does

not arise.

38. It is well settled law and principle that when a

person came to the court and seek a relief of

permanent injunction, he has to establish the

possession over the plaint schedule property as on the 

3

date of filing of the suit and also interference of

opposite party into his peaceful possession and

enjoyment, but though D5, who is plaintiff in OS

130/08 filed suit for seeking a relief of permanent

injunction against plaintiff herein, who is D3 in OS

130/08 failed to prove his possession over plaint

schedule property as well as alleged interference of

plaintiff and her children. Though D5 examined Dw1

to 4 and marked Exs.B1 to B3 on his behalf, but

nothing is elicited to prove his possession over plaint

schedule property and alleged interference. Therefore

the plaintiff failed to produce any proper and cogent

evidence to prove his possession over the disputed

property as well as alleged interference of plaintiff and

others. Therefore D5, who is plaintiff in OS 130/08 is

not entitled to seek any relief sought for. Accordingly,

2nd issue is determined and decided against D5, who

is plaintiff in OS 130/2008.”

5. Aggrieved by the same the plaintiff in O.S.No.95 of 2008

preferred an appeal in A.S.No.96 of 2016 on the file of the

learned VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Krishna,

Machilipatnam. The lower Appellate Court upon hearing both

the parties framed issues No.1 to 4 at para No.7 of the

judgment and after examining all the issues came to a

conclusion that the appellant therein who is plaintiff in

O.S.No.95 of 2008 is not entitled for any relief and

accordingly dismissed the appeal by confirming the common

judgment and decree dated 21.06.2016 passed in O.S.Nos.95

and 130 of 2008 on the file of I Additional Junior Civil Judge,

Machilipatnam against which the present second appeal is 

4

filed with the following grounds which are in the nature of

appeal grounds:

1. Whether both the Courts below are right in giving

a finding that the oral contract of sale is not a sale

and after lapse of 18 years filing a suit for Specific

Performance is fatal to seeking such relief by the

appellant/plaintiff?

2. Whether both the Courts below are right in

denying 18 years possession of the appellant over

the suit property, in as much as the same was also

admitted by the respondent No.1?

3. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

considering Ex.A3 to A6 and A17 to A24, which

were issued by the competent authority?

4. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

applying the direct decision rendered in AIR 2000

AP 504 on similar facts when the parties are close

relatives under an oral contract of sale?

5. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

applying the direct decision of Clacutta High Court

in AIR 2001 Cal 42 in which AIR 1946 F.C. 97 was

followed on oral contract of sale?

6. Whether both the Courts below are right in not

coming to conclusion that in view of the spiraling

price, now in the Town due to coming of Port, the

respondents colluded together and brought Ex.B1

agreement of Sale-Cum-Power of Attorney which is

not bonafide one and invalid in view of the

judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court

reported in AIR 2009 SC 3077?

7. Whether both the Courts below are right in holding

that suit is filed for specific performance on the

basis of Ex.A1? 

5

8. Whether the lower Appellate Court is holding the

decisions of Trial Court and its findings?

6. Heard Sri Kancharlapalli Siva Rama Prasad, learned

counsel for the appellant.

7. Having heard and perused the material on record, this

Court opines that the learned counsel for the appellant had

miserably failed in showing that the substantial question of

law is involved for seeking any indulgence of this Court in the

present second appeal.

8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case, as no substantial question of law is framed or evaluated

seeking indulgence of this Court in judgment passed by the

lower appellate Court confirming the judgment of the Court

below, this Court is of the view that this Second Appeal is

liable to be dismissed at admission stage.

9. Accordingly, this Second Appeal is dismissed. There

shall be no order as to costs.

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any,

pending shall stand closed.

 ________________________

B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J

Date: 30.11.2020

IKN 

6

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

S.A.No.278 of 2020

30.11.2020

IKN 

Friday, March 26, 2021

when the defendant disputed the title of the plaintiff’s vendors, the suit ought to have been filed for declaration of title and mere seeking of a permanent injunction will not entitle the plaintiff for a decree. In the absence of establishment of possession and enjoyment of the said property, it cannot be decreed.

 when the defendant disputed the title of the plaintiff’s vendors,  the suit ought to have been filed  for declaration of title and mere seeking of a permanent injunction will not entitle the plaintiff for a decree. In the absence of establishment of possession and enjoyment of the said property, it cannot be decreed.

AP HIGH COURT 

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL NO.280 OF 2020

Sodisetty Subramanyam

     -VS-

Poola Balanchendraiah

JUDGMENT:

This Second Appeal is filed against the judgment and

decree, dated 20.03.2020 passed in A.S.No.23 of 2018 on the

file of the III Additional District Judge at Rajampet dismissing

the appeal by confirming the judgment and decree dated

23.04.2018 passed in O.S.No.9 of 2014 on the file of Junior

Civil Judge, Railway Kodur.

2. The appellant herein is the appellant before the lower

appellate Court and plaintiff in O.S.No.9 of 2014. The

respondent herein is the respondent before the lower

appellate Court and defendant in the said suit.

3. The suit in O.S.No.9 of 2014 is filed before the Junior

Civil Judge, Railway Kodur against the defendant for grant of

permanent injunction restraining him, his men and agents

from interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and

enjoyment over the suit schedule property i.e. land

admeasuring Ac.0-05 cents in survey No.58/6 of Kodur

village and costs of the suit.

4. The case of the plaintiff is that an extent of Ac.0-41

cents of land in survey No.58/6 is an ancestral property of

one Katikam Seshaiah and during his life time, he sold away

Ac.0-36 cents out of Ac.0-41 cents by retaining Ac.00-05

cents of the land. After his death, the property devolved upon

the legal heirs of said Katikam Seshaiah and from them, the 

2

plaintiff purchased Ac.00-05 cents i.e. the suit schedule

property. The suit schedule property is a part and parcel of

Ac.0-41 cents. But the same was opposed by the defendant.

5. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs1 and 2 were examined

and Exs.A1 to A5 were marked. On behalf of the defendants,

DWs1 and 2 were examined and Exs.B1 to B5 were marked.

After hearing both the sides, the Court below came to a

conclusion that in a suit for permanent injunction, the

plaintiff has to prove his possession and enjoyment over the

suit schedule property as on the date of filing the suit basing

on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of

the defendant’s case. The plaintiff admittedly relied upon

Ex.A3 and considering the merits, the Court below came to a

conclusion that the plaintiff could not establish his

possession over the suit schedule property of the land

admeasuring Ac.00-05 cents and as such the suit was

dismissed observing further that it is a misconceived one, as

the plaintiff sought only for permanent injunction when there

is a title dispute between the parties. Aggrieved by the same,

the plaintiff preferred the first appeal in A.S.No.23 of 2018

before the III Additional District Judge, Rajampet.

6. The lower appellate Court after hearing both the sides,

gave a finding to the effect that prior to the instant case,

under Ex.B5 itself, the defendant disputed the title of the

plaintiff’s vendors, as such the suit ought to have been filed 

3

for declaration of title and mere seeking of a permanent

injunction will not entitle the plaintiff for a decree. In the

absence of establishment of possession and enjoyment of the

said property, it cannot be decreed. Hence, the lower

appellate Court has dismissed the appeal and confirmed the

judgment of the trial Court against which the present second

appeal is preferred raising some grounds purported to be the

substantial questions of law. Two of such questions are

hereunder:

“(L) Whether or not the Gift Settlement Deed dated

22.08.1958 produced and marked on behalf of the

defendant as Ex.B1 confers any right to conclude

the title and possession over the suit schedule

property although the oral transfer of the Suit

Schedule Property is invalid?

(N) Whether or not the Courts are justified in

shifting the onus of the plaintiff for disproving the

knowledge about the Gift Settlement Deed dated

22.08.1958?”

7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff

and perused the record.

8. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case, taking into consideration of the judgments rendered by

the Courts below wherein it was held that the plaintiff has

miserably failed in establishing the possession over the suit

schedule property as on the date of initiating an action, the

suit for granting permanent injunction can’t be decreed and 

4

that apart as the appellant/plaintiff has not made out any

grounds to frame any substantial questions of law, this Court

finds no reason to interfere with the judgments of the lower

Courts and accordingly this Second Appeal is dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any,

pending shall stand closed.

 ________________________

B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J

Date: 30.11.2020

IKN 

5

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

S.A.No.280 of 2020

30.11.2020

IKN 

whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction for eviction of a tenant by landlord as the SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by the bank aganist the landlord ? - No The appellants herein/the tenants are neither the guarantors nor any person inducted into the possession of the secured asset/suit schedule property by way of a lease after notice under Section 13 (2) was given and default committed. Admittedly they have been inducted into the possession of the plaint schedule property on 01.11.2011 by virtue of an oral lease and they have committed default of payment of rent with effect from 01.12.2012 and the creditor bank took symbolic possession of the secured asset/plaint schedule property of the borrower/landlord on 18.09.2015 under the provisions of SARFAESI Act which was not injucted by the Courts below. The present case which was dealt by the Courts below is totally falls outside the purview of the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act and the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below do not hit or inject the Debt Recovery Tribunal or any other Appellate Tribunal to function under the provisions of SARFAESI Act with reference to the very same plaint schedule property which is a secured asset mortgaged by the borrower/the landlord/the respondent herein. There is no conflict of orders passed by the Courts below with the orders that may be passed under SARFAESI Act and RDBI Act 1993.

whether  the civil Court has no jurisdiction for eviction of a tenant by landlord as the SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by the bank aganist the landlord ? - No

The appellants herein/the tenants are neither the guarantors nor any person inducted into the possession of the secured asset/suit schedule property by way of a lease after notice under Section 13 (2) was given and default committed. Admittedly they have been inducted into the possession of the plaint schedule property on 01.11.2011 by virtue of an oral lease and they have committed default of payment of rent with effect from 01.12.2012 and the creditor bank took symbolic possession of the secured asset/plaint schedule property of the borrower/landlord on 18.09.2015 under the provisions of SARFAESI Act which was not injucted by the Courts below.

The present case which was dealt by the Courts below is totally falls outside the purview of the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act and the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below do not hit or inject the Debt Recovery Tribunal or any other Appellate Tribunal to function under the provisions of SARFAESI Act with reference to the very same plaint schedule property which is a secured asset mortgaged by the borrower/the landlord/the respondent herein. There is no conflict of orders passed by the Courts below with the orders that may be passed under SARFAESI Act and RDBI Act 1993. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL No.28 OF 2021

Between:

Barigala Kotesh, S/o. Peturu & another

… APPELLANTS

AND

Bandaru Yedukondalu, S/o. Venkateswarlu


... RESPONDENT

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 12.02.2021

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers

may be allowed to see the order? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of order may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the

fair copy of the order? Yes/No

_________________________

JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN 

 2 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

*IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

*HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

+ SECOND APPEAL No.28 OF 2021

% Dated : 12.02.2021

Between:

# Barigala Kotesh, S/o. Peturu & another

… APPELLANTS

AND

$ Bandaru Yedukondalu

... RESPONDENT

! Counsel for appellants : Mr. G. Rama Chandra Reddy

^Counsel for Respondent : Mr. Phani Teja Cheruvu

<GIST :

>HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred:

1 Dt.11.09.2019 in Criminal Appeal Nos.1371 of 2019

2 Dt. 27.08.2020 in Civil Appeal Nos.2843-2844 of 2010

3 Dt. 21-01-2021 in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.15870 of 2020

4 Dt.06-05-2016 in CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4083-4084 of 2016

5 Dt. 25-11-2014 in CIVIL APPEAL No.10589 OF 2014

6 Dt. 17-07-2017 in CIVIL APPEAL No.9151 of 2017

7 Dt. 27-01-2021 in CIVIL APPEAL No.6744 of 2013

8 Dt.18.01.2016 in Civil Appeal No.167 of 2007

 3 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

SECOND APPEAL No.28 OF 2021

JUDGMENT:

This second appeal is filed against the Judgment and decree in

A.S.No.82 of 2020 on the file of the V Additional District Judge,

Guntur, FAC III Additional District Judge, Guntur, dated 21.12.2020

confirming the Judgment and decree in O.S.No.122 of 2016 on the file

of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri, dated 05.05.2020 ordering the

eviction of the appellants herein/tenants to deliver the vacant

possession of the plaint schedule property to the respondent

herein/landlord and comply with the other reliefs granted by the

Courts below.

2. The appellants herein are the appellants in the first appeal and

the defendants in the suit. The respondent herein is the respondent

in the first appeal and the plaintiff in the suit.

3. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned

counsel for the respondent.

4. The plaintiff initiated an action in O.S.No.122 of 2016 on the

file of the Senior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri against the defendants for

eviction and delivery of the vacant possession of the plaint schedule

property, for the payment of arrears of Rs.4,25,700/- and damages

for use and occupation unauthorisedly from 01.03.2016 to 31.05.2016 

 4 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month with interest at the rate of 24%

per annum from the date of suit till the date of realisation and costs.

5. The plaintiff contends that he is the absolute owner of the

plaint schedule property, the defendants herein took the said

property/apartment/flat on 01.11.2011 for a monthly rent of

Rs.8,000/- under an oral lease and the rent was enhanced to

Rs.12,900/- per month with effect from 01.12.2012, in-spite of

enjoying the possession of the said property as tenants, the

defendants have committed default in payment of monthly rent with

effect from 01.12.2012, due to which the plaintiff became a defaulter

before the creditor bank of ICICI Bank, in those circumstances he filed

a case in RCC No.4 of 2013 before the Rent Controller, Mangalagiri for

eviction against the 1st defendant and the same was allowed and the

appeal preferred by the 1st defendant/tenant in RCA was allowed

setting aside the order in RCC on the point of jurisdiction, as such the

defendants continued as tenants in the schedule premises without

paying any rents with effect from December, 2012 and that apart the

defendants filed a suit in O.S.No.291 of 2015 on the file of the

Principal Junior Civil Judge, Mangalagiri for permanent injunction

against the landlord/plaintiff herein which is being contested by the

plaintiff herein. Subsequently the plaintiff got issued a statutory

notice, dated 03.02.2016 to the defendants terminating the lease of

the schedule property/apartment by the end of the month of

February, 2016 calling upon them to vacate the plaint schedule

property within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said notice by 

 5 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

paying the arrears of rent since December, 2012 till the date of

vacation of the premises at the rate of Rs.12,900/- per month and

payment of damages for the unauthorised occupation at the rate of

Rs.20,000/- per month till the premises is vacated. Since the

defendants did not comply with the said demand notice, the plaintiff

was constrained to file the suit for eviction, for damages and recovery

of arrears of rent since December, 2012 to till the date of eviction.

6. Then, the defendants filed a written statement denying the

averments and contentions of the plaintiff contending further that the

plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property/the apartment under

a valid registered sale deed obtaining loan from ICICI Bank, Bandar

Road Branch, Vijaywada, became a defaulter in payment of loan

installments and as such the plaintiff intended to sell the said

property, then one Mr. Barigala Suresh, purchased the said property

for an amount of Rs.18 lakhs by paying an advance amount of

Rs.5 lakhs under an agreement of sale dated 13.10.2011, the said

purchaser is none other than the brother of the 1st defendant, the

plaintiff delivered the possession of the suit schedule property and

the brother of the 1st defendant/the purchaser has let out the said

property to the 1st defendant and as such, they have been in

possession and enjoyment of the same on a rent of Rs.5,000/- per

month and the 2nd defendant filed a complaint in crime No.159 of

2015, dated 29.06.2015 against the plaintiff and others under Sections

323, 427, 506, 509 r/w 34 of IPC, Section 3-1-1, 3-1-X SC, ST POA Act

which is pending before the Mangalagiri Town police station. 

 6 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

7. Basing upon the above said rival averments and contentions, the

trail Court framed the issues as follows :-

(1) Whether the plaintiff has got title over the

plaint schedule property or not ?

(2) Whether the defendants are tenants of plaintiff

with regard to the plaint schedule property or

not ?

(3) Whether the defendants committed wilful

default in payment of rent for the plaint

schedule property or not ?

(4) Whether the defendants are liable to pay the

damages as prayed by the plaintiff or not ?

(5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the eviction

as sought for or not ?

(6) To what relief ?

8. During the course of trial on behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 and 2

were examined and Exs.A1 to A13 were marked. On behalf of the

defendants, DW1 was examined and no document was marked.

9. The plaintiff in his deposition besides relying upon the

averments of the plaint further stated that he became the chronic

defaulter in repayment of loan due to non payment of rents by the

defendants and as such the ICICI bank took symbolic possession of the

plaint schedule property under SARFAESI Act on 18.09.2015 and the

bank is trying to auction the same for realisation of their debt. In

furtherance of the same, the bank has also filed O.A No.716 of 2016

before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Visakhapatnam which is pending

for trial. 

 7 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

10. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court gave a

finding that there is no proof to show that the plaint schedule

property belongs to the said Barigala Suresh as contended by the

defendants and they miserably failed in proving the said

contention/transaction and the defendants have committed default in

payment of rent and they are due for arrears of payment of rent and

damages along with the vacation of the premises. Ultimately the suit

is decreed with costs vide it’s judgment dated 05.05.2020 directing

the defendants to vacate and deliver the plaint schedule property, to

pay the arrears of rent of Rs.4,25,700/-, to pay damages of

Rs.20,000/- per month from 01.03.2016 to 31.05.2016 for an

unauthorized occupation of the premises from the date of the suit till

the date of realization and deliver the vacant possession to the

plaintiff with interest thereupon at the rate of 6% per annum from the

date of suit till the date of realisation.

11. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants therein/tenants

preferred an appeal in A.S.No.82 of 2020 on the file of the III

Additional District Judge, Guntur. While considering the same, the

lower appellate Court framed the following points :

1. Whether there is a landlord and tenant

relationship existed between the plaintiff and

defendants ?

2. Whether the defendants committed wilful

default in payment of rents for the plaint

schedule property ?

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for eviction of

defendants as prayed for ? 

 8 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

4. Whether this appellate Court finds any reasons

to interfere with the findings on the trial Court?

5. To what relief ?

12. It has observed that the appellants therein/the tenants raised

an additional plea that the civil Court has no jurisdiction as the

SARFAESI proceedings were initiated by the bank and the bank has

also filed O.A.No.716 of 2016 against their landlord/the respondent

therein and service of summons was also marked as Ex.A13 before the

trial Court. While considering the case on merits, the lower appellate

Court gave a finding that in case of any grievance for the appellants

as tenants they can approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal under the

relevant provisions of the SARFAESI Act and with regard to the

findings of the trial Court, the same was confirmed, dismissing the

appeal vide it’s Judgment, dated 21.12.2020. Against the said

confirming Judgments and decrees the appellants herein/the tenants

filed the Second Appeal before this Court by framing a ground as

“substantial question of law” to the effect that “the jurisdiction of

the civil Court is barred and the proceedings under SARFAESI Act are

alone available to proceed against the appellants herein/the tenants

and the respondent herein/the landlord cannot continue the eviction

proceedings against them and as such the Judgments of the Courts

below are liable to be set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.”

13. To substantiate the same, the learned counsel for the

appellants refers to the following Sections of law under the provisions 

 9 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

Section 13 :

13. Enforcement of security interest.—(1)

Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or

section 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of

1882), any security interest created in favour of any

secured creditor may be enforced, without the

intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in

accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a

secured creditor under a security agreement, makes any

default in repayment of secured debt or any installment

thereof, and his account in respect of such debt is

classified by the secured creditor as non-performing

asset, then, the secured creditor may require the

borrower by notice in writing to discharge in full his

liabilities to the secured creditor within sixty days from

the date of notice failing which the secured creditor

shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights

under sub-section (4).

1[Provided that—

(i) - - -

(ii) - - -

 (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in

full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the

secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the

following measures to recover his secured debt,

namely:—

(a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower

including the right to transfer by way of lease,

assignment or sale for realising the secured asset;

[(b) - - -

(c) - - -

(d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person

who has acquired any of the secured assets from the 

 10 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

borrower and from whom any money is due or may

become due to the borrower, to pay the secured

creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the

secured debt.

(5) Any payment made by any person referred to in

clause (d) of sub-section (4)to the secured creditor shall

give such person a valid discharge as if he has made

payment to the borrower.

17. 1[Application against measures to recover secured

debts].—(1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved

by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of

section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his

authorised officer under this Chapter,2

[may make an

application along with such fee, as may be prescribed,]to

the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the

matter within forty-five days from the date on which

such measures had been taken:

1

[(2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether

any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of

section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement

of security are in accordance with the provisions of this

Act and the rules made thereunder.

2

[(3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the

facts and circumstances of the case and evidence

produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that

any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of

section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in

accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules

made thereunder, and require restoration of the

management or restoration of possession, of the secured

assets to the borrower or other aggrieved person, it may,

by order,—

(a) declare the recourse to any one or more measures

referred to in sub-section (4) of section 13 taken by

the secured creditor as invalid; and 

 11 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

(b) restore the possession of secured assets or

management of secured assets to the borrower or

such other aggrieved person, who has made an

application under sub-section (1), as the case may be;

and

(c) pass such other direction as it may consider

appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the

recourse taken by the secured creditor under subsection (4) of section 13.]

(4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse

taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of

section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this

Act and the rules made thereunder, then,

notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for

the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be

entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures

specified under sub-section (4) of section 13 to recover

his secured debt.

1

[(4A) Where—

(i) any person, in an application under sub-section (1),

claims any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the secured

asset, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, after examining the

facts of the case and evidence produced by the parties in

relation to such claims shall, for the purposes of

enforcement of security interest, have the jurisdiction to

examine whether lease or tenancy,—

(a) has expired or stood determined; or

(b) is contrary to section 65A of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882(4 of 1882); or

(c) is contrary to terms of mortgage; or

(d) is created after the issuance of notice of default

and demand by the Bank under sub-section (2) of

section 13 of the Act; and

(ii) the Debt Recovery Tribunal is satisfied that tenancy

right or leasehold rights claimed in secured asset falls

under the sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) or sub-clause

(c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (i), then notwithstanding 

 12 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

anything to the contrary contained in any other law for

the time being in force, the Debt Recovery Tribunal may

pass such order as it deems fit in accordance with the

provisions of this Act.]

(5) Any application made under sub-section (1) shall be

dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as

expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty

days from the date of such application:

Provided that - - -

34. Civil court not to have jurisdiction.—No civil court

shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or

proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts

Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is

empowered by or under this Act to determine and no

injunction shall be granted by any court or other

authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in

pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or

under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial

Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).

35. The provisions of this Act to override other laws.—

The provisions of this Act shall have effect,

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith

contained in any other law for the time being in force or

any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.

37. Application of other laws not barred.—The

provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall

be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the

Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), the Securities Contracts

(Regulation) Act, 1956(42 of 1956), the Securities and

Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (15 of 1992), the

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions

Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) or any other law for the time

being in force.

 13 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

14. Per contra the learned counsel for the respondent refers to

some of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the

Hon’ble High Court – Jodhpur as follows :

01. Criminal Appeal Nos.1371 of 2019, Dt.11.09.20191

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.20 of Page 14 as.,

“While Section 13 (13) of SARFAESI prohibits a

borrower from leasing out any of the secured assets

after receipt of a notice under Section 13 (2) without

the prior written consent of the secured creditor”.

02. Civil Appeal Nos.2843-2844 of 2010, Dt. 27.08.20202

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.25 of Page 11 as.,

“25. A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal

is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is

conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a

substantial question of law. If statute confers a

limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the

scope of the appeal. It was not open to the

Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or to call

upon the High Court to reanalyze or re-appreciate

evidence in a Second Appeal.”

03. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.15870 of 20203

, Dt. 21-01-2021 on

the file of Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.18 OF

Page 6 as.,

“18. The Court must interpret a statute in a manner

which is just, reasonable and sensible. If the

grammatical construction leads to some absurdity or

some repugnancy or inconsistency with the legislative

intent, as may be deducted by reading the provisions

of the statute as a whole, the grammatical

construction may be departed from to avoid anomally,


1 Dt.11.09.2019 in Criminal Appeal Nos.1371 of 2019

2 Dt. 27.08.2020 in Civil Appeal Nos.2843-2844 of 2010

3 Dt. 21-01-2021 in SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.15870 of 2020

 14 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

absurdity or inconsistency. To quote Venkatarama

Aiyar, J. In Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh. AIR 1955

SC 830 (at 833), “where the language of a statute, in

its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,

leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent

purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience

or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not

intended, a construction may be put upon it which

modifies the meaning of the words, and even the

structure of the sentence.” This view has been

reiterated by this Court.”

04. CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4083-4084 of 2016, Dt.06-05-20164

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held as in Para No.14 as.,

“The issues of facts once finally determined will

however, stare at the parties and bind them on

account of earlier judgments or for any other good

reason where equitable principles of estoppel are

attracted.”

05. CIVIL APPEAL No.10589 OF 2014, Dt. 25-11-20145

 on the file of

Hon’ble THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para No.13 as.,

“13. In the present case, we find this statement of law

would apply on all fours. The judgment of the Trail

Court has been decided issue wise, on the merits,

after hearing both parties. The suit has finally been

decreed. Consequently this judgment cannot be

reversed purely on technical grounds unless there is a

failure of justice, which we have seen, is nobody’s

case.”

06. CIVIL APPEAL No.9151 of 2017, Dt. 17-07-20176

 on the file of Hon’ble

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in Para No.48 as.,

“48)We sincerely feel that the eviction matters should

be given priority in their disposal at all stages of


4 Dt.06-05-2016 in CIVIL APPEAL Nos.4083-4084 of 2016

5 Dt. 25-11-2014 in CIVIL APPEAL No.10589 OF 2014

6 Dt. 17-07-2017 in CIVIL APPEAL No.9151 of 2017 

 15 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

litigation and especially where the eviction is claimed

on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. We

hope and trust that due attention would be paid by all

courts to ensure speedy disposal of eviction cases.”

07. CIVIL APPEAL No.6744 of 2013, Dt. 27-01-2021 7on the file of Hon’ble

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in Para No.8 as.,

“The first appeal is a valuable right, and, at that

stage, all questions of fact and law decided by the

trial court are open for re-consideration. The

judgment of the appellate court must, therefore,

reflect conscious application of mind and must record

the court’s findings, supported by reasons for its

decision in respect of all the issues, along with the

contentions put forth and pressed by the parties.”

08. In Civil Appeal No.167 of 2007, Dt.18.01.20168

 on the file of Hon’ble

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, held in para Nos.22, 23, 24, as.,

“22) That apart, we find that the appellants were

able to prove their ownership through their

predecessor-in-title on the strength of sale deed

(Ex.P.6/7) of the suit premises whereas the

respondents failed to prove their defence. Indeed, the

burden being on them, it was necessary for the

respondents to prove that the sale in favour of the

appellants’ predecessor-in-title of suit premises was a

transaction of mortgage and not an outright sale.

Since the respondents did not adduce any

documentary or oral evidence to prove their defence,

the first appellate Court was justified in allowing the

eviction petition. In our view, the evidence adduced

by the appellants to prove their title over the suit

premises was sufficient to maintain eviction petition

against the respondents and it was, therefore, rightly

accepted by the first appellate Court.


7 Dt. 27-01-2021 in CIVIL APPEAL No.6744 of 2013

8 Dt.18.01.2016 in Civil Appeal No.167 of 2007 

 16 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

23) As observed supra, the first appellate Court

having recorded categorical findings that the

relationship of landlord-tenant was proved and

secondly, the respondents had committed a wilful

default in payment of monthly rent and its arrears

from 01.06.1987, these findings were binding on the

High Court while deciding the revision petition. It was

more so when these findings did not suffer with any

jurisdictional error which alone would have entitled

the High Court to interfere.

24) Learned counsel for the respondents lastly argued

that there was an encroachment made by the

appellants on the suit premises and document (Ex-P-6)

was inadmissible in evidence, hence the eviction

petition was liable to be dismissed on these two

grounds also. These submissions, in our considered

view, deserve to be rejected at their threshold

because the same were not raised in the written

statement filed by the respondents before the Rent

Controller and nor were urged at any stage of the

proceedings. We cannot, therefore, allow such factual

submissions to be raised for the first time in this

appeal.”

09. The Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur in I.C.I.C.I. Bank

Limited Vs. Krishna Kumar & Others on 27 April, 2018 held as.,

“Before incorporation of sub-section (4-A) and

substitution of sub-section (3) in Section 17 of the

SARFAESI Act as above, there was no remedy

available to a tenant who was being dispossessed

(25 of 25) [CW-16965/2017] under the SARFAESI Act

and hence, it was in those circumstances that the

judgment in the case of Vishal N. Kalsaria (supra)

was passed. The amended Act and incorporation of

sub-section (4-A) in Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act as

well as sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI

Act sufficiently empowered the tenant to challenge 

 17 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

the proceedings qua his dispossession as a lessee or

a tenant, in case, action is being initiated against

him for dispossession under the SARFAESI Act.”

15. As stated supra, Section 13 (1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 speaks

about the power of a secured creditor to enforce any security interest

without interference of the Court or Tribunal.

 Section 13 (2) of the said Act speaks about the power of the

secured creditor to issue notice calling upon to discharge the full

liability of the borrower within 60 days in case of default and

declaration of the account as non-performing asset.

 Section 13 (4) (a) empowers the creditor to recover the secured

debt by taking possession of the secured assets of the borrower

including the right of transfer by way of lease, assignment of sale

etc., in the case of default and violation of Section 13 (2).


 Section 13 (4) (d) empowers the secured creditor to issue a

notice to any person who acquired the security asset to pay money to

the creditor to satisfy the secured debt of the borrower. As per

Section 13 (5) any payment made by such a person as per Section 13

(4) (d) to the secured creditor is a valid discharge.

 As stated supra, Section 17 (1) enables to file an application by

any person (including the borrower) to question the measures taken

by the secured creditor under Section 13 (4) within 45 days from the

date of such measures taken. 

 18 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

 Under Section 17 (4A) the Debt Recovery Tribunal would go into

the issues and examine the facts of the case with reference to the

situations enshrined in sub clause (a) to (d) of Section 17 (4A) (i)

provided either any tenant or lessee files an application under Section

17 (1).

 Section 34 bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain any

suit or proceedings in respect of the matters having jurisdiction of the

Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal under the provisions

of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the RDBI Act, 1993 and no injunction can

be granted for the action taken under the said Acts.

16. It is to be carefully seen that all the above said provisions of the

SARFAESI Act do not come to the rescue of the appellants/tenants

herein as none of the situations and circumstances are applicable to

the facts and circumstances of the present case. The appellants

herein/the tenants are neither the guarantors nor any person

inducted into the possession of the secured asset/suit schedule

property by way of a lease after notice under Section 13 (2) was given

and default committed. Admittedly they have been inducted into the

possession of the plaint schedule property on 01.11.2011 by virtue of

an oral lease and they have committed default of payment of rent

with effect from 01.12.2012 and the creditor bank took symbolic

possession of the secured asset/plaint schedule property of the

borrower/landlord on 18.09.2015 under the provisions of SARFAESI Act

which was not injucted by the Courts below. At least it is not the 

 19 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

case of the appellants/the tenants that they have made an

application under Section 17 (1) seeking shelter under sub Clause (4A)

of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. Obviously they could not do so,

because they are not inducted into the suit schedule property

subsequent to the notice issued under Section 13 (2) and symbolic

possession taken under Section 13 (4). Hence they can’t be termed as

any person or tenant under the provisions of SARFAESI Act.

17. The present case which was dealt by the Courts below is totally

falls outside the purview of the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act and

the Judgments and decrees of the Courts below do not hit or inject

the Debt Recovery Tribunal or any other Appellate Tribunal to

function under the provisions of SARFAESI Act with reference to the

very same plaint schedule property which is a secured asset

mortgaged by the borrower/the landlord/the respondent herein.

There is no conflict of orders passed by the Courts below with the

orders that may be passed under SARFAESI Act and RDBI Act 1993.

From the above said facts and circumstances and legal position, it is

obvious and evident that the appellants’ relationship is only with their

landlord and they are nothing to do with the secured creditor/the

banker who advanced housing loan to their landlord as a borrower.

Just because their landlord has become the defaulter before the bank

with reference to payment of equated monthly installments of a

housing loan with respect to the plaint schedule property, the tenants

cannot take undue advantage of the same and exploit by refraining to 

 20 BKMJ

 Sa No.28 of 2021

make payments of rents flouting their oral lease and understanding

between the parties.


18. In view of the forgoing reasons, the Second Appeal has to fail as

there is no substantial question of law for interference of this Court

under Section 100 C.P.C. and the appellants herein are directed to

vacate the plaint schedule property within four (4) months from today

by complying with the other terms of the decree of the trial Court as

it is. It is needless to mention that the respondent shall bring it to

the notice of the secured creditor and the learned Debt Recovery

Tribunal in which the proceedings are pending about this Judgment of

this Court enabling them to take necessary action and passing of

orders suitably with respect to the secured asset of the respondent

herein/borrower under the provisions of SARFAESI Act r/w RDBI Act.

19. Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no

order as to costs.

 As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in the

Second Appeal, shall stand closed.

 _________________________

JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

12th February, 2021.

Note:-

L.R. Copy to be marked.

(B/o)

Yvk 

Thursday, March 25, 2021

Or.26 rule 9 of CPC - Petition for Advocate Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule - suit for mandatory injunction & permanent Injunction - for demolition of illegal construction of shops allegedly made by the defendants in the plaint schedule site- Tiral Court dismissed on the main ground that the plaintiff failed to file any document to show about the disputed measurements and she filed the plaint schedule basing on the boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 09.10.2006 and she has not filed any document to show the disputed measurements. The Court further observed that the plaintiff could now show prima facie evidence either oral or documentary to show that there was a dispute regarding the remaining extent of 28 feet x 1.50 feet site - Their Lordships of AP High Court held that the suit is at the inceptional stage and the trial has not yet commenced.-this Court is of the considered view that after the trial is completed and if the plaintiff is able to establish that originally she purchased 3 RCC shops in an extent of 28 feet x 12 feet and the constructions made by the defendants fall within any portion of the aforesaid extent purchased by her, she is at liberty to file a fresh application seeking appointment of the Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint plan as ABCD marked portion and to make measurements and note down the boundaries etc, in which case the trial Court shall consider the same and pass an appropriate order.


Or.26 rule 9 of CPC - Petition for Advocate  Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule - suit for mandatory injunction & permanent Injunction - for demolition of illegal construction of shops allegedly made by the defendants in the plaint schedule site- Tiral Court dismissed on the main ground that the plaintiff failed to file any document to show about the disputed measurements and she filed the plaint schedule basing on the boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 09.10.2006 and she has not filed any document to show the disputed measurements. The Court further observed that the plaintiff could now show prima facie evidence either oral or documentary to show that there was a dispute regarding the remaining extent of 28 feet x 1.50 feet site - Their Lordships of AP High Court held that the suit is at the inceptional stage and the trial has not yet commenced.-this Court is of the considered view that after the trial is completed and if the plaintiff is able to establish that originally she purchased 3 RCC shops in an extent of 28 feet x 12 feet and the constructions made by the defendants fall within any portion of the aforesaid extent purchased by her, she is at liberty to file a fresh application seeking appointment of the Commissioner to note the physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint plan as ABCD marked portion and to make measurements and note down the boundaries etc, in which case the trial Court shall consider the same and pass an appropriate order.


AP High Court 

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO

Civil Revision Petition No.68 of 2021

Samanthula Vasanthalaxmi 

-verses-

Althi Kishore

ORDER:

 Heard Smt. Taddi Sowmya Naidu, counsel representing Sri

Taddi Nageswara Rao, learned counsel for petitioner, and Sri Ambati

Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. As can be seen, the trial Court dismissed I.A.No.181/2020, filed

by the petitioner/plaintiff, seeking appointment of the Commissioner

to note the physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint

plan mentioned ABCD marked portion on the main ground that the

plaintiff failed to file any document to show about the disputed

measurements and she filed the plaint schedule basing on the

boundaries mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 09.10.2006 and she has

not filed any document to show the disputed measurements. The

Court further observed that the plaintiff could now show prima facie

evidence either oral or documentary to show that there was a dispute

regarding the remaining extent of 28 feet x 1.50 feet site. On these

observations the trial Court expressed its disinclination to appoint the

Commissioner.

3. As can be seen, the suit is at the inceptional stage and the trial

has not yet commenced. The suit is for mandatory injunction for

demolition of illegal construction of shops allegedly made by the

defendants in the plaint schedule site, morefully shown in the plaint 

2

plan mentioned ABCD red marked portion, and for permanent

injunction.

4. Having regard to the nature of the suit and considering that the

suit is in the neonatal stage, this Court is of the considered view that

after the trial is completed and if the plaintiff is able to establish that

originally she purchased 3 RCC shops in an extent of 28 feet x 12 feet

and the constructions made by the defendants fall within any portion

of the aforesaid extent purchased by her, she is at liberty to file a fresh

application seeking appointment of the Commissioner to note the

physical features of the plaint schedule shown in the plaint plan as

ABCD marked portion and to make measurements and note down the

boundaries etc, in which case the trial Court shall consider the same

and pass an appropriate order.

5. The Civil Revision Petition is disposed of with the above

observations. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any

pending, shall stand closed.

__________________________

U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J

20.03.2021

MVA 

Friday, March 12, 2021

the very appointment of the petitioners as Village Revenue Assistants is in dispute as the respondents contending that the appointment of the petitioners is contrary to the Rules, thereby the respondents addressed a letter to the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada inviting certain clarifications, but successfully Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada avoided to clarify any of the issues while directing the Revenue Department to take action in accordance with the Rules. Till date, no action was taken to find out whether the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or in violation of rules. Even according to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020 certain guidelines were given for promotion of the Village Revenue Assistants as Village Revenue Officers, Grade –II and necessary qualification is prescribed in paragraph No.7 of the said Government Order. = Here, it is not the question of doubtful integrity and the dispute is with regard to appointment of the petitioners in violation of the rules. Therefore, such question of fact has to be examined by the competent authority and this Court cannot undertake such exercise of deciding the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or otherwise. At best, this Court can issue a direction to the respondents to enquire into the alleged illegalities in the appointment of the petitioners and if the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the law and rules, the case of the petitioners be considered subject to fulfilling other conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020, within four (4) weeks from today.

the very appointment of the petitioners as Village Revenue Assistants is in dispute as the respondents contending that the appointment of the petitioners is contrary to the Rules, thereby the respondents addressed a letter to the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada inviting certain clarifications, but successfully Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada avoided to clarify any of the issues while directing the Revenue Department to take action in accordance with the Rules. Till date, no action was taken to find out whether the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or in violation of rules. Even according to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020 certain guidelines were given for promotion of the Village Revenue Assistants as Village Revenue Officers, Grade –II and necessary qualification is prescribed in paragraph No.7 of the said Government Order. =

Here, it is not the question of doubtful integrity and the dispute is with regard to appointment of the petitioners in violation of the rules. Therefore, such question of fact has to be examined by the competent authority and this Court cannot undertake such exercise of deciding the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the rules or otherwise. At best, this Court can issue a direction to the respondents to enquire into the alleged illegalities in the appointment of the petitioners and if the appointment of the petitioners is in accordance with the law and rules, the case of the petitioners be considered subject to fulfilling other conditions contained in G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020, within four (4) weeks from today. 

AP HIGH COURT

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

WRIT PETITION Nos.01 of 2021 and 25859 of 2020

1) K.Sathipandu,

-VERSES-

1) Government of Andhra Pradesh

COMMON ORDER:

The writ petition No.01 of 2021 is filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India seeking the following relief:

“to issue a writ, order or direction particularly one in the nature of Writ

of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in not considering the

claims of the Petitioners for promotion for the post of Village Revenue Officers

Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list dated 04.02.2020 is illegal,

arbitrary and violation of Article 14, 16, 21 of the Constitution of India. The

petitioners further pray that they are entitled to promotion to the post of

Village Revenue Officers Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list

dated 04.02.2020 with all consequential benefits on par with their juniors

and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the circumstances of the case”.

The writ petition No.25859 of 2020 is filed under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:

“to issue a writ, order or direction particularly one in the nature of Writ

of Mandamus declaring the action of the Respondents in not considering the

claims of the Petitioners for promotion for the post of Village Revenue Officers

Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list dated 04.02.2020 is illegal,

arbitrary and violation of Article 14, 16, 21 of the Constitution of India. The

petitioners further pray that they are entitled to promotion to the post of

Village Revenue Officers Grade-II as per the placement in the seniority list

dated 04.02.2020 with all consequential benefits on par with their juniors

and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and

proper in the circumstances of the case”.

 Since the relief claimed in both the petitions is identical,

it is expedient to decide both the writ petitions by common order.

 The petitioners were appointed as Village Revenue Assistants

(VRAs) in West Godavari District under the jurisdiction of respondent

Nos.3 and 4. Ever since, their appointment till date, they have been

discharging their duties with utmost devotion and dedication,

without any complaint from any one.

 The village servants are being paid very low amount.

Subsequently, when it is sought to regularize their services by paying 

MSM,J

WPs_1_2021 and 25859_2020

2

Rs.1,180/- plus Rs.50/- D.A., they are being paid honorarium and

were never paid pay scales. In view of the arduous nature of work

and also very low emoluments, normally the Village Revenue

Assistants posts are being filled on compassionate appointment and

also by giving preference to the family members whose

parents/family members are related since they would be acquainted

with the nature of duties. Subsequently, the honorarium is being

increased from time to time i.e. Rs.5,000/- and presently the

petitioners are being paid Rs.10,500/- plus Rs.300/- D.A. plus

Rs.100/- T.A. per month.

 It is further contended that out of 75 Village Revenue

Assistants, who are included in the provisional seniority list dated

04.02.2020 at appropriate place, respondent No.3 has promoted

nearly 30 candidates along with all other candidates and promotions

are given to 415 candidates including several persons who are

juniors to the petitioners vide Ref.No.A1/251/2019 dated

25.06.2020. Whereas, the case of the petitioners is totally ignored by

the respondents, such denial of promotion to the petitioners is illegal

and arbitrary, requested to issue a direction.

 Respondents filed counter mainly contending that the very

appointment of the petitioners is irregular and it is pending for

taking action by the concerned authorities. Unless the action is

taken in accordance with law, in terms of the directions issued by

the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Vijayawada, the

petitioners cannot be promoted to next higher cadre, requested to

dismiss the writ petitions.

 During hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn

the attention of this Court to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III)

Department dated 27.01.2020 and requested to consider the case of 

MSM,J

WPs_1_2021 and 25859_2020

3

the petitioners with reference to said Government Order and

clarification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration, Vijayawada in Ref.No.Ser.IV(2)/160/2020-1 dated

29.09.2020, requested to issue a direction for promoting the

petitioners as Village Revenue Officers Grade-II.

 Learned Government Pleader for Services – I reiterated the

contentions urged in the counter and contended that the very

appointment of the petitioners is in dispute, unless action is taken in

accordance with law, in terms of the directions issued by the Chief

Commissioner of Land Administration, Vijayawada, the petitioners

cannot be promoted to next higher cadre, requested to dismiss the

writ petitions.

 As seen from the rival contentions, the very appointment of the

petitioners as Village Revenue Assistants is in dispute as the

respondents contending that the appointment of the petitioners is

contrary to the Rules, thereby the respondents addressed a letter to

the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh,

Vijayawada inviting certain clarifications, but successfully Chief

Commissioner of Land Administration, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada

avoided to clarify any of the issues while directing the Revenue

Department to take action in accordance with the Rules. Till date, no

action was taken to find out whether the appointment of the

petitioners is in accordance with the rules or in violation of rules.

Even according to G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated

27.01.2020 certain guidelines were given for promotion of the Village

Revenue Assistants as Village Revenue Officers, Grade –II and

necessary qualification is prescribed in paragraph No.7 of the said

Government Order. 

MSM,J

WPs_1_2021 and 25859_2020

4

 Learned counsel for the petitioners requested to issue a

direction to follow the procedure prescribed in paragraph No.7 of

G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated 27.01.2020 and

specifically drawn the attention of this Court to clause (ix) of

paragraph No.7 of the said Government Order, where the District

Collector reserves right to reject the promotion of any candidate with

doubtful integrity and whose performance as Village Revenue

Assistant is not satisfactory or any disciplinary case is pending. No

doubt, a right is vested with the District Collector to reject the

candidature of any candidate, if his/her integrity is doubtful etc.

 Here, it is not the question of doubtful integrity and the

dispute is with regard to appointment of the petitioners in violation

of the rules. Therefore, such question of fact has to be examined by

the competent authority and this Court cannot undertake such

exercise of deciding the appointment of the petitioners is in

accordance with the rules or otherwise. At best, this Court can issue

a direction to the respondents to enquire into the alleged illegalities

in the appointment of the petitioners and if the appointment of the

petitioners is in accordance with the law and rules, the case of the

petitioners be considered subject to fulfilling other conditions

contained in G.O.Ms.No.13 Revenue (SER.III) Department dated

27.01.2020, within four (4) weeks from today.

 With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. No

costs.

The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand

closed.

_________________________________________

JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

08.02.2021

Ksp