Suit for partition -who has to account for - which properties are liable for partition -proof of will Deed- properties liable for partition excluding sold properties by family , rest of the properties are liable for partition ,but Ungrudgingly, that was accepted and correspondingly, the share of the 1st defendant stood reduced - When plaintiff was not denied the management of the properties and when plaintiff was already enjoying some properties , both plaintiff and defendant were liable to show accounts but not their legal heirs - When some properties if any purchased in the name of son-in-law for his services rendered to the joint family , those properties are not amenable for partition - when some properties sold while in joint for the family, those sales should fall on entire joint family and not on the defendant who helped in management of properties - When the will deed is not genuine , when the will deed excludes some of the plaintiffs - non-examination of typist who typed the will deed and the evidence of attestators are doubtful , that will can not be considered for inter parties disputes - High court confirmed the orders of single judge and dismissed the LPAs = Sri P. Nithyananda Reddy .... Appellant Sri P. Sivarama Reddy (died)S/o. late P. Chinnama Reddy, R/o.Periyambadi Village, Chittoor Taluk and District and others .... Respondents = 2014 ( January part ) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10780

Suit for partition -who has to account for - which properties are liable for partition -proof of will Deed-   properties liable for partition  excluding sold properties by family , rest of the properties are liable for partition ,but Ungrudgingly, that was accepted and correspondingly, the share of the 1st defendant stood reduced - When plaintiff was not denied the management of the properties and when plaintiff  was already enjoying some properties , both plaintiff and defendant were liable to show accounts but not their legal heirs - When some properties if any purchased in the name of son-in-law for his services rendered to the joint family , those properties are not amenable for partition - when some properties sold while in joint for the family, those sales should fall on entire joint family and not on the defendant who helped in management of properties - When the will deed is not genuine , when the will deed excludes some of the plaintiffs - non-examination of typist who typed the will deed and the evidence of attestators are doubtful , that will can not be considered for inter parties disputes - High court confirmed the orders of single judge and dismissed the LPAs =

(1) Whether the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court and the judgment
rendered by the learned Single Judge suffer from any factual or legal infirmity.
The relationship between the parties is not disputed.  Yerram Reddy, who
held extensive properties in three villages, had two sons i.e., 1st plaintiff
and 1st defendant.  Though the 1st plaintiff pleaded that his brother, the 1st
defendant was in the management of the properties since 1917, the latter pleaded
that their father - Yerram Reddy was administering the properties till his death
in 1937.  
There was some uncertainty as to from when onwards, the jointness of
the family ceased.  
It has already been mentioned that the 1st plaintiff issued
a notice in the year 1937 i.e., the year in which Yerram Reddy died, calling
upon the 1st defendant to effect partition.  
No tangible steps were taken thereafter.  
It was from 1941 onwards, that the 1st plaintiff assumed administration of the properties in one village.
The 1st defendant did not oppose the partition as such.  
The controversy was as to the properties that are available for partition.  

The ultimate finding on this aspect was reflected in
issue No.11, namely, what are the properties liable for partition.  Individual
survey numbers in the respective shares were referred to.  The learned Single
Judge of this Court has also undertaken extensive discussion in relation to that
issue.
        The learned counsel for the appellants are not able to point out as to how
the preliminary decree and in particular, the finding as to the properties that
are available for partition is incorrect. As a matter of fact, no arguments have
been advanced with reference to individual items, except for the properties in
'C' Schedule, and therefore, we answer this point against the appellants.
(2) Whether the Wills executed by the 1st plaintiff, in particular, Ex.A.2
dated 07.09.1980 are valid and enforceable in law?

The
root cause for this is that the 1st plaintiff executed as many as five Wills and
one codicil, as the case may be.  In the chronological order, the Wills are
marked as Exs.A.3, A.5, A.8, A.10 and A.2, dated 04.12.1971, 15.08.1975,
19.04.1979, 18.02.1980 and 07.09.1980 respectively.  The codicil is dated
18.02.1980.
P.Ws.1 and 2 are stated to be testators of Ex.A.2.  Both the witnesses are from
Bangalore.  The trial Court observed that P.Ws.1 and 2 are the close friends of
P.W.3, the 2nd plaintiff.  In the cross-examination of P.W.1, several
contradictions were elicited.  Though he deposed that he treated the 1st
plaintiff for several ailments, he feigned ignorance about the treatment in a
policlinic.  D.Ws.5 and 6 were examined to demonstrate that P.W.1 would readily
issue any certificate on payment of Rs.100/- even without verifying the physical
condition. Trustworthiness of P.W.1 or the lack of it was successfully
demonstrated by the defendants. 
The failure to examine the typist was
pointed out.  The trial Court has also observed that when there were several
respectable persons in the neighbourhood, the procurement of P.Ws.1 and 2 from
Bangalore exclusively for the purpose, is in itself, suspicious circumstance.
Other factors of this category included the nature of disposition whereunder
several close relations including the grand daughters of the 1st plaintiff were
disinherited under Ex.A.2.

In case Ex.A.2 is disbelieved, the Will, which immediately preceded that,
namely, Ex.A.10 may gain some acceptability.  However, the very presence of
signature of the 1st plaintiff on Ex.A.2 was doubted and the fact that he went
on executing one Will after the other substantially changing the purport
thereof, would only disclose his fickle-mindedness, lack of clarity and
indecisiveness.  It is not as if he held any specific item of property
exclusively for himself, when executed any of the five Wills.  At every stage,
reference was made to the pendency of the suit.  Having initiated a fertile
litigation, he just wanted to ensure that it outlines him and added further
dimensions. The trial Court and the learned Single Judge have adopted the safest
course of not accepting any of the Wills.  We concur with that finding.
(3) Whether 'C' schedule properties held by the 4th defendant are liable to be
partitioned?
It was held
that the 4th defendant is not illatom son-in-law of Yerram Reddy.
While discussing issue No.6, the trial Court held that though the 4th defendant
was not the illatom son-in-law of Yeeram Reddy, Yerram Reddy and his son, the
1st defendant have made some arrangements in favour of the 4th defendant, for
the services rendered by him.  The purchases made under Ex.A.25 and Exs.B.23 to
25 were found to be perfectly legal.  It is not difficult to imagine the status
of a person, who is the husband of the only daughter of an affluent
agriculturist and businessman in the District.  For all practical purposes, the
plaintiffs wanted the 4th defendant to be treated as a pauper and not entitled
to own or hold any item of property.  The learned Single Judge has also bestowed
adequate attention on this aspect and upheld the findings of the trial Court.
We answer the point in the negative.
(4) Whether the 1st defendant and his legal representatives are under
obligation to render accounts?

In a way, the approach of the 1st plaintiff was contrary to the
very concept of joint family under Hindu coparcenary.  The 1st defendant did not
deny the rights of the 1st plaintiff over the joint family property. While the
1st plaintiff was merely enjoying an elite life at Madras, the burden of
managing vast extents of land in different villages fell upon the 1st defendant.
It was not even pleaded by the 1st plaintiff that he was denied the right or
opportunity to administer the properties.  He did not plead that he has any
independent income for his studies or maintenance of his family at later point
of time.  All that expenditure was provided from the joint family funds. The
occasion to require the Kartha of the joint family or coparcenar to render
accounts would arise if only he enjoyed the possession of the extensive property
without permitting the others to administer it or to share the income.  In a
way, it can be said that the 1st defendant has deprived to him, the comfort,
which the 1st plaintiff was enjoying, when he administered the properties.  He
had to spend lot of time and energy to look after such vast extent of
properties.

The 1st plaintiff was so technical and meticulous that he wanted the properties
that were sold by the family, to be kept to the share of the 1st defendant.
Ungrudgingly, that was accepted and correspondingly, the share of the 1st
defendant stood reduced. Added to that, the 1st plaintiff started administering
the properties from the year 1941 onwards to the extent it was possible for him.
If the 1st defendant is to be placed under obligation to render accounts,
equally so, would be the 1st plaintiff.  Therefore, we hold that the 1st
defendant or his legal representatives cannot be held liable to render accounts.
In the result, L.P.A.Nos.109 and 166 of 1989 and C.M.A.No.1140 of 2000 are
dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.
Consequently, the Miscellaneous Petitions filed in these appeals shall stand
disposed of.

2014 ( January part ) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10780


THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY and THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL
                 
L.P.A.Nos.109 of 1989 and BATCH

02-01-2014

Sri P. Nithyananda Reddy .... Appellant

Sri P. Sivarama Reddy (died)S/o. late P. Chinnama Reddy, R/o.Periyambadi
Village, Chittoor Taluk and District and others .... Respondents



Counsel for the Appellant: SRI V.L.N.G.K. MURTHY



Counsel for Respondent Nos.    : SRI S.V. MUNI REDDY

Counsel for Respondent Nos.      :     SRI J. PRABHAKAR

Counsel for Respondent No.10 : SRI T. BALI REDDY

Counsel for Respondent No.11:  SRI C.B.RAMAMOHANA REDDY      

Counsel for Respondent Nos.13 to 16: SRI O.MANOHAR REDDY    

Counsel for Respondent Nos.17 and 19: SRI A.C. LAXMANACHARY          


<Gist :

>Head Note:



?Cases referred:



THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY          
and

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.K.JAISWAL        


L.P.A.Nos.109 & 166 of 1989
and
C.M.A.No.1140 of 2000





COMMON JUDGMENT: - (Per the Hon'ble Sri Justice L. Narasimha Reddy)  
        The Letters Patent Appeals and the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal are the
offshoots of O.S.No.54 of 1959 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Chittoor.
The subject matter of these appeals is the dispute about partition of the
properties held by an affluent family in Chittoor District.  The sad part of it
is that two brothers were unable to agree upon the partition and their
disagreement has brought about a litigation spread to three generations.
        For the sake of convenience, the parties referred to, as arrayed in the
suit.
        One Sri Yerram Reddy had lands and other immovable properties in three
villages, namely Peruyambadi, Chitra and Arambadi villages of Chittoor District.
He was also doing abkari (excise) business. He had two sons by name Narayana
Reddy and Chinnam Reddy. While Narayana Reddy was at Chennai undertaking     
studies, Chinnam Reddy was assisting his father in the administration of the
properties and business.
        Yerram Reddy died in the year 1937.  By that time, his son Narayana Reddy
was at Madras pursuing his studies.
Narayana Reddy got issued a notice in the
year 1937 to his brother Chinnam Reddy requiring him to bring about partition.
From February, 1941 onwards Narayana Reddy assumed the administration of the
properties in Chitra and Arambadi villages and
Chinnam Reddy was looking after the properties in Peruyambudi village.
Yerram Reddy had a daughter and her
husband, Sri Adhikari Narayana Reddy was also assisting the family.
        Narayana Reddy, 1st plaintiff and his two sons Nityanand Reddy and Manohar 
Reddy, plaintiffs 2 and 3 filed O.S.No.54 of 1959 in the Court of the
Subordinate Judge, Chittor, against Chinnam Reddy, the 1st defendant, his son,
Siva Ram Reddy, 2nd defendant, his grand-son, Amarnath Reddy, defendant No.3,  
for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties and for
rendition of accounts for the property, for the period, during which, the 1st
defendant was said to be in the management of the entire properties.
The
plaintiffs pleaded that taking advantage of the fact that the 1st plaintiff was
at Madras and Yerram Reddy was old, the 1st defendant has appropriated the
family income for himself and he has also diverted some of the properties for
his benefit.
It was also pleaded that though the son-in-law of Yerram Reddy,
the 4th defendant, did not have any properties at his native place, he too, has
acquired properties in his own name by using the income of the joint family of
the plaintiff and the 1st defendant.
Another contention was that an item of
property was purchased in the name of the 1st defendant from the joint family
funds, was shown in the revenue records in the name of the 4th defendant with
the collusion of the 1st defendant.
        During the pendency of the suit, the 1st plaintiff, Narayana Reddy died.
His two sons are already on record. The 3rd plaintiff i.e., second son of
Narayana Reddy died and his legal representatives were brought on record.  The
defendants 1 and 4 also died and their legal representatives were brought on
record.  The cause title became expanded on account of the fact that quite large
number of persons, who are purchasers of the properties at different points of
time, were also impleaded.
        During the pendency of the suit, an interim preliminary decree was passed
on 25.10.1960 in I.A.No.3899 of 1960, directing that certain items of plaint A
and B schedule properties, which were sold in favour of third parties, shall be
deducted from the shares of defendants 1 to 3.
Apart from the disputes between
the plaintiffs on one hand, and the defendant on the other hand, there existed
some disputes, inter se plaintiffs 2 and 3 and their sisters.
The children of
the 1st plaintiff laid claims against each other, on the basis of as many as
five Wills said to have been executed by him.
        Ultimately, the trial Court passed a preliminary decree on 07.06.1982. It
did not accept any of the Wills executed by the 1st plaintiff.
It was held that

a) the branches of the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant are entitled for
equal shares in the suit schedule properties, excluding certain items standing
in the name of the 4th defendant,

b) the plaintiffs 1 to 3 are entitled to 1/3rd each, in the share of their
father, the 1st plaintiff, in the suit schedule i.e., 1/6th each, and

c) the right and entitlement of the 4th defendant vis--vis the properties
acquired by him and those were entered in the revenue records in his name were
kept outside the partition.

        Challenging the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court, the 2nd
plaintiff filed A.S.No.1898 of 2002 before this Court, defendants 2, 3 and 29
filed A.S.No.1591 of 1982 and defendant No.38 filed A.S.No.1955 of 1983.
Through a common judgment, dated 25.08.1987, a learned Single Judge of this
Court dismissed all the three appeals. However, certain corrections were ordered
in para 5 of the decree passed by the trial Court, in relation to the properties
covered by the interim preliminary decree, dated 25.10.1960.
        The 2nd plaintiff filed L.P.A.No.109 of 1989, feeling aggrieved by the
dismissal of A.S.No.1898 of 2002. Defendants 2,3 and the legal representatives
of the defendant No.29 filed L.P.A.No.166 of 1989, aggrieved by the dismissal of
A.S.No.1591 of 1989.  No appeal was filed by the 38th defendant.
        Final decree proceedings were initiated by filing I.A.No.313 of 1993
before the trial Court. 
The 2nd defendant filed I.A.No.1153 of 1983, alleging
disobedience of order of injunction passed in I.A.No.313 of 1993, dated
11.03.1992, on the part of the respondents therein.  
The trial Court allowed the
I.A. through order, dated 12.04.2000.  C.M.A.No.1140 of 2000 is filed against
the same by the respondent in the Miscellaneous Petition.
        Arguments on behalf of the 2nd plaintiff and defendants 2, 3 and 29 are
advanced by Sri V.L.N.G.K. Murthy and

Sri C.B. Rama Mohan Reddy.  They submit that the trial Court as well as the
learned Single Judge have ignored the fact that Ex.A.2 was the last Will
executed by the 1st plaintiff, and the same ought to have been enforced. They
submit that the reasons furnished for ignoring the said Will are not at all
tenable in law.
The second contention advanced by the learned counsel is that
though the 1st plaintiff on one hand, and the 1st defendant on the other hand,
were appointed as receivers by the Court, in respect of the properties under
their management, the latter failed to render the accounts and the trial Court
and the learned Single Judge did not pass any decree in this behalf.
It is
pleaded that for quite a considerable length of time, large extents of
properties were under the management of the 1st defendant and he, and after his
death, his legal representatives were under obligation to render the accounts.
        Learned counsel further urged that the findings recorded by the trial
Court and the learned Single Judge, in relation to the 'C' schedule properties
under the enjoyment of the 4th defendant, are contrary to the evidence on
record.  According to them, the 4th defendant failed to adduce any evidence to
establish that he has any source of income of his own for payment of
consideration under the respective Sale Deeds for purchase of the properties in
'C' schedule.  It is also pleaded that there was collusion between the 1st
defendant and the 4th defendant in diverting the valuable items of joint family
property in favour of the 4th defendant, just by manipulating the revenue
records. They have also advanced arguments in relation to the CMA.
        The learned counsel for the respondents in the appeals, on the other hand,
submit that the baseless and speculative litigation initiated by the 1st
plaintiff and his sons, is haunting the entire family and various others, for
the past more than six decades. They submit that the trial Court has taken into
account, the oral and documentary evidence into account and arrived at just and
proper conclusions. They submit that this Court has also undertaken extensive
discussion on each and every aspect urged by the parties and has dismissed all
the appeals.  According to them, the scope of interference in a Letters Patent
Appeal is very limited, and it cannot be treated as a further appeal for re-
appreciating the facts.
        It is also their case that the 4th defendant has independent source of
income, and taking advantage of the fact that the recital in the respective Sale
Deeds that the consideration is paid by the 1st defendant, it is sought to be
pleaded that the consideration was paid from the funds of the joint family.  The
learned counsel submit that because the 4th defendant was an illiterate and busy
in agriculture, the amount earned by him was paid by the 1st defendant to the
vendees. They further submit that the series of Wills said to have been executed
by the 1st plaintiff have revealed inherent contradictions and the trial Court
and the learned Single Judge have properly chosen to ignore all of them.
        The background of the case is presented in the preceding paragraphs.  On
the basis of the pleadings before it, the Trial Court framed the following
issues and additional issues for its consideration:


Issues:

1. Was the 1st plaintiff's taking possession of Chithapara lands and the garden
at Arambakam and management thereof only a temporary measure and pleaded by  
defendants 1 to 3 and when?

2. Was the Abkari business from 1944 to 1947 that of the joint family as urged
by plaintiffs or was it only the separate concern of the 1st defendant?

3. Is plaint 'D' schedule correct?

4. Are the properties mentioned in plaint schedules A to D joint family
properties and are the plaintiffs entitled to a declaration in this behalf?

5. Are the debts mentioned in the plaint true and binding on the suit
properties?

6. Was 4th defendant taken as an illatom son-in-law and are items 112 and 170
of 'B' schedule and 184 to 199 of 'C' schedule his separate properties?

7. Are the settlement deeds pleaded by 4th defendant valid and binding?

8. Is the settlement deed pleaded by 7th defendant valid and binding?

9. Is the settlement deed pleaded by 8th defendant valid and binding?

10. Is 9th defendant not necessary party?

11. What are the properties liable for partition?

12. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of alienees from 1st defendant?

13. Is the suit not valued correctly and is the court fee paid insufficient?

14. Was the 1st defendant in management of the family properties from 1918?

15. To what relief, if any are the plaintiffs entitled?





Additional Issues:



1. Which party is liable to account and regarding what properties and what
period?

2. Whether the defendants 12 to 19 and defendants 21 to 23 are bonafide
purchasers and are they in possession of the properties purchased by them in
their own right?

3. Whether the defendants 12 to 19 and 21 to 23 are entitled to any equitable
relief if the properties purchased by them are held liable for division?

4. Has the 1st defendant alienated or sold away joint family properties to
defendants 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22 and 23?

5.  Whether the plaintiff was a consenting party to the alienation in favour of
defendants 19 and 21 and if so, is he entitled to question the same?

6. Whether defendants 12 and 13 have perfected their title by adverse
possession?

7. Whether Item No.59 of the plaint 'A' schedule is the self-acquired property
of 1st defendant?

8. Whether the will dated 4.12.1971 executed by the late 1st plaintiff is the
last and valid will binding on the heirs of the 1st plaintiff?

9. Whether the will dated 7.9.1980 executed by late 1st plaintiff is his last
will and whether it is true, valid and binding on the heirs of 1st plaintiff?



On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.67 were
filed.  On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 11 were examined and Exs.B.1 to
B.27 were filed.  In addition to that, the pleadings and petitions in O.S.No.54
of 1959 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Chittoor, were taken on record as
Exs.C.1 to C.10. Exs.X.1 to X.3 were also taken on record.

The trial Court passed a preliminary decree and issued certain directions.

In A.S.Nos.1591 and 1898 of 1982 filed before this Court, the learned Single
Judge framed the following points for consideration:

A.S.No.1591 of 1982:

1. When is the division of status took place in between the first plaintiff and
the rest of the joint family i.e., whether it is in the year 1938, as contended
by the first defendant and his sons; or whether the same has taken place in the
year, 1958 when the first plaintiff gave a notice to the other co-parcenars
intimating his intention to separate himself from the rest of the family?

2. Whether item no.59 in the plaint 'A' schedule property is the joint family
property as contended by the plaintiffs or whether the same is the self acquired
property of the first defendant?

3. What is the period of accounting and by which of the parties?



A.S.No.1898 of 1982:

1. Whether the 'C' schedule properties covered by sale deeds, Ex.A.25, Ex.B.23,
Ex.B.24 and Ex.B.25 belong to the fourth defendant and his sons or whether the
same are also the joint family properties of the first defendant branch and the
first plaintiff branches?

2. Whether Ex.A.2, dated 7.9.1980, is the last will of the deceased first
plaintiff?

3. Which of the parties are liable to account and from which date and with
regard to which properties?

4. Whether the first plaintiff and the first defendant already filed accounts
into Court, if so, whether the same are true and correct?

5. Whether the Paragraphs 1, 2 and 5 of the decree of the lower Court require
any clarification? If so, after clarification in what manner the three
paragraphs are to be redrafted?



        For all practical purposes, the decree passed by the trial Court was
upheld.

        The principal contentions that are urged before us give rise to the
following points:

(1) Whether the preliminary decree passed by the trial Court and the judgment
rendered by the learned Single Judge suffer from any factual or legal infirmity.



(2) Whether the Wills executed by the 1st plaintiff, in particular, Ex.A.2
dated 07.09.1980 are valid and enforceable in law?


(3) Whether 'C' schedule properties held by the 4th defendant are liable to be
partitioned?


(4) Whether the 1st defendant and his legal representatives are under
obligation to render accounts?


POINT No.1:


        The relationship between the parties is not disputed.  Yerram Reddy, who
held extensive properties in three villages, had two sons i.e., 1st plaintiff
and 1st defendant.  Though the 1st plaintiff pleaded that his brother, the 1st
defendant was in the management of the properties since 1917, the latter pleaded
that their father - Yerram Reddy was administering the properties till his death
in 1937.  
There was some uncertainty as to from when onwards, the jointness of
the family ceased.  
It has already been mentioned that the 1st plaintiff issued
a notice in the year 1937 i.e., the year in which Yerram Reddy died, calling
upon the 1st defendant to effect partition.  
No tangible steps were taken thereafter.  
It was from 1941 onwards, that the 1st plaintiff assumed administration of the properties in one village.
The 1st defendant did not oppose the partition as such.  
The controversy was as to the properties that are available for partition.  
The pendency of the proceedings for the past more than
half a century gave rise to several other subsidiary problems.
Disputes have
arisen among the plaintiffs themselves and the effect thereof would be dealt
with later.
        The lack of harmony between the two brothers i.e., 1st plaintiff and the
1st defendant was acute and at one point of time, a part preliminary decree was
passed. That was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Appeal No.188 of
1961 and A.A.O.No.118 of 1964 through order dated 24.08.1966.  The trial Court
has also taken note of the same.
        Several issues were framed, dealing with the clusters of items of property
and in some cases, individual items. In relation to each of such items, the
trial Court has undertaken extensive discussion with reference to oral and
documentary evidence.  The ultimate finding on this aspect was reflected in
issue No.11, namely, what are the properties liable for partition.  Individual
survey numbers in the respective shares were referred to.  The learned Single
Judge of this Court has also undertaken extensive discussion in relation to that
issue.
        The learned counsel for the appellants are not able to point out as to how
the preliminary decree and in particular, the finding as to the properties that
are available for partition is incorrect. As a matter of fact, no arguments have
been advanced with reference to individual items, except for the properties in
'C' Schedule, and therefore, we answer this point against the appellants.



POINT No.2:

The second point is in relation to the dispute inter se the plaintiffs and some
of the defendants, who are the legal representatives of the 1st plaintiff.  The
root cause for this is that the 1st plaintiff executed as many as five Wills and
one codicil, as the case may be.  In the chronological order, the Wills are
marked as Exs.A.3, A.5, A.8, A.10 and A.2, dated 04.12.1971, 15.08.1975,
19.04.1979, 18.02.1980 and 07.09.1980 respectively.  The codicil is dated
18.02.1980.

The additional issue framed on 12.12.1982 by the trial Court is in relation to
the first and last Wills marked as Exs.A.3 and A.2.  Substantial portion of the
judgment of the trial Court covering paragraphs 55 to 58 was devoted for this
additional issue.  Ex.A.2 did not make any provision for plaintiff Nos.4 to 7.
This Will is a substantial deviation from the earlier Wills.  As a matter of
fact, major portion of the oral evidence was also with reference to Ex.A.2.  The
trial Court has undertaken comparison of the undisputed signatures of the 1st
plaintiff over various documents, including Ex.A.54 with the one on Ex.A.2.

P.Ws.1 and 2 are stated to be testators of Ex.A.2.  Both the witnesses are from
Bangalore.  The trial Court observed that P.Ws.1 and 2 are the close friends of
P.W.3, the 2nd plaintiff.  In the cross-examination of P.W.1, several
contradictions were elicited.  Though he deposed that he treated the 1st
plaintiff for several ailments, he feigned ignorance about the treatment in a
policlinic.  D.Ws.5 and 6 were examined to demonstrate that P.W.1 would readily
issue any certificate on payment of Rs.100/- even without verifying the physical
condition. Trustworthiness of P.W.1 or the lack of it was successfully
demonstrated by the defendants.  Another serious flaw that was noticed in
relation to execution of Ex.A.2 was that, it was said to have been already typed
and the testator has simply signed it.  The failure to examine the typist was
pointed out.  The trial Court has also observed that when there were several
respectable persons in the neighbourhood, the procurement of P.Ws.1 and 2 from
Bangalore exclusively for the purpose, is in itself, suspicious circumstance.
Other factors of this category included the nature of disposition whereunder
several close relations including the grand daughters of the 1st plaintiff were
disinherited under Ex.A.2.

In case Ex.A.2 is disbelieved, the Will, which immediately preceded that,
namely, Ex.A.10 may gain some acceptability.  However, the very presence of
signature of the 1st plaintiff on Ex.A.2 was doubted and the fact that he went
on executing one Will after the other substantially changing the purport
thereof, would only disclose his fickle-mindedness, lack of clarity and
indecisiveness.  It is not as if he held any specific item of property
exclusively for himself, when executed any of the five Wills.  At every stage,
reference was made to the pendency of the suit.  Having initiated a fertile
litigation, he just wanted to ensure that it outlines him and added further
dimensions. The trial Court and the learned Single Judge have adopted the safest
course of not accepting any of the Wills.  We concur with that finding.



POINT No.3:

The third point is about the properties held by the 4th defendant.  These
included not only the items purchased in his name, but also those settled upon
him by the 1st defendant.  It has already been mentioned that the 4th defendant
was assisting his father-in-law, Yerram Reddy, and brother-in-law, 1st
defendant, in the agriculture and business.  Even while the 1st plaintiff was in
Madras pursuing the studies, the 4th defendant shifted his residence from his
native village to assist the family of his father-in-law.  The evidence
discloses that he sold away certain items of property in the native village and
purchased properties at one of the three villages where Yerram Reddy had
properties.  Obviously because the 4th defendant was illiterate, the
transactions were undertaken by his brother-in-law, 1st defendant. In certain
cases, correction of entries in the Revenue Records was undertaken to ensure
that the properties purchased by him with his funds are recorded in his name.
Issue Nos.6 and 7 framed by the trial Court touched this aspect.  It was held
that the 4th defendant is not illatom son-in-law of Yerram Reddy.

While discussing issue No.6, the trial Court held that though the 4th defendant
was not the illatom son-in-law of Yeeram Reddy, Yerram Reddy and his son, the
1st defendant have made some arrangements in favour of the 4th defendant, for
the services rendered by him.  The purchases made under Ex.A.25 and Exs.B.23 to
25 were found to be perfectly legal.  It is not difficult to imagine the status
of a person, who is the husband of the only daughter of an affluent
agriculturist and businessman in the District.  For all practical purposes, the
plaintiffs wanted the 4th defendant to be treated as a pauper and not entitled
to own or hold any item of property.  The learned Single Judge has also bestowed
adequate attention on this aspect and upheld the findings of the trial Court.
We answer the point in the negative.



POINT No.4:



One of the major planks of argument advanced by the plaintiffs before the trial
Court as well as the learned Single Judge was that the 1st defendant enjoyed the
extensive properties of the joint family and that he was under obligation to
render accounts.
In a way, the approach of the 1st plaintiff was contrary to the
very concept of joint family under Hindu coparcenary.  The 1st defendant did not
deny the rights of the 1st plaintiff over the joint family property. While the
1st plaintiff was merely enjoying an elite life at Madras, the burden of
managing vast extents of land in different villages fell upon the 1st defendant.
It was not even pleaded by the 1st plaintiff that he was denied the right or
opportunity to administer the properties.  He did not plead that he has any
independent income for his studies or maintenance of his family at later point
of time.  All that expenditure was provided from the joint family funds. The
occasion to require the Kartha of the joint family or coparcenar to render
accounts would arise if only he enjoyed the possession of the extensive property
without permitting the others to administer it or to share the income.  In a
way, it can be said that the 1st defendant has deprived to him, the comfort,
which the 1st plaintiff was enjoying, when he administered the properties.  He
had to spend lot of time and energy to look after such vast extent of
properties.

The 1st plaintiff was so technical and meticulous that he wanted the properties
that were sold by the family, to be kept to the share of the 1st defendant.
Ungrudgingly, that was accepted and correspondingly, the share of the 1st
defendant stood reduced. Added to that, the 1st plaintiff started administering
the properties from the year 1941 onwards to the extent it was possible for him.
If the 1st defendant is to be placed under obligation to render accounts,
equally so, would be the 1st plaintiff.  Therefore, we hold that the 1st
defendant or his legal representatives cannot be held liable to render accounts.

C.M.A.No.1140 of 2000 is filed against the order dated 12.04.2000 passed by the
Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chittoor in I.A.No.1153 of 1993 in O.S.No.54 of
1959, wherein a specific finding was recorded to the effect that the order of
injunction passed in I.A.No.313 of 1993 was violated.  The appellants are not
able to point out any serious defect in the finding recorded by the trial Court.
On the one hand, the plaintiffs have initiated the proceedings for partition and
on the other, they have chosen to violate the orders passed in an application
filed in final decree proceedings.

In the result, L.P.A.Nos.109 and 166 of 1989 and C.M.A.No.1140 of 2000 are
dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, the Miscellaneous Petitions filed in these appeals shall stand
disposed of.
____________________
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J  
______________________  
M.S.K.JAISWAL, J
Date:02.01.2014

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