On a reading of the settlement with regard to the Bread Winner Scheme it is clear that it was made applicable with immediate effect to the contract crew, which includes the petitioner. - The act of the second respondent to circumvent the orders should not be encouraged and the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the contemnor are not applicable to the facts of the case. Hence, this Court holds that the second respondent is liable for punishment and, accordingly, the second respondent is convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and punished to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) to the petitioner within four weeks. The payment of fine or the punishment in this case, will not absolve the responsibility of the respondents to comply with the order.

THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO            

CONTEMPT CASE No.2013 of 2016    

27-04-2017

S.Kiranmayi.Petitioner

Sri N.Sambasiva Rao, Managing Director, APSRTC, RTC House, Pandit Nehru us Station, Vijayawada,And others. Respondents    
       
Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri A.G.Satyanarayana Rao

Counsel for the Respondent: Sri Aravala Rama Rao

<Gist :
       
>Head Note :

? Cases referred
1.      AIR 1972 SC 591
2.      (1986) 2 SCC 679
3.      2000 (1) ALD 108
4.      (2006) 4 SCC 257
5.      2012 (3) ALD 429
6.      (1996) 6 SCC 291
7.      (1996) 10 SCC 102
8.      2013 (1) ALD 9 (SC)
9.      2014 (3) ALT 617
10.     2016 (4) ALD 520 : 2016 (5) ALT 226
11.     AIR 1993 SC 356
12.     (1995) 2 SCC 584
13.     (2002) 4 SCC 21
14.     (2004) 8 SCC 683


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO            

CONTEMPT CASE No.2013 of 2016    
ORDER:                                        

        This Contempt Case is filed alleging non-implementation of
the order in W.P.No.12970 of 2016 dated 27.06.2016

        Though it is not necessary for this Court to repeat the entire
order, but for the purpose of disposal of the present Contempt
Case, the following facts are necessary.      

        The husband of the petitioner, who was appointed as a
contract driver in Chittoor-I Depot, died while in service on
20.02.2012 leaving behind the petitioner and her two minor
children.  The petitioner states that she is entitled for
compassionate appointment under the Bread Winner Scheme.  In  
respect of dependents of regular employees, they are eligible for
payment of additional monetary benefit in lieu of employment
from the year 1989.  But, in view of the hardship of the families of
contract employees who died while in service, the management
extended the scheme of compassionate employment to the eligible
dependants by entering into a Memorandum of Settlement under
Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, with the
APSRTC Employees Union on 03.08.2013.  The Government    
issued G.O.Ms.No.2, Transport Department dated 05.01.2013
according permission to APSRTC to provide compassionate  
appointments to all the eligible dependents of the employees who
died in harness during the period from 01.01.1998 to
31.12.2010.  It was clarified in G.O.Ms.No.15, Transport
Department, dated 07.02.2014, making it applicable to the
employees who died thereafter also.  The Corporation also issued
circular on 01.03.2014 directing continuance of process of
recruitment under the Bread Winner Scheme in respect of the
employees who died beyond 31.12.2010 also.

        The petitioner studied Intermediate and submitted an
application on 24.02.2012 seeking employment on
compassionate grounds.  Her case was considered for the post of
RTC Constable, interview was conducted and she was
provisionally selected for the said post.  She was asked to
undergo physical efficiency test by proceedings dated
23.01.2016.  She was qualified in that test also.  She was asked
to undergo medical examination by letter dated 23.03.2016 and
she underwent the same.  Thereafter, she was informed that she
will not be given appointment as her husband was only a contract
employee at the time of his death.  In those circumstances, the
petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.No.12970 of 2016.
In spite of several adjournments, no counter affidavit was filed
and the learned Standing Counsel orally submitted that the
settlement arrived with the Employees Union was not approved
by the Board of Directors.  This Court disposed of the Writ
Petition by directing the respondents to consider the case of the
petitioner for appointment to the post of RTC Constable under
compassionate grounds in view of the settlement arrived at on
03.08.2013 and pass appropriate orders within three months.

        The aforesaid order was not complied with and an order
was issued on 31.08.2016 by the second respondent stating that
the petitioners case will be considered in the selections to be
conducted for employment under Bread Winner Scheme  
(compassionate grounds) after receipt of the approval of the
Government for the Memorandum of Settlement arrived on
03.08.2013, and it was further stated that the said proceedings
were passed in compliance with the orders of this Court.

        Learned Counsel for the petitioner issued a notice on
13.09.2016 stating that the said order is in violation of the orders
of this Court.

        Since a counter affidavit was not filed in the Writ Petition,
the respondents filed a counter affidavit in the present case
admitting the facts stated in the affidavit and justified the action
of denying appointment on the ground that before appointment of
the petitioner when they verified the personal records of the
deceased employee, they came to know that he was not a regular
employee but he worked as contract driver and his services were
not regularized.  It is stated that the Bread Winner Scheme
communicated by letter dated 15.05.2013 is applicable only to
the regular employees of the Corporation.  The petitioner was not
eligible, as her husband was not a regular employee.  However,
the case of the petitioner will be considered in the selections to be
conducted for employment under Bread Winner Scheme after  
receipt of the approval of the Government for the Memorandum
of Settlement arrived on 03.08.2013.  The said proceedings were
issued when the second respondent received the communication
from the Executive Director on 15.05.2013 clarifying that the
applications of the dependants of contract employees cannot be
considered under the Bread Winner Scheme since it is applicable
only to the regular employees of the Corporation.

        Learned Counsel for the writ petitioner who initiated the
present contempt proceedings submitted that the denial of relief
to the petitioner is in willful violation of the orders of this Court
when this Court directed the respondents to consider the case
meaning to pass favourable orders only.  He relied on The
Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. A.J.Rana , Comptroller and
Auditor-General of India v. K.S.Jagannathan ,
S.Purushotham v. District Collector, Karimnagar ,
Employees State Insurance Corporation v. All India ITDC
Employees Union  and K.Achamma v. Venkateswara    
University .
      Learned Counsel for the Corporation, on the other hand,
submitted that by taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances of the case, an order was passed by the second
respondent and, in view of passing of such order, it cannot be
said that there is willful violation of the orders of the Court
punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act.  He relied on
J.S.Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar , V.Kanakarajan v. General
Manager, South Eastern Railway , Salauddin Ahmed v.
Samta Andolan  and Nambaru Ramu v. M.R.Prasanna    
Kumar .

      In the instant case, when the Writ Petition was considered,
the respondents never chose to file a counter affidavit as could be
seen from the adjournments granted and the order dated
27.06.2016.  Even after disposal of the Writ Petition also an order
was passed as aforesaid and no appeal was preferred against the
order.  Thus, the second respondent put upon himself the
burden of implementing the orders of this Court.  While
examining the validity of the said order it has to be seen whether
the said settlement relied on by the petitioner stated to have been
sent to the Government for approval requires approval at all for
implementation and in the absence of approval from the
Government, denial of relief to the petitioner is a violation of the
order of this Court or not.

      A perusal of the Memorandum of Settlement shows that it
was entered under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947.  The regularization of contract crew is one of the items of
settlement.  It was stated that the contract crew who were
recruited up to December, 2012 will be taken up in a phased
manner upon obtaining the prior permission from the
Government as per the schedule given thereunder.  The
regularization schedule shows that it will come to an end by
01.09.2014.  It was also stated that necessary administrative
steps for getting permission from the Government for the said
proposal will be taken up immediately.  In respect of Bread
Winner Scheme, the Unions represented for extension of the
Bread Winner Scheme to contract crew with retrospective effect,
while the management proposed for implementation of the
scheme with prospective effect.  After negotiations,
implementation of the scheme with immediate effect was mutually
agreed to.  Only with regard to continuance of the scheme for
future beneficiaries in respect of both regular and contract
employees dependants, it was agreed to seek clarification from
the Government.  The relevant portion reads as follows:
Bread Winner Scheme:  The unions represented for
extension of the Bread Winner Scheme to contract
crew with retrospective effect while the management
proposed for implementation of the scheme with
prospective effect.  After negotiations, implementation
of the scheme with immediate effect was mutually
agreed to.  It is also agreed to seek clarification from
the Government to continue the scheme for future
beneficiaries in respect of both regular and contract
employees defendants.

      In the above case the husband of the petitioner was
selected in the year 2008 by a duly constituted selection
committee and was appointed as a contract driver in Chittoor-I
Depot on 08.10.2009.  He died while in service on 20.02.2012.
The settlement was arrived at on 03.08.2013.  On a reading of the
settlement with regard to the Bread Winner Scheme it is clear
that it was made applicable with immediate effect to the contract
crew, which includes the petitioner.  However, with regard to the
application of the Scheme for future beneficiaries, clarification
from the Government was required and sought.  The issue with
regard to regularization of contract crew was also pending for
permission from the Government.  Now we are concerned with
application of Bread Winner Scheme only and as per the
settlement, there is no doubt that the Scheme is applicable with
immediate effect.  It appears that a resolution was passed by the
Board for extension of the Scheme to the contract crew with
retrospective effect as could be seen from the letter of the
Corporation addressed to the Special Chief Secretary on
24.09.2013.

      Thus, it is clear that there is no need to obtain the orders or
clarification from the Government in respect of the settlement
arrived and in view of the resolution passed by the Board.  In
view of this clear position, the contemnor should not have taken
the stand that the case of the petitioner would be considered in
the selections to be conducted for employment under Bread
Winner Scheme (compassionate grounds) after receipt of the
approval of the Government for the MOU arrived on 03.08.2013.
The contemnor having taken that stand, this Court has no other
alternative except to hold that the contemnor violated the orders
of this Court by misinterpreting and by disallowing the genuine
claim of the petitioner on untenable grounds.  Thus, the second
respondent violated the orders of this Court.

      Coming to the legal position, the second respondent took a
defense by relying on the decisions in J.S.Parihars case (supra),
V.Kanakarajans case (supra), Salauddin Ahmeds case (supra)
and Nambaru Ramus case (supra).

      In J.S.Parihars case (supra) the Supreme Court was
considering a case relating to the preparation of seniority list.
The Division Bench of the High Court declared the seniority list
prepared with retrospective effect in terms of the amended Rules
as unconstitutional and it accordingly quashed the list and
directed preparation of the seniority list afresh.  The said order
was followed by two other Division Benches.  When contempt
proceedings were taken up, the learned single Judge of the Court
held that the respondents had not willfully disobeyed the orders
of the Court and gave direction to prepare the seniority list as per
the orders of the Division Bench by giving liberty to the petitioner
to move the contempt petition afresh if the order was not
complied with.  When the appeal was filed against the said order,
a preliminary objection was taken with regard to the
maintainability of the appeal.  The Division Bench held that the
appeal was not maintainable under Section 19 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, but held that the appeal would be maintainable as a
Letter Patent Appeal and set aside the directions issued by the
learned single Judge.  The matter was taken up to the Supreme
Court.  The Supreme Court, on the facts of the case, held that the
appeal was not maintainable as there was no order of
punishment.  With regard to setting aside the direction of the
learned single Judge, it was held that when once an order was
passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued
by the Court, a fresh cause of action arises, but that cannot be
considered to be a willful violation of the order. It was further
held that when the learned single Judge held that there was no
willful violation of the orders, he ought not to have issued further
direction to redraw the seniority list.

      The case in V.Kanakarajan (supra) is a case arising out of
an order of dismissal by the Division Bench of Calcutta High
Court on an application for contempt.  The order of the High
Court stated that no case was made out for contempt against the
respondents, but the petitioner was given liberty to move against
the said order in appropriate writ application.  The said order
was upheld by the Supreme Court.

      In Salauddin Ahmeds case (supra) the Supreme Court
held that in order to establish that a person had deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of Court, two essential ingredients
have to be proved.  The first thing is a direction from the Court,
and the second thing is, in spite of knowledge of such order, the
person has deliberately and willfully violated the same with the
intention of lowering the dignity and image of the Court.

      In the instant case the order passed by the contemnor has
to be read as it is and when the said order is based on untenable
grounds, it has to be construed as a deliberate and willful
violation.

      In Nambaru Ramus case (supra) when contempt
proceedings were initiated for not complying with the order
directing the respondents to consider approving the
appointments of petitioners as Secondary Grade Teachers and as
Hindi Pundit (Grade-I), learned Government Pleader therein
relied on J.S.Parihars case (supra).  Learned single Judge, on
the facts of the case, opined that there was no direction to
approve the appointments of the petitioners but it was only a
direction to 'consider approving' the same.  When the
respondents passed elaborate orders concluding that the
approval cannot be granted, in view of the decision in
J.S.Parihars case (supra), it was held that the cause of action
did not survive and no contempt would lie.

      In the light of the above decisions it has to be considered
whether the direction of this Court mandates the respondents to
consider the case of the petitioner in a positive manner or it left
anything to the discretion of the respondents enabling them to
pass an order giving rise to a fresh cause of action.

      In Barium Chemicals Ltd.s case (supra) the word
consider fell for interpretation and the Supreme Court observed
as follows:
      The words 'considers it necessary' postulate
that the authority concerned has thought over the
matter deliberately and with care and it has been
found necessary as a result of such thinking to pass
the order. The dictionary meaning of the word
'consider' is 'to view attentively, to survey, examine,
inspect (arch), to look attentively, to contemplate
mentally, to think over, meditate on, give heed to, take
note of, to think deliberately, be think oneself. to
reflect' (vide Shorter Oxford Dictionary). According to
Words & Phrases-Permanent Edn: Vol. 8-A to 'consider'
means to think with care. It is also mentioned that to
'consider' is to fix the mind upon with a view to careful
examination; to ponder; study; meditate upon, think
or reflect with care. It is, therefore, manifest that
careful thinking or due application of the mind
regarding the necessity to obtain and examine the
documents in question in sine qua non for the making
of the order. If the impugned order were to show that
there has been no careful thinking or proper
application of the mind as to the necessity of obtaining
and examining the documents specified in the order,
the essential requisite. to the makings of the order
would be held to be non-existent.
A necessary corollary of what has been observed above
is that mind has to be applied with regard to the
necessity to obtain and examine all the documents
mentioned in the order. An application of the mind
with regard to the necessity to obtain and examine
only a few of the many documents mentioned in the
order, while there has been no such application of
mind in respect of the remaining documents, would
not be sufficient compliance with the requirements of
the statute. If, however, there has been consideration
of the matter regarding the necessity to obtain and
examine all the documents and an order is passed
thereafter, the Court would stay its hand in the matter
and would not substitute its own opinion for that of
the authority concerned regarding the necessity to
obtain the documents in question.

      The above observations were made while interpreting
Section 19(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. The
Supreme Court quashed the order passed under the said Section
by the competent authority on the ground that the order was
passed without complying with the requirements of the said
Section.  It was also stated that the compliance of the Section is
required in view of the penal consequences flowing from non-
compliance with the order made under the said Section.

      In K.S.Jagannathans case (supra) the Supreme Court
considered the nature of writ of mandamus and observed as
follows:
      There is thus no doubt that the High Courts in
India exercising their jurisdiction under Article 226
have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ
in the nature of mandamus or to pass orders and give
necessary directions where the Government or a public
authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly
exercised the discretion conferred upon it by a statute
or a rule or a policy decision of the Government or has
exercised such discretion mala fide or on irrelevant
considerations or by ignoring the relevant
considerations and materials or in such a manner as
to frustrate the object of conferring such discretion or
the policy for implementing which such discretion has
been conferred. In all such cases and in any other fit
and proper case a High Court can, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226, issue a writ of
mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or
pass orders and give directions to compel the
performance in a proper and lawful manner of the
discretion conferred upon the Government or a public
authority, and in a proper case, in order to prevent
injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court
may itself pass an order or give directions which the
Government or the public authority should have
passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised
its discretion.

      The circumstances under which this Court passes an order
in a writ of mandamus and the nature of the order is explained in
Employees State Insurance Corporations case (supra), more
particularly in relation to the directions issued in the Writ
Petitions to consider the cases, as follows:
      Where an order or action of the State or an
authority is found to be illegal, or in contravention of
prescribed procedure, or in breach of the rules of
natural justice, or arbitrary/unreasonable/irrational,
or prompted by mala fides or extraneous consideration,
or the result of abuse of power, such action is open to
judicial review. When the High Court finds that the
order or action requires interference and exercises the
power of judicial review, thereby resulting in the
action/order of the State or authority being quashed,
the High Court will not proceed to substitute its own
decision in the matter, as that will amount to
exercising appellate power, but require the authority to
'consider' and decide the matter again. The power of
judicial review under Article 226 concentrates and lays
emphasis on the decision making process, rather than
the decision itself.
The High Courts also direct authorities to 'consider' ,
in a different category of cases. Where an authority
vested with the power to decide a matter, fails to do so
in spite of a request, the person aggrieved approaches
the High Court, which in exercise of power of judicial
review, directs the authority to 'consider' and decide
the matter. In such cases, while exercising the power of
judicial review, the High Court directs 'consideration'
without examining the facts or the legal question(s)
involved and without recording any findings on the
issues. The High Court may also direct the authority to
'consider' afresh, where the authority had decided a
matter without considering the relevant facts and
circumstances, or by taking extraneous or irrelevant
matters into consideration. In such cases also, High
Court may not examine the validity or tenability of the
claim on merits, but require the authority to do so.
Where the High Court finds the decision-making
process erroneous and records its findings as to the
manner in which the decision should be made, and
then directs the authority to 'consider' the matter, the
authority will have to consider and decide the matter
in the light of findings or observations of the Court.
But where the High Court without recording any
findings, or without expressing any view, merely
directs the authority to 'consider' the matter, the
authority will have to consider the matter in
accordance with law, with reference to the facts and
circumstances of the case, its power not being
circumscribed by any observations or findings of the
Court.
We may also note that sometimes the High Courts
dispose of matter merely with a direction to the
authority to 'consider' the matter without examining
the issue raised even though the facts necessary to
decide the correctness of the order are available.
Neither pressure of work nor the complexity of the
issue can be a reason for the Court, to avoid deciding
the issue which requires to be decided, and disposing
of the matter with a direction to 'consider' the matter
afresh.
There are also several instances where unscrupulous
petitioners with the connivance of 'pliable' authorities
have misused the direction 'to consider' issued by
court. We may illustrate by an example. A claim, which
is stale, time-barred or untenable, is put forth in the
form of a representation. On the ground that the
authority has not disposed of the representation
within a reasonable time the person making the
representation approaches the High Court with an
innocuous prayer to direct the authority to 'consider'
and dispose of the representation. When the Court
disposes of the petition with a direction to 'consider',
the authority grants the relief, taking shelter under the
order of the Court directing it to 'consider' . Instances
are also not wanting where authorities, unfamiliar
with the process and practice relating to writ
proceedings and the nuances of judicial review, have
interpreted or understood the order 'to consider' as
directing grant of relief sought in the representation
and consequently granting reliefs which otherwise
could not have been granted. Thus, action of the
authorities granting undeserving relief, in pursuance
of orders to 'consider', may be on account of ignorance,
or on account of bona fide belief that they should grant
relief in view of Court's direction to 'consider' the claim
or on account of collusion/connivance between the
person making the representation and the authority
deciding it.
Therefore, while disposing of writ petitions with a
direction to 'consider', there is a need for the High
Court to make the direction clear and specific. The
order should clearly indicate whether the High Court
is recording any finding about the entitlement of the
petitioner to the relief or whether the petition is being
disposed of without examining the claim on merits.
The aforesaid aspects were highlighted recently
in A.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors. v. G. Srinivas Reddy and Ors.
(AIR 2006 SCW 1108).

      The said cases were followed by this Court in
S.Purushothams case (supra).

      The consequences of not following such directions was
considered by a learned single Judge of this Court in
K.Achammas case (supra) by once again considering the word
consider and holding as follows:
      At this stage, this Court has no option except to
go through the dictionary meaning of the word
'consider' by referring to two or three premier
dictionaries.
      As per the Chambers Dictionary 10th Edition,
the word 'consider' means "look at attentively or
carefully; to think or deliberate on; to take into
account; to attend to, to regard as, to think, hold the
opinion, to reward, think seriously or carefully, to
deliberate."
      As per the Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and
Wordpower Guide, Indian Edition 2007, the word
'consider' means "think carefully about; take into
account when making judgment; contemplate; reflect
on; examine; review; mull over; ponder; deliberate on."
      As per Collins English Dictionary, the word
'consider' means 'to think carefully about (a problem
or decision); to bear in mind; to have regard for or care
about; to discuss (something) in order to make a
decision; to look at."
      The Apex Court in case between Divisional
Personnel Officer, Southern Railway and Another v.
T.R.Challappan ((1976) 3 SCC 190), observed that to
consider means; there should be active application of
the mind and further observed that the term consider
postulates consideration of all the aspects. In cases
between The Barium Chemicals Ltd and another v.
SH. A.J.Rana and others (AIR 1972 SC 591) and Ajit
Singh and others (II) v. State of Punjab and others
((1999) 7 SCC 209), the Apex Court observed that "It is
therefore manifest that careful thinking or due
application of the mind regarding the necessity to
obtain and examine the documents in question is sine
qua non for the making of the order."
      Therefore, the dictionary meaning of the word
'consider' means to consider basing on the material
available on record. To consider means to consider
sincerely and honestly, which means to make sincere
effort to pass an order in the letter and spirit of the
directions of this Court. To consider means to make all
efforts to fulfil the object of the order of the Court. To
consider does not mean to search for a lame excuse
and reject the claim. It does not mean to just pass an
order and dismiss the claim of the petitioner on flimsy
grounds. Therefore, the respondents shall not invent
or search some fresh reason or other technical ground
and reject the claim of the petitioner when there is a
specific direction by this Court to consider the case of
the petitioner. The Authorities cannot show the same
reason or ground which they had already taken in the
earlier proceedings. This amounts to showing
disrespect to the orders of the court. The authorities
cannot flout the orders of the Court on technical
grounds. If at all they require permission of the
Government, they must address the Government  
enclosing the copy of the order of the court or orders of
the quasi judicial authorities and the authorities at the
government level also should and must take into
consideration the directions and observations of the
court and purport of those orders. No authority can
disturb the findings or observations of any court. The
findings, directions or observations of a court can only
be disturbed, varied, modified or set aside by the court,
superior to the court which made those findings or
directions. Except the superior court, no authority can
take a contra view, taken by a court. Rejection of the
claim on a ground which they had already taken in the
earlier proceedings and which has been already
considered and rejected by the Court amounts to
nothing but Contempt of Court and disobeying the
orders of the Court.

      In view of the above position of law and in the light of the
facts and circumstances of the case, the second respondent has
no option but to extend the benefit under the Memorandum of
Settlement to the petitioner.  But, the second respondent passed
an order after initiation of contempt proceedings stating that the
case of the petitioner would be considered in the selections to be
conducted for employment under Bread Winner Scheme  
(compassionate grounds) after receipt of the approval of the
Government for the MOU arrived on 03.08.2013.  As stated
above, no permission was required for giving the benefit to the
petitioner.  If the petitioner is driven to another round of
litigation, as contended by the learned Counsel for the
respondents, it is a mockery of justice.  This Court has to have a
holistic view of the matter and should not multiply the litigation.
When there is no choice to the respondents to exercise the
discretion, except passing an order in a particular manner on the
facts of the particular case, the passing of an order deviating and
denying the benefit would amount to willful violation of the orders
of this Court.  This Court cannot dismiss the Contempt Cases on
technical pleas when the orders have become final and Contempt
Cases are filed alleging non-implementation of such orders.
Several opportunities were given to the second respondent to
correct his mistake in the present case also and in spite of the
same, no effort was made by him nor did wisdom dawn on him.
It appears that at a belated stage, an appeal was filed seeking
condonation of delay and the fate of such appeal was not known.
This Court is a Court of record and vested with the power to
punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution of
India and in appropriate cases it can travel beyond the
provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act.

      This Court in Sabza Ali v. M.Raghunandan  considered
the decisions of the Supreme Court in Maniyeri Madhavan v.
Inspector of Police, Cannanore , In re Vinay Chandra
Mishra , Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh  and E.T.Sunup
v. C.A.N.S.S.Employees Association , and quoted that even a
lackadaisical attitude, which itself may not be deliberate or wilful,
have not been held to be a sufficient ground of defence in a
contempt proceeding. Obviously, the purpose is to ensure
compliance of the orders of the court at the earliest and within
stipulated period.

      Here is a case of a poor lady who wanted compassionate
appointment and was denied the same on untenable grounds.  If
the second respondent has taken into consideration the facts and
circumstances of the case and the order passed by this Court, he
would have allowed the case of the petitioner.  The act of the
second respondent to circumvent the orders should not be
encouraged and the decisions relied on by the learned Counsel
for the contemnor are not applicable to the facts of the case.
Hence, this Court holds that the second respondent is liable for
punishment and, accordingly, the second respondent is convicted
under the Contempt of Courts Act and punished to pay a fine of
Rs.5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) to the petitioner within
four weeks.  The payment of fine or the punishment in this case,
will not absolve the responsibility of the respondents to comply
with the order.

      The Contempt Case is, accordingly, allowed.


________________________________    
A.RAMALINGESWARA RAO, J)      
27.04.2017

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