No maintainance from Paramour - but he is liable to pay maintenance to his illegitimate child = sole respondent (revision petitioner), used to approach her under the pretense of dropping the minor boy Ganesh in school and developed intimacy with her and lured her to marry him and there was a marriage between them on 27.11.2004, at Nakrekal and in their wedlock, they blessed with female child, M.C. 2nd respondent by name Venkata Harshini. It is thereby her claim is for entitlement of maintenance.= Having regard to the above, the awarding of maintenance to her of Rs.3,500/- per month is per se unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.




Moodududla Srinivas, S/o M.Yoganandam, aged 31 years, OCC:sOFTWARE eNGINEER, r/O c-210, Siddamsetty Towers, Jawahar Nagar, M          

SMT  .N.Usha Rani. W/o M.Srinivas, aged 34 years,OCC: House Wife, Near Vishnu Apartments, Gndhinagar, Hyderabad, and others.  

Counsel for the petitioner: Sri I.Gopala Reddy

Counsel for the respondents: Sri K.R.Koteswara Rao , Public Prosecutor


>Head Note:


 2000 Crl.L.J. 1(1)
  (2011)  1 SCC 141
  (1993) 3 SCC 406
  (2014) 1 SCC 188
  2014 1 NCC (SC) 1




         The revision petitioner is the sole respondent in
M.C.No.245 of 2009.   The revision respondent No.1, for herself
and minor daughter, in the so-called wedlock with revision
petitioner, maintained the M.C.No.245 of 2009, before the
Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum- Judge, Family
Court, Hyderabad and after contest in her claim at
Rs.25,000/- per month to herself and the minor daughter, the
learned Judge, Family Court, on 26.07.2012, awarded
maintenance of Rs.3,500/- to her and Rs.5,000/- to the minor
child per month, from date of passing the order.  Impugning
the same, the so-called husband maintained the present
revision as referred supra.

2.      Heard both sides at length and perused the material on

3.      The undisputed facts, right from the maintenance claim
petition averments are that the M.C. Petitioner No.1
Smt.N.Usha Rani, married one Nomula Srinivas on 30.08.1999
and they resided at Gandhi Nagar, Hyderabad and in their
valid wedlock, they blessed with male child by name Sai
Ganesh, in and around 2009 and the said Nomula Srinivas
went to Malaysia subsequently and Nomula Srinivas and
herself lived even in U.S.A. from December, 2004 to February,
2005 and they came back to India and thereafter differences
arose between them and since February, 2005 or so, they are
residing separately as even efforts through elders became
futile.  Even the other averments undisputed are that there was
a so-called document of Ex.P.16, dated 25.11.2005, executed
between herself and Nomula Srinivas, stating there is no valid
marriage between them, however, if there is anything in
subsistence, it is dissolving by the memorandum of
understanding supra.

4.      It is her claim therefrom that thereafter the M.C. sole
respondent (revision petitioner), used to approach her under
the pretense of dropping the minor boy Ganesh in school and
developed intimacy with her and lured her to marry him and
there was a marriage between them on 27.11.2004, at 
Nakrekal and in their wedlock, they blessed with female child,
M.C. 2nd respondent by name Venkata Harshini.  It is thereby
her claim is for entitlement of maintenance.

5.      Section 4 of the Hindu Marriage Act, provides the
overriding effect of the Act provisions.  Undisputedly, it is not
even a case of there is any caste custom in prevalence or the
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act are not applicable to
them.  Once such is the case, as provided by the Act and as
laid down in Section 4 of the Act, any dissolution of the
marriage or annulment of the marriage is only through court of
law and any agreement or understanding or proceeding 
outside the court has no legal sanctity, much less to say,
including by virtue of Ex.P.16, there from of the marital tie
between Nomula Srinivas and the M.C. 1st petitioner -
Smt.N.Usha Rani, any way terminated.  

6.      Once such is the case, whether she and the minor child
are entitled to claim maintenance or not concerned, as per
Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act (as per 1976
amendment), even a child of void marriage is legitimate for all
purposes including for purpose of succession, to say including
for entitlement of maintenance during minority and till
marriage or securing independent means.  Here, as per the
pleadings and also from the evidence on record, there was a
marriage between M.C. 1st petitioner and M.C. sole respondent.
Thus, by virtue of the marriage - though void, because of the
M.C. 1st petitioners marital tie with Nomula Srinivas -
admittedly in subsistence for not dissolved even from the
Ex.A.16, M.O.U., dated 25.11.2005, the child is entitled to
claim maintenance, but not by herself as
self-infected hardship cannot be taken advantage by any
person is also the settled law as one of the fundamental

7.      Even from the petition averments and evidence on record
of he knowingly married her, for she being wife of Nomula
Srinivas of the marital tie in subsistence and knowingly
married the M.C. respondent M.Srinivas, said marriage is once
void, she is not getting the status of a wife, but for to consider
to the status of the child within the limited scope as laid down
in Section 16 of the Act as referred supra.

8.      Coming to the M.C. petitioner wants to rely on the
expressions of the Apex Court:
(a) Dwarika Prasad Satpathy Vs. Bidyut Prava Dixit and
another , what the principle laid down therein by the two
judge bench of the Apex Court is that strict proof of marriage is
not required to claim maintenance in the proceedings under
Section 125 Cr.P.C.  There is no dispute on the proposition,
including to draw any inference from long living together, but
for to appreciate with reference to the facts, as each case
depends upon its own facts.  Here from the very petition
averments, the marriage with Nomula Srinivas to the M.C. 1st
petitioner was validly performed on 30.08.1999 and from
Ex.P.16 - M.O.U., dated 25.11.2005, outside the court there is
no valid dissolution of said marital tie and once there is no
legal dissolution of the marital tie of her with Nomula Srinivas,
even any ceremony of marriage with Moodududla Srinivas (the
M.C. respondent) taken place, that does not give sanctity and
thereby the decision in Dwarika Prasad Satpathy (referred
supra) has no application to the case on hand.
(b)     In Chanmuniya Vs. Virendra Kumar Singh
Kushwaha and another , where the proposition laid down
from the settled expressions is that a long living together gives
the presumption to say subsistence of the relation of man and
wife and that too there was performance of a marriage
ceremony between them from the evidence to give a strong
presumption of valid marriage.  Here that proposition has no
application to the facts, because in the very maintenance claim
petition, it is admitted that there is already a first marriage with
Nomula Srinivas to the M.C. 1st petitioner in subsistence.
(c)     In Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga Vs.
Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga, dated 13.12.2004,  
a case under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act (for short,
HMC Act) for permanent alimony from the finality of the
proceedings in relation to the matrimonial status in dispute,
there is no dispute on the proposition but for to say this
decision has also no application to the facts, for not a claim
under Section 25 of the HMC Act.  This Court even cannot
convert the Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceedings as one under
Section 25 of HMC Act.  Further there is no matrimonial
proceedings filed or pending much less disposed of for
annulment of the void marriage to invoke Section 25 of HMC
Act  vide Chand Dhawan vs Jawaharlal Dhawan .

(d)     Even from the decision in Badsha Vs. Urmila Badsha
Godse and another , in the facts where the husband having a
wife already suppressed that factum and married the M.C.
petitioner (who was earlier spinister) and it is held there from
that once he suppressed the factum of he got a valid 1st wife,
she is entitled to maintenance.  Here the facts are entirely
different.  It is not even her case that M.C. respondent got
another wife and suppressed the fact and married her.  It is
her case in fact that she got another husband Nomula Srinivas,
with whom marital tie not terminated.

(e)     In Indra Sarma Vs. V.K.V.Sarma , of the Apex Court,
is the outcome of domestic violence there was a discussion in
considering domestic relationship is subsisting or not.  There is
no any finding in favour of the petitioner to say that despite she
got 1st husband from the so-called marriage, against the 2nd
husband she is entitled to maintenance or other claims under
Domestic Violence Act.

9.      Having regard to the above, the awarding of maintenance
to her of Rs.3,500/- per month is per se unsustainable and is
liable to be set aside.  Needless to say, her remedy, if any, is
either under Section 24 or 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act or to
maintain any suit for compensation as one of the arguments
advanced in the course of hearing, which remedy is elsewhere
as discusses supra.  So far as child maintenance is concerned,
it is upheld as entitled by virtue of the discussion supra.

12.     Accordingly, this criminal revision case is partly allowed.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this case shall stand



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