Cheque Bounce Case - Territorial Jurisdiction - Statement/Affidavit /Evidence Recorded before taking Cognizance of the case - whether such a sworn statement can be treated as commencement of recording of evidence to retain the case in that Court or not. Going by the above ruling of Apex Court, the said sworn statement though admitted to be evidence, cannot be treated as commencement of the evidence to retain the case in that Court. Any evidence led by the complainant in the form of affidavit or oral statement during pre-summoning i.e. pre-cognizance stage cannot be treated as commencement of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) of N.I.Act to retain the case in that Court. So, also the sworn statement given by complainant at pre-cognizance stage admitted as evidence during trial cannot be construed as commencement of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) N.I.Act to retain the case in the same court. not amounts to commencement of Evidence - 2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports



the form of affidavit or oral statement during pre-summoning i.e.
pre-cognizance stage cannot be treated as commencement of recording of
evidence under Section 145(2) of N.I.Act to retain the case in that Court.
So, also the sworn statement given by complainant at pre-cognizance stage
admitted as evidence during trial cannot be construed as commencement of
recording of evidence under Section 145(2) N.I.Act to retain the case in the
same court.

when the complainant presented the said cheque in Andhra
Bank, Anantapur Branch on 19.07.2012, the same was bounced with the  
endorsement as Account Closed and thereby the statutory notice followed
to the accused but in vain.  Hence, the complaint under Sec.138 of N.I. Act
and also under Sec.420 IPC.
 The petitioner/accused seeks quashment of the proceedings on the
main plank of argument that the cheque was drawn at Hyderabad and the
same was dishonoured there itself and no part of cause of action has arisen
at Anantapur and therefore, the criminal case is not maintainable in the
Court at Anantapur since the Special Judicial First Class Magistrate (Mobile
Court) has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the criminal case in view of
the ruling given by Honble Apex Court in its latest judgment reported in
Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra and another .
where, post the summoning and
appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has
commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable 
Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place.
To
clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the
Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral
statement, the complaint will be maintainable only at the  place
where the cheque stands dishonoured. 
The admitted facts in this case are that the subject cheque
was drawn on Citi Bank, Hyderabad and the complainant presented the said
cheque for collection through Andhra Bank, Georgepet Branch, Anantapur
and later the cheque was bounced on the ground account closed

 Sometimes the complainant
submits a vivid sworn statement basing on which the Court takes cognizance
of the complaint. After appearance of the accused when the matter comes up
for trial, the complainant may request the Court to treat his previous sworn
statement as evidence on his behalf as the said statement is vivid enough
containing full particulars and the Court may also accepts the same. Now the
point is whether such a sworn statement can be treated as commencement of  
recording of evidence to retain the case in that Court or not. Going by the
above ruling of Apex Court, the said sworn statement though admitted to be
evidence, cannot be treated as commencement of the evidence to retain the
case in that Court.
Any evidence led by the complainant in
the form of affidavit or oral statement during pre-summoning i.e.
pre-cognizance stage cannot be treated as commencement of recording of  
evidence under Section 145(2) of N.I.Act to retain the case in that Court.
So, also the sworn statement given by complainant at pre-cognizance stage
admitted as evidence during trial cannot be construed as commencement of 
recording of evidence under Section 145(2) N.I.Act to retain the case in the
same court. - 2015 Telangana & A.P. msklawreports

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