injunction =a person in possession of the property can obtain permanent injunction on the basis of his possession if he has got better title to the suit property than that of the other parties. = even after obtaining Ex.B-1 registered sale deed, no steps are taken by the 1st defendant to mutate his name in the revenue records. It is also noticed from the contention of the 1st defendant’s counsel that it is only after filing of the suit, steps were taken by the 1st defendant for mutation. Therefore, the alleged admission of P.W-1 about Chakali Ramayya and Chakali Bichaiah having equal shares cannot have any bearing. 5) In M.Kallappa Setty V. M.V.Lakshminarayana Rao[1], it was held by the Supreme Court that a person in possession of the property can obtain permanent injunction on the basis of his possession if he has got better title to the suit property than that of the other parties. In this case, the revenue title deeds etc, standing in favour of the plaintiffs and also Pahanis prior to filing of the suit disclose possession of the suit lands with the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs having better title to the suit lands than that of the defendants. I find no error or legal error in the decision of the lower appellate Court. I also find that no substantial questions of law arise for determination in this second appeal. 6) In the result, the second appeal is dismissed.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRAPRADESH
AT HYDERABAD

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

SECOND APPEAL No.195 of 2013

DATE: 18.03.2013


Between:

Gorukanti Laxmaiah
                                                                                                …… Appellant
And

Bommagouni Veeraiah @ Veerender and others
   ...Respondents
SA 195 / 2013SASR 7481 / 2013
PETITIONERRESPONDENT
GORUKANTI LAXMAIAH, NALGONDA DIST  VSBOMMAGOUNI VEERAIAH @ VEERENDER, NALGONDA DIST & 6 OTHRS
PET.ADV. :  PRAVIN KUMARRESP.ADV. : 
SUBJECT: PERPETUAL INJUNCTION (IMMOVABLE PROPERTY)DISTRICT:  NALGONDA
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU
SECOND APPEAL No.195 of 2013
JUDGMENT :
        The so-called substantial questions of law which were noted in memorandum of grounds of second appeal and urged during the course of arguments by the appellant’s counsel are as follows:
“(a) Whether the non consideration of the admissions of P.W-1 that Chakali Ramaiah and Chakali Buchaiah pattadars having equal shares sold under the registered sale deed under Ex.B1, dated 04.02.1988 to the defendant No.1 is a substantial question of law.
(b) Whether the suit filed by plaintiff for perpetual injunction is maintainable when P.W-1 admitted in his examination suit property between himself and other plaintiffs and are is separate portions of land in suit lands evidence by Exs.A-1 to A-6.
(c) Whether registration document in Ex.B-1 dated 04.02.1988 is a notice to the plaintiffs under the provisions of Section 3 Explanation-I of Transfer of Property Act.”
        2) This second appeal arises out of a suit for permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule property.  
The plaint schedule property consists of Ac.1-14 guntas in S.No.29, Ac.0-23 guntas in S.No.30, Ac.2-03 guntas in S.No.31, Ac.0.35 guntas in S.No.32, Ac.0-35½ guntas in S.No.33 and Ac.0-25 guntas in S.No.34 totalling Ac.6-15½ guntas of dry land in Padamatisomaram village, Bibinagar Mandal, Nalgonda District within the specified boundaries in the plaint schedule.  
It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that the suit is bad for non-giving of boundaries under Order VII Rule 3 C.P.C. as there are no separate boundaries given for each of the extents.  
According to the plaintiffs, the lands are within the above specified boundaries.  
No material is placed to show that there is plea in the written statement on non-compliance of Order VII Rule 3 C.P.C in this case, much less any evidence on this aspect of the matter and this point was also argued before the lower appellate Court.
        3) The plaintiffs based their claim for permanent injunction on Exs.A-1 to A-7 revenue title deeds and pattedar passbooks standing in the names of the plaintiffs 1 to 3 and husband of the 4th plaintiff separately for different extents of lands in the above survey numbers, but with different sub-letters.   According to the plaintiffs, they are members of one family and they are jointly entitled for the suit land.  
The plaintiffs also filed Exs.A-8 to A-10 pahanis and A-11 Khasra Pahani.  Exs.A-8 to A-10 are for the period prior to filing of the suit in the trial Court.  
Ex.A-11 relates to the year 1954-55 prior to filing of the suit. 
In Phanis, the plaintiffs’ family members are shown to be in possession of the suit lands.
        4) It is incorrect to contend that the lower appellate Court did not consider Ex.B-1 registered sale deed dated 04.02.1998 in favour of the first defendant at all.  
The lower Court after  examining Ex.B-1 in detail came to the conclusion that on the basis of Ex.B-9 protected tenancy record, names of Bommagouni Sayanna and Chakali Bichaiah were cancelled in view ofRajinama petition submitted in file bearing Nos.4912/55/B4 and 5269/55/B4 respectively.  
The lower appellate Court also pointed out that even after obtaining Ex.B-1 registered sale deed, no steps are taken by the 1st defendant to mutate his name in the revenue records.  
It is also noticed from the contention of the 1st defendant’s counsel that it is only after filing of the suit, steps were taken by the 1st defendant for mutation.  
Therefore, the alleged admission of P.W-1 about Chakali Ramayya and Chakali Bichaiah having equal shares cannot have any bearing.
        5) In M.Kallappa Setty V. M.V.Lakshminarayana Rao[1],       
it was held by the Supreme Court that 
a person in possession of the property can obtain permanent injunction on the basis of his possession if he has got better title to the suit property than that of the other parties.  
In this case, the revenue title deeds etc, standing in favour of the plaintiffs and also Pahanis prior to filing of the suit disclose possession of the suit lands with the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs having better title to the suit lands than that of the defendants.  
I find no error or legal error in the decision of the lower appellate Court.  I also find that no substantial questions of law arise for determination in this second appeal.
        6) In the result, the second appeal is dismissed.


_______________________________
SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU, J
March 18, 2013
ksh



[1] AIR 1972 Supreme Court 2299

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