whether it is open to a claimant to recover entire compensation from one of the joint tort feasors, particularly when in accident caused by composite negligence of drivers of trailor-truck and bus has been found to 2/3rd and 1/3rd extent respectively. Apex court held that (i) In the case of composite negligence, plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several. (ii) In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tort feasors vis a vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. (iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tort feasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one joint tort feasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. (iv) It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tort feasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award. Resultantly, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. Parties to bear the costs as incurred.- 2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

whether it  is  open  to  a  claimant  to  recover  entire
compensation from one of  the  joint  tort  feasors,  particularly  when  in
accident caused by composite negligence of drivers of trailor-truck and  bus
has been found to 2/3rd and 1/3rd extent respectively.
 Apex court held that
(i)   In the case of composite negligence,  plaintiff/claimant  is  entitled
to sue both or any one of the joint tort feasors and to recover  the  entire
compensation as liability of joint tort feasors is joint and several.
(ii)  In the case of composite  negligence,  apportionment  of  compensation
between  two  tort  feasors  vis  a  vis  the  plaintiff/claimant   is   not
permissible.  He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them.
(iii) In case all the joint tort feasors have been  impleaded  and  evidence
is sufficient, it is open  to  the  court/tribunal  to  determine  inter  se
extent of composite negligence of the  drivers.  However,  determination  of
the extent of negligence between the joint tort  feasors  is  only  for  the
purpose of their inter se liability so that one may  recover  the  sum  from
the other after making whole of payment to  the  plaintiff/claimant  to  the
extent it has satisfied the liability of the other.  In case  both  of  them
have been impleaded and the apportionment/ extent of  their  negligence  has
been determined by the court/tribunal, in main case one  joint  tort  feasor
can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings.
(iv)  It would not be appropriate for the court/tribunal  to  determine  the
extent of composite negligence  of  the  drivers  of  two  vehicles  in  the
absence of impleadment  of  other  joint  tort  feasors.  In  such  a  case,
impleaded joint tort feasor should be left, in case he so  desires,  to  sue
the other joint tort feasor in independent proceedings after passing of  the
decree or award.

Resultantly, the appeals are allowed.  The  judgment  and  order
passed by the High Court is hereby set aside. Parties to bear the  costs  as
incurred.- 2015 S.C.MSKLAWREPORTS

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