The petitioner-A2 filed the two petitions, one under Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1873, to send Ex.P29-undertaking to the Government Examiner on questioned documents, for the purpose of comparing the signature of the petitioner on the said document with the admitted signatures available on various exhibits and to give his opinion and the other under Section 243(2) Cr.P.C., to issue witness summons to the Government examiner on questioned documents, so as to examine him as defence witness to depose about the contents of his opinion relating to Ex.P29, respectively. The trial Court dismissed both the said petitions. = The prosecution version is that Ex.P29 was submitted by the petitioner to the bank along with Exs.P2 to P6 on the same day. The petitioner was only disputing his signature on Ex.P29. Moreover, if really the petitioner disputes the signature on Ex.P29, as rightly held by the learned trial Court, he should have cross examined the prosecution witnesses on the said aspect, but the petitioner did not cross examine any of the witnesses for the prosecution suggesting to them that the signature on Ex.P29 does not belong to him and it is forged. The learned trial Court expressed its view that the petitions were made only for the purpose of protracting the case before the trial Court and there are no merits in the petitions. Having regard to the afore stated circumstances, the learned trial Court is right in dismissing the petitions filed by the petitioner under Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act and under Section 243(2) Cr.P.C. The orders passed by the learned trial Court do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.


THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R. KANTHA RAO


CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.1756 AND 1757 OF 2013


COMMON ORDER :


                 Heard Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/A-2 and Sri P. Kesava Rao, learned Special Standing Counsel for CBI.
            These two Criminal Petitions are filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the orders dated 22.02.2013 passed by the Principal Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam, in Crl.M.P.Nos.1002 and 1003 of 2012 respectively in C.C.No.23 of 2005.
The petitioner-A2 filed the two petitions, one under Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1873, to send Ex.P29-undertaking to the Government Examiner on questioned documents, for the purpose of comparing the signature of the petitioner on the said document with the admitted signatures available on various exhibits and to give his opinion and the other under Section 243(2) Cr.P.C., to issue witness summons to the Government examiner on questioned documents, so as to examine him as defence witness to depose about the contents of his opinion relating to Ex.P29, respectively.  The trial Court dismissed both the said petitions. 
According to the prosecution, the petitioner, along with Exs.P2 to P6, submitted Ex.P29-undertaking to the Bank on 24.04.2002.  The undertaking was written on a stamp paper, which was purchased on 24.04.2002 in the name of State Bank of Hyderabad, Arandalpet, Guntur, by one P.Chandra Mohan (the petitioner herein).  The trial was completed and the arguments were to be heard before the learned trial Court.  At that time, the petitioner filed the above two applications to send Ex.P29 for comparison of the signature with that of the admitted signatures by the hand writing expert and for his opinion and to issue witness summons to the Government Examiner on questioned documents, so as to examine him as defence witness to depose about the contents of his opinion relating to Ex.P29.
The prosecution version is that Ex.P29 was submitted by the petitioner to the bank along with Exs.P2 to P6 on the same day.  The petitioner was only disputing his signature on Ex.P29.  Moreover, if really the petitioner disputes the signature on Ex.P29, as rightly held by the learned trial Court, he should have cross examined the prosecution witnesses on the said aspect, but the petitioner did not cross examine any of the witnesses for the prosecution suggesting to them that the signature on Ex.P29 does not belong to him and it is forged.
The learned trial Court expressed its view that the petitions were made only for the purpose of protracting the case before the trial Court and there are no merits in the petitions.
Having regard to the afore stated circumstances, the learned trial Court is right in dismissing the petitions filed by the petitioner under Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act and under Section 243(2) Cr.P.C.  The orders passed by the learned trial Court do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Both the Criminal Petitions are devoid of merits and are, accordingly, dismissed.  Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand dismissed.


_________________________
                                                                    JUSTICE R. KANTHA RAO

11/03/2013
Gvl/RRB









































THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R. KANTHA RAO






























CRIMINAL PETITION Nos.1756 AND 1757 OF 2013

















DATE:  11.03.2013.


Gvl/RRB





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