the pendency of a civil suit is no bar for criminal proceedings.It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the dispute is purely a civil dispute and that the FIR consequently is liable to be quashed. As rightly submitted by Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing the Public Prosecutor, the pendency of a civil suit is no bar for criminal proceedings. The 2nd respondent initiated criminal proceedings under Sections 420, 427, 454 and 506 IPC. The dispute, as already pointed out by me, can be resolved through evidence only. Consequently, this petition deserves to be dismissed.


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR      

Criminal Petition No.10815 of 2009

23-8-2012

Rakesh Gupta and another      

State of AP, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad,
Through Station House Officer, Mahankali PS, Secunderabad
P.N.M.Raju, Holding GPA on behalf of N.Suryanarayana Raju De facto Complainant

Counsel for Petitioners:  Smt. Pushpinder Kaur

Counsel for the 1st Respondent: Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, Advocate, Rep.the
Public Prosecutor,High Court of A.P.

Counsel for the 2nd respondent: None

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
   Nil.

Order:

        The 2nd respondent was served with notice, but no one appeared for the 2nd
respondent.  This petition is disposed of without hearing the 2nd respondent.
The petitioners, who are the accused 1 and 2 in Crime No.274 of 2009 on the file
of Mahankali Police Station, Secunderabad, seek for the quashment of the FIR.
The 2nd respondent laid a complaint before the Police alleging that the
petitioners have been interfering with the premises bearing Flat No.207, 2nd
Floor, Chandralok Complex, Secunderabad, wherefrom the petitioners have been
attempting to conduct their business.

        2. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners
have been running their business in premises bearing Flat No.220, 2nd Floor,
Chandralok Complex.  The petitioners are partners and allegedly have been
conducting business under the name and style of M/s. Appar Procon.  The basic
dispute thus is whether the premises is Flat No.207 or Flat No.220.  This is
a question of fact.  I am afraid that it cannot be decided whether the
petitioners are in Flat No.220 or Flat No.207 unless evidence is let in before
the trial Court.  Consequently, I consider that the present petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C is misconceived.

        3. It would appear that in fact, the petitioners approached Police
alleging that the 2nd respondent had been interfering with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over their property and that the
Police directed the parties to approach a Civil Court.  The learned counsel for
the petitioners contended that
a suit in O.S.No.533 of 2009 on the file of the I Junior Civil Judge, City Civil
Court, Secunderabad, in fact was filed by the petitioners herein seeking for
perpetual injunction against the 2nd respondent.  However, the petitioners have
not obtained temporary injunction orders in their favour.

        4. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that
the dispute is purely a civil dispute and that the FIR consequently is liable to
be quashed. 
As rightly submitted by Sri K.Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing the
Public Prosecutor, the pendency of a civil suit is no bar for criminal
proceedings.
The 2nd respondent initiated criminal proceedings under Sections 420, 427, 454
and 506 IPC.  The dispute, as already pointed out by me, can be resolved through
evidence only.  Consequently, this petition deserves to be dismissed.

        5. However, in view of the bona fide contention of the petitioners, I
consider it appropriate to exempt the petitioners from appearing before the
Criminal Court till charge-sheet is laid.

        6. Accordingly, this petition is found to be devoid of merits and is
dismissed.  The petitioners, however, are exempted from appearing before the
Criminal Court till charge-sheet is filed.
___________________  
K.G.SHANKAR, J.  
23rd August, 2012.

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