Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988- In accident claim when F.I.R. and wound certificate is salient and other evidence is absent - mere mentioning his name in the charge sheet alone does not give any right to file a accident claim petition - claim petition is dismissed rightly = G.Narayana Reddy... Appellant M.Vajida Tabusum and another... Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=10567

Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988- In accident claim when F.I.R. and wound certificate is salient and other evidence is absent - mere mentioning his name in the charge sheet alone does not give any right to file a accident claim petition - claim petition is dismissed rightly = 
The appellant made a claim under Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (the Act, for short) together with the Rules thereunder claiming
compensation at Rs.1,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in an accident
that occurred on 15-7-2003.
The learned Chairman of the Tribunal held that the claimant failed to prove that
he sustained injuries in the accident and dismissed the claim.
the appellant-claimant,
contended that 
the charge-sheet disclosed the claimant as 2nd witness and also
recites that the claimant also sustained injuries in the said accident.  =
His
contention is that after due verification, Police considered that the claimant
sustained injuries in the accident. =
 It may be noticed that charge-sheet can
never be a ground to decide the merits of the case. =
The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is on par with
Ex.A-1 certified copy of the FIR and Ex.A-2 certified of the Wound Certificate,
which show that the accident occurred at about 10.00 p.m. whereas the claimant
was treated at about 07.00 p.m.  
The Tribunal therefore was perfectly justified
in concluding that the claimant did not sustain injuries in the said accident.

        5. I may also add that in the complaint, which was registered as FIR
lodged by one M.Razak Ahmed, 
there was no reference that the claimant was  travelling in the offending jeep.  
Thus, Exs.A-1 and A-2 certified copies of the
FIR and the Wound Certificate do not agree with the claim of the petitioner.

        6. In that view of the matter, the award of the Tribunal was perfectly
justified.  I therefore see no merits in this appeal.  This appeal accordingly
is dismissed.

HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR      

M.A.C.M.A.No.1296 of 2005

26-11-2013

G.Narayana Reddy... Appellant

M.Vajida Tabusum and another... Respondents


Counsel for the appellant:Sri I.Venkata Prasad

Counsel for respondent No.1: None
Counsel for respondent No.2:  Sri K.S.Raju,
                                Representing
                                Smt.N.P.Anjana Devi

<Gist :

>Head Note:    

?Cases referred:
Nil.

HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR      

M.A.C.M.A.No.1296 of 2005

Date: 26-11-2013

Judgment:

The claimant preferred the appeal assailing the award of the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal cum
V Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), Anantapur (the Tribunal, for
short) in O.P.No.16 of 2004 dated 22-11-2004 .

2. The appellant made a claim under Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (the Act, for short) together with the Rules thereunder claiming
compensation at Rs.1,00,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in an accident
that occurred on 15-7-2003.
The learned Chairman of the Tribunal held that the claimant failed to prove that
he sustained injuries in the accident and dismissed the claim.  Hence, the
appeal.

        3. The accident occurred on 15-7-2003 at about 10.00 p.m.  The First
Information Report (FIR), certified copy of which is Ex.A-1, shows the time of
the accident as 10.00 p.m.  The claimant deposed as P.W.1 that he sustained
injuries at 10.00 p.m.  P.W.2 is the doctor, who treated the claimant.  P.W.2
deposed that he treated the claimant at about 07.00 p.m.  The Wound Certificate
also shows that the claimant was admitted at the hospital at 07.00 p.m. on 15-7-
2003.  Thus, the accident occurred at 10.00 p.m. whereas P.W.2 deposed and
supported by Ex.A-2 certified copy of the Wound Certificate that the claimant
was treated by P.W.2 at 07.00 p.m.  On the basis of this evidence, the Tribunal
dismissed the claim.

        4. Sri I.Venkata Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant-claimant,
contended that
the charge-sheet disclosed the claimant as 2nd witness and also
recites that the claimant also sustained injuries in the said accident.  
His
contention is that after due verification, Police considered that the claimant
sustained injuries in the accident. 
 It may be noticed that charge-sheet can
never be a ground to decide the merits of the case. 
 Charge-sheet is prepared on
the basis of the material available including Section 161 Cr.P.C Statements,
Medical Certificates and other available records.  
At any rate, in the charge-sheet, it was shown that one
Dr. P.Nagaraju, Chief Medical Officer, Government General Hospital, Anantapur,
who was cited as 6th witness (L.W.6), issued Wound Certificate of the claimant.  
Curiously, one Dr. M.Atmaram was examined as P.W.2, who claimed that he treated the claimant.  
The said Atmaram was not cited as a witness in the charge-sheet.  Thus, there is
no correlation between the charge-sheet and the evidence of the claimant as
P.W.1 and the evidence of P.W.2.  
The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is on par with
Ex.A-1 certified copy of the FIR and Ex.A-2 certified of the Wound Certificate,
which show that the accident occurred at about 10.00 p.m. whereas the claimant
was treated at about 07.00 p.m.  
The Tribunal therefore was perfectly justified
in concluding that the claimant did not sustain injuries in the said accident.

        5. I may also add that in the complaint, which was registered as FIR
lodged by one M.Razak Ahmed, 
there was no reference that the claimant was  travelling in the offending jeep.  
Thus, Exs.A-1 and A-2 certified copies of the
FIR and the Wound Certificate do not agree with the claim of the petitioner.

        6. In that view of the matter, the award of the Tribunal was perfectly
justified.  I therefore see no merits in this appeal.  This appeal accordingly
is dismissed.
No costs.
_____________________  
Dr. K.G.SHANKAR, J.  
26th November, 2013

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