Rent control case - Eviction petition not maintainable in the absence of land-lord and tenant relationship - Rent control case is filed with out having any registered sale deed for eviction - with out permission of original owner , no rent control case is to be filed - Appellate court found the dispute about the title raised by tenant is a bonafide - Rent control court has no jurisdiction to decided the title except whether the denial of title is bonafide or not - Revision court has no jurisdiction to reassess the entire evidence done by appellant court in the absence of blatant mistakes under sec.22 of Act - High court dismissed the revision = Vanumu Kondamma (died) per LRs.... petitioners Polavarapu Simhachalam... Respondent = Published in judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=10293

Rent control case - Eviction petition not maintainable in the absence of land-lord and tenant relationship - Rent control case is filed with out having any registered sale deed  for eviction - with out permission of original owner , no rent control case is to be filed - Appellate court found the dispute about the title raised by tenant is a bonafide - Rent control court has no jurisdiction to decided the title except whether the denial of title is bonafide or not - Revision court has no jurisdiction to reassess the entire evidence done by appellant court in the absence of blatant mistakes under sec.22 of Act - High court dismissed the revision =
The respondents-tenants filed counter in all the rent control cases taking
the same plea and denying that the 1st revision petitioner is the owner of the
petition schedule property.  They also denied that they took lease of the
property from the husband of the 1st revision petitioner.  
It is also contended
by the respondents that the property originally belongs to Kesanapalli Narasinga
Rao, who is the absolute owner of the property, from whom, the father of
respondent-tenants directly took lease of the property.  
They have also denied
that the 1st revision petitioner's husband purchased the property.  The
respondents-tenants also stated that the husband of the 1st revision petitioner
used to collect the ground rent as agent of Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao from all
the tenants under single receipt.  
It is also contended that the requirement of
the premises for personal occupation of the revision petitioners is not bona
fide.  It is also stated by the respondents-tenants that the Rent Control Court
has no jurisdiction with respect to vacant land since the respondents-tenants
have taken the land from Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao.  Hence, sought for dismissal
of the eviction petitions. =

 The Appellate Authority found
that since there is no registered sale deed in favour of the 1st revision
petitioner by her husband, she failed to prove her title to the petition
schedule property.  The Appellate Authority found that Ex.B.16, which is true
copy of the property tax demand register issued by the Municipal Corporation
shows that the house bearing D.No.26-14-4 with old Assessment No.8034 stands in  
the name of Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao.  The Appellate Authority basing on
Exs.A.11 and B.16, held that denial of title by the respondents-tenants is bona
fide. 
By relying on the evidence, the Appellate Court, which is final fact finding
Court, held that the denial of title and landlord and tenant relationship by the
respondents-tenants to be bona fide one.  
I cannot re-appreciate the same within
the revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act in view of the judgments
discussed above.  More so, the Rent Control Court cannot decide the title, only
it can find out whether the denial is bona fide or not.  It is not as if the 1st
revision petitioner is not without any remedy to evict the respondents, but he
has to approach the civil court and establish his title for evicting the
respondents-tenants.  
The jurisdiction of authorities under the Rent Controller
is limited to find out whether the denial of title of landlord by the
respondents-tenants is bona fide or not, they cannot make a roving enquiry of
the title aspect.

In view of the above facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that there is
no error committed by the Appellate Authority in allowing the appeals of the
respondents-tenants.

 Accordingly, all the civil revision petitions are dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.


THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY            

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.5660 of 2006 and batch  

dated:04-09-2013

Vanumu Kondamma (died) per LRs.... petitioners

Polavarapu Simhachalam... Respondent  

Counsel for the petitioners:Smt. P.Anjana Devi Satyanarayana

Counsel  for the Respondent:  Sri G.Ram Gopal


<Gist :

>Head Note:

?Cases referred:

1. 2003(6) ALD 84
2. AIR 1987 SC 2028
3. AIR 2002 SC 67
4. 1994) 4 SCC 422
5. 2008(4) ALT 96
6. 1996(3) ALD 650
7. 2004(6) ALD 161
8. 2002) 3 SCC 626
9. 2005(4) ALD 45
10. 2012(1) ALT 470
11. 2010(1) ALT 363
12. 1998(1) ALD 224
13. 1995(2) ALT 61
14. 2008(4) ALD 586
15. 2002(1) SCC 176

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.RAJASHEKER REDDY        

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos.5660 of 2006,  
2453 /2007, 2428 /2008, 3661 /2008, 925 /2008,
924 /2008, 474 /2007, 1162 /2007, 1180 /2007,
1277 /2007, 1294 /2007, 1296 /2007

COMMON  ORDER:    

        All these civil revision petitions are disposed of by this common order,
since the issue involved in these cases is common, the landlord is the same in
all the cases and all the premises form part of one property.
       
        The facts of the case, which are necessary for disposal of these revision
petitions, are as follows:
        The revision petitioner No.1 filed rent control cases against the
respondents-tenants stating that she is the owner of the petition schedule
property bearing D.No.26-14-4/1 to 26-14-4/14.  It is her case that her husband
originally took lease of site from Smt.K.Annapurnamma, wife of Kalidas in the
year 1954.  Thereafter, he constructed two rows of buildings.  Later after some
time, the husband of the 1st revision petitioner purchased the property for
Rs.1,600/- under a registered sale deed.  Thus, the husband of the 1st revision
petitioner became the owner, and after his death, the 1st revision petitioner
became the owner of the property.  The 1st revision petitioner is collecting
rents from the respondents-tenants, the rent is stated to be Rs.100/- per month.
The revision petitioners 2 and 3 were added as legal representatives, since the
1st revision petitioner died after disposal of the R.C.As. by the Appellate
Authority.

        It is the case of the revision petitioners that the respondents-tenants
paid rents upto November, 1993.  
The 1st revision petitioner demanded the
respondents-tenants to vacate the premises in November, 1993 for her personal
occupation, then the respondents-tenants stopped paying rents and filed
O.S.No.1314 of 1993 on the file of the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge,
Visakhapatnam for permanent injunction restraining the revision petitioners from
evicting the tenants except under due process of law.  
It is also stated that
the 1st revision petitioner is having two daughters who are residing elsewhere
and she required the premises for her accommodation and also for her daughters.
Hence, sought for eviction of the respondents herein-tenants.

        The respondents-tenants filed counter in all the rent control cases taking
the same plea and denying that the 1st revision petitioner is the owner of the
petition schedule property.  They also denied that they took lease of the
property from the husband of the 1st revision petitioner.  It is also contended
by the respondents that the property originally belongs to Kesanapalli Narasinga
Rao, who is the absolute owner of the property, from whom, the father of
respondent-tenants directly took lease of the property.  They have also denied
that the 1st revision petitioner's husband purchased the property.  The
respondents-tenants also stated that the husband of the 1st revision petitioner
used to collect the ground rent as agent of Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao from all
the tenants under single receipt.  It is also contended that the requirement of
the premises for personal occupation of the revision petitioners is not bona
fide.  It is also stated by the respondents-tenants that the Rent Control Court
has no jurisdiction with respect to vacant land since the respondents-tenants
have taken the land from Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao.  Hence, sought for dismissal
of the eviction petitions.

        In all the rent control cases, the case of the revision petitioners and
the respondents-tenants is the same and the points framed by the Rent Controller
are also same, the evidence is almost same in all the rent control cases.
Basing on the pleadings, the Rent Controller framed the following points for
consideration:-
1) Whether there is landlord and tenant relationship between the 1st revision
petitioner and respondents-tenants ?
2) Whether the denial of title of the 1st revision petitioner herein over the
schedule property in the rent control cases by the respondents-tenants is bona
fide ?

Basing on the oral and documentary evidence, the Rent Controller allowed all
eviction petitions.  Against the same, the respondents-tenants filed appeals
before the Appellate Authority.  The Appellate Authority also framed the same
points as framed by the Rent Controller and allowed the appeals filed by the
respondents-tenants by setting aside the eviction order and held that the denial
of title by the respondents-tenants is bona fide and also held that landlord and
tenant relationship between the 1st revision petitioner and the respondents-
tenants is not proved.  Challenging the same, the revision petitioners filed the
present revision petitions.

Learned counsel for the revision petitioners, Smt.P.Anjana Devi Satyanarayana,
contended that the respondents-tenants themselves admitted that they were paying
rents to the husband of the 1st revision petitioner from 1955 onwards, and
thereafter to 1st revision petitioner, as such, as per the definition of the
'landlord', a person receiving the rent is also the landlord under Section 2(vi)
of the A.P.Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short
'the Act').  She also contended that the oral evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and
Exs.A.1 to A.12, which includes special notices issued by Visakhapatnam
Municipal Corporation, in the name of husband of the 1st revision petitioner
Vanumu Sanyasi and the revision preferred by late Sanyasi and tax passbook, and
all these documents establish that since the year 1955 Vanumu Sanyasi has paid
taxes to the petition schedule property, which goes to show that the husband of
the 1st revision petitioner is having title and after his death, 1st revision
petitioner is the owner.  She also contended that person receiving rent can
maintain eviction petition, as he is landlord within the meaning of Section
2(vi) of the Act.  She placed reliance on the judgments in V.Padmavattamma v.
Pala Rathnam1 and Smt. Shanti Sharma and others v. Smt. Ved Prabha and others2.  
She also contended that a person need not necessarily be the owner, in a vast
majority of cases an owner will be a landlord but in many cases a person other
than an owner may as well be a landlord, it may be that in a given case the
landlord is also an owner but a landlord under the Act need not be the owner.
She placed reliance on the judgment in K.D.Dewan v. Harbhajan S. Parihar3.  She
also contended that earlier CRPs filed are not decided on merits, hence the plea
of res judicata is not applicable and the present CRPs are not hit by principles
of res judicata as earlier CRPs are filed in the name of the 1st revision
petitioner, inadvertently as she passed away at that time.  She placed reliance
on the judgments in Krishan Lal v. State of J & K4 and Mothukuri Ranga Rao and
another V. Royyala Laxminarayana and others5.  She also contended that the Rent
Controller cannot go into the title but only jural relationship can be examined
by the Rent Controller.  She also contended that the judgment relied on by the
Appellate Authority in Vasant Rao Ankilkar v. Nalini Bai Joshi6, wherein it is
held that the person receiving the rent cannot maintain eviction petition
without the consent of the landlord and the same is not applicable since the 1st
revision petitioner has filed the eviction petition on the ground that she is
the landlord.  She also contended that the judgment cited by the learned counsel
for the respondents-tenants in S.Saraswathi v. Y.Laxminarayana7 is in favour of
the revision petitioners.  She also contended that the case of the revision
petitioners falls within the scope of revisional jurisdiction, since the
interpretation of definition of landlord is the issue in the present cases.  She
also contended that the Appellate Authority misread the evidence and came to
wrong conclusion by holding that dispute raised by respondents-tenants is bona
fide.  She also contended that this Court can allow the revision petitions
within the scope of revisional jurisdiction as held by the Supreme Court in
Harshavardhan Chokkani v. Bhupendra N. Patel and others8.  She also contended
that tenants have claimed that they have taken the site from Kesanapalli
Narasinga Rao on lease and constructed the premises, but the said Kesanapalli
Narasinga Rao as 1st defendant filed written statement in O.S.No.1314 of 1993
filed by the respondents-tenants for injunction, stating that he does not know
the respondents-tenants and that they have not taken the petition schedule
property on lease from him, which is marked as Ex.A.11 in all the rent control
cases, Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao has not supported the case of the respondents-
tenants, which goes to show that the claim made by the respondents-tenants is
false.  She also contended that the respondents-tenants admitted that husband of
the 1st revision petitioner as well as the 1st revision petitioner was receiving
rents, but they failed to prove that as they are receiving rents on behalf of
Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao, as such, they go to show that there is landlord and
tenant relationship.  She also contended that in view of Exs.A.1 to A.12, the
title of the 1st revision petitioner is proved.  She also contended that Ex.B.16
is copy of alleged assessment extract in respect of No.2216 in the name of
K.Narasinga Rao, but the author of the said document is not examined, and as
such, it cannot be given any credence.  She also contended that assessment
number from the tax passbook marked as Ex.A.9 is 2218, whereas in Ex.B.16, it
shows as 2216 and the assessment number is not tallying.  She also contended
that if K.Narasinga Rao was the owner and he has not filed any rent control case
or suit against the 1st revision petitioner during her lifetime or subsequent to
her death.  She further contended that the said K.Narasinga Rao has not filed
any petition to implead him as a party in RCCs or RCAs or in these CRPs, but no
prudent landlord would wait 30 years without taking steps for eviction of the
tenant on the ground of willful default in payment of rents.  She also contended
that as per the respondents-tenants, K.Narasinga Rao, from whom they have taken
the lease, is said to be aged 40 to 45 years by the time evidence was adduced in
RCC No.348 of 1995, since the respondents-tenants contended that they have taken
on lease from K.Narasinga Rao in 1955 i.e., about 42 years back from the date of
evidence, as such, the age of said K.Narasinga Rao would be 2 or 3 years by the
time of taking the land on lease, which cannot be believed.  She further
contended that in the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents-
tenants in Rajendra Prasad v. Narsing Prasad and another9, wherein it is held
that no roving enquiry can be made by the Rent Controller in regard to the title
of premises, and the said decision is in favour of the revision petitioners.
She further contended that the same was observed by the Rent Controller in the
present case.  She also contended that the decision relied on by the learned
counsel for the respondents-tenants in M.Sarojini Devi (died) per L.Rs. v. Jugal
Kishore Sanghi10 has no application to the facts of the present case, since the
landlord in that case has collected rents on behalf of Dharmasala earlier and
the tenant claimed title.  She further contended that in the judgment cited by
the learned counsel for the respondents-tenants in Avulapalle Mallikarjuna and
others v. N.T.Chengalarayappa11, wherein the tenant never paid rents to the
alleged landlord and the tenant claiming title and hence there is no landlord
and tenant relationship in that case and the same decision is not applicable to
the facts of the present case.

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents-tenants Sri
G.Ramgopal in all the petitions contended that the respondents-tenants have
taken the open site on lease from K.Narasinga Rao and constructed the petition
schedule property, the husband of the 1st revision petitioner used to collect
ground rent, and after his death, the 1st revision petitioner has been
collecting rents on behalf of K.Narasinga Rao.  He further contended that the
revision petitioners failed to substantiate that there is landlord and tenant
relationship between the revision petitioners and the respondents-tenants and no
independent witness is examined and no document is filed to that effect.  He
also contended that the Rent Controller in para-16 of the order by referring to
Exs.A.1 to A.12, observed that though none of the said documents establishes the
title of revision petitioner or her husband to the suit schedule premises, but
basing on the assessments relating to Municipal taxes and further referring to
Ex.A.11 filed by K.Narasinga Rao in O.S.No.1314 of 1993, proceeded to pass order
of eviction of the tenants by observing that denial of either the relationship
of landlord and tenant or the ownership of schedule property is not bona fide.
He also contended that earlier revision petitions were dismissed, as such, the
present CRPs are hit by principles of res judicata.  He also contended that when
there is bona fide title dispute, the Rent Controller cannot pass order of the
eviction and the person claiming title has to approach civil court.  He also
contended that the respondents only stated that the husband of the 1st revision
petitioner used to collect rents on behalf of K.Narsinga Rao and without
permission of the landlord, they cannot maintain eviction petition.  He placed
reliance on the judgment in Vasant Rao Ankilkar case (6 supra).  He also
contended that whenever the landlord establishes title and the tenant fails to
prove the title pleaded by him, such a person cannot be construed to be a tenant
under the landlord.  He placed reliance on the judgment in Kedar Bhatia v.
Lingarkar Panduranga Rao and others12.  He also contended that when the title of
the 1st revision petitioner is denied, it is for the revision petitioners to
prove the title, but in the present case, the Rent Controller himself observed
that the revision petitioners could not prove the title, as such, denial of the
title by the respondents become bona fide.  He also relied on the judgment in
K.P.Janakiram v. K.Suguna Bai13.  He further contended that the jurisdiction of
Rent Controller is limited to decide whether denial of title or claim made by
tenant is bona fide, it cannot decide existence of title with finality.  He
placed reliance on the judgments in Rajendra Prasad case (9 supra), S.Saraswathi
case (7 supra) and M.Sarojini Devi case (10 supra).  He also contended that
every person in possession of premises, even without title; cannot become a
tenant automatically, of any one, including that of the rightful owner, while
possession can come into existence with unilateral acts of parties, a tenancy is
the one, which would emerge only with the consent of parties.  He further
contended that unless tenancy is established, there is no basis to eviction
order.  He relied on the judgment in Avulapalle Mallikarjuna case (11 supra).
Finally, he contended that scope of revisional jurisdiction is limited and this
Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act
cannot re-appreciate the evidence and the revisional jurisdiction under Section
22 of the Act cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate court.  He
further contended that in examining the legality and propriety of the order
under challenge, what is required to be seen by the High Court is whether it is
in violation of any statutory provision or a binding precedent or suffers from
misreading of the evidence or omission to consider relevant clinching evidence
or where the interference drawn from the facts proved is such that no reasonable
person could arrive at or the like, and it is only in such situations that
interference by the High Court in revision in a finding of fact will be
justified and mere possibility of a different view is no ground to interfere in
exercise of revisional power.  He relied on the judgments in Mohammed Abdul
Rahman and others v. B.Manorama and another14, Harshavardhan Chokkani case (8  
supra) and N.Prabhakar Rao v. J.R.Ramesh Kumar alias Rameshji15.  He also  
contended that the person receiving the rent can maintain eviction petition only
with the permission of the landlord.  He also relied on the judgment in Vasant
Rao Ankilkar case (6 supra).

In view of the rival contentions, it is to be seen that whether the order of
eviction passed by the Rent Controller is right, whether the Appellate Authority
is justified in setting aside the order of eviction passed by the Rent
Controller.

In this case, the Rent Controller found that denial of title by the respondents-
tenant is not bona fide.  The Rent Controller also observed that the 1st
revision petitioner failed to establish her title.  But basing on some documents
regarding assessment of municipal taxes and also relying on Ex.A.11 written
statement filed by K.Narasinga Rao in O.S.No.1314 of 1993, held that the tenants
paid rents to the husband of the 1st revision petitioner and also to the
revision petitioners after her death.  The Rent Controller has not gone into the
aspect of willful default or bona fide requirement of the 1st revision
petitioner, as it found the denial of ownership and denial of landlord and
tenant relationship were not bona fide.  On the other hand, the appellate
authority after scrutinizing the evidence of P.Ws.1 & 2 and Exs.A.1 to A.12 came
to the conclusion that the assessment numbers and house numbers are not tallying 
with the petition schedule property.  As such, held that 1st revision petitioner
could not prove the title or landlord and tenant relationship.  The Appellate
Authority also found that the revision petitioner could not maintain the
eviction petition without the consent of the landlord.  The Appellate Authority
also has not believed the version of the 1st revision petitioner that she has
proved that she is the owner of the property.  The Appellate Authority found
that since there is no registered sale deed in favour of the 1st revision
petitioner by her husband, she failed to prove her title to the petition
schedule property.  The Appellate Authority found that Ex.B.16, which is true
copy of the property tax demand register issued by the Municipal Corporation
shows that the house bearing D.No.26-14-4 with old Assessment No.8034 stands in  
the name of Kesanapalli Narasinga Rao.  The Appellate Authority basing on
Exs.A.11 and B.16, held that denial of title by the respondents-tenants is bona
fide.  The Appellate Authority also relied on the evidence of P.W.2 and came to
the conclusion that she was unable to show anything about the affairs of the
petition schedule property.  The Appellate Authority also found that non-failure
of respondents to prove their title cannot improve the case of the revision
petitioners, since the 1st revision petitioner has to independently establish
the title to the suit schedule property.

In K.D.Dewan (3 supra), it is held that a person must be a landlord within the
meaning of the terms in Section 2(c) his being owner of the premises is neither
a pre-requisite nor a relevant factor.
In V.Padmavattamma (1 supra), it is held that a person who is receiving rent or
who is entitled to receive rent of a building, whether on his own account, or on
behalf of another or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or
guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if
the building were to let out to a tenant is a landlord.
In Smt. Shanti Sharma and others (1 supra), it is held that though a person is
not the owner of the land, but the person who constructed the building structure
thereon is owner, as such he could maintain eviction petition.  It is further
held that that a person who is receiving the rents is included in the definition
of landlord.
In Krishan Lal (4 supra), it is held that when the matter is not decided on
merits, principle of res judicata has no application.
In Mothukuri Ranga Rao and another (5 supra), it is held that principles of res
judicata applies only when the earlier matter has been heard and finally
disposed of by such Court, and in that case it is also held that mere dismissal
of earlier petition for default, does not operate as res judicata in subsequent
proceedings.

In the present case, the Appellate Authority found that the husband of the 1st
revision petitioner and the 1st revision petitioner were collecting rent, but
since they are receiving rent on behalf of K.Narasinga Rao and the eviction
petition is not maintainable without the permission of the landlord as laid down
in the decision in Vasant Rao Ankilkar (6 supra).
In Kedar Bhatia (12 supra), it is held that just because tenant failed to prove
his title and the landlord establishes his title, such a person shall not be
construed to be a tenant under the landlord.
In K.P.Janakiram (13 supra), it is held that unless the tenant and landlord
relationship is established between the landlord and tenant, eviction petition
cannot be maintained.
In Rajendra Prasad (9 supra), it is held that the jurisdiction of Rent
Controller is limited to decide whether denial or claim by the tenant is bona
fide or not and it cannot decide existence of title with finality.
In M.Sarojini Devi (10 supra), it is held that the Rent Controller need not make
a roving enquiry with regard to the title of the landlord, however when the
title of the landlord is disputed, the Rent Controller has to decide whether
dispute of title is bona fide or not.
In Avulapalle Mallikarjuna case (11 supra), it is held that every person in
possession of premises, even without title; cannot become a tenant
automatically, of any one, including that of the rightful owner, and while
possession can come into existence with unilateral acts of parties, a tenancy is
the one, which would emerge only with the consent of parties and the consent can
be expressed orally, or in writing, and until the tenancy, that too, of a
particular nature was not established by the landlord, there was no basis for
the trial Court to order eviction of the tenant.
In Mohammed Abdul Rahman (14 supra), it is held in para-5 as follows:
"It is now well settled that jurisdiction of High Court under Section 22 of the
Act is revisional jurisdiction. Though the power is a little wider than
revisional jurisdiction, it is not equal to appellate jurisdiction.  A limited
scrutiny is to see that order passed by appellate authority is not vitiated by
illegality, irregularity or impropriety.  Mere possibility of a different
conclusion in background facts does not enable High Court to reverse finding of
appellate authority."

In Harshavardhan Chokkani case (8 supra), it is held in para-7 as follows:
"There can be no controversy about the position that the power of the High Court
under Section 22 of the Act is wider than the power under Section 115 CPC.
Nonetheless, the High Court is exercising the revisional power, which in its
very nature is a truncated power.  The width of the powers of the revisional
court cannot be equated with the powers of the appellate court.  In examining
the legality and the propriety of the order under challenge, what is required to
be seen by the High Court is whether it is in violation of any statutory
provision or a binding precedent or suffers from misreading of the evidence or
omission to consider relevant clinching evidence or where the inference drawn
from the facts proved is such that no reasonable person could arrive at or the
like.  It is only in such situations that interference by the High Court in
revision in a finding of fact will be justified.  Mere possibility of a
different view is no ground to interfere in exercise of revisional power.  From
the above discussion, it is clear that none of the aforementioned reasons exist
in this case to justify interference by the High Court."


In view of the above discussion and the judgments relied on by both sides, it is
found that the Appellate Authority as well as Rent Control Court held that the
1st revision petitioner could not prove her title, but the Rent Controller
relied on some of the municipal assessments, held that the 1st revision
petitioner has proved her case and ordered eviction.  Whereas, the Appellate
Authority found that the municipal assessments are not tallying with the
municipal numbers of suit schedule premises and came to the conclusion that the
1st revision petitioner has not established her title to the suit schedule
property.  The Appellate Authority also relied on Ex.A.11 and also Ex.B.16, and
held that denial of title by respondents is bona fide.

By relying on the evidence, the Appellate Court, which is final fact finding
Court, held that the denial of title and landlord and tenant relationship by the
respondents-tenants to be bona fide one.
I cannot re-appreciate the same within
the revisional jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act in view of the judgments
discussed above.  More so, the Rent Control Court cannot decide the title, only
it can find out whether the denial is bona fide or not.  It is not as if the 1st
revision petitioner is not without any remedy to evict the respondents, but he
has to approach the civil court and establish his title for evicting the
respondents-tenants.
The jurisdiction of authorities under the Rent Controller
is limited to find out whether the denial of title of landlord by the
respondents-tenants is bona fide or not, they cannot make a roving enquiry of
the title aspect.

In view of the above facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that there is
no error committed by the Appellate Authority in allowing the appeals of the
respondents-tenants.

 Accordingly, all the civil revision petitions are dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in all the revisions, shall
stand disposed of.

____________________  
A.RAJASHEKER REDDY, J    
Date: 04-09-2013

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Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) reads as follows: “For Specific performance of a contract: Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused.”= the apex Court in Ahmmadsahb Abdul Mila vs. Bibijan[1], wherein it was held that the date fixed for the performance of the contract should be a specified date in the calendar, and submitted that since no specified date in the calendar for performance of the contract is mentioned in the agreement of sale, the second limb of Article 54 of the Limitation Act is applicable. ; whether the suit is barred by limitation or not becomes a tribal issue and when there is a tribal issue, the lower Court ought not to have rejected the plaint at the threshold. In view of the same, order, dated 27-01-2012, in CFR.No.90 of 2012, passed by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ongole, (FAC) Senior Civil Judge, Darsi, is, hereby, set aside. The Appeal is allowed accordingly.

Or.18, rule 17 and sec.151 C.P.C - petition filed for reopen and examination of the executant of Ex.A1 the sale deed to fill up the lacuna in evidence pointed out at the time of arguments not maintainable = Shaik Gousiya Begum. ..Petitioner Shaik Hussan and others.... Respondents = Published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/qrydisp.aspx?filename=10515

Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. plaintiff has to prove his title and possession how he came into possession prima faice , in the absence of the same, not entitled for interim injunction = The questions as to whether the lease deed was properly stamped and whether the stamp paper on which it was typed can be said to have been procured through proper source, need to be dealt with at the stage of trial.; The suit filed by the 1st respondent, is the one for injunction simplicitor in respect of an item of immovable property. He has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Basically, it was for the 1st respondent to establish that he is in possession and enjoyment of the property and that he derived the same through lawful means, particularly when he did not contend that he encroached upon the property.= assumptions of facts against to the contents of crucial third party by misreading the same- it is just un-understandable as to how the trial Court gathered the impression that Anuradha stated that there was a meeting of Board of Directors, where it was decided to lease the property to the appellants. - the trial Court itself was not clear as to whether the appellant is the lessee or a Manager or is working under any other arrangement. - The important findings that have a bearing upon the valuable rights of the parties cannot be based upon such uncertain and unverified facts. One of the cardinal principles in the matter of examining the applications filed under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC is that a party claiming that relief must come to the Court with clean hands. Prima facie, we find that there are no bona fides, much less consistency on the part of the 1st respondent, in his effort to get the order of temporary injunction. The trial Court has misread the evidence and misinterpreted the facts borne out by the record.