a chronic litigant, who is an expert to drag on the pending proceedings in the lower Court - not entitled for one more opportunity to lead evidence - PETITIONER RESPONDENT VANDANAPU SURYA PRAKASA RAO, KHM DIST VS SRI DURGA KALA MANDIR, KOTHAGUDEM, KHM DIST & ANO - hc.ap.nic.in/csis/MainInfo.=CRP&mno=1670&year=2013

a chronic litigant, who is an expert to drag on the pending proceedings in the lower Court - not entitled for one more opportunity to lead evidence =
The plaintiffs’ evidence was over more than two years ago.  Since then the first defendant was successful in dragging the matter without he entering into the witness box or leading any evidence on his behalf.  The lower Court closed the first defendant’s evidence twice, but was kind enough to reopen the matter and give opportunity to the first defendant on two earlier occasions.  In spite of it, the first defendant did not lead his evidence.  Now he pleads eye operation.  It cannot be a passport for not leading evidence eternally.  The suit is of the year 2002.  The first defendant’s intention appears to be to drag on the suit either eternally or to the extent possible.  His conduct is not bonafide in Court and is vitiated by oblique motive.  The lower Court rightly refused request of the petitioner to reopen the matter and to give opportunity to him to lead evidence.  The order passed by the lower Court in the circumstances is legal and proper.

CRP 1670 / 2013

CRPSR 9537 / 2013
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
VANDANAPU SURYA PRAKASA RAO, KHM DIST  VSSRI DURGA KALA MANDIR, KOTHAGUDEM, KHM DIST & ANO
PET.ADV. : KOWTURU VINAYA KUMARRESP.ADV. : 
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 227DISTRICT:  KHAMMAM
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NOs.1670 AND 1673 OF 2013

COMMON ORDER:
  The lower Court rightly refused to grant one more opportunity to the first defendant/petitioner herein to lead his evidence.  The first defendant appears to be a chronic litigant, who is an expert to drag on the pending proceedings in the lower Court.  The suit is filed by the first respondent/plaintiff for recovery of money payable by the first defendant in connection with lease transaction.  The second defendant /second respondent is surety for the first defendant.  The plaintiffs’ evidence was over more than two years ago.  Since then the first defendant was successful in dragging the matter without he entering into the witness box or leading any evidence on his behalf.  The lower Court closed the first defendant’s evidence twice, but was kind enough to reopen the matter and give opportunity to the first defendant on two earlier occasions.  In spite of it, the first defendant did not lead his evidence.  Now he pleads eye operation.  It cannot be a passport for not leading evidence eternally.  The suit is of the year 2002.  The first defendant’s intention appears to be to drag on the suit either eternally or to the extent possible.  His conduct is not bonafide in Court and is vitiated by oblique motive.  The lower Court rightly refused request of the petitioner to reopen the matter and to give opportunity to him to lead evidence.  The order passed by the lower Court in the circumstances is legal and proper.
In the result, both the revision petitions are dismissed.

____________________
SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU, J
16th April,2013.
Dv/Rns

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