Accident claim - M.V.Act - 5 years child died in Auto riksha accident - tender age having no income - No multiplier of Rs.15,000/- not applied basing on the Apex court judgment Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and others, fixed compensation as Rs.1,11,500/- under different heads - High court held that lower tribunal applied the latest judgment properly nothing is there to find fault and dismissed the appeal = Mesram Chinnu and another..... Appellants M.Doulath Rao and another.... Respondents = 2014 ( January Part) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10785

Accident claim - M.V.Act - 5 years child died in Auto riksha accident - tender age having no income - No multiplier of Rs.15,000/- not applied basing on the Apex court judgment Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and others, fixed compensation as Rs.1,11,500/- under different heads - High court held that lower tribunal applied the latest judgment properly nothing is there to find fault and dismissed the appeal = 
Coming to the quantum of compensation, the
Tribunal has observed that the deceased was an infant boy of 5 years and a non-
earning member.  Therefore, to assess compensation, the Tribunal having relied
upon the decisions reported in Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed
Ibrahim and others1 and Smt. Lata Wadhwa and others vs. State of Bihar and 
others2 granted compensation of Rs.1,11,500/- as follows:
1. Conventional compensation 
under Section 140 of M.V. Act                   Rs.50,000/-
2. Loss of Estate                                       Rs.  7,500/-
3. Funeral expenses                                     Rs.  2,000/-
4. Transportation charges                               Rs.  2,000/-
5. Loss of notional future earnings             Rs.50,000/-
   ______________ 
TOTAL                   =     Rs.1,11,500/-
   ______________ 
e) It may be noted that in the process of arriving at the above compensation,
the Tribunal declined to consider the decisions relied upon by the claimants on
the ground that the deceased in those cases were the children aged 9 and 13
years and so notional income of Rs.15,000/- as applied in those cases cannot be
applied to the instant case since the deceased in the instant case was aged 5
years.  Instead, as already stated, the Tribunal followed the case of Oriental
Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and others (1 Supra), which was 
relating to the death of a child aged 7 years.  The Tribunal observed that as
per the above decision, the compensation for the death of a child cannot be
assessed as in the case of an adult.
Hence, the appeal by claimants for enhancement of compensation. =
Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and
others (1 Supra)
the death was that of a child aged 7 years.   
The Tribunal
awarded sum of Rs.51,500/- as compensation on the ground that the child had no
income.  
However, High Court of Karnataka in an appeal filed by the claimants
enhanced the compensation to Rs.1,52,000/-.  
In the appeal preferred by the
Insurance Company, Hon'ble Apex Court after discussing the principles to be
followed in assessing the compensation in child death cases had maintained the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal.  
In that case, the multiplier system was
not made applicable and notional income of Rs.15,000/- was not taken for the death of child.  
The Tribunal followed the aforesaid decision and granted compensation of Rs.1,11,500/- under different heads as stated supra.   
In view
of Tribunal's following the latest decision of Hon'ble Apex Court wherein the
deceased was 7 years, whose age was proximate to the age of the deceased in the 
instant case, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal cannot be found fault.
In the instant case, the deceased was only a
child of 5 years and there is no record to show that he was going to school.  So
the said decision cannot be applied to the instant case.
10)     In the result, I find no merits in the appeal and the same is accordingly
dismissed. No costs. 

2014 ( January Part) judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10785

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U.DURGA PRASAD RAO          

M.A.C.M.A.No.202 of 2009

20-01-2014

Mesram Chinnu and another..... Appellants


M.Doulath Rao and another.... Respondents

Counsel for Appellants          : Sri S. Surender Reddy

Counsel for Respondents : Sri Ravi Shankar Jandhyala      

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:
1) AIR 2008 SC 103
2) (2001) 8 SCC 197
3) (2009) 14 SCC 1
4) 2007 ACJ 160 SC
5) 2008 ACJ 1405 SC
6) 2005 ACJ 99 SC
7) 2007 ACJ 1003 (AP)

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE U. DURGA PRASAD RAO        

M.A.C.M.A. No.202 of 2009

JUDGMENT:  
        Challenging the award dated 28.11.2008 in M.V.O.P.No.477 of 2005 passed by
the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum- District Judge, Adilabad (for
short "Tribunal"), the claimants preferred the instant M.A.C.M.A on the ground
that compensation awarded by the Tribunal as low and inadequate.
2)      The factual matrix of the case is thus:
a) The claimants are the parents of deceased boy- M. Nagender, aged 5 years and
they are residents of Muthnoor Village, Indervelli Mandal of Adilabad District.
Their case is that on 09.11.2004m, at about 5:30pm, when the deceased was 
standing by the side of the road near their house, the driver of the auto
bearing No.AP 01 KA T/R 186 drove the auto at high speed and hit the deceased 
and thereby the boy suffered fatal injuries and subsequently died in the Church
Hospital in that local area.  The claimants pleaded that the accident was
occurred due to the fault of the driver of the auto rickshaw. They further
pleaded that the deceased was a student and a bright boy and due to his abrupt
death, he lost prospects in the life and they lost their future supporter.  On
these pleas, the claimants filed M.V.O.P.No.477 of 2005 and claimed compensation 
of Rs.1,50,000/- under various heads against respondent Nos.1 and 2 who are the
owner and insurer of the offending auto rickshaw.
b) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed counters and opposed the claim.
c) During trial PWs.1 to 3 were examined, Exs.A.1 to A.5 were marked on behalf
of claimants.  Policy copy filed by 2nd respondent was marked as Ex.B.1.
d) Perusal of the judgment would show that the Tribunal having regard to the eye
witness account of PW.2 and supporting documents like Ex.A.1- F.I.R, Ex.A.2-
inquest report and Ex.A.4- charge sheet held that the accident was occurred due
to the fault of the auto driver.  Coming to the quantum of compensation, the
Tribunal has observed that the deceased was an infant boy of 5 years and a non-
earning member.  Therefore, to assess compensation, the Tribunal having relied
upon the decisions reported in Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed
Ibrahim and others1 and Smt. Lata Wadhwa and others vs. State of Bihar and 
others2 granted compensation of Rs.1,11,500/- as follows:
1. Conventional compensation 
under Section 140 of M.V. Act                   Rs.50,000/-
2. Loss of Estate                                       Rs.  7,500/-
3. Funeral expenses                                     Rs.  2,000/-
4. Transportation charges                               Rs.  2,000/-
5. Loss of notional future earnings             Rs.50,000/-
   ______________ 
TOTAL                   =     Rs.1,11,500/-
   ______________ 
e) It may be noted that in the process of arriving at the above compensation,
the Tribunal declined to consider the decisions relied upon by the claimants on
the ground that the deceased in those cases were the children aged 9 and 13
years and so notional income of Rs.15,000/- as applied in those cases cannot be
applied to the instant case since the deceased in the instant case was aged 5
years.  Instead, as already stated, the Tribunal followed the case of Oriental
Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and others (1 Supra), which was 
relating to the death of a child aged 7 years.  The Tribunal observed that as
per the above decision, the compensation for the death of a child cannot be
assessed as in the case of an adult.
Hence, the appeal by claimants for enhancement of compensation. 
3)      Heard arguments of Sri S. Surender Reddy, learned counsel for
appellants/claimants.  No representation for respondents.
4)       Fulminating the award of the Tribunal, learned counsel for appellant
argued that the Tribunal erred in not applying notional income of Rs.15,000/-
per annum to the deceased for computation of loss of future earnings of the
deceased.  He argued that though the deceased was an infant and a non-earning
member by the date of his death, still the Tribunal ought to have taken his
notional income as Rs.15,000/- p.a and ought to have computed compensation
through multiplier method. Instead, the Tribunal granted only a lump sum amount
of Rs.50,000/- as notional loss of earnings which is impermissible under law.
He thus prayed to review the compensation under this head and grant enhanced
compensation.  In this context, he relied upon a decision reported in R.K.Malik
and another vs. Kiran Pal and others3.
5)      In the light of above argument, now the point for determination in this
appeal is:
"Whether the compensation granted by the Tribunal is just and reasonable"?
6)      POINT: It may be noted that the claimants before Tribunal relied upon the
following decisions: a) New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Satender and
others4 b) Santosh Rani vs. Ranjith Singh5 c) Manju Devi and another vs. Musafir
Paswan and another6 and d) National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pittala Ramulu
and others7.
7)      It may be noted that in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited 
vs. Satender and others (4 Supra),
for the death of a boy of 9 years, the
Hon'ble Apex Court applied multiplier method by taking his notional income as
Rs.15,000/-.
In the case of Santosh Rani vs. Ranjith Singh (5 Supra), when the
Tribunal awarded Rs.50,000/-, Hon'ble Apex Court fixed a lump sum compensation
of Rs.2,50,000/- with subsequent interest and costs.   In the case of Manju Devi
and another vs. Musafir Paswan and another (6 Supra), for the death of 13 years
old boy, Hon'ble Apex Court applied multiplier method by taking his notional
income as Rs.15,000/- p.a.
In the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs.
Pittala Ramulu and others (7 Supra),
for the death of boy aged about one year,
our High Court has applied multiplier method by taking his notional income as
Rs.15,000/- p.a.
8)      However as already stated supra, the Tribunal did not follow the above
decisions on the observation that the deceased in some of those cases were aged
between 9 and 13 years whereas the deceased in the instant case was aged 5  
years. 
 Instead the Tribunal has relied upon the decision reported in the case
of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and others (1 Supra)
wherein another decision of Supreme Court reported in the case of Smt. Lata
Wadhwa and others vs. State of Bihar and others (2 Supra) was discussed and 
relied. 
 In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Syed Ibrahim and
others (1 Supra),
the death was that of a child aged 7 years.  
The Tribunal
awarded sum of Rs.51,500/- as compensation on the ground that the child had no
income.
However, High Court of Karnataka in an appeal filed by the claimants
enhanced the compensation to Rs.1,52,000/-.
In the appeal preferred by the
Insurance Company, Hon'ble Apex Court after discussing the principles to be
followed in assessing the compensation in child death cases had maintained the
compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
In that case, the multiplier system was
not made applicable and notional income of Rs.15,000/- was not taken for the death of child.  
The Tribunal followed the aforesaid decision and granted compensation of Rs.1,11,500/- under different heads as stated supra.   
In view
of Tribunal's following the latest decision of Hon'ble Apex Court wherein the
deceased was 7 years, whose age was proximate to the age of the deceased in the 
instant case, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal cannot be found fault.
9)      It may be noted that the decision reported
in R.K.Malik and another vs.
Kiran Pal and others (3 Supra) relied upon by the appellant can be distinguished
on facts.
That was a case of death of 29 school going children.  When those
children were proceeding to the school in a bus, the said bus overran the road
and broke the railing and drowned in Yamuna River.  In that ghastly accident, 29
children died. Some children were in the age group of 10 to 15 years; some in
the age group of 15 to 18 and three children were in the age group of less than
10 years.  In that context, the future prospects were also considered and
compensation was fixed for them.
In the instant case, the deceased was only a
child of 5 years and there is no record to show that he was going to school.  So
the said decision cannot be applied to the instant case.
10)     In the result, I find no merits in the appeal and the same is accordingly
dismissed. No costs. 
        Miscellaneous applications if any pending in this appeal, shall stand
dismissed.
__________________________  
U. DURGA PRASAD RAO, J    
Date: 20.01.2014

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