S.10(3)(c) OF A.P.RENT CONTROL ACT = ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION - RELATIVE Hardship - EVICTION = hardship is bound to be caused if the 1st respondent is disturbed from the premises where he had been carrying on business but if he had made no attempt to find out whether alternative accommodation for his purpose is available in the same or any other locality, it has to be held that the hardship caused to him would not outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The landlord cannot be compelled to live in an inconvenient position merely because he had tolerated it for sometime. The advantage to the landlord,in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case would clearly outweigh the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer because of his eviction. 66. For all the above reasons, I hold that the petitioners have established their need for additional accommodation under S.10(3)(c); that their need is bonafide; and that the hardship which would be caused to the 1st respondent is outweighed by the advantage to the petitioners.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9722

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO          

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.5778 of 2006  

14.03.2013

M/s.Sri Srinivas Enterprises,Tarnaka, Secunderabad and another.

Sri Narayandas and others.

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

Counsel for Petitioners: Sri B.Nalin Kumar

Counsel for Respondents: Smt.Manjari Ganu for Sri M.Papa Reddy.

? Cases referred
1 1979(2) APLJ 141
2 1961(1) MLJ 223
3 1964(1) MLJ 112
4 (1987) 2 SUPREME COURT CASES 707      
5 1988 (2) ALT 109
6 1995(2) ALT 270
7 1988 (1) ALT 414
8 1997 (5) ALT 785
9 (2005) 5 SUPREME COURT CASES 252      
10 (2002) 5 SUPREME COURT CASES 397      
11 2009 (2) ALT 271
12 AIR 1965 AP 220
13 (2008) 17 SUPREME COURT CASES 679      
14 (2002) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 329      
15 (2003) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES 101      
16 (1982) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 4      
17 AIR 1958 SC 448
18 2012(3) ALD 132
19 2006 (1) ALD 785
20 AIR 1989 SUPREME COURT 302      
21 2005 (2) ALD 204
22 AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 2507      
23 (2002) 3 SCC 626
24 2004 (8) SCC 490
25 (2001) 8 SCC 110
26 (1998) 8 SCC 119

ORDER:

        This Civil Revision Petition is filed under Section 22 of the A.P.
Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction ) Control Act, 1960, ( for short "the Act")
by the landlords challenging the order dt. 5.6.2006 in RA No.504 of 1994 of the
Appellate Authority under the Act-cum-Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes
Court, Hyderabad confirming the order dated 25.4.1994 in RC No.1175 of 1988 of
the  Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad.
2. The subject matter of this Civil Revision Petition is a mulgi bearing
premises No.5-8-658/5  situated at Station Road, Nampally, Hyderabad
(hereinafter referred to as "RC schedule premises". The first petitioner is a
firm in which petitioner no.2 and respondents 2 to 9 are  partners.( for short
"petitioners")
3. The RC schedule premises was purchased by the 1st petitioner firm under regd.
sale deeds dt. 9.5.1985 and 10.5.1985. The first petitioner firm was carrying on
hotel business under the name and style of Coromondel Lodge in the premises
bearing Municipal Nos.5-8-658, 658/1-4 and sheds bearing Nos. 658/5,658/6 and
658/7 and three floors with back side restaurant Shalimar Bar and Restaurant.
The first,  second and third floors are  resting on the ground floor shops
bearing Nos. 5-8-657, 658, 658/1 to 8 situated at Nampally Station Road,
Hyderabad. On the western side of the main road, there is a passage with shutter
gate. In the first, second and third floors there are total 33 rooms with
balcony, W.C. bath and other amenities fully equipped with furniture.
4. The 1st respondent is a tenant of the petitioners in the RC schedule premises
and he had attorned his tenancy with effect from 12.5.1985. The 1st respondent
was paying monthly rent of Rs.350/- excluding electricity consumption charges
and carried on business in the name and style of "M/s Sona Foot Wear".
5. After purchase of the RC schedule premises , the 1st petitioner  firm
informed the 1st  respondent that it requires it and adjacent mulgies for their
own use as it is facing inconvenience in its business for want of accommodation
for business; that it is temporarily using the stair case room for Reception and
facing problems to accommodate the Manager, Telephone cabin, Receptionist,
Accounts Section etc., and waiting lounge for customers; that customers are
suffering inconvenience for lack of sitting accommodation; it could not
accommodate a manager with a cabin to attend to customers; and this is affecting
the business of the petitioners; they could not install a lift providing easier
access to the 3 floors above. As the 1st respondent did not vacate, RC. No.1175
of 1988 was filed in the Court of the Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad under
Section 10(3) (c) of the Act to evict the 1st  respondent contending  that
petitioners require additional accommodation which requirement is bonafide; that
hardship to the petitioners outweighs the requirements of the 1st respondent;
apart from the RC schedule premises the 1st  petitioner also requires other two
shops which are abutting it i.e premises bearing municipal no.5-8-658/6 and 7;
that it had initiated eviction proceedings against the tenants of the said
premises also;  that petitioners has to take up construction of fourth floor to
create more lodging accommodation; and they require the RC schedule premises for
additional accommodation for reception, Manager Room etc., which need is
bonafide and therefore the 1st respondent is liable to be evicted.
6.  The 1st  respondent filed a counter admitting the jural relationship of
landlord and tenant between the 1st petitioner and himself and also quantum of
rent. But he pleaded that the petitioners have no right to seek eviction under
Section 10(3)(c ) of the Act; that the first petitioner in its capacity as firm
is not competent to file petition for eviction on account of non-compliance of
mandatory provisions  embodied under Section 69 of the Partnership Act; there
are also other buildings on the site including the building occupied by M/s.
Shalimar Bar and Restaurant; the building occupied by the 1st respondent has
been allotted an independent separate municipal number and is not part of any
other building and as such, the provisions of section 10(3) (c) of the Act are
not attracted ; that 1st petitioner deliberately suppressed various sale
transactions in respect of other independent buildings from the same vendor; the
allegation of the 1st petitioner that it is undergoing inconvenience for want of
accommodation for its business is not true; the 1st  petitioner is occupying a
vast building in the first, second  and third floors of the building; the 1st
petitioner is having accommodation of its choice and using the same as reception
room; the 1st petitioner has recently constructed a separate hall for Manager's
office  on the terrace of the building occupied by M/s Shalimar Bar and
Restaurant; this hall is being used as Office and Manager's room; there is
separate accommodation for telephone, cabin for receptionist  and accounts
section; that the tenant M/s. Shalimar Bar and Restaurant has vacated big
reception room and other adjoinin premises and had inducted the 1st petitioner
in to them; the RC schedule premises is an independent building having
independent access and it had always been used as such by previous tenants and
also let out as such; 1st petitioner had sold mulgies bearing Nos.5-8-658/3, 5-
8-657/1   to the previous tenants under different sale deeds; there would be no
hardship to the 1st  petitioner if the petition for eviction is dismissed; that
1st  petitioner acquired the buildings in the rear side of the premises No. 5-8-
658, 658/1 to 7 in the ground floor and occupied the same; that  requirement of
the petitioners is not bona fide; that business of the 1st respondent in the
schedule premises is the only source of income for him and for his family
members; and the hardship that would be caused to him would out-weigh the
advantage to the petitioners.
7. Before the Principal Rent Controller, the Manager of the 1st  petitioner firm
was examined as P.W.1, and Exs.P.1 to P.11 were marked.  The son of the first
respondent who was also his GPA holder was examined as RW.1 and he marked    
Exs.R.1 to R.20.
8. By his order dated 25.4.1994, the Principal Rent Controller dismissed the
petition for eviction. He held that the premises in occupation of the
petitioners and the RC schedule premises are not two separate buildings but are
part of the same building; the petition for eviction is maintainable to seek
eviction of 1st respondent from the RC schedule premises under section 10(3) (c)
of the Act;  petitioners are not having accommodation in the ground floor of the
same building for their business requirements; the requirement of the
petitioners is bona fide;1st  respondent had no right  to direct or instruct the
landlord to adjust his requirements in the accommodation available in another
building; it is not possible to hold that the rooms in the first, second and
third floors of the building in occupation of the petitioners are reasonable
accommodation to adjust the requirements of the 1st  petitioner's lodge;  R.W.1
had not deposed in his evidence that the petitioner's firm  at any time demanded
him to enhance the rent; the petitioners had no oblique motive in seeking
additional accommodation in the occupation of the 1st  respondent; it is
admitted by the 1st respondent that building where M/s. Shalimar Bar and
Restaurant and M/s Sri Sai Restaurant are located is a separate building;
letting of the building to M/s. Sri Sai Restaurant subsequent to the filing of
the petition is not helpful to the first respondent; however, it is not possible
for 1st respondent to get similar accommodation for his business in the same
locality; and therefore hardship which may be caused to the 1st respondent would
outweigh  the advantage to the  petitioners if the petition for eviction is
allowed.
9. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed RA No.504 of 1994 before the
Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad.  The said appeal was
dismissed by order dt. 29.12.1999.
10. Challenging the said order in RA No.504 of 1994, the petitioner and the
respondents 2 to 9 filed CRP No.509 of 2001 before this Court.
11. By its order dt.17.6.2005, this Court allowed the Revision on the ground
that before Appellate Authority Exs.R.21 to  R.29 (photos, paper publications
and copy of sale deed) were filed by 1st respondent probably to show that there
was no pressing need for the petitioners-landlords requiring additional
accommodation and that their requirement is not bona fide; the petitioners also
filed an affidavit of K.Lakshminarayana , who was in possession of premises
no.5-8-658/6 ; counter affidavit filed by petitioners opposing the application
to receive additional evidence brought out subsequent events and additional
facts; subsequent events can be brought before the appellate authority for
deciding the matter; the appellate authority while dismissing the appeal had not
considered issue of comparative hardship; in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, and in view of  subsequent events which were brought
to the notice of the Court, it is a fit case where opportunity should be given
to the parties to lead further evidence in the matter; therefore the CRP was
allowed, order of the appellate authority was set aside and the matter was
remitted back to the lower appellate authority to afford opportunity to both
parties "on all aspects" and to dispose of the matter. This Court also gave
opportunity to adduce further oral and documentary evidence to substantiate the
respective contentions of the parties.
12. After remand, the 1st petitioner firm filed I.A.No.895/2005 to amend its
petition for eviction and sought to add paragraph "6 a" to "6 d" therein.  The
said application was allowed on 6.12.2005 by the lower appellate authority.
13. These paragraphs contains some additional pleadings of the petitioners. The
petitioners contended that premises bearing No.5-8-658/5, 5-8-658/6  and 7  are
adjacent to each other and next to stair case room; that RC schedule premises 5-
8-658/5 is very next to the staircase room and premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 is
in between 5-8-658/5 and 5-8-658/7; that premises bearing No.5-8-658/6, 5-8-
658/7 have been vacated for some  years and petitioners were losing a lot of
money; that there was a discussion among partners of the 1st  petitioner firm on
this issue several times; it was suggested by the partners that unless premises
5-8-658/5 is vacated, it is not possible to convert/modify the said premises for
accommodation of Manager, Telephone cabin, cabin, receptionist, accounts
section, waiting room for the customers and lift; since the present proceedings
commenced in the year 1988 and it was not certain how much more time it would
take before the proceedings terminate, it was suggested that the petitioners
should not lose income, if a right party, who is credible, came forward to take
it on rent subject to terms and conditions of the petitioners; that Sri Y.
Satyanarayana and Sri K. Laxminarayana approached the petitioners to take the
premises 5-8-658/6 on rent at Rs.25,000/- per month; the said offer was
attractive; the 2nd  petitioner explained to the said persons about the
requirement of the premises  No.5-8-658/6 along with the other 2 premises
bearing Nos.5-8-658/5 and 5-8-658/7, that litigation in respect of 5-8-658/5 was
pending, and in the event of litigation finally terminating in favour of the
petitioners, they have to vacate the premises to enable the petitioners to make
necessary conversion, modification to the premises; that 1st petitioner firm
expected that in any event minimum period  for termination of the proceedings
would be one year in 2004; and as such offered premises  No.5-8-658/6 to Sri
Y.Satyanarayana and Sri K.Laxminarayana on the specific understanding that they
should handover the premises to petitioners on their securing vacant passion of
the adjacent premises no.5-8-658/5 and they agreed to it; accordingly
Ex.P12/regd.lease deed dt. 9.2.2004 bearing No.334/2004 was entered into for a
period of 11 months on a monthly rent of Rs.25,000/-; as the proceedings for
eviction of 1st respondent from the RC schedule premises did not terminate, they
executed another regd. lease deed Ex.P13/dt.16.2.2005 for 3 more years subject
to the understanding that they would it handover on termination of  proceedings
in  favour of petitioners or on expiry of 3 years whichever is earlier; this was
done only to earn income for the petitioners, but not for any oblique purpose;
the said Y.Satyanarayana and K.Laxminarayana are willing to vacate the premises
as agreed on the petitioners securing vacant possession of the RC schedule
premises; the petitioners had no intention to sell the property; and they also
gave an undertaking to the Court that the RC schedule premises will be put to
the use of the purpose for which eviction is sought, on obtaining vacant
possession.
14. The 1st  respondent filed additional counter denying all the averments made
in the amendment application contending that RC schedule premises is not located
next to the stair case room; that  petitioners had admitted that premises No.5-
8-658/6 and 7 were kept vacant for many years without occupying the same; that
they have suppressed the fact that these premises have fallen vacant with a
malafide intention; only when 1st  respondent filed an application in the
revision to receive certain documents as additional evidence, this plea was
raised; if there is any requirement which is bona fide and genuine, the 1st
petitioner would have used the premises fallen vacant for their alleged
requirement and would not have created a story which is unbelievable, in order
to justify keeping those premises vacant; that  petitioners should have adjusted
themselves for their alleged business requirement in the area which is vacant,
instead, they have let out the same to a new tenant on handsome rent and
received deposits; 1st petitioner has not specifically stated anything about the
alleged conversion and modification of the RC schedule premises for Manager,
telephone cabin, reception, accounts section, waiting lounge for the customers;
the so called understanding between the petitioner and the tenants
Y.Satyanarayana and K.Laxminarayana  is not true;  1st  petitioner had given a
paper advertisement in Deccan Chronicle news paper dated 15.4.1998 for disposal
of the entire property and this also indicates that its requirement is not bona
fide. The 1st  respondent also raised certain additional pleas that during the
pendency of the appeal, M/s.  Shalimar Bar and Restaurant which was in
occupation of the premises adjacent to the main building of the petitioners on
the rear side vacated and handed over vacant possession of the portion under its
occupation to the 1st petitioner;  that the said tenant was occupying area
approximately 12 x 40 feet; after obtaining vacant possession, the 1st
petitioner had constructed additional rooms and let out half portion of the same
to one Vaishnavi Restaurant on higher rent and the other half is being used for
manager room, waiting lounge etc., therefore, the alleged requirement of
additional accommodation, if any, ceases and the cause of action, if any, stands
extinguished; to the east of the petition schedule premises is the entrance of
the petitioners' lodge and beyond that there is another premises  No.5-8-658/3;
apart from the said premises adjacent to the main gate, another premises no.5-8-
658/4 was in occupation of the another tenant of the petitioners by name Shri
Duhilanomal ; petitioners obtained a part of premises bearing No.5-8-658/3
adjacent to mugli no.5-8-658/4 from Duhilanomal under a compromise dt.24.11.2004
in  O.S.no.227/2003 before the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Courts,
Hyderabad,  whereby the said tenant has withdrawn the said suit in favour of the
petitioners by receiving a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- giving up a portion out of
premises no.5-8-658/3; that 1st petitioner filed eviction case against  tenant
M/s. Carona Shoe and Co. Ltd occupying premises no.5-8-658/6, adjacent to the RC
schedule premises and another tenant Smt. P. Lalitha occupying premises no.5-8-
658/7 vide RC No.1140 of 1988 and RC No.1174 of 1988 before the Rent Controller,
Hyderabad and obtained vacant possession of the same during the pendency of the
appeal; that the said eviction cases were filed on the same grounds of personal
requirement as alleged in the present eviction proceedings; having obtained
vacant possession of the premises nos.5-8-658/6 and 5-8-658/7, the first
petitioner has kept the premises bearing No.5-8-658/7 vacant since many years
and let out premises no.5-8-658/6 to Y. Satyanarayana and K. Laxminarayna; in
view of the subsequent developments also, the 1st petitioner firm and its
partners are not entitled to maintain the R.C. and seek any relief. The 1st
respondent also filed cross objections to the same effect.
15. By common order dt. 5.6.2006 in RA  No.506 of  1994 and cross objections,
the Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad dismissed the
appeal filed by petitioners while setting aside the findings of the Principal
Rent Controller. He held that  RC schedule premises is a separate building
within the definition of S.2 (iii) of the Act for all practical purposes and the
petitioners are not entitled to invoke S.10(3) (c) of the Act ; that letting out
premises 5-8-658/6 to P.W.3 and others and the portion adjacent to Shalimar Bar
and Restaurant to Sri Sai Restaurant disentitles the petitioners from seeking
eviction of the 1st respondent; that requirement of the RC schedule premises as
additional accommodation is not genuine and bona fide and 1st  respondent is not
liable to be evicted from the RC schedule premises.
16. Aggrieved thereby, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the 1st
petitioner and 2nd petitioner.
17. Heard Sri B.  Nalini Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt.
Manjari Ganu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri M. Papa  Reddy, learned
counsel for the 1st respondent.
18. Learned counsel for petitioners contended that the finding of the Appellate
Authority that the RC schedule premises is an independent building is incorrect
; that he erred in holding that  petitioners are not entitled to seek eviction
of 1st respondent under Section 10(3)(c) ;  that he failed to appreciate that
the premises No. 5-8-658/5 obtained by the petitioners from other tenant was let
out for a limited period subject to specific understanding to avoid loss of
income from the property pending present litigation to evict 1st respondent from
the RC schedule premises;  that he failed to consider that the premises obtained
from M/s. Shalimar Bar and Restaurant was let out to M/s. Sri Sai Restaurant is
no way connected to the bonafide requirement of petitioners as the same is not
located in the building facing the main road but on it's rear side and not
suitable for proposed additional accommodation; that he ought to have held that
hardship faced by 1st respondent is not outweighed by advantage to the
petitioners;  the Appellate Authority ought to have set aside the order of the
Principal Rent Controller and directed eviction of 1st respondent; that he erred
in  holding that the intention of  petitioners is only to evict the 1st
respondent from the premises for getting more rent; that he  erred in holding
that the entire family of the 1st respondent would be deprived of it's
livelihood as R.W.1 clearly admitted in the cross examination that his family
members are having other business; and that due to lack of additional
accommodation the petitioners are put to lot of inconvenience. In support of his
contentions, he relied on the following decisions reported in
T.VENKATAKRISHNA REDDY v. T.K. SREEDHAR AND OTHERS 1, R.K. VEERAPPA NAIDU AND                  
ANOTHER v. N. GOPALAN2,  A.MOHAMMED JAFFAR SAHEB v.            
A.PALANIAPPA CHETTIAR3,  SHRI BALAGANESAN METALS V. M.N. SHANMUGHAM CHETTY AND                    
OTHERS 4,  B. ARTHO THYADI ( Died) BY LRs. V G. KAMARAJU 5, KOSURI SATTI BABU V.          
VADABOYINA SIMHACHALAM AND ANOTHER6, K.C. KANNIYAPPAN v Y. VENKATARAMANA RAO7,                      
SMT. CHUNNU BAI v. K. RAMULU AND OTHES 8,  SAINT NAGJEE PURUSHOTHAM AND CO. LTD.                
V. VIMALABAI PRABHULAL AND OTHERS9,  JOGINDER PAL V. NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL10,                
B.RUKMAIAH AND OTHERS V. M.A. SAMAD AND OTHERS11, K. PARASURAMAIAH V. POKURI                    
LAKSHMAMMA12,  BENTOOL STEEL PRODUCTS PVT LTD. V O.M.A. MOHAMMED OMAR AND                      
ANOTHER13, S.N. KAPPOR Died LRs. V. BASANT LAL KHATRI14, BHIMANAGOUDA BASANA                
GOUDA PATIL V. MOHD. GUDUSAHEB 15,   SMT. GANGABAI W/O. RAMBILAS GILDA V. SMT.                
CHHABUBAI W/O PUKHARAJJI GANDHI16, BAI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS V. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE                
17.    
19. On the other hand, Smt. Manjari S Ganu, learned counsel representing Sri M.
Papa Reddy, counsel for 1st  respondent contended that findings of the Appellate
Authority under the Act are based on appreciation of  evidence on record and
therefore the order under challenge do not warrant any interference in exercise
of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 22 of the Act.  She
reiterated that the reasoning of the Principal Rent Controller insofar  as
applicability of S.10 (3) (c) was rightly set aside in appeal  giving cogent
reasons; requirement of the  petitioners of the RC schedule premises is not bona
fide;  RC schedule premises is an independent building and therefore the
petition for eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act was held rightly to be
not maintainable ;  subsequent events clearly show that the need of petitioners
is not subsisting as adjacent premises which have fallen vacant were not
utilized for the needs of the  petitioners but were kept vacant; premises
bearing No.5-8-658/6 was let out to P.W.3 and others  and thus sought for
dismissal of the CRP. In support of her contentions, the following decisions
were relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents KUN JI BAI G. CHUGANI
V. FASHION, SECUNDERABAD18, GENERAL AUTO AGENCIES V. GOPAL DAS J. BHUPATA19,                  
GANGARAM V. N. SHANKAR REDDY20, MANIK HALDER V. POLAMRAJU LAVANYA21 and SHIV                    
SARUP GUPTA V. MAHESH CHAND GUPTA22.          
20. Before we consider the contentions of the parties, it is necessary to deal
with the scope of S.22 of the Act.
21.     In Harshavardhan Chokkani v. Bhupendra N. Patel23, the Supreme Court,
while considering the scope of S.22 of the Act, held:
"There can be no controversy about the position that the power of the High Court
under Section 22 of the Act is wider than the power under Section 115 CPC.
Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional power which in its very
nature is a truncated power. The width of the powers of the revisional court
cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate court. In examining the
legality and the propriety of the order under challenge, what is required to be
seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory provision
or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or omission to
consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn from the facts
proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the like. It is only
in such situations that interference by the High Court in revision in a finding
of fact will be justified. Mere possibility of a different view is no ground to
interfere in exercise of revisional power".

22.     In Central Auto Agencies (19 supra) cited by the learned counsel for  1st
respondent, this Court held that concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the
Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that  a premises in occupation of  a
tenant is not separate and distinct from that in the occupation of the landlord
cannot be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.  In the
present case, the finding of the Rent Controller that the premises in occupation
of the 1st respondent-tenant are not separate from the premises in occupation of
the 1st petitioner landlord has been reversed by the appellate authority.
Therefore this decision has no application.
23.     In Shiv Sarup Gupta (22 supra), the Supreme Court while interpreting the
scope of Revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control
Act, 1958 held that the High Court cannot enter into appreciation of evidence
merely because it is inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it
were a Court of facts and that its jurisdiction while not limited as is under
Section 115 CPC is also not wide as that of an appellate Court.  The 1st
respondent cannot place any reliance on this decision as the language in Section
25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is substantially different from that of
Section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh Act (which is wider and permits the legality,
regularity and propriety of the order under revision to be judged by the High
Court).  Therefore the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 22 of the Act is
wider and it can even interfere on issues of fact if the parameters set out in
Harshavardhan Chokkani (23 supra ) are satisfied.
24.     In Manik Halder (21 supra), this Court held that in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction, the High Court can judge, the legality, regularity and propriety
of the order under revision.

        25.     Keeping in view the above principles, we have to consider the
following points in this revision.
(i) Whether the RC schedule premises is part and parcel of the building which is
in occupation of the landlords ?
(ii) Whether action of the petitioners in  letting out premises No.5-8-658/6 to
P.W.3 and others (which was obtained by filing eviction petition on the ground
of additional accommodation) disentitles the petitioners to seek eviction of 1st
respondent?
(iii) Whether action of the petitioners in letting out to Sri Sai Restaurant ,
the premises adjacent to Shalimar Bar and Restaurant disentitles them from
seeking eviction of 1st respondent from RC schedule premises on the ground of
additional accommodation ?
(iv) Whether the petitioners require RC schedule premises as an additional
accommodation and their need is genuine and bonafide?
(v) If so, whether the hardship which may be caused to the 1st respondent by
granting eviction will outweigh the advantage to petitioners?
26.     Point No.(i) :
The  petitioners filed the RC for eviction of the 1st respondent under Section
10(3)(c) of the Act . The said provision entitles a landlord, who is occupying
only of a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, to seek
eviction of a tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of
the building and to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires
additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a
business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.  However, the Rent
Controller may reject the said application if he is satisfied that the hardship
which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to
the landlord as per proviso to Section 10(3)(c).
27.     The contention of the petitioners is that the respondent is in occupation
of a portion in the ground floor portion and the petitioners are in occupation
of first, second and third floor portions of the same building. Therefore they
are entitled to invoke S.10(3) (c). On the other hand, 1st respondent contends
that premises in his occupation is a separate and independent building and as
such, the present petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is not
maintainable.
28.     It is not disputed that RC schedule premises is situated in the ground
floor ; there are some other mulgies  in occupation of other tenants in the
ground floor; and all these mulgies are in a row. It is admitted that originally
the entire premises belonged to one Gopalakrishna Reddy and Suryanarayana Reddy  
who were carrying on hotel and lodging business in the entire premises under the
name and style M/s. Brundavan Hotels and that the previous owners let out RC
schedule premises  to 1st respondent and others. It is not disputed that these
two persons sold their property including the premises let out to 1st respondent
to 1st petitioner firm under different sale deeds. Admittedly there is direct
access to premises in occupation of the respondent from the main road.
29.     In SHRI BALAGANESAN METALS's case (4 supra), a landlord living in a  
upstairs portion of a building sought eviction of a tenant living in the down
stairs portion of the said building on the ground that he requires additional
accommodation under S.10(3)(c) of the Tamilnadu Buildings (Lease, Rent and
Eviction ) Control Act, 1960 (which is in pari materia with S.10(3) (c) of the
Act). The Supreme Court held that Section 2(2) of the said Act defines a
"building" to mean "any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to
be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes....."
unless the context otherwise requires; a part of a building which has been let
out can also be construed as a separate and independent building without
reference to the other portion or portions of the building where it is not
necessary to treat the entire building as one whole and inseparable unit; but,
if the context otherwise requires and warrants, the entire building can be
construed as one integral unit; it would be inappropriate to view the building
in question as consisting of several disintegrated units and not as one
integrated structure; there is a vast difference between the words  "residential
building" and "non-residential building" used in Section 10(3)(a) (i) and (iii)
on the one hand and Section 10(3)(c) on the other; that the former refers to the
building only as a residential or non-residential but the latter refers to  the
landlord occupying a part of  a building, whether residential or non-
residential; that Section 10(3)(c) states that a landlord may apply to the
Controller for an order of eviction being passed against a tenant  " occupying
the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building" ; if as
contended by the tenant, each portion of the building let out separately should
always be construed as an independent unit by itself, then there is no scope for
a landlord occupying "a part of a building" seeking eviction of a tenant
occupying "the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building";  and
that such a construction would render  the provisions of Section 10 (3) (c)
otiose because a landlord can never then ask for additional accommodation since
section 10(3) (a) does not provide for eviction of tenants on the ground of
additional accommodation for the landlord either for residential or non-
residential purposes.  It observed:
"It is, therefore, obvious that insofar as Section 10 (3) (c) is concerned the
legislature has intended that the entire building, irrespective of one portion
being occupied by the landlord and the other portion or portions being occupied
by a tenant or tenants should be viewed as one whole and integrated unit and not
as different entities.  To import the expansive definition of the word
"building: in Section 2 (2) into Section 10 (3) (c) would result in rendering
meaningless the words "part of a building" occupied by the landlord and a tenant
"occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building".

30.     A Division Bench of this Court in B. ARTHO THYADI (5 supra) held that a
reading of sections 10 (3)(a) (i), (ii) and (iii) and Section 2(iii) do not lead
to an inference that a building which is structurally one and the same ceases to
be a building when it is leased out in portions to more than one tenant.  It
held that if the building is such that it can be conveniently divided into
different portions, it can be leased out in portions. But the unit as a whole
does not cease to be a building on that count. Every premises let, or to be let,
is a building within the meaning of the Act. Therefore, even if each portion of
a house is let out and is a building for the purposes of the Act, the entire
building as an integrated unit is also a building and if the requirement is for
the integrated unit, there is no prohibition in law, subject of course to the
restrictions or conditions mentioned in the 10(3)(a) (i) or Section
10(3)(a)(iii).  The Bench held that there is nothing in Section 10(3)(a)(i) or
Section 10(3)(a)(iii) which precludes a landlord seeking possession of the
entire building let out to different tenants if his requirement is bonafide; If
the context in a particular provision requires that the word "building" should
not be understood as defined in Section 2(iii) of the Act, certainly it is open
to the Court to give the normal, natural and ordinary meaning which it is
capable of;  a landlord can seek possession of the entire building or any one or
more portions of the building depending on his requirements and if the competent
authority is satisfied that the requirement is bonafide, he can be put in
possession of the integrated unit. The Bench also referred to SHRI BALA NAGESHAN  
METALS (4 supra) and held that the definition of the term "building" depends on
the context and that if the context warrants the entire building to be taken as
a single unit, it should be so taken and the issue of additional accommodation
requirement of the landlord should be adjudicated.
31.      The learned counsel for the respondent however relied upon the decision
in GANGARAM's case (20 supra) and in particular to the following passage:
"7. On a consideration of the matter, we find that the contention of Mr.
Nambiyar, which has found acceptance with the Appellate Court and the High Court
is not at all a tenable one. What Section 10 (3) (c) envisages is the oneness of
the building and not the oneness of ownership of two different buildings, one
occupied by the landlord and the other by the tenant. The significant words used
in Section 10(3)(c) are "the landlord who is occupying only a part of a
building" and "any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining
part of the building". Surely no one can say that two adjoining buildings
bearing different door numbers, one occupied by the landlord and the other by
the tenant would make them one and the same building if they are owned by one
person and separate buildings if they are owned by two different persons. A
practical test which can be applied to find out if two adjoining buildings form
part of the same building or two different buildings would be to see whether one
of the two buildings can be sold by the landlord and the purchaser inducted into
possession of the premises sold without the landlord's possession and enjoyment
of the premises in his occupation being affected. Viewed in that manner, it can
at once be seen that the leased premises in the appellant's occupation can be
independently sold and the purchaser delivered possession without the
respondent's possession of door no. 1-1-249 being affected in any manner. As a
matter of fact, the previous history of the building shows that before it was
purchased by the respondent, it was owned by Sri Sitaram Rao and the respondent
was owning only door no. 1-1-249. Such being the case, merely because the
appellant has acquired title to door no. l- l-250 also, it can never be said
that the building under the tenancy of the appellant became part and parcel of
the respondent's building No. l-1-249. Similarly, the fact that the two
buildings are separated only by a single wall with no intervening space between
them would not alter the situation in any manner because the identity of two
separate buildings is not to be judged on the basis of the buildings being
separated by a single wall or by two separate walls with intervening space in
between them."

32.     This Court in KOSURI SATTI BABU's case   ( 6 supra)  considered both the
decisions in Gangaram (20 supra) and in Shri Balaganesan Metals (4 supra)  and
held that in Gangaram, there were two separate buildings to start with owned by
two different persons, with two different house numbers, and the respondent
before the Supreme Court who owned the building bearing Door No.1-1-249
purchased the adjoining tenanted building  Door No.1-1-250 (in the occupation of
the tenant/appellant before the Supreme Court), which was separated "by a single
wall with no intervening space" from the other building; the respondent-landlord
contended that these two buildings should be treated as parts or portions of one
building and claimed that he is entitled to invoke Section 10 (3) (c); rejecting
the said contention, the Supreme Court in Gangaram held that the practical test
which could be applied to find out if two adjoining buildings form part of the
same building would be to see whether one of the two buildings could be sold by
the landlord and the purchaser inducted into possession of the building sold
without the landlord's possession and enjoyment of the building in his
occupation being affected; this Court explained that  the said test cannot be
divorced from the context of the facts of Gangaram and the contentions urged
therein i.e. existence of two separate and distinct building owned by two
different persons when the appellant before the Supreme Court was inducted as a
tenant of one of the buildings.  This Court held that when what is leased to the
tenant is only a portion of a house and not an independent building, Section 10
(3) (c) could be invoked notwithstanding the fact that a part of a building is
also a "building" as defined under Section 2 (iii), because in the context, such
portion is a part of one integrated structure of a building.
33.     In T.Venkata Krishna Reddy's case (1 supra), this Court held that where a
portion let out to a tenant is structurally part of the main building though it
was given a separate municipal number, the landlord is entitled to seek eviction
of the tenant on the ground of requiring additional accommodation by invoking
Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act.  Similar view was taken by the Madras High Court
in R.K.Veerappa Naidu and Another (2 supra) which was approved by a Division
Bench of the said Court in A.Mohammed Jaffar Saheb (3 supra).
34.     In K.C.Kanniyappan's case (7 supra), this Court held that Section 10 (3)
(c) of the Act is an enabling provision to a landlord to seek eviction of a
tenant from a portion of the building, which has been rented out for a non-
residential purpose, so as to expand the business which he is already carrying
on in a portion of that building.
35.     In Smt.Chunnu Bai's case (8 supra), this Court held that where the
structure of the premises in occupation of the landlord and a tenant is one and
the same, even if they are in separate possession and occupation by different
owners from the very beginning and have been given separate assessment numbers,
it would not alter the nature of the structure and its oneness; that the demised
premises has to be treated as part of the main structure upon which the
residential house of the landlord is situated; and the landlord can invoke
Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act.
36.     In the present case, the premises which is in occupation of the 1st
respondent is situated in the ground floor; there are some other mulgies also in
occupation of other tenants in the ground floor;  all these mulgies are in a
row; above the ground floor, there are three other floors having 33 rooms with
balcony, W.C. and bath and other amenities fully equipped by furniture in which
the  petitioners are doing lodging business. The fact situation in the present
case is similar to that in Shri Balanagesan Metals (4 supra) . Ex.R52 sketch
filed by the 1st respondent shows these facts in detail. In my opinion, these
facts when holistically considered would lead to the only conclusion that the
ground floor mulgies and the three floors above would form an integrated unit.
It would appear to be a single building with several portions, if viewed by any
reasonable man, from the Nampally Road (on the south of the premises) where it
is located.  The facts in the present case set out above do not warrant the
application of the definition of the term "building" as defined in Section 2
(iii) of the Act to be adopted.  It is clearly a situation where the petitioner
is in possession of a part of a non-residential building and it is seeking
eviction of 1st respondent from another part of the same building on the ground
that it requires additional accommodation for it's business. Though 1st
respondent can be said to be a tenant of a portion of the premises which by
itself is a building within the meaning of Section 2 (iii), yet, the portion in
occupation of  1st respondent is not to be considered as a separate building
when the petitioners admittedly are in possession of the remaining portion of
the composite building. Merely because separate municipal members have been
given to the premises in occupation of the 1st respondent, or that it was sold
under a different sale deed on a different date to the petitioners, it does not
become a separate building. The Rent Controller rightly held that the RC
schedule premises and the premises in occupation of the petitioners are not two
separate buildings and they are part of the same building.    The Appellate
authority under the Act, while accepting that RC schedule  premises is a portion
in the main building (at para 28), erroneously applied the decision in Gangaram
(20 supra) without understanding the context in which the observations were made
in the said case and came to a wrong conclusion relying on Section 2 (iii) of
the Act that the premises in occupation of the 1st respondent is a separate
building and held that  the provisions of Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act cannot
be invoked by the  petitioners.    The said view of the Appellate Authority is
not correct for the aforesaid reasons and therefore, the I hold that petitioners
are entitled to invoke Section 10 (3) (c) of the Act.

37.  Point Nos.(ii) and (iii):
It is not disputed that premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 was let out by the
petitioners to Y. Satyanarayana and K. Laxminarayana on a monthly rent of
Rs.25,000/- initially under a regd. lease deed Ex.P.12/dt.09.02.2004 for 11
months and later under another regd. lease deed Ex.P.2/ dt.16.02.2005 for 3
years.  The petitioners contend that they had explained to the said tenants
about their requirement of premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 along with 5-8-658/5
(the RC schedule premises occupied by the 1st respondent) and 5-8-658/7; that as
litigation against 1st respondent is pending in respect of RC schedule premises,
they should handover premises No.5-8-658/6 to petitioners on  termination of
proceedings in their favour  in the said litigation or on expiry of 3 years,
whichever is earlier.

38.     The 1st respondent also contended that M/s. Shalimar Bar and Restaurant is
in occupation of premises belonging to petitioners adjacent to the main building
of the petitioners on the rear side and part of it  was let out to M/s Sri Sai
Restaurant pending the RC.  In the cross examination, PW.1 also stated that
Shalimar Restaurant was on the rear side of the main building in which the 1st
respondent is in occupation of one mulgi; it is a part of premises No.5-8-658/4
and is in the ground floor; that it is a separate wing; there is a first floor
building on Shalimar Restaurant; there are six single rooms on the first floor
of Shalimar Restaurant belonging to the 1st petitioner; by the side of Shalimar
Restaurant, there is a building wherein Sri Sai Restaurant is carrying on
business and it belongs to petitioners; there is also first floor on Sri Sai
Restaurant; in 1992, the petitioners had let out the premises to Sri Sai
Restaurant for Rs.3,000/- per month; and that it was kept vacant from 1989 to
1992.
       
39.     The counsel for the  petitioners contended that landlord tenant disputes
in our country take a long time and one cannot wait indefinitely for resolution
of such litigation; the landlord cannot be expected to sit idle, keep a property
vacant and lose income; in the present case, had the  petitioners done so, they
would have lost rents from 2004 to 2012 i.e., 8 years.
       
40.     In Pratap Rai Tanwani Vs. Uttam Chand24, the Supreme Court held:
"7.     It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the
more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long
interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on
that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the
proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during
the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted,
patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All
that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and
we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his
reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the
litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente
lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such
unduly long period.
8. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the
landlord the crucial date is the date of the petition. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho
Ram1 a two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachalia, J., as he then was and
N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and
obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis
commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded from
moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events
provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. What the
learned Chief Justice observed therein is this: (SCC pp. 626-27, para 6)
"6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the
parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But
this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which
have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on
aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not
precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact
and law to mould the relief."
9. The next three-Judge Bench of this Court which approved and followed the
above decision in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad2 has taken care to emphasise
that the subsequent events should have "wholly satisfied" the requirement of the
party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal requirement. The
relevant passage is extracted below: (SCC pp. 113-14, para 14)
"Therefore, it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for
personal requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by
the landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till
the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events
have cropped up which would show that the landlord's requirement is wholly
satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is
incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the
tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events."
10. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired
notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the
start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this
long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in
relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the cause
of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady
of the system, it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the
impairment already caused.
11. The above position in law was highlighted in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep
Srivastava"

        41.     The eviction proceedings initiated against  1st respondent in 1988
are admittedly pending till 2013 i.e, for almost 25 years.  It would be grossly
unjust to expect the petitioners to keep the premises No.5-8-658/6 or the
premises adjacent to M/s. Shalimar Bar and Restaurant on the rear side (which
was let out to Sri Sai Restaurant) vacant in the hope that the litigation
against the 1st respondent  would end quickly.  Therefore, the mere fact that
premises No.5-8-658/6 is let out to Y. Satyanarayana and K. Laxminarayana or
that the premises beside M/s. Shalimar Bar and Restaurant on the rear side was
given on lease to Sri Sai Restaurant cannot per se disentitle the  petitioners
from seeking eviction of  1st respondent on the ground that they require the RC
schedule premises for  additional accommodation.

        42.     The counsel for  1st respondent sought to contend that the alleged
understanding between  petitioners and K. Laxminarayana/ Y. Satyanarayana for
taking on lease premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 (that they would vacate the same
as soon as the litigation for eviction against the 1st respondent in respect of
premises bearing No.5-8-658/5 ends) is not reflected in the lease deeds Exs. P12
and P13;  there was in fact no such understanding and the said plea is a
concocted one; therefore the said circumstance should be taken into account and
the plea of the  petitioners should be rejected.

        43.     PW.2, the managing partner of the 1st petitioner firm stated in his
evidence that  premises No.5-8-658/6 and 5-8-658/7 had been vacant since a long
time and  petitioners were losing a lot of money; there was discussion among
partners of 1st petitioner firm on the issue several times in this regard; it
was suggested by partners that unless the premises No.5-8-658/5 is vacated, it
is not possible to convert/ modify the three premises for providing
accommodation for Manager, telephone cabin, receptionist, accounts section,
waiting lounge for customers and lift apart from constructing an additional
floor; as proceedings for eviction which had commenced in 1988 were not
concluded and it was uncertain when they would attain finality, it was decided
that  petitioners should not lose  income if a right party who is credible came
forward to take it on rent; that K. Laxminarayana and Y. Satyanarayana agreed to
take the premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 on rent and had also agreed to vacate the
said premises as and when RC schedule premises became vacant to enable the 1st  
petitioner to make necessary conversion/ modification to the premises; and
therefore Ex.P.12 and P.13 lease deeds were executed.
       
44.     PW.3, K. Laxminarayana, the lessee who had taken the premises No.5-8-
658/6, also corroborated the evidence of PW.2 and stated that there was a clear
understanding between the petitioners and himself that he and Y.Satyanarayana
should vacate if  proceedings initiated by  petitioners against 1st respondent
ended in favour of  petitioners.
       
45.     In view of  evidence of PWs.2 and 3 it cannot be doubted that there was an
understanding between the petitioners and K. Laxminarayana/ Y. Satyanarayana
that the latter would vacate  premises No.5-8-658/6 in the event the
petitioners succeed to get  1st respondent evicted from the RC schedule
premises. The mere absence of such a clause in the lease deeds does not preclude
them from having such understanding. Both petitioners and the said
persons/tenants are clearly ad idem on the said issue and have asserted the same
on solemn oath. I do not see why such evidence should be discarded. Therefore,
the grant of lease of premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 by petitioners to Sri K.
Laxminarayana and Sri Y. Satyanarayana does not disentitle the petitioners from
seeking eviction of  1st respondent from the R.C schedule premises.
       
46.     In respect of premises in occupation of M/s. Sri Sai Restaurant, PW.1
clearly stated that it is adjacent to the premises in occupation of M/s.
Shalimar Bar and Restaurant on the rear side of the main building in which the
R.C schedule premises in occupation of  1st respondent is located and both the
buildings are separated by a distance of 5 feet.  RW.1 in his evidence stated
that a portion of the premises vacated by Shalimar Bar and Restaurant was let
out to Sri Sai Restaurant in 1991-92 and that Shalimar Bar and Restaurant was in
occupation of premises behind the R.C schedule premises. It is an admitted fact
that the R.C schedule premises is facing the main road- Nampally Station Road.
Therefore, the fact that the premises adjacent to Shalimar Bar and Restaurant
and which is on the rear side of the R.C schedule premises was let out to Sri
Sai Restaurant would not disentitle the 1st petitioner to seek eviction of  1st
respondent from the R.C schedule premises for additional accommodation to meet
it's needs for additional accommodation for  Manager, telephone cabin,
receptionist, accounts section, waiting lounge for customers and lift apart from
constructing an additional floor .

47. It is common knowledge that reception, waiting lounge for customers,
Manager's room , accountant's room apart from lift are normally provided in the
area facing the main road as it would  facilitate the business.   As would be
evident from the later part of this order, it is not for the 1st respondent to
dictate to the petitioners how they should conduct their lodge business and
where they should locate such amenities. It is not unreasonable for the
petitioners to provide the above amenities in the area covered by the RC
schedule premises, 5-8-658/6 and 7, part of 5-8-658/3 facing the above main road
instead of providing them in the rear side area or in the upstairs portion
considering the nature of their business i.e for running a lodge.

        48.     In my view, the Appellate Authority misread the evidence on record
and came to a conclusion which no reasonable man would come to i.e., that the
leasing of premises  No.5-8-658/6 and the rear side area to Sri Sai Restaurant
disentitles petitioners from seeking eviction of the 1st respondent.    The
Appellate Authority failed to see that it is normal and reasonable for any
landlord, who, when faced with long drawn out litigation against a tenant, to
lease out the  portion in his occupation (adjoining the portion which is subject
to the lis). By doing so,  pending the finalization of the lis with the tenant,
he would avoid suffering financial loss. The Appellate Authority ought to have
accepted the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 in regard to the understanding between them
that PW.3 would vacate premises bearing No.5-8-658/6 as and when petitioners
succeed in obtaining eviction of 1st respondent from R.C schedule premises which
is adjacent to premises No.5-8-658/6.
       
49.     The view of the Appellate Authority even with regard to  grant of lease to
Sri Sai Restaurant i.e., that petitioners should have located the Manager room,
accounts section, reception etc., in the premises leased to Sri Sai Restaurant
(which was admittedly not on the main road on which the RC schedule premises was
located but on the rear side of the RC schedule premises) is clearly perverse as
it would be unreasonable to expect a person running a lodge  to have such
facilities - not on the portion facing the main road , but on the rear side of
the building in which the RC schedule premises is located.  In doing so, the
Appellate Authority is allowing the tenant to dictate to the landlord how the
landlord should conduct its business or locate the amenities for the landlord's
business, which is clearly not permitted by law as explained below.

50. Point Nos.(iv) and (v):-
It is the contention of the 1st respondent that premises  No.5-8-658/6 and 7,
which were adjacent to the premises in his  occupation, were kept vacant by
petitioners for many years; they failed to occupy and use them for the purpose
pleaded in the eviction petition;  having let out these two premises to
Y.Satyanarayana and K.Lakshmi Narayana under registered lease deed dt.09-02-2004  
for 11 months and subsequently extending the said lease for three more years
under regd.lease deed dt.16-02-2005, on handsome rent, petitioners have failed
to prove that their need is bonafide, honest and genuine;  that M/s.Shalimar Bar
and Restaurant was in occupation of a premises 12'X40' belonging to the 1st
petitioner adjacent to the main building on the backside; after obtaining vacant
possession of the same, the 1st petitioner constructed additional rooms and let
out half portion to M/s.Vaishnavi Restaurant on higher rent and the other half
is being used for Manager room, waiting lounge etc. and therefore requirement of
additional accommodation, if any ceases; portion of the premises let out to
Shalimar Bar and Restaurant was let out to Sri Sai Restaurant ;  that
petitioners  got vacated part of another premises bearing No.5-8-658/3 to the
East of the RC schedule premises in a compromise dt.24-11-2004 in O.S.No.227 of
2003 on the file of III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and
5-8-658/4; it also obtained vacant possession of premises bearing No.5-8-658/6
and 5-8-658/7 by getting the tenants M/s.Carona Shoe & Co. Ltd. and Smt.
P.Lalitha in possession thereof evicted in R.C.No.1140 of 1988 and R.C.No.1174
of 1998 in the Court of the Rent Controller, Hyderabad and therefore the
petitioners could use any or some of these premises for their needs and cannot
insist for eviction of  1st respondent from the R.C schedule premises.
51.  The counsel for the petitioners however contended that it is the
prerogative of the landlord to decide for what purpose he requires premises in
question; the tenant cannot dictate terms to landlord and advise him what he
should do or not do; and it is the privilege of the landlord to choose the
nature of the business and the place of business; and where he should provide
the amenities for the purpose of it's business. It is common knowledge that
reception, waiting lounge for customers, Manager's room , accountant's room
apart from lift are normally provided in the area facing the main road as it
would  facilitate the business.   Accepting the case of the respondent would
force the petitioners to provide these facilities in a cramped area adjacent to
the RC schedule premises or in the area on the rear side which would not be
convenient for the business of the petitioners.
52. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. (9 supra), the Supreme Court observed
that it is always the prerogative of the landlord to choose the nature of the
business and the place of business and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms
to the landlord and advise him what he should do or not do.  In the said case,
the landlords had business spreading over Chennai and Hyderabad and they wanted
to expand their business at Calicut but the tenant contended that the landlords'
need for the premises at Calicut is not bonafide and genuine as they already
have business at Chennai and Hyderabad.  The Supreme Court held that there is
nothing unnatural in the landlords seeking eviction of the tenant at Calicut for
expansion of their business at the said place.
53. In S.R. Babu v. T.K. Vasudevan25, the Supreme Court while considering the
provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, held:
"10. Sub-section (8) of Section 11 reads thus:
"11. (8) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, may apply to the
Rent Control Court for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any
portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession
thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use."
11. A perusal of sub-section (8) makes it clear that to invoke this sub-section
the landlord must show that: (i) he is occupying only a part of the building;
(ii) the tenant is occupying the whole or a portion of the remaining part; and
(iii) the landlord requires the additional accommodation for his personal use.
12. The following is the distinction between sub-section (3) and sub-section (8)
of Section 11 of the Act. The former provision applies when the building is
wholly occupied by the tenant and the landlord bona fide needs the building for
his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent
on him provided he does not have any building of his own in his possession in
the same city, town or village whereas the latter provision applies when a
landlord is already in occupation of a portion of the building and needs
additional accommodation which the tenant is occupying, for his personal
occupation.
13. In the instant case, admittedly, the first respondent is in occupation of a
part of a building and the appellant is occupying another part of the building
which the first respondent requires as additional accommodation for his personal
use. Therefore, this case falls under sub-section (8) of Section 11 and not
under sub-section (3) of Section 11 of the Act.
14. In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional
accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit
his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be
used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may
use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or
alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters."


54. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd26., the Supreme Court,
while considering the provisions of the Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958, held :
"The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is
that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises
must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his
own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that
the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are
satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent
Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona
fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms
to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession
of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the
requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to
how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.
15. Facts such as the cordial relationship between a landlord and his daughter-
in-law or that he is comfortably residing in the present building are not
relevant in judging the bona fides of the claim of the landlord. Otherwise it
would appear that the landlord can think of residing in his or her own
residential building only when cracks develop in the relationship between him
and his kith and kin."

55.     In Kunji Bai G.Chugani  (18 supra) cited by  counsel for  1st respondent,
a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the term "bonafide" means,
honestly, in good faith, without fraud or deception, without an ulterior motive
and that the word "require" is something more than a mere wish or desire; and
that the landlord must show the circumstances proving his necessity.  It was
held that if a landlord is in possession of other non-residential premises then,
in order to invoke Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, he must prove that the
other premises is not sufficient considering the aspects of quality, size and
suitability of the building and that if he cannot plead and prove the same, his
requirement cannot be treated as bonafide.  This principle will not apply in
case where the provisions of Section 10 (3) (c) is invoked by a landlord as in
the present case.
56. Admittedly, the RC schedule premises is adjacent to the main road and has
direct access from it. It is admitted that  RC schedule premises is in the
ground floor and the  petitioners are running a lodge in the first, second and
third floors above the RC schedule premises where there are 33 rooms with
balcony, WC, bath and other amenities. It has already been held under point
no.(i) supra that the premises bearing Municipal No.5-8-658/1 to 8 including the
RC schedule premises have to be treated as part of a single building and cannot
be treated as separate and independent buildings.
57. The petitioners are seeking additional accommodation to accommodate their
Manager, telephone cabin, receptionist, accounts section, waiting lounge for
guests for the lodge run by them apart from a lift. The petitioners also intend
to build a fourth floor to create further lodging accommodation to their
customers.
58.     The first respondent has admitted in his deposition that the premises in
the occupation of Shalimar Bar and Restaurant is a separate building; M/s.
Shalimar Bar and Restaurant and Sri Sai Restaurant are located on the rear side
of the building where the RC schedule premises is located; there are rooms on
the first floor of these two restaurants. But there is no direct access to the
road from these buildings as they are located on the rear side of the subject
building.    The 1st respondent has not been able to show any decision to the
effect that the requirement of the petitioners would not be bonafide in an
application filed under S.10(3)(c), if the landlord is having accommodation in
another building or adjoining building.
59.     The 1st respondent contends that the landlord, should adjust in the
premises No.5-8-658/6 or 5-8-658/7 or in the back side where Shalimar Bar and
Restaurant and Sri Sai Restaurant are located or 5-8-658/3, 5-8-658/4 (which
were secured by virtue of the compromise dt.24.11.2004 in O.S.No.227 of 2003
before the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Courts, Hyderabad).
60. But the petitioners contend that if the respondent vacates the RC schedule
premises, then K. Satyanarayana and Y. Laxminarayana in occupation of the
adjacent premises No.5-8-658/6 would also vacate; premises No.5-8-658/7 is
vacant (after the tenant Smt. P. Lalitha vacated it pursuant to orders in RC
No.1174 of 1988); and if the 1st respondent vacates the RC schedule premises,
the petitioners can make a provision for all their above needs by suitably
modifying the building.
61.     O.S.No.227 of 2003 was compromised on 24.11.2004 and under the said  
compromise Ex.R.51, Duhilanomal, tenant of premises No.5-8-658/3 and the 1st
respondent agreed not to claim any right, title or interest in the place under
the staircase (to the west of the premises No.5-8-658/3) at the entrance of the
Coromandel lodge and accepted that the said area belonged to the 1st petitioner;
they also agreed not to claim any right, title or interest on the open space
abutting their wall on the northern side of their premises No.5-8-658/3 and
under the balcony of Coromandel lodge and accepted that the same belongs to  1st
petitioner and that it forms part of premises No.5-8-658/4 of the 1st
petitioner; in consideration of the above concession by  1st respondent and
Duhilanomal, they were paid Rs.4,50,000/- by the petitioners. The area covered
by this compromise is very small and would be hardly sufficient for the
petitioners to provide all amenities mentioned above therein.
62.     In my opinion, Shalimar Bar and Restaurant/ Sri Sai Restaurant premises
are separate buildings and area available therein cannot be taken into account
and in any event they would not be suitable as they are not located on the main
road but on the rear side of the RC schedule premises; the 1st  respondent
cannot dictate to the landlords where and how they should meet their additional
requirements mentioned in para 57 above; and it is the privilege of the landlord
to chose the nature and place of his business and where he should locate the
amenities for the said business. The request of the petitioners to locate the
reception, waiting lounge for customers, Manager's room , accountant's room
apart from lift in the RC schedule premises and the adjacent area facing the
main road is reasonable and bonafide as it would certainly  facilitate their
business. Thus the RC schedule premises is located in such a way in the building
that the amenities sought by the landlord cannot be provided except by evicting
the 1st respondent and remodeling the entire building; and therefore, it has to
be held that the requirement of the landlord for personal use for its business
needs is bonafide.
63.     Coming to the question of relative hardship which has to be looked into as
per proviso S.10(3)(c) of the Act, in Parasuramaiah's case(12 Supra), a Division
Bench of this Court held that hardship of the tenant has to be first found out
in case eviction u/s. 10(3)(c) of the Act is to be directed; that hardship then
has to be placed against the relative advantages which the landlord would stand
to gain if an order of eviction is passed;  hardship and advantage then have to
be weighed and if the balance turns in favour of the tenant, the petition of the
landlord must be rejected. It held that such a consideration is not restricted
merely to financial or physical advantages or disadvantages or any injury to the
health of the person affected; it would take in existence or availability of an
alternative accommodation or the real efforts made by the tenant to seek an
alternative building for his purposes and other such things; the proviso should
not be read as if it confers the practical immunity on the tenant from being
evicted and if it were to be so construed, it would destroy the very purpose of
S.10(3)(c).  The Bench held that once the bonafide requirement of the landlord
brings him within that provision, then the onus is on the tenant to allege and
prove the various factors which he wants the Rent Controller to take into
account for weighing the relative hardship which may be caused to the tenant in
case he is evicted, and establish that it outweighs the advantage which might
accrue to the landlord.  It observed:
"Merely because the tenant has been occupying the premises since a long time, it
does not necessarily mean that his eviction would cause irreparable loss to him.
If he has really established his reputation as a good and reliable photographer,
which building he occupies and in what locality would certainly be not much
material. He does not seem to have made any real attempt to find out whether any
alternative accommodation for his purpose is available in the same or any other
locality. His statement in his deposition that "My main objection to vacate is
that I will not be able to get better accommodation" does not in any manner
disclose that real efforts were put in to find out any other accommodation.
There is no evidence in that regard. The Rent Controller obviously went wrong in
accepting the ready made conclusion given by the tenant that in case he is asked
to vacate, it would be fatal to his business. Some hardship is bound to be
caused when a person is disturbed from the premises where he has been carrying 
on business of photography for the last so many years apart from personal
inconvenience, but this hardship which is inherent in the situation does not
compare better with the disadvantage from which the landlady is suffering at the
moment. She might have been compelled to be content with that limited
accommodation under the circumstances prevailing previously.  That does not
however necessarily mean that she cannot subsequently have reasonable need for 
additional accommodation.... She should not therefore be allowed to live in that
inconvenient position merely because she tolerated it for some time...."
64.     This decision was followed in B. Rukmaiah's case (11 Supra).
65.     The 1st respondent in his counter merely pleaded that if he is evicted, he
and his family members will be deprived of their source of income and therefore,
the hardship which would be caused to him in the event of his eviction will
outweigh the advantage to the petitioners. 
In his deposition, the 1st respondent
did not say what attempts he made to secure other accommodation in the area but 
merely stated that his family consists of 8 members; their source of income for
livelihood is only the income from the business in the RC schedule premises; in
the event of eviction, he will be put to great hardship. 
As held in
Parasuramaiah's case(12 Supra), 
some hardship is bound to be caused if the 1st
respondent is disturbed from the premises where he had been carrying on business but if he had made no attempt to find out whether alternative accommodation for his purpose is available in the same or any other locality, it has to be held
that the hardship caused to him would not outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The landlord cannot be compelled to live in an inconvenient position merely because he had tolerated it for sometime. The advantage to the landlord,in my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case would clearly outweigh
the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer because of his eviction.
66.     For all the above reasons, I hold that the petitioners have established their need for additional accommodation under S.10(3)(c); that their need is bonafide; and that the hardship which would be caused to the 1st respondent is
outweighed by the advantage to the petitioners.
67.     Therefore, the C.R.P is allowed and the order dt.05.06.2006 of the
Appellate Authority under the Act-cum-Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes
Court, Hyderabad and the order passed by the Principal Rent Controller,
Hyderabad dt.25.04.1994 in R.C.No.1175 of 1988 are set aside; the 1st respondent
is directed to deliver vacant possession of the RC schedule premises to the 1st
petitioner on or before 30.06.2013; and continue to pay the admitted rent up to
the said period. No costs.
__________________________________    
JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO        
Date:15-03-2013